Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Terrapin Station]

So what would an illusion that's not a mental phenomenon amount to? What is having or experiencing the illusion?

Not sure what you're getting at. People experience auditory or visual illusions when their brains misfire for any number of reasons.

I suppose my question is: what do you think has or experiences anything - never mind illusions?

First, we don't have an illusion unless we have (a) the way something appears to be versus (b) the way something really is.

So if we're going to say that mind is an illusion, we're saying that mind appears to obtain, but that's not what's really the case.

The problem with this is that the appearance part of illusions is to minds--to Joe's (conscious) mental experience, for example, there appears to be a large puddle of water on the hot road ahead, but there's not really a large puddle of water on the hot road ahead.

Well, if we're going to say that Joe's mental experience is an illusion, then we need to be saying that (a) Joe appears to have mental experiences, but (b) Joe does not really have mental experiences.

But if that's what we're saying, then just what it would be that's "receiving" the appearance of Joe having a mental experience? We can't say that it's Joe's mental experience that "receives" this, because in that case, Joe has mental experiences and mental experiences aren't illusory after all. So it has to be something else that we're saying receives the faulty appearance. Just what are we saying receives that?

Re your question, there are different popular senses of "experience." So it depends on what sense we're talking about. But often, there's a connotation of experiences being first-person awareness of phenomena. That's a set of brain states, the set of brain states that from the spatio-temporal reference point of being the brain in question, we call mental states, or "mind."

[Sy Borg]

There is only one way to make morality objective, and that is to know every single knock-on effect of every event. Each "good" claimed by any person or group simply refers to a geographical and temporal span. If you know what will ultimately bring the greatest good, not in 10 years' time or 100 years' time, but a thousand or a million years' time.

Due to the unpredictable nature of chaos, relatively minor events can occasionally have huge and lasting knock-on effects due to the particular time and circumstance in which they occurred. By contrast, some major events are largely washed away by history. So how can we ultimately know what's best?

Our morality is ultimately a practical tool for ordering societies and, in terms of " the truth", it is pure guesswork.

[Terrapin Station]

There is only one way to make morality objective, and that is to know every single knock-on effect of every event. Each "good" claimed by any person or group simply refers to a geographical and temporal span. If you know what will ultimately bring the greatest good, not in 10 years' time or 100 years' time, but a thousand or a million years' time.

Even if you could do that, how would you get past the fact that whether anything is "good" is still a mental assessment that individuals have to make?

There's no way to get past that fact.

[GE Morton]

The conceptual tangle in this explanation demonstrates my point. You say 'the mind' is a name for (a term denoting) 'the subjective experience of a sentient creature, and the conscious processing of that experience'. Why not just talk about the experience?

Because "experience" is ambiguous. It can refer to something objective ("I have 10 years experience as a journeyman plumber"), or to a subjective, inner sensation or event. Hence the adjective (fairly standard in the philosophy of mind).

Why invent 'a hypothetical, immaterial 'organ'? What use is this 'descriptive construct'?

Because it provides a unity and locus for conscious phenomena; a conceptual/descriptive framework for discussing those phenomena. "Minds" are immaterial analogs of bodies, allowing description using similar syntactic structures. It is term of linguistic convenience.

And is experience anything other than subjective? What might objective experience be?

Answered above. But there are many other examples: "Skydiving: the experience of a lifetime!," ""Everyone I know has had bad experiences with that company." Etc.

And what about the unconscious processing of experience? Does the mind do that too?

Yep. The "subconscious mind" (a somewhat paradoxical term, but analogous to non-conscious bodily processes).

And, given our denial of substance-dualism, we agree there are only electro-chemical processes going on in our brains. So what is it that mental talk describes?

It denotes any of the distinct sensations, impressions, feelings, thoughts, beliefs, etc., that someone may be experiencing. But it doesn't describe them very well. E.g., no description will tell Mary what "red" will look like when she encounters it for the first time.

(Here is a link to Frank Jackson's famous paper):

https://watermark.silverchair.com/pq32- ... nHeWMQ0AWE

And what are the 'subjective aspects' of 'subjective experience' (?) that can't, even in principle, be described?

What can't be described are any phenomena denoted with "qualia" terms --- terms for colors, odors, tastes, tactile sensations, or terms for feelings or emotional states. They can't be described in a way that will allow someone who has never experienced them to visualize them or recognize them on presentation. I can describe, say, a certain house on a certain street in such a way that you can visualize it and recognize it when you see it. But I can't describe to Mary what red will look like, what cinnamon will smell like, or what feeling sad will feel like. Such description is impossible because those properties are perceptual primitives. All description consists in attaching predicates (properties) to subjects (objects). But those primitives have no properties; they are unitary, simple, and unique. They are properties. The terms for them are the terms from which all description begins.

Not only does talk of the mind and mental things and events have no descriptive utility . . .

Really? You're prepared to abandon such constructions as, "My mind's made up," "He's out of his mind," "She suffered a mental breakdown," etc.?

- it suckers us into the metaphysical delusions that have plagued philosophy - and not just philosophy of mind - for centuries. But, of course, we happily use such talk every day utterly unaware of the philosophical mess that taking such talk seriously causes.

Well, I agree there. So its up to us philosophers to slay those metaphysical hobgoblins whenever they sneak into the conversation.

Then how is it possible for us to describe any thoughts, feelings or sensations? Is your 'descriptive construct' completely useless? In what way is 'the quality of a feeling' different from a feeling? More furkling down the rabbit hole.

As above, we can denote them, but not describe them in an informative way. Sure, we can speak of, say, "bright red" or "dark red." That tells the hearer that the patch of color referred to emits or reflects more or less light. But it tells him nothing about what "red" is. Or we can speak of mild pains or severe pains. That tells the hearer that pains have variable intensities. But it tells him nothing about what pain feels like.

I'm sorry, but if you can't be sure other people have minds, but may be zombies or computer-generated constructs, then you have no reason to be sure what you're experiencing isn't also an illusion - that your 'mind' is real. After all, you think it's merely a descriptive construct.

Of course I do. I experience those "mental" phenomena directly. As Descartes pointed out, I cannot deny that I am thinking, and there is something doing that thinking. Even if some (or all) of my thoughts are illusions, I can't deny that I'm having them. But I can't experience your thoughts or illusions directly. I can know of them only by inference (a compelling and useful inference, but still an inference).

[Sy Borg]

There is only one way to make morality objective, and that is to know every single knock-on effect of every event. Each "good" claimed by any person or group simply refers to a geographical and temporal span. If you know what will ultimately bring the greatest good, not in 10 years' time or 100 years' time, but a thousand or a million years' time.

Even if you could do that, how would you get past the fact that whether anything is "good" is still a mental assessment that individuals have to make?

There's no way to get past that fact.

Yes, "good for whom?" is always the question.Ultimately, morality is a frippery born of prosperity. If you and another mother's babies are almost dead and there's just enough food to save one, what is the moral thing to do?

[GE Morton]

There is only one way to make morality objective, and that is to know every single knock-on effect of every event.

Wrong in two respects. That would require omniscience. Objectivity has nothing to do with omniscience, and morality doesn't require it.

Objective and subjective are properties of propositions. A proposition is objective if it has public truth conditions. If a proposition asserting a moral principle or rule has public truth conditions it is objective.

Each "good" claimed by any person or group simply refers to a geographical and temporal span. If you know what will ultimately bring the greatest good, not in 10 years' time or 100 years' time, but a thousand or a million years' time.

Wrong again. What is good is for each agent to define and decide. There is no universal "greatest good," at a given instant or over a million years. Morality is not concerned with presuming or defining "the good." It is concerned with enabling each person to secure whatever he or she deems to be good.

So how can we ultimately know what's best?

What is "ultimately best" is a meaningless phrase.

Thanks for dragging this thread back on-topic!

[Terrapin Station]

Objective and subjective are properties of propositions. A proposition is objective if it has public truth conditions.

That doesn't work as the distinction because a proposition can't have public truth conditions.

Morality is not concerned with presuming or defining "the good."

Aspect of morality are concerned with that, and it's often been a major focus. For example, what the good is is a big part of the Nicomachean Ethics.

[Sy Borg]

There is only one way to make morality objective, and that is to know every single knock-on effect of every event.

Wrong in two respects. That would require omniscience. Objectivity has nothing to do with omniscience, and morality doesn't require it.

Objective and subjective are properties of propositions. A proposition is objective if it has public truth conditions. If a proposition asserting a moral principle or rule has public truth conditions it is objective.

Actually, objective morality does require omniscience. That is exactly the point. You are just referring the popular subjective moralities. If you said that, practically, popular subjective morality is as good as it gets for us humans at the moment, then I'd agree. It's possible that AI may one day be able to calculate moral import to a fair extent.

Each "good" claimed by any person or group simply refers to a geographical and temporal span. If you know what will ultimately bring the greatest good, not in 10 years' time or 100 years' time, but a thousand or a million years' time.

Wrong again. What is good is for each agent to define and decide. There is no universal "greatest good," at a given instant or over a million years. Morality is not concerned with presuming or defining "the good." It is concerned with enabling each person to secure whatever he or she deems to be good.

People deciding what they think is good is not actually "objective morality". That is the definition of subjective reality.

So how can we ultimately know what's best?

What is "ultimately best" is a meaningless phrase.

Not to me. I like to look VERY long term - right up to how it ends for humans and the biosphere. Here are some possibilities.

1. Humans die out and take the rest of the complex biosphere with them.
2. Humans die out, leaving enough ecosystems undamaged for evolution to begin again at a fairly advanced level.
3. Humans bifurcate, with the wealthy going on to meld (or be replaced by) with machines and start new colonies space while the rest of humanity regresses due to lack of resources.
4. Humans create a balance between themselves and nature.

No doubt there are other possibilities but, in the end, if we are to seek objective morality (in the philosophical sense, not just a practical, social or political sense) then we need the largest possible frame.

What do we make of the desirability of these? The likelihood? The direction we are heading? (For the record, my own answers would be that #4 and #3 are the most desirable, that #1 and #3 are most likely.

It means considering questions such as "What is the point of life?" or "What is the point of humanity?" in the same sense as one might as "What is the point of a larvae?" or "What is the point of a pupa?". It means considering the broader dynamics.

Thanks for dragging this thread back on-topic!

I like it. Usually people (rightly) complain that I focus on tangential issues.

[GE Morton]

Objective and subjective are properties of propositions. A proposition is objective if it has public truth conditions.

That doesn't work as the distinction because a proposition can't have public truth conditions.

"Paris is the capital of France" is a proposition. It is objective because its truth conditions --- it is the place where the Assembly meets, where government departments have their principal offices, etc. --- are public (verifiable by any suitably situated person). I suppose you disagree because you have adopted some spurious, idiosyncratic definition of "proposition." You need to use that term as is commonly understood in the philosophical literature.

Morality is not concerned with presuming or defining "the good."

Aspect of morality are concerned with that, and it's often been a major focus. For example, what the good is is a big part of the Nicomachean Ethics.

Yes. Confounding axiology (the theory of value) with deontology (theory of moral principles and rules) has been a perennial problem in the history of philosophy. Those are separate issues and need to be addressed separately. Failure to do so is a major reason for the chaotic state of moral philosophy.

[Terrapin Station]

"Paris is the capital of France" is a proposition. It is objective because its truth conditions --- it is the place where the Assembly meets, where government departments have their principal offices, etc. --- are public

If someone is using correspondence theory, part of what they're presumably looking at is "public" data when they're judging whether a proposition is true or not.

This does not imply that the truth conditions are public. What it means for a proposition to be true is that someone has a meaning in mind, and they're making a mental judgment about the way their meaning connects with facts from their perspective. The facts in question can be facts that are external to their mind, but the mere fact that that's the case doesn't make the truth conditions public. The truth condition is the judgment the person makes about the relation of the proposition to the facts.That judgment isn't public.

(verifiable by any suitably situated person).

"Suitably situated" in whose judgment?

I suppose you disagree because you have adopted some spurious, idiosyncratic definition of "proposition."

There's nothing idiosyncratic about the definition of proposition that I use. Propositions are the meanings of declarative sentences.

[Terrapin Station]

I forgot to add above that of course not everyone uses correspondence theory, or at least not for every proposition.

[GE Morton]

If someone is using correspondence theory, part of what they're presumably looking at is "public" data when they're judging whether a proposition is true or not.

This does not imply that the truth conditions are public.

Yes, it does. The truth conditions for a proposition are the observable states-of-affairs-in-the-world which, if they obtain, make the proposition true.

What it means for a proposition to be true is that someone has a meaning in mind, and they're making a mental judgment about the way their meaning connects with facts from their perspective.

Nope. The truth of a proposition has nothing to do with anything "in people's heads." "Paris is the capital of France" is true no matter what anyone thinks or what idiosyncratic meanings someone may attach to any word (as long as the state-of-affairs asserted by the proposition obtains). If Alfie disagrees it is because he doesn't understand the proposition, perhaps because he is not fluent in English.

You need to scrap this notion of yours that meanings are "things in people's heads." As I've pointed out, that thesis leads to a reductio ad absurdum.

The facts in question can be facts that are external to their mind, but the mere fact that that's the case doesn't make the truth conditions public.

Yes, it does.

The truth condition is the judgment the person makes about the relation of the proposition to the facts.That judgment isn't public.

If Alfie understands English he knows that relation implicitly. That is precisely what understanding a language means. No judgment on his part is required or relevant.

"Suitably situated" in whose judgment?

No one's. No judgment is involved. Either Alfie is or is not in a position to make the required observation.

There's nothing idiosyncratic about the definition of proposition that I use. Propositions are the meanings of declarative sentences.

The meaning of a declarative sentence is the state of affairs it asserts, i.e., its truth condition. "Snow is white" and "Der schnee ist weiss" have the same meaning, because they assert the same state of affairs. What may be in anyone's head is irrelevant.

[GE Morton]

Actually, objective morality does require omniscience.

Well, we've had this discussion before. You want to endow "objective" with some sort of transcendental implications, i.e., that it means sub specie aeternitatis, or "from God's point of view," or something along those lines. But in common usage it has no such implications. It simply denotes a proposition whose truth conditions are public. E.g., "Paris is the capital of France" is an objective proposition. "Paris is beautiful" is a subjective one. No metaphysical assumptions are involved, and none are implied.

Morality is objective to the extent propositions asserting moral principles have public truth conditions, just as for any other category of propositions.

Wrong again. What is good is for each agent to define and decide. There is no universal "greatest good," at a given instant or over a million years. Morality is not concerned with presuming or defining "the good." It is concerned with enabling each person to secure whatever he or she deems to be good.

People deciding what they think is good is not actually "objective morality". That is the definition of subjective reality.

People deciding what they think is good is not morality at all. Morality is concerned with human actions, whether they are right or wrong, not with values. What people value --- what they deem good or bad --- is indeed subjective, but irrelevant to morality. How they go about securing those things they deem good is the subject matter of morality.

What is "ultimately best" is a meaningless phrase.

Not to me. I like to look VERY long term - right up to how it ends for humans and the biosphere. Here are some possibilities . . .

Well, those are matters of concern to you. But they are not matters of concern to everyone, and among those to whom they are matters of concern their priority among their other concerns differs. But what people are variously concerned about is not a moral issue. It is what they do about their concerns that can raise moral issues.

It means considering questions such as "What is the point of life?" or "What is the point of humanity?" in the same sense as one might as "What is the point of a larvae?" or "What is the point of a pupa?". It means considering the broader dynamics.

Ah, your transcendentalism is showing again. I take it that by "having a point" you mean "having a purpose." But only sentient creatures can sensibly be said to have purposes. The universe is not a sentient creature; natural phenomena have no purposes. People do, which differ from person to person.

[Sy Borg]

Actually, objective morality does require omniscience.

Well, we've had this discussion before. You want to endow "objective" with some sort of transcendental implications, i.e., that it means sub specie aeternitatis, or "from God's point of view," or something along those lines. But in common usage it has no such implications. It simply denotes a proposition whose truth conditions are public. E.g., "Paris is the capital of France" is an objective proposition. "Paris is beautiful" is a subjective one. No metaphysical assumptions are involved, and none are implied.

Morality is objective to the extent propositions asserting moral principles have public truth conditions, just as for any other category of propositions.

What I said had nothing whatsoever to do with metaphysics. Please try again, and reply to what I wrote, not what you wished I had written.

People deciding what they think is good is not actually "objective morality". That is the definition of subjective reality.

People deciding what they think is good is not morality at all. Morality is concerned with human actions, whether they are right or wrong, not with values. What people value --- what they deem good or bad --- is indeed subjective, but irrelevant to morality. How they go about securing those things they deem good is the subject matter of morality.

That's what you said, not me. I just refuted the idea that any person or groups of people can determine an objective morality. It will always be skewed, always subjective.

This is logically indisputable.

[Peter Holmes]

GE Morton wrote:

'Morality is objective to the extent propositions asserting moral principles have public truth conditions, just as for any other category of propositions.'

What are the public truth conditions for the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong'? What, independent from opinion, would make that true, the absence of which would make it false?