Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Terrapin Station]

No, we don’t get any kind of dualism. Recognizing that the same informational object can exist across different physical mediums just makes us aware of a feature of objective reality. It does not require us to engage in metaphysics.

"X is a feature of objective reality" IS metaphysics.

[Atla]

And his eliminative materialist followers tend to think that people who claim otherwise are just crazy.

Exhibit number 223 demonstrating that on a deeply fundamental level, you just don’t understand Dennett’s views--he has vehemently attacked eliminative materialism as incoherent and incompatible with his theories of intentionality.

But I’m sure you’ll never let objective facts get in your way when it comes to him.

You really seem to be under the misunderstanding that Dennett doesn't keep contradicting himself all over the place.

[Atla]

This is simply not what Dennett says, it's what you want him to say.

Excuse me, cupcake, but I’ve forgotten more about Dennett’s work than you will ever bother to learn, and I see quite plainly how his comments about information consistently tie in with ideas in his other work.

I know what he believes. You absolutely do not. You will start being a serious philosopher when you begin to deal with genuine content instead of made up versions of people you disagree with.

If information is always registered by a physical state of some sort, because information is an abstraction about that physical state, then either information isn't real in the sense that matter/energy are real, or information IS matter/energy.

Dennett doesn’t care about establishing degrees of reality and thinks philosophers who are concerned with that sort of thing are wasting their time. Information is as real as money, marriage, contracts, and Wall Street in his view. Real enough to matter, and that’s enough.

Here's an analogy. Let's look at 5 apples, what can we say about them? Are the apples just as real, as the number 5 itself?
And if yes, then are we talking about 6 things now? Is that an objective fact that there are now 6 things?

Then when you can fit your conception of “phenomenal consciousness” into an evidence-based, reason-based approach to objective reality, let me know. Until then, as far as I’m concerned, you are essentially whining about materialism’s failure to address fairy dust and unicorns, issues we don’t care about.

Any evidence-based, reason-based approach acknowledges phenomenal consciousness as far as I'm concerned.

[Consul]

The important point in this thread is that the scientists have succeeded in identifying the natural place and source of phenomenal consciousness/subjective experience in the universe: animal brains!

When you have a Theory of Consciousness which can tell us the necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal experience, then we're talking.

We're talking already, because we have the insight that certain electrochemical mechanisms in animal brains are necessary and sufficient conditions as the starting point of the neuroscientific inquiry into consciousness.

[Consul]

And his eliminative materialist followers tend to think that people who claim otherwise are just crazy.

Exhibit number 223 demonstrating that on a deeply fundamental level, you just don’t understand Dennett’s views--he has vehemently attacked eliminative materialism as incoherent and incompatible with his theories of intentionality.
But I’m sure you’ll never let objective facts get in your way when it comes to him.

There is no doubt that Dennett denies the existence of phenomenal qualities (qualia) conceived as a type of intrinsic nonphysical properties sui generis; so if consciousness/experience is said to be constituted by or to include such special qualia, then he denies its existence. However, to reject a particular conception of consciousness/experience is not necessarily to deny its existence absolutely. In fact, he writes that…

QUOTE>
"I do not deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I grant moreover that each person's states of consciousness have properties in virtue of which those states have the experiential content that they do."

(Dennett, Daniel C. "Quining Qualia." 1988. Reprinted in The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, edited by Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Güven Güzeldere, 382-414. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997. p. 382)

"Consciousness exists, but just isn't what some folks think it is[.]"

(Dennett, Daniel C. From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2017. p. 223)
<QUOTE

On the other hand, critics have objected that the conception of consciousness/experience he accepts isn't really one of consciousness/experience but of something else, because consciousness/experience without subjective phenomenal/experiential qualia is nonconsciousness/nonexperience. Therefore, what Dennett calls consciousness/experience isn't properly called so by him. For example:

QUOTE>
"Dennett looking-glasses the term ‘consciousness’, where to looking-glass a term is to use it in such a way that whatever one means by it, it excludes what the term means."

(Strawson, Galen. "Intentionality and Experience: Terminological Preliminaries." 2005. Reprinted in Real Materialism and Other Essays, 255-280. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. p. 257)
<QUOTE

Here's his reply:

QUOTE>
"I have learned, however, that some people are so sure that they know what consciousness…would have to be to be real that they dismisss my claims as disingenuous: They claim I'm trying to palm off a cheap substitute for the real thing. For instance:
—
Of course the problem here is with the claim that consciousness is 'identical' to physical brain states. The more Dennett et al. try to explain to me what they mean by this, the more convinced I become that what they really mean is that consciousness doesn't exist.
(Wright 2000 [Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny], ch. 21, fn. 14)
…
—
According to my theories, consciousness is not a nonphysical phenomenon…, and by the lights of Wright…(and others), I ought to have the courage then to admit that neither consciousness nor free will really exists. (Perhaps I could soften the blow by being a 'fictionalist', insisting that they don't really exist but it is remarkably useful to act as they did.) I don't see why my critics think their understanding about what really exists is superior to mine, so I demur."

(Dennett, Daniel C. From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2017. pp. 223-4)
<QUOTE

[Consul]

No, he doesn't intend to dehumanize people in any way by denying phenomenal consciousness; and the reasons for his denial aren't political but philosophico-scientific ones. Comparing him to the Nazis is ludicrous!

I did not mean to imply that that was his intention. Maybe I should restate my comment. His dismissal of phenomenal consciousness (qualia) bothered me because of MY thoughts about the potential political and social consequences.

And let us be perfectly frank here, the people who learned how to split the atom were not trying to blow up Japan. The fact remains that denying phenomenal consciousness (qualia) in people is dehumanizing, and it is a tool that is frequently used in racism and when people choose to eradicate other people. It is also why we refuse to admit that other species are phenomenally conscious -- because we kill and eat them.

I did not compare him to Nazis, but I am sure that the Nazis would have liked the idea. What would be ludicrous would be comparing Dennett to the Christian Church as Dennett hates religion. We are not talking dismissive of religion, or dislikes religion, we are talking vehement hatred.

Regardless, Dennett's idea that he can deny phenomenal consciousness in humans is ridiculous. Do you want to know why? It is because Dennett would never deny his own rights, his own subjectivity, and his own experience/qualia. We always, always, deny other people's.

* First of all, Dennett doesn't deny that there seems to be phenomenal consciousness. He doesn't deny that he himself is labouring under "the illusion of phenomenality". (How there can be an introspective illusion of phenomenality without real phenomenality is another question.)

* If "denying phenomenal consciousness (qualia) in people is dehumanizing," then the denier is dehumanizing her-/himself too—which Dennett doesn't intend to do. The Nazis regarded the Jews as subhumans, but they certainly didn't regard themselves as subhumans. Dennett doesn't regard all others as phenomenal zombies and himself as the only phenomenal nonzombie.

* For example, Dennett would never say that torturing people is morally right because we are all phenomenal zombies.

[Steve3007]

The idea is this:

We don't know whether substratum independence (that is, consciousness arising out of different sorts of materials) works.

We know that brains, made out of the materials they're made out of, structured as they are, functioning as they function, amount to consciousness.

So, why not start by attempting to build artificial brains as literally as possible? The closer we can make an artificial brain to a natural brain, the more we can be sure that we've created something capable of consciousness. We might as well remove any source of uncertainty that we can regarding whether we've artificially built something that's conscious. Then once we've done that, we can experiment with just what we can change, to just what extent, where it still seems to be conscious. It's simply a matter of controlling our variables as much as we can. Begin with what we're sure works. Then gradually try changing different variables to different extents.

Yes, I see your point. You start with something that you're sure works and then gradually change it. When it stops working, you've learnt something about what it is that makes consciousness possible. The trouble is, I think this means you'd have to start by using a brain that has been made in the conventional way - i.e. using an actual functioning brain. I think it would be difficult to get support for that, at least in modern times.

[Terrapin Station]

The idea is this:

We don't know whether substratum independence (that is, consciousness arising out of different sorts of materials) works.

We know that brains, made out of the materials they're made out of, structured as they are, functioning as they function, amount to consciousness.

So, why not start by attempting to build artificial brains as literally as possible? The closer we can make an artificial brain to a natural brain, the more we can be sure that we've created something capable of consciousness. We might as well remove any source of uncertainty that we can regarding whether we've artificially built something that's conscious. Then once we've done that, we can experiment with just what we can change, to just what extent, where it still seems to be conscious. It's simply a matter of controlling our variables as much as we can. Begin with what we're sure works. Then gradually try changing different variables to different extents.

Yes, I see your point. You start with something that you're sure works and then gradually change it. When it stops working, you've learnt something about what it is that makes consciousness possible. The trouble is, I think this means you'd have to start by using a brain that has been made in the conventional way - i.e. using an actual functioning brain. I think it would be difficult to get support for that, at least in modern times.

The way I'd start is by trying to recreate the materials of brains artificially. Our bodies are just combinations of various molecules/chemicals. We'd need to start with something relatively simple, like trying to combine nucleic acids, lipids, proteins and carbohydrates into artificial RNA, and work our way up. The research involved with this would surely have other benefits, too.

[Steve3007]

Ok. Although you may find that the only way to do it is to put all those chemicals in a big jar and wait for 4.5 billion years.

[Terrapin Station]

Ok. Although you may find that the only way to do it is to put all those chemicals in a big jar and wait for 4.5 billion years.

Haha--that wouldn't work so well in that case, but I still think it would be worth the attempt. If for no other reason than the fact that it should have some positive upshots . . . kind of like how developing various things necessary to accommodate space travel resulted in a lot of technology with widespread practical benefits.

[Sy Borg]

Do we believe that neuroscientists are on the verge of solving the "hard problem", with current models being correct, with only a few details needed to work it all out?

I would say, “Yes, but there are a ton of details to work out”. Since the 1990’s we’ve had a growing consensus in the cognitive neuroscience community around the Global Neuronal Workspace model of consciousness, which already gives us a plane’s eye perspective on what consciousness is and how the brain achieves it. But there are huge technical details to work out, the binding problem being the biggest in my opinion. The general outline, however, is not ever likely to be overturned and replaced with something else, just supplemented.

For some philosophers, though, the so-called “hard problem” was purposely fashioned and designed to be completely untouchable by any form of known science ...

Your last claim is false. The "hard problem" was raised by David Chalmers, not as a secret theist agenda, but because it is a real conundrum. Processing v being. That is why neuroscientists have been trying all these years to work it out.

Not so long ago it was proclaimed that we had found the ultimate generator of consciousness - the claustrum. It was major news for a while. If you gave the claustrum an electric charge you could blank out consciousness, or bring it back again. It's essentially an on/off switch. If researchers are confusing on/off switches with generators, they are a long way from understanding what's going on.

There's an obvious test to check our progress. How close are we to being able to create a sense of being in our creations and precisely measure their internality? How much do we know about the subtle (but possibly potent) interdependencies between the brain and metabolic systems? If we do not know, and cannot achieve, these then we do not understand the nature of being.

So why do people commit so completely to this issue when there is so obviously insufficient evidence? Politics. Pushing theism or secularism. Each side will speak in detail about how there's plenty of evidence to support their position, but it's just spin. As per above, there is a practical test to determine our understanding and it's obvious that no one knows at this stage.

[Atla]

Not so long ago it was proclaimed that we had found the ultimate generator of consciousness - the claustrum. It was major news for a while. If you gave the claustrum an electric charge you could blank out consciousness, or bring it back again. It's essentially an on/off switch. If researchers are confusing on/off switches with generators, they are a long way from understanding what's going on.

Even that is highly suspect, the claustrum is probably neither a generator, nor an on/off switch for individual consciousness. It probably just integrates various content from all over the brain into a unified, singular experience. And this may be a two-way communication between the unified experience and the outlying brain regions. Once we give it an electric shock, this process is probably inhibited and we turn into a plant.

[Gertie]

Right, as I recall Dennett makes this 'aboutness' distinction between beliefs and desires(intentional states), and qualia, which he has a different approach to. Yes?

I’d say his way of dealing with qualia is on a spectrum that is consistent with his approach to intentionality. Remember, he doesn’t think that qualia as conceived by most philosophers even exist, or that the concept is confused and worth tossing, which is essentially the same thing.

If we're interested in consciousness, why wouldn't we care about experiential mental states and their correlated brain states?

Do you need to look inside of someone’s brain to tell if they are sad or mad, happy or amused? Of course not. If you want to understand the mechanisms that lead to those states., yes, but here Dennett is not concerned with a scientific understanding of intentional states, just what they are in ordinary human existence, where science is literally irrelevant for you to ascribe those states to another person.

OK, so he's saying intentional states, beliefs, are physically 'instantiated' in this particularly complicated way, which means no two people's beliefs will be instantiated identically in any two people, therefore phenomenal mental intentional states can't be reducible to their physical correlates?

Yes.

I don't see how the 'therefore...' follows, if I've understood you correctly. Not being identically reducible in others, doesn't mean not reducible in each individual.

He’s operating according to the strict, technical definition of what counts as a reduction, which requires a law like or logical relation which solidly and reliably links one set of vocabularies to matching terms in another vocabulary. I mean, almost nothing reduces when you raise the bar so high, so saying mental states don’t reduce isn’t saying much.

This still puzzles me. Why not say a successful theory of consciousness will explain the How and Why of phenomenal mental states?

Because science is done from a third person perspective, and the only evidence you’ll ever be able to study about those states are the descriptions of subjects using language or following instructions (like “press the button when you see a color word”). So once you’ve been able to establish causal chains inside of their bodies leading to those motor activities, you are done and there is nothing left to explain.

Is it just because we can't observe other people's mental states, only their behaviour and reports, so hey lets not worry about it?

I think he would say that the observable behaviors (including nervous system activities) are the only evidence you have of a mental state and that’s all you need to explain.

I doubt the objections need spelling out to you, and personally this approach and the way he presents it really annoys me. I don't get why some people find it satisfying, unless they are simply bedazzled by his rhetorical style (which I find frustratingly slippery and torturous) and the intriguing winding paths he leads us down.

Why do you find it more satisfying than Chalmers' approach which identifies similar problems with formulating a Theory of Consciousness, but says in essence this means we have to look deeper, rather than 'explain away' phenomenal experience?

[Faustus5]

"X is a feature of objective reality" IS metaphysics.

I kind of knew that when I wrote that sentence, but I thought I could get away with it. I think you know what I was driving at, though.

[Faustus5]

You really seem to be under the misunderstanding that Dennett doesn't keep contradicting himself all over the place.
[/quote]

Yes, I understand that to someone who essentially doesn't have a clue about what Dennett really believes, this might seem to be the case. You could easily prove me wrong by providing two statement in his own words that directly contradict each other, but we both know that would require levels of scholarship you aren't going to bother with.