Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Terrapin Station]

The source of the belief=the place where the belief occurs/arises. It's where the belief, as a belief, is found.

Er, no. I found my lost watch under a sofa cushion. But the sofa was not its source. Dogs are found in kennels. But they are not their source. "Source," in most cases, denotes origin or cause.

I wrote the word "arises." That's not origin?

So you're arguing that the origin of a belief could be Paris? Where in Paris, exactly, would the belief originate?

"Definition of source (Entry 1 of 3)
"1a: a generative force : CAUSE
"b(1): a point of origin or procurement : BEGINNING"

So you want to argue that the belief begins in Paris. Again, what parts of Paris amount to the belief beginning?

Use the word "source" correctly and it will answer your question.

No such thing as "correct" word usage. There's conventional word usage, but it's not incorrect to be unconventional. You'd have to be a wicked conformist to think something like that.

[GE Morton]

That's true. But no amount of thinking about will give us the answer. That will require an observation of something external.

Sure. But what you're observing isn't identical to the thought that amounts to the answer (the meaning, the associations in question).

I didn't say it was.

The pointing hand can't do this itself. You need to observe it and THINK about it.

That is a given (though very little thinking is required). But my thinking about it doesn't give me the answer to, "What does 'dog' mean to Alfie?" His behavior gives me that answer. I can then say, "The meaning of 'dog' to Alfie is . . . [points to a dog]. The animal pointed to, and other members of the species, is the meaning of "dog" to Alfie.

Meanings are not mental phenomena; they are publicly determinable conventions for the uses of words--- vectors linking words to objects or other distinguishable features of percepts. One can use words correctly (consistently with the conventions) or incorrectly (as you did above with "source"). The correct meaning of any substantive word is the class of objects, properties, or actions/events it denotes, per those conventions. Your knowledge of the meaning of "dog" is a mental phenomenon, but the meaning is not; it is external to you, public, and objective (which fact allows us to say, "You're using that word incorrectly").

Re the comment about me stating a contradiction, I answered a question about As, Bs and Cs, and then I stated that not everything is an A, B, or C. How would that be contradictory? It's not contradictory to say As, Bs and Cs have property F, but not everything is an A, B or C, so not everything has property F.

In your first answer you agreed that "what is determined, believed is a mental event." Then in the second you said, "The world doesn't consist solely of judgments, beliefs, etc."

What is determined or believed is not a mental phenomenon; it is a state of affairs in the world. The belief is a mental phenomenon, but what is believed is not. So your two answers are contradictory.

[Terrapin Station]

That is a given (though very little thinking is required). But my thinking about it doesn't give me the answer to, "What does 'dog' mean to Alfie?" His behavior gives me that answer.

His behavior alone can not give you that answer. In order for his behavior along to give you that answer his behavior has to be the answer wholesale, and then you simply receive it as you'd receive a letter or something.

You have to THINK ABOUT his behavior. His behavior alone is just a motion of a limb or whatever. If you have a machine like a video camera capture that, it doesn't capture (and then know) what something means to someone else (to use that inexact turn of phrase). A mind is required to THINK ABOUT the behavior and make a judgment about it, make an association, etc.

[Terrapin Station]

Instead of "intentionality is the mark of the mental" it seems like you want to say that "Intentionality is the mark of everything, including abstract things like 'the city of Paris.'"

[GE Morton]

I wrote the word "arises." That's not origin?

The origin of a belief is not a place (except for beliefs about places). It is the state of affairs giving rise to the belief, that caused that belief to form in your mind, and which can be encoded in a proposition stating the belief.

So you're arguing that the origin of a belief could be Paris? Where in Paris, exactly, would the belief originate?

"In" Paris?

I think we've exhausted this discussion.

[Terrapin Station]

I wrote the word "arises." That's not origin?

The origin of a belief is not a place (except for beliefs about places). It is the state of affairs giving rise to the belief, that caused that belief to form in your mind, and which can be encoded in a proposition stating the belief.

The origin of everything is a place--a location. Nothing exists "outside" of a location. Places ARE states of affairs. Some locations are complex and discontinuous, but nevertheless they're locations.

So you're arguing that the origin of a belief could be Paris? Where in Paris, exactly, would the belief originate?

"In" Paris?

I think we've exhausted this discussion.

Again, everything, including beliefs, has a location.

[GE Morton]

One problem with referring to anything as 'mental' is that what we call the mind and mental things and events are misleading metaphysical fictions.

They're not fictions; they're useful descriptive constructs. And they're only misleading if one imputes various metaphysical/ontological fictions to them. I doubt either you or I would be misled by such statements as, "I've made up my mind," "A mind is a terrible thing to waste," "That man is mentally unhinged," etc.

What and where are the mind and mental things and events?

Mental events are "in minds." Minds are in brains.

What can it mean to say I know I have a pain, a thought or a sensation? What is the self that experiences these things? What is the consciousness to which a nervous system 'presents' sensations?

Ah, many thorny and unsettled questions in the philosophy of mind. But answers to those questions aren't necessary for those terms to be useful, and informative, in most conversations.

In what way are we shut in a private world? The ways we talk about ourselves are all public, because language is a social phenomenon. I think your argument about what and where meaning 'goes on' is evidence for the conceptual confusion I'm talking about.

We are shut in because (as I said before) no one but me can know by acquaintance my thoughts or feelings, or even the subjective values of "qualia" words. They can only know of those indirectly, via my verbal descriptions, which are never complete, or behaviors, which are never conclusive. (No verbal description ever completely describes anything). But "shut in" is perhaps too strong a claim. We can communicate, but "through a glass darkly," to to speak.

Do we think other primates and mammals are cut off from each other and their environments in private worlds? And if not, why not?

Presumably. But I cannot be "absolutely" sure you have a mind, much less other primates. But I can be reasonably sure, for both you and the primates. (There is an extensive literature on the "zombie" issue).

[Peter Holmes]

One problem with referring to anything as 'mental' is that what we call the mind and mental things and events are misleading metaphysical fictions.

They're not fictions; they're useful descriptive constructs. And they're only misleading if one imputes various metaphysical/ontological fictions to them. I doubt either you or I would be misled by such statements as, "I've made up my mind," "A mind is a terrible thing to waste," "That man is mentally unhinged," etc.

Agreed - our conversations are shot-through with 'mental' talk, which is always easily paraphrased to remove the words involved. The fictionalising begins when we take it seriously and do philosophy of mind and psychology.

What and where are the mind and mental things and events?

Mental events are "in minds." Minds are in brains.

QED: 'metaphysical/ontological fictions'. Any equivocation on 'in' here? Are minds in brains in the way that brains are in skulls?

What can it mean to say I know I have a pain, a thought or a sensation? What is the self that experiences these things? What is the consciousness to which a nervous system 'presents' sensations?

Ah, many thorny and unsettled questions in the philosophy of mind. But answers to those questions aren't necessary for those terms to be useful, and informative, in most conversations.

The reason why they are thorny and unsettled questions in the philosophy of mind is precisely the one I stated: minds and mental things and events are misleading metaphysical fictions.

In what way are we shut in a private world? The ways we talk about ourselves are all public, because language is a social phenomenon. I think your argument about what and where meaning 'goes on' is evidence for the conceptual confusion I'm talking about.

We are shut in because (as I said before) no one but me can know by acquaintance my thoughts or feelings, or even the subjective values of "qualia" words. They can only know of those indirectly, via my verbal descriptions, which are never complete, or behaviors, which are never conclusive. (No verbal description ever completely describes anything). But "shut in" is perhaps too strong a claim. We can communicate, but "through a glass darkly," to to speak.

How do we learn the meanings of the words we use to talk about our thoughts, feelings and sensations?

Do we think other primates and mammals are cut off from each other and their environments in private worlds? And if not, why not?

Presumably. But I cannot be "absolutely" sure you have a mind, much less other primates. But I can be reasonably sure, for both you and the primates. (There is an extensive literature on the "zombie" issue).

So you also can't be absolutely sure you have a mind either. If the mind is a thing we 'have', it's also a thing we may not 'have'. More metaphysical/ontological/fictional nonsense.

[Terrapin Station]

The reason why they are thorny and unsettled questions in the philosophy of mind is precisely the one I stated: minds and mental things and events are misleading metaphysical fictions.

Why would it be any more of a "fiction" than something like "cloud" or "riptide"?

[GE Morton]

Mental events are "in minds." Minds are in brains.

QED: 'metaphysical/ontological fictions'. Any equivocation on 'in' here? Are minds in brains in the way that brains are in skulls?

The "mind" is conventional term for denoting the subjective experience of a sentient creature, and the conscious processing of that experience. It is a descriptive construct --- a hypothetical, immaterial "organ" wherein that processing occurs. It only becomes a fiction when it is accorded an ontological status other than a descriptive construct. Some of that experience could be described in physiological terms, but most of it (so far) cannot, and the subjective aspects of it cannot be described in principle; they can be known only by acquaintance.

The reason why they are thorny and unsettled questions in the philosophy of mind is precisely the one I stated: minds and mental things and events are misleading metaphysical fictions.

Well, the task for the philosophy of mind is purge that vocabulary of its metaphysical baggage without abandoning its descriptive utility.

How do we learn the meanings of the words we use to talk about our thoughts, feelings and sensations?

In the conventional way --- by observing how others use them. But no possible verbal description can convey the subjective quality of a feeling or percept (think of Jackson's "Mary the color scientist" scenario). That quality is ineffable, but is quite real.

So you also can't be absolutely sure you have a mind either.

Of course I can. I understand what the word denotes --- subjective experience, etc. --- and know I have those; I experience them directly. But that you have them can only be an inference I draw from your behavior (similarly with some other animals).

[Peter Holmes]

QED: 'metaphysical/ontological fictions'. Any equivocation on 'in' here? Are minds in brains in the way that brains are in skulls?

The "mind" is conventional term for denoting the subjective experience of a sentient creature, and the conscious processing of that experience. It is a descriptive construct --- a hypothetical, immaterial "organ" wherein that processing occurs. It only becomes a fiction when it is accorded an ontological status other than a descriptive construct. Some of that experience could be described in physiological terms, but most of it (so far) cannot, and the subjective aspects of it cannot be described in principle; they can be known only by acquaintance.

The conceptual tangle in this explanation demonstrates my point. You say 'the mind' is a name for (a term denoting) 'the subjective experience of a sentient creature, and the conscious processing of that experience'. Why not just talk about the experience? Why invent 'a hypothetical, immaterial 'organ'? What use is this 'descriptive construct'?

And is experience anything other than subjective? What might objective experience be? And what about the unconscious processing of experience? Does the mind do that too? And, given our denial of substance-dualism, we agree there are only electro-chemical processes going on in our brains. So what is it that mental talk describes? And what are the 'subjective aspects' of 'subjective experience' (?) that can't, even in principle, be described? Why are they different from the other aspects (?) of subjective experience that this supposedly useful descriptive construct can describe?

And so on. I'm not trying to be difficult - but this is a mess.

The reason why they are thorny and unsettled questions in the philosophy of mind is precisely the one I stated: minds and mental things and events are misleading metaphysical fictions.

Well, the task for the philosophy of mind is purge that vocabulary of its metaphysical baggage without abandoning its descriptive utility.

Not only does talk of the mind and mental things and events have no descriptive utility - it suckers us into the metaphysical delusions that have plagued philosophy - and not just philosophy of mind - for centuries. But, of course, we happily use such talk every day utterly unaware of the philosophical mess that taking such talk seriously causes.

How do we learn the meanings of the words we use to talk about our thoughts, feelings and sensations?

In the conventional way --- by observing how others use them. But no possible verbal description can convey the subjective quality of a feeling or percept (think of Jackson's "Mary the color scientist" scenario). That quality is ineffable, but is quite real.

Delete the redundant 'subjective', and we're left with 'the quality of a feeling or percept', which you say is 'ineffable'. Then how is it possible for us to describe any thoughts, feelings or sensations? Is your 'descriptive construct' completely useless? In what way is 'the quality of a feeling' different from a feeling? More furkling down the rabbit hole.

So you also can't be absolutely sure you have a mind either.

Of course I can. I understand what the word denotes --- subjective experience, etc. --- and know I have those; I experience them directly. But that you have them can only be an inference I draw from your behavior (similarly with some other animals).

I'm sorry, but if you can't be sure other people have minds, but may be zombies or computer-generated constructs, then you have no reason to be sure what you're experiencing isn't also an illusion - that your 'mind' is real. After all, you think it's merely a descriptive construct.

[Terrapin Station]

I'm sorry, but if you can't be sure other people have minds, but may be zombies or computer-generated constructs, then you have no reason to be sure what you're experiencing isn't also an illusion - that your 'mind' is real. After all, you think it's merely a descriptive construct.

It would make zero sense to say that mental phenomena are an illusion. What would an illusion that's not a mental phenomenon amount to anyway?

[Peter Holmes]

I'm sorry, but if you can't be sure other people have minds, but may be zombies or computer-generated constructs, then you have no reason to be sure what you're experiencing isn't also an illusion - that your 'mind' is real. After all, you think it's merely a descriptive construct.

It would make zero sense to say that mental phenomena are an illusion. What would an illusion that's not a mental phenomenon amount to anyway?

Erm. I think it makes no sense to talk about mental phenomena, full stop. I don't think we have minds that cut us off from each other, or that mean we can only 'see' each other through a glass darkly. The ancient dualist doctrine of the mind and mental things and events has had its day, and caused enough intellectual and emotional damage. Because of our physiology and evolution as social primates, we share our 'selves' - which is why we can express our thoughts, feelings and sensations with language - as we're doing here. The idea that I can't be sure anyone else has a mind is an absurdity.

[Terrapin Station]

It would make zero sense to say that mental phenomena are an illusion. What would an illusion that's not a mental phenomenon amount to anyway?

Erm. I think it makes no sense to talk about mental phenomena, full stop. I don't think we have minds that cut us off from each other, or that mean we can only 'see' each other through a glass darkly. The ancient dualist doctrine of the mind and mental things and events has had its day, and caused enough intellectual and emotional damage. Because of our physiology and evolution as social primates, we share our 'selves' - which is why we can express our thoughts, feelings and sensations with language - as we're doing here. The idea that I can't be sure anyone else has a mind is an absurdity.

So what would an illusion that's not a mental phenomenon amount to? What is having or experiencing the illusion?

[Peter Holmes]

Erm. I think it makes no sense to talk about mental phenomena, full stop. I don't think we have minds that cut us off from each other, or that mean we can only 'see' each other through a glass darkly. The ancient dualist doctrine of the mind and mental things and events has had its day, and caused enough intellectual and emotional damage. Because of our physiology and evolution as social primates, we share our 'selves' - which is why we can express our thoughts, feelings and sensations with language - as we're doing here. The idea that I can't be sure anyone else has a mind is an absurdity.

So what would an illusion that's not a mental phenomenon amount to? What is having or experiencing the illusion?

Not sure what you're getting at. People experience auditory or visual illusions when their brains misfire for any number of reasons.

I suppose my question is: what do you think has or experiences anything - never mind illusions?