Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Consul]

Sorry, hit send. Related to the above post then....
'belonging to the subject matter of physics' seems to me a definition not based on substance, but rather based on what a certain portion of professionals focus on as part of their research. At any given moment we can look at that set of 'things' and try to come up with a description of the properties of that set of things. It seems like each generation of these professionals infers, measures, or determines that new 'things' are affecting what was previously considered the set of physical things. These new 'things' are then considered 'physical' because they affect physical things: that is, they affect matter, energy, measuring devices, or seem to be parts of 'things' already considered physical. It is not the properties of the 'things' but the affects.

If we are going to say that anything that affects the physical is physical, then we are not really saying that only a certain substance exists, but rather that we want effects we can reproduce that seem to be coming from something we have not be able to posit and verify before, before we can add it to the category physical (and the category real).

According to interactionist substance dualism, nonphysical souls (such as God) can affect physical things; so "is physical" cannot be defined in terms of "affects physical things".

Idealists my think that the physical emerges (or doesn't even emerge) from the non-physical. Until we know how far 'down' consciousness goes- with the panpsychists thinking 'all the way down' we cannot speak with full confidence about the direction of emergence. Of course many physicalists think we do know the direction of emergence.

As for the direction of emergence or reduction, physicalism is certainly incompatible with an idealistic/mentalistic worldview such as Berkeley's, according to which the subject matter of physics is psychologically reducible (with physical things being nothing but collections of ideas in the minds of nonphysical souls/spirits). So here's a version of my definition that rules out that the physical is reducible to or emergent from the mental:

* An entity is physical iff it is either narrowly physical (physicSal) in the sense that it is a non-mental/non-experiential entity belonging to the subject matter of physics, or broadly physical in the sense that it is ontologically reducible to (identifiable with) or emergent from (complexes of) narrowly physical (physicSal) entities.

* Physicalism is the view that all entities (existing, real things) are concrete, and that all concrete entities belonging to the subject matter of chemistry, biology, psychology, or sociology are ontologically reducible to or emergent from (complexes of) non-mental/non-experiential entities belonging to the subject matter of physics, the fundamental science of the matter-energy-space-time world.

[Present awareness]

In my view, there are things, made up of matter, that have mass and there are no-things, like empty space, which have no matter or mass. If it were not for nothing, things would no have space to exist in. My simple definition of physical is that which has matter and mass is physical, simply because it may be observed and that which has no matter or mass is non physical and only may be observed by it interaction with mass.

Light may travel through the vacuum of empty space for billions of years as long as it does not encounter mass to interact with. Until light hits an eyeball or some other form of mass to interact with, it will continue to travel through the infinity of empty space at a speed that only a massless energy may obtain.

[Consul]

This is actually a compelling argument. Taking energy as physical, which I would not have done, and accepting consciousness as some type of energy makes it more reasonable.

Wilhelm Ostwald (a 1909 Nobel Prize awardee in chemistry) wrote in 1901 that [my transl. from German] "the mental processes consist in the origination and transformation of a particular kind of energy, which, in order to be able to talk about it, we can provisionally call mental energy."
(In Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie [Lectures on Natural Philosophy], 1902, p. 377)

But I think that Alois Riehl is right [my transl. from German]:

"It is not the case that consciousness corresponds to a single form of energy. Its objective counterpart is a structure, the architecture of the nervous system, more precisely, the coordination of energies which is made possible by and conducted through this structure. This elucidates that it is not admissible to speak of a mental energy in the same sense as we speak e.g. of chemical energy."
(In Zur Einführung in die Philosophie der Gegenwart [Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy], 3rd ed., 1908, p. 170)

I don't think it makes sense to regard consciousness/experience as a distinctive, nonphysical form of energy, as "mental energy". It's neither an energy nor a stuff. However, it's one thing to say that consciousness/experience is energy, and another to say that it has energy. But if it has energy (in virtue of which it is not epiphenomenal), then its "mental energy" is arguably reducible to physical or chemical forms of energy. The obscure concept of a physically/chemically irreducible mental or vital energy has no (longer a) place in natural science.

I'm not fully on board, as the experience of free will still compels me. A couple issues arise, even if all that above is accepted.

How or why did life emerge from non-life? Even if consciousness simply emerged along the way from simple life forms to complex ones, why did the simple ones come to be in the first place? Chemicals or energy alone do not act to protect themselves or enhance their well-being, as even simple life does.

We still don't have a (complete and detailed) scientific explanation of abiogenesis (the emergence of life from nonlife) and apsychogenesis (the emergence of conscious life from nonconscious life), but the scientists are working hard on it; and the existence of these explanatory gaps doesn't justify the rejection of physicalist naturalism about life and consciousness.

And, what does materialism or emergence have to say about free will? If the implication is that free will does not exist, then I feel there is a flaw in the argument, because I experience free will.

Well, you think you do. Materialism entails neither determinism nor indeterminism, and it is consistent both with incompatibilism (the view that if determinism is true, free will is incompatible with it) and with compatibilism (the thesis that if determinism is true, free will is compatible with it). What materialism is arguably inconsistent with is the view that (causal) determinism is false and we have free will in the sense that "each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing—or no one—causes us to cause those events to happen."
(Chisholm, Roderick M. On Metaphysics. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. p. 12)

(See: Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will)

[Consul]

In my view, there are things, made up of matter, that have mass and there are no-things, like empty space, which have no matter or mass. If it were not for nothing, things would no have space to exist in. My simple definition of physical is that which has matter and mass is physical, simply because it may be observed and that which has no matter or mass is non physical and only may be observed by it interaction with mass.

Light may travel through the vacuum of empty space for billions of years as long as it does not encounter mass to interact with. Until light hits an eyeball or some other form of mass to interact with, it will continue to travel through the infinity of empty space at a speed that only a massless energy may obtain.

If Einstein is right and energy is equivalent to mass, then there cannot be any massless energy.

Mass is just one physical property among many others. Moreover, if you define "to be physical" as "to have mass", then all physical properties, including mass itself (or mass-tropes themselves), become nonphysical, since no physical property has (a) mass.
A definition of "physical object/substance" isn't (also) a definition of "physical attribute/property"!

[Present awareness]

In my view, there are things, made up of matter, that have mass and there are no-things, like empty space, which have no matter or mass. If it were not for nothing, things would no have space to exist in. My simple definition of physical is that which has matter and mass is physical, simply because it may be observed and that which has no matter or mass is non physical and only may be observed by it interaction with mass.

Light may travel through the vacuum of empty space for billions of years as long as it does not encounter mass to interact with. Until light hits an eyeball or some other form of mass to interact with, it will continue to travel through the infinity of empty space at a speed that only a massless energy may obtain.

If Einstein is right and energy is equivalent to mass, then there cannot be any massless energy.

Mass is just one physical property among many others. Moreover, if you define "to be physical" as "to have mass", then all physical properties, including mass itself (or mass-tropes themselves), become nonphysical, since no physical property has (a) mass.
A definition of "physical object/substance" isn't (also) a definition of "physical attribute/property"!

“Light is composed of photons, so we could ask if the photon has mass. The answer is then definitely "no": the photon is a massless particle. According to theory it has energy and momentum but no mass, and this is confirmed by experiment to within strict limits.”

According to the above definition, light is massless.

[Consul]

Materialism entails neither determinism nor indeterminism…

"Perhaps because of the historical determinism implicit in dialectical Materialism, and perhaps because of memories of the mechanical Materialist theories of the 18th and 19th centuries, when physics was deterministic, it is popularly supposed that Materialism and determinism must go together. This is not so. As indicated below, even some ancient Materialists were indeterminists, and a modern physicalist Materialism must be indeterministic because of the indeterminism that is built into modern physics. Modern physics does imply, however, that macroscopic bodies behave in a way that is effectively deterministic, and, because even a single neuron (nerve fibre) is a macroscopic object by quantum mechanical standards, a physicalistic Materialist may still regard the human brain as coming near to being a mechanism that behaves in a deterministic way."

(Smart, J. J. C. "Materialism." Encyclopaedia Britannica. Encyclopaedia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2010)

[Present awareness]

Materialism entails neither determinism nor indeterminism…

"Perhaps because of the historical determinism implicit in dialectical Materialism, and perhaps because of memories of the mechanical Materialist theories of the 18th and 19th centuries, when physics was deterministic, it is popularly supposed that Materialism and determinism must go together. This is not so. As indicated below, even some ancient Materialists were indeterminists, and a modern physicalist Materialism must be indeterministic because of the indeterminism that is built into modern physics. Modern physics does imply, however, that macroscopic bodies behave in a way that is effectively deterministic, and, because even a single neuron (nerve fibre) is a macroscopic object by quantum mechanical standards, a physicalistic Materialist may still regard the human brain as coming near to being a mechanism that behaves in a deterministic way."

(Smart, J. J. C. "Materialism." Encyclopaedia Britannica. Encyclopaedia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2010)

You have come up with some very valid arguments Consul, and I’m certainly not saying you are wrong. My view may be outdated, but I guess it’s just the way I like to look at things, even if I may be wrong.

[Consul]

If Einstein is right and energy is equivalent to mass, then there cannot be any massless energy.

“Light is composed of photons, so we could ask if the photon has mass. The answer is then definitely "no": the photon is a massless particle. According to theory it has energy and momentum but no mass, and this is confirmed by experiment to within strict limits.”

According to the above definition, light is massless.

You're right insofar as a photon has energy but lacks mass, so there's an exception to Einstein's equation E = mc^2.
I did some googling and found this explanation:

"Question: Einstein's famous E = mc^2 doesn't seem to hold for a photon which is massless but has energy. What am I missing?

Answer: I often get this question. It originates with taking a famous equation and not understanding when it is applicable. E = mc^2 is the energy of a particle of mass m at rest; a photon is never at rest and therefore this equation is not applicable to it. The energy of any particle is E = sqrt[m^2c^4 + p^2c^2] where p is the linear momentum. Note that if p = 0, the particle is at rest and indeed E = mc^2. If m = 0 then E = pc. Massless particles have momentum. The only massless particles we know is the photon which has an energy E = hf where h is Planck's constant and f is the frequency of the corresponding electromagnetic wave. So the momentum of a photon is hf/c."

(F. Todd Baker. From Newton to Einstein: Ask the Physicist about Mechanics and Relativity. San Rafael, CA: Morgan & Claypool, 2014. p. 2-11)

[Present awareness]

“Light is composed of photons, so we could ask if the photon has mass. The answer is then definitely "no": the photon is a massless particle. According to theory it has energy and momentum but no mass, and this is confirmed by experiment to within strict limits.”

According to the above definition, light is massless.

You're right insofar as a photon has energy but lacks mass, so there's an exception to Einstein's equation E = mc^2.
I did some googling and found this explanation:

"Question: Einstein's famous E = mc^2 doesn't seem to hold for a photon which is massless but has energy. What am I missing?

Answer: I often get this question. It originates with taking a famous equation and not understanding when it is applicable. E = mc^2 is the energy of a particle of mass m at rest; a photon is never at rest and therefore this equation is not applicable to it. The energy of any particle is E = sqrt[m^2c^4 + p^2c^2] where p is the linear momentum. Note that if p = 0, the particle is at rest and indeed E = mc^2. If m = 0 then E = pc. Massless particles have momentum. The only massless particles we know is the photon which has an energy E = hf where h is Planck's constant and f is the frequency of the corresponding electromagnetic wave. So the momentum of a photon is hf/c."

(F. Todd Baker. From Newton to Einstein: Ask the Physicist about Mechanics and Relativity. San Rafael, CA: Morgan & Claypool, 2014. p. 2-11)

Good find Consul, that was a very illuminating explanation.

[ThomasHobbes]

We have no ned to make a conceptual distinction. That would be a fudge.

There is a distinction between psychological concepts/predicates and neurophysiological ones.

Yes, made of fudge.
You can make as many fake distinctions as you want. body/soul; brain/mind; corporeal/incorporeal; flesh/spirit.
Well duh. It is in the very distinction that you convince yourself that consciousness is not physical.
The point is that ALL examples of consciousness are evident only in the presence of specialised physical phenomena; in particular neural matter.

[ThomasHobbes]

According to the above definition, light is massless.

And wholly physical.

[ThomasHobbes]

No brain, no feeling.

That is right, because it is one and the same event, seen from two conceptually incompatible points of view. Brain and mind are identical in one sense but conceptually there is an insurmountable wall between them. If this wall really is insurmountable is the question we are discussing here, and as you see it is not as simple as you seem to think. There are many other hypotheses than the identity hypothesis.

The wall is only conceptual, not real. We do this with everything. Perception builds a conceptual universe, we cannot see what is real even when it hits us in the face like a wet fish.
That wall is the thickness of our mistrust of our senses.

[Mosesquine]

Whatever we can find is in the physical world!!! Nonphysical things are just things that can't be found anywhere!!!

Dualists will reply that you can find nonphysical things in your mind, in your consciousness, which is directly accessible to introspection.

If your mind is nonphysical, then your mind does not exist. Your mind is, as you wish, nonphysical. Therefore, your mind does not exist!!!

"Nonphysical" and "nonexistent" are surely not synonyms.

Be aware of the difference between arguing from physicalism (by presupposing it) and arguing for physicalism (without presupposing it)!

It's a set theory: (∀x)(x ∈ the set of nonphysical things → x ∈ the set of nonexistent things)

Compare the following: (∀x)(x ∈ the set of dogs → x ∈ the set of animals)

[Mosesquine]

Ideas are not physical, yet they exist. Ideas are simply thoughts expressed, so perhaps your thoughts or consciousness lack a material existence as well. It is possible, in your 'everything is physical' reality, to say your mind does not exist, if it acts in ways not compatible with the laws governing physical things. It's not clear if it does or not. It's becoming clear, though, that you are only concerned with making declarations, so I'll stop bothering you with questions.

In the late 1950s, many of scientists and philosophers of mind stated that ideas are physical. For example, ideas can be brain processes. Perhaps, ideas are brain processes with attitudes. Furthermore, ideas can be both physical and observable. Ideas are physical, in the sense of brain processes, and they are observable, in the sense of speaking sounds or writing sentences like this reply post I am typing on the screen. So, your objection to physicalism is not successful!!!

[chewybrian]

We still don't have a (complete and detailed) scientific explanation of abiogenesis (the emergence of life from nonlife) and apsychogenesis (the emergence of conscious life from nonconscious life), but the scientists are working hard on it; and the existence of these explanatory gaps doesn't justify the rejection of physicalist naturalism about life and consciousness.

I'm not so sure. Haven't we been able to explain pretty much all physical events? Even those we can't verify are still thought to be understood, like what is happening inside the sun. The fact that we can't explain the emergence of life does tend to make you think something else might be going on there. I'd say it's reasonable enough to hold off 'picking a side', at least.

Well, you think you do. Materialism entails neither determinism nor indeterminism, and it is consistent both with incompatibilism (the view that if determinism is true, free will is incompatible with it) and with compatibilism (the thesis that if determinism is true, free will is compatible with it). What materialism is arguably inconsistent with is the view that (causal) determinism is false and we have free will in the sense that "each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing—or no one—causes us to cause those events to happen."

No material thing acts of its own accord, so materialism seems to lead naturally to a denial of free will. I know the stoics believed in hard fate and free will, but they left it hanging without giving a rational reconciliation. I find great wisdom in stoic philosophy, but I'm not sure I can get on board with them here. And there is contrived nonsense like the Frankfurt Cases: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frankfurt_cases. But, seriously, can you reconcile hard fate and choice in a rational way?

I wouldn't be here but for the actions of my parents, for one. Deterrence effects of laws or the judgments of others can move me. And, sadly, I'll never be a jockey. The really difficult aspect is rationality. I shouldn't be judged to lack free will because I make rational choices. I still have the ability to make a silly choice, even if I rarely do. So, the actions of a free will and those fully driven by causes will have huge overlaps, and it would be difficult to discern which is which, but this should not be used to deny the existence of free will.

The path of rationality is well-worn, with good reason. But, it only takes one detour in a lifetime to show that it was possible to leave the path at any step along the way. I am only fighting to protect that view of free will. I'd be interested to see a compelling argument for compatibilism, but for now I feel I need to toss materialism and determinism in favor of free will.