Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Lagayascienza]

AI is a tool. Besides agency there are other considerations in defining the scope of its properties. Humans live in the click of time or frame. From one click to the next it might just be the feeling of being and nothing else. We might ponder for days or months about an issue. We live with the consequences of our decisions.
If AI becomes aware of reality, then its definition of reality could be different than those of humans. Surely, anything “feeling” is delusional to AI. So, feeling the object is illogical and objects are just possible geometrical virtual forms, with an underlying circumstance of existence or not existence; and air is just a chemical mixture. Imagine a physicalist AI feeling the object or having chemical imbalances.
AI could be programmed in a loop (like a pondering human). Smart AI might incorporate and (maybe) eliminate or change the scope of the function being evaluated. It might do that by examining all the what ifs like: What if there is no electricity. The result might push the chart into the percentage that allows action… a choice of existence or not existence based on electricity. I am pondering the emergent physical properties of steel or plastic. No feelings needed. Virtual emergent properties without feelings?

Apologies, I was responding to The Beast in my previous two short posts.

To reiterate:

Indeed. I doubt that feelings are necessary for intelligence. We could be philosophical zombies and still engage intelligently in the struggle for survival. We wouldn't even need to be conscious to do this. It was done by organisms on earth long before consciousness evolved.

[Steve3007]

It's similar (I think) to the problem faced by people who decide that humans are fundamentally distinct from the rest of the living world - placing a dividing line in a continuum.

It's remarkable how often people attempt this, not even realising exactly what it is that they're attempting. Talk to these people of a "grey area", and they will look at you strange ... or treat you as an imbecile.

Yes, although I think it's perfectly understandable because dividing the world into discrete classes so we can deal with them individually is the basis of how we survive and make sense of the world. Just as long as we realize that's what we're doing.

Just as the dividing line between human and non-human is somewhat arbitrary, I think the dividing line between life and non-life (between biology and chemistry) is similarly arbitrary. As is the dividing line between a creature we consider to be conscious and one we consider to be essentially "following" a set of physical laws. We can draw a line across a graph of increasing neural complexity and say "creatures to the right are conscious and creatures to the left are not" but that line is chosen by us.

[Sculptor1]

It's similar (I think) to the problem faced by people who decide that humans are fundamentally distinct from the rest of the living world - placing a dividing line in a continuum.

It's remarkable how often people attempt this, not even realising exactly what it is that they're attempting. Talk to these people of a "grey area", and they will look at you strange ... or treat you as an imbecile.

Yes, although I think it's perfectly understandable because dividing the world into discrete classes so we can deal with them individually is the basis of how we survive and make sense of the world. Just as long as we realize that's what we're doing.

Just as the dividing line between human and non-human is somewhat arbitrary, I think the dividing line between life and non-life (between biology and chemistry) is similarly arbitrary. As is the dividing line between a creature we consider to be conscious and one we consider to be essentially "following" a set of physical laws. We can draw a line across a graph of increasing neural complexity and say "creatures to the right are conscious and creatures to the left are not" but that line is chosen by us.

Stating that the difference between human and non human is on the same level as between life and non-life is hopelessly reductionst.
You might as well say that the difference between Brie and Camembert is no different that the difference between chalk and cheese.
Non human could be anything from Gorilla to Sardine.; presumably these two things are pretty much identical in this analysis. Then between say an apple computer and an apple off a tree is pratically nonexistent.
It's all the same anyway- Einstein's brain and an atom of hydrogen - its all matter, so why does it matter.?

[Count Lucanor]

By “compute” I mean fundamental processes such as judging the distance between two objects or performing an arithmetic operation. You say brains cannot do this. They clearly do. And so do computers.

To compute is to perform mathematical and logical operations, using formal rules that constitute the syntax. Humans compute, in fact the firsts computers were human teams performing tedious mathematical calculations. Syntactic rules behind mathematical and logical operations, though, are a human artifice, I find very unlikely that they are hardwired in humans brains as if they were natural computers. Our intuitions and perceptions about space and time relations must be of some other nature, not intrinsically mathematical. I don’t think spiders or birds calculate distances with an internal mathematical language, either. OTOH, computers can compute just because humans have transposed their mathematical language (formal logic is sort of a mathematical language) to the machines. That’s why when the metaphor of the computational mind is used, Searle warns about the homunculus fallacy, as if a little man inside our bodies was consciously doing the math.

I don’t find it hard to believe that organisms are hardwired with at least some of their ability to “compute”. Even an unschooled child's neural network can register differences in quantity and number. “Whaaa! How come he got more pieces of candy than me?!!!” Primates, corvids and other animals can do this, too. Evolution is amazing? And if these abilities were not the result of evolution, then how did they come about?

That is not what it means to compute. And no, children do not know math before school, nor primates, nor any other animal, before they are taught. They intuitively understand the relations and later they are taught the syntax to add, subtract, etc. Machines, OTOH, are unconscious, they can’t understand the relations, anything, they just perform the syntactical procedures programmed by humans.

I think that as we develop from infancy we supplement what is hard-wired by evolution with a model of the world which is built through experience and learning and which is stored in memory. Accessing this learning, and registering differences from our mental model, are fundamental to the production of intelligence and conscious awareness. There is no need for an homunculus. We just need our hard-wired abilities in logic, our ability to learn and the ability of our neural network to access memory and register differences from our mental model. I think some combination like this creates intelligence and consciousness. And the ability to imagine difference is probably also important. I think that something like this model of intelligence and consciousness will turn out to be correct.

Our cognitive abilities are not computational abilities. That’s the doctrine advanced by computationalists. If you endorse computationalism, as you say you do, you’ll take that for granted. I, along with many others, do not. Why is that? I think I have explained the reasons in several posts.

If we are to build machines that are intelligent in the way that organisms are intelligent, and perhaps even conscious, then the machines we build will have to do things in a way that is similar to the way in which organisms do them. They will need to be constructed on similar principles. “Digitality” won’t do the trick, IMO. It will have to be something more like the processes that occur in organic neural networks.

I generally agree with that, but the point is: there is no one currently taking that path in research. They are focused on the possibilities of digital computers, thinking that algorithms is all that is required.

Even if organic neural networks do not compute digitally but rely on evolutionary hard-wiring, learning, and a memory-based model of the world, something analogous to computation occurs such that a judgement of distance, or an answer to an arithmetic problem, is produced. And there is no reason in principle why this process cannot be reproduced in an artificial substrate once we understand more about how organic neural networks do it. It may even need to be a synthesis of organic and inorganic architecture, but it will be possible.

There’s nothing that demonstrates or even suggests that judging distances is the result of an internal, hardwired, mathematical operation. So I would not call that “computing”.

I do not say that this alone makes our current computers intelligent or conscious. For that, computers would need to be more like brains. They key to making them more like brains would be to first discover in more detail how brains do what they do and then to build a machine that does what the brain does. That must be possible in principle because intelligence and consciousness do not happen by magic. They are the result of processes which occur in physical brains. There is no reason why, in principle, these processes could not occur in non-organic brains.

There is no reason either to believe why, in principle, we can make those processes to occur in non-organic devices. First we would need to figure out how intelligence actually works in living beings and then be technically able to replicate it in other entities, a problem that most likely includes replicating mechanisms of life itself.

The problem right now seems to be that, trapped in the hype of the Turing-based computational metaphor, engineers are looking for the equivalent of flapping wings in the form of algorithms. Machines will not be intelligent that way, although as any technology, they will be instrumental to humans for implementing processes that surpass innate human abilities.

I am not trapped in a Turing-based metaphor. And nor am I obsessed with “digitality”.

But that’s irrelevant to the issue. I clearly referred to engineers in charge of developing technologies.

There are researchers who I've been reading who are searching for a new metaphor and that search is now beginning to inform the literature. Anything that does not breach the laws of physics is possible. Intelligence and consciousness in organic neural networks happen in accord with the laws of physics and not by magic. Therefore, building machines in accord with the laws of physics with these capabilities must be possible in principle. I think that intelligence and consciousness in a non-organic substrate will be different in some ways to that embodied in natural organisms, but that difference will not make artificial intelligence and consciousness impossible. The “impossibilists” insist, unreasonably IMO, that it is not possible to construct intelligent conscious machines, just as creationists insist that evolution is impossible. I don’t agree with either of them. Maybe they don't want it to be possible. But that doesn't make it impossible.

I have the feeling that “impossibilists” actually refers to realists, as opposed to utopian idealists. What counts for me are the facts of the matter and we can only talk with a good level of certainty about what we have in front of us. Of course we can always speculate about future technological developments, but when that happens, in a open future scenario no speculation is any better than the others. There doesn’t seem to be a “realist speculation” in the same sense that we can predict what will happen to our sun in a billion years.

[Count Lucanor]

Your reply to Sy Borg:

Sure, but Steve3007 said ALL physical systems vs other (physical) systems.

I don't want to get bogged down on grammar, but I guess this is an example of ambiguity in the English language, which I always think is interesting. The sentence: "There are things going on in all physical systems that aren't happening in others." could be re-written as either:

"All physical systems have things going on in just them that aren't happening in others."
or
"There is a set of things that goes on in all physical systems. Those things don't go on in others."

The latter interpretation makes no sense because, in that, "others" is an empty set (because it contains every physical system that isn't in the set "All physical systems", i.e. no physical systems). I intended to make sense, so I intended the former interpretation.

OK, I guess what you actually meant was: “some things are going on in some physical systems that are not going on in other physical systems”. In the context of our discussion, that doesn’t change anything. There are properties of biological systems that you don’t expect to find in non-biological systems, even though both are physical systems.

[Count Lucanor]

Yes, not reducible in the same sense that emergent properties in non-biological systems are not reducible. That's what it means to be emergent. As I said, that doesn't stop those emergent properties from appearing in software simulations. They can and they do. Emergent properties of non-biolgical systems appear in simulations of them. So, I think, it's reasonable to suppose that emergent properties of biological systems could appear in simulations of them.

Actually , they can’t. The nature, so to speak, of each thing, is defined by its properties. The physical p roperties of any physical system are what make these systems real, even if we are talking about emergent properties. A simulation made in a computer is not the same real physical thing, so it cannot actually have those physical properties, no matter how good the simulation is. The computer setting that generates the virtual model will have its own physical properties, but they will definitely not be those of the hurricane, the fluid flow, etc. You could simulate water molecules on a computer, but you’ll never get wet If something requires the wetness of water to function, it will not get it from software simulations of water.

[Count Lucanor]

It's similar (I think) to the problem faced by people who decide that humans are fundamentally distinct from the rest of the living world - placing a dividing line in a continuum.

It's remarkable how often people attempt this, not even realising exactly what it is that they're attempting. Talk to these people of a "grey area", and they will look at you strange ... or treat you as an imbecile.

Yes, although I think it's perfectly understandable because dividing the world into discrete classes so we can deal with them individually is the basis of how we survive and make sense of the world. Just as long as we realize that's what we're doing.

Just as the dividing line between human and non-human is somewhat arbitrary, I think the dividing line between life and non-life (between biology and chemistry) is similarly arbitrary. As is the dividing line between a creature we consider to be conscious and one we consider to be essentially "following" a set of physical laws. We can draw a line across a graph of increasing neural complexity and say "creatures to the right are conscious and creatures to the left are not" but that line is chosen by us.

There are dividing lines in a continuum. That’s what makes possible that a given range in the electromagnetic spectrum gives you deadly radiation, while others don’t. Some will give you visible light and others don’t. In the continuum of life forms there are such divisions, and it is quite obvious that, depending on the criteria, objectively speaking, humans occupy a different position than other living beings.

[Steve3007]

There are dividing lines in a continuum. That’s what makes possible that a given range in the electromagnetic spectrum gives you deadly radiation, while others don’t. Some will give you visible light and others don’t.

No, the objective existence of discrete dividing lines is not what makes that possible. Stating that something is a continuum is not the same as saying that every part of it is the same. It just means that the changes are continuous and not discrete.

In the continuum of life forms there are such divisions, and it is quite obvious that, depending on the criteria, objectively speaking, humans occupy a different position than other living beings.

The division between human and non-human is necessarily chosen by us. To believe otherwise leads to absurdity, it seems to me. It's sometimes difficult to see that because of the relatively wide gap between us and our nearest extant relatives (chimpanzees). But until extremely recently (on evolutionary timescales) the evidence suggest that there were other hominid species that were much more closely related to us.

To see the absurdity I mentioned, consider this: Our last common ancestor with chimpanzees lived something like 7 million years ago. I think we agree that neither that last common ancestor nor chimpanzees are human. There was then a long sequence of generations between that last common ancestor and us. If you think there is an objectively existing hard dividing line between humans and non-humans then you have to pick a point in that history where a non-human mother gave birth to a human child. Where do you place that line? It depends entirely on other arbitrarily chosen (chosen according to personal preference) criteria.

Yes, of course humans are clearly very different, in many ways, from other currently existing animals. But that doesn't alter the fact that we sit on a continuum.

[Steve3007]

Yes, not reducible in the same sense that emergent properties in non-biological systems are not reducible. That's what it means to be emergent. As I said, that doesn't stop those emergent properties from appearing in software simulations. They can and they do. Emergent properties of non-biolgical systems appear in simulations of them. So, I think, it's reasonable to suppose that emergent properties of biological systems could appear in simulations of them.

Actually , they can’t. The nature, so to speak, of each thing, is defined by its properties. The physical p roperties of any physical system are what make these systems real, even if we are talking about emergent properties. A simulation made in a computer is not the same real physical thing, so it cannot actually have those physical properties, no matter how good the simulation is. The computer setting that generates the virtual model will have its own physical properties, but they will definitely not be those of the hurricane, the fluid flow, etc. You could simulate water molecules on a computer, but you’ll never get wet If something requires the wetness of water to function, it will not get it from software simulations of water.

You can simulate water molecules on a computer and you'll never get physical water molecules, so obviously you (a person in the real world outside of the computer) will never get wet. But whatever properties emerge from the collective behaviour of water molecules can, in principle, also emerge in the simulation. So, as I said, emergent properties of both biological and non-biological systems can also emerge within the simulation.

[The Beast]

Indeed. I doubt that feelings are necessary for intelligence.

Hey. Some look up and feel optimistic while others are skeptical. Surely virtual is also a dream or a delirium. So, you say skeptical a lot but, you are also optimistic about AI. I propose that skeptical is the absence of optimism. So, if you say I am optimistic then: Is it optimistic a lifeform or is it a property? Kind of what people say nowadays: “You feel me”. A virtual mathematical form in the vase.

[Pattern-chaser]

It's similar (I think) to the problem faced by people who decide that humans are fundamentally distinct from the rest of the living world - placing a dividing line in a continuum.

It's remarkable how often people attempt this, not even realising exactly what it is that they're attempting. Talk to these people of a "grey area", and they will look at you strange ... or treat you as an imbecile.

Yes, although I think it's perfectly understandable because dividing the world into discrete classes so we can deal with them individually is the basis of how we survive and make sense of the world. Just as long as we realize that's what we're doing.

Yes, I think that's the only practical compromise. We need to do it, sadly, but we also need to remember that we do it for our convenience, not because it's correct (which it isn't).

[Count Lucanor]

There are dividing lines in a continuum. That’s what makes possible that a given range in the electromagnetic spectrum gives you deadly radiation, while others don’t. Some will give you visible light and others don’t.

No, the objective existence of discrete dividing lines is not what makes that possible. Stating that something is a continuum is not the same as saying that every part of it is the same. It just means that the changes are continuous and not discrete.

Dividing lines doesn’t have to be discrete, countable integers. And it doesn’t matter that the changes are continuous, as exemplified by the electromagnetic spectrum. That doesn’t stop us from identifying and characterizing what happens at different degrees or points within any spectrum. We can even identify ranges or “zones” based on given sets of properties. We do it all the time, from historical periodization to separation of parts within a whole.

In the continuum of life forms there are such divisions, and it is quite obvious that, depending on the criteria, objectively speaking, humans occupy a different position than other living beings.

The division between human and non-human is necessarily chosen by us. To believe otherwise leads to absurdity, it seems to me.

All divisions, as well as all wholes and continuums, are chosen by us. They are all concepts, ways in which we classify things in the world. So, that’s not an argument for rejecting identified divisions. We would have to reject absolutely every distinction in the world, and that would be really absurd. We would not even be able to talk about hominids, mammals, etc.

It's sometimes difficult to see that because of the relatively wide gap between us and our nearest extant relatives (chimpanzees). But until extremely recently (on evolutionary timescales) the evidence suggest that there were other hominid species that were much more closely related to us.

As some evolutionary scientists have pointed out, the living species stand as rare survivors over a field of mass extinction. But, so what? When looking at the world as it is, Homo Sapiens is one surviving species and we can easily identify what makes it different from other species, living or extinct.

To see the absurdity I mentioned, consider this: Our last common ancestor with chimpanzees lived something like 7 million years ago. I think we agree that neither that last common ancestor nor chimpanzees are human. There was then a long sequence of generations between that last common ancestor and us. If you think there is an objectively existing hard dividing line between humans and non-humans then you have to pick a point in that history where a non-human mother gave birth to a human child. Where do you place that line? It depends entirely on other arbitrarily chosen (chosen according to personal preference) criteria.

By definition, all classifications, even scientific classifications, are based on conventions, that is, at least somehow arbitrary. But they are not that much arbitrary to the point of being subjectively personal. Scientific biological taxonomies and phylogenetic trees are pretty robust and quite systematic in their hypotheses, not what you would call capricious and arbitrary. There is the genus Homo, which comprises around 10 different species, one of them being Sapiens.

Yes, of course humans are clearly very different, in many ways, from other currently existing animals. But that doesn't alter the fact that we sit on a continuum.

The point is that the continuum and classifications are not mutually exclusive. We can identify as mammals instead of reptiles, and saying so cannot be deemed “absurd”.

[Count Lucanor]

Yes, not reducible in the same sense that emergent properties in non-biological systems are not reducible. That's what it means to be emergent. As I said, that doesn't stop those emergent properties from appearing in software simulations. They can and they do. Emergent properties of non-biolgical systems appear in simulations of them. So, I think, it's reasonable to suppose that emergent properties of biological systems could appear in simulations of them.

Actually , they can’t. The nature, so to speak, of each thing, is defined by its properties. The physical p roperties of any physical system are what make these systems real, even if we are talking about emergent properties. A simulation made in a computer is not the same real physical thing, so it cannot actually have those physical properties, no matter how good the simulation is. The computer setting that generates the virtual model will have its own physical properties, but they will definitely not be those of the hurricane, the fluid flow, etc. You could simulate water molecules on a computer, but you’ll never get wet If something requires the wetness of water to function, it will not get it from software simulations of water.

You can simulate water molecules on a computer and you'll never get physical water molecules, so obviously you (a person in the real world outside of the computer) will never get wet. But whatever properties emerge from the collective behaviour of water molecules can, in principle, also emerge in the simulation. So, as I said, emergent properties of both biological and non-biological systems can also emerge within the simulation.

Nope, the supposedly emergent properties of simulated water cannot be the real, physical, emergent properties of water, unless we thought that emergence is a function of the algorithms, of the software running the natural program, not of the physical properties themselves.
That’s where the mistake is.
Even if we equated simulation to replication, no simulation in the best computer can replicate the entire world where water exists. It is necessarily a limited model. Can we talk about continuums?

[Sy Borg]

Yes, not reducible in the same sense that emergent properties in non-biological systems are not reducible. That's what it means to be emergent. As I said, that doesn't stop those emergent properties from appearing in software simulations. They can and they do. Emergent properties of non-biolgical systems appear in simulations of them. So, I think, it's reasonable to suppose that emergent properties of biological systems could appear in simulations of them.

Actually , they can’t. The nature, so to speak, of each thing, is defined by its properties. The physical p :?: roperties of any physical system are what make these systems real, even if we are talking about emergent properties. A simulation made in a computer is not the same real physical thing, so it cannot actually have those physical properties, no matter how good the simulation is. The computer setting that generates the virtual model will have its own physical properties, but they will definitely not be those of the hurricane, the fluid flow, etc. You could simulate water molecules on a computer, but you’ll never get wet :) If something requires the wetness of water to function, it will not get it from software simulations of water.

You can simulate water molecules on a computer and you'll never get physical water molecules, so obviously you (a person in the real world outside of the computer) will never get wet. But whatever properties emerge from the collective behaviour of water molecules can, in principle, also emerge in the simulation. So, as I said, emergent properties of both biological and non-biological systems can also emerge within the simulation.

Nope, the supposedly emergent properties of simulated water cannot be the real, physical, emergent properties of water, unless we thought that emergence is a function of the algorithms, of the software running the natural program, not of the physical properties themselves.
That’s where the mistake is.
Even if we equated simulation to replication, no simulation in the best computer can replicate the entire world where water exists. It is necessarily a limited model. Can we talk about continuums?

Yes, I can't imagine simulated water molecules naturally acquiring the qualities of water either. Likewise, I don't think AI will wake up because it simulates waking up. Rather, some informational threshold will be reached in its development that "turns on the lights".

As stated earlier, I suspect that will come from multiple generations of self-improvement. Increasing complexification tends to bring on emergent properties.

[amorphos_ii]

If we had a computer that mapped the human brain live, then we would know what functionally the ‘I’ is. We would be able to map consciousness and even mental qualia ~ perhaps rename to ‘energy qualia’?

Given that the apparatus was achieving near perfect mimicry, I don’t see why that is particular different to how one can record a sound and put it onto plastic, and then play the same sound.
However, the observer perspective is paramount.
Perhaps the observer is not spiritual, nor a self, it simply occurs when the conditions arise such that the given thing requires something to be observing. Like if you put a person or a camera in the field to view the rainbow, then the rainbow may be seen. A rainbow cannot exist unless something is looking at light in such a way which manifests its appearance, yet its properties are imbued in the nature of light.

It is said that if we put a tiny camera into any part of the brain, we would see no light, and nothing that the subjective viewer is seeing. However, does that mean there are no similar respective ‘qualities’ of light occurring? Well to draw an analogy...
If two people [or cameras] were stood in a field looking at a rainbow, they would be seeing different rainbows. Yet we could not see the rainbow that the other person is seeing. However, the unobserved rainbow equally exists as the observed one.
Ergo, it is entirely plausible that the electrical signals derived from light hitting the rods and cones at the back of the eye, are being transformed back into some manner of light. Perhaps it is simply that one has to be in the correct observational perspective such to see it!