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[lincoy3411]

I'm aware of church history. I believe the current orthodoxy covers what is best exegetically determined. Heresies have been established, sects have been banned, etc... That does nothing to determine the truth of what was claimed by Orthodoxy. The Old Testament God is hard to reconcile with the New Testament God just based on history or just based on literature or just based on theology. A proper reading will fit these all together because the Old Testament is not literature, history, or theology, it is literature, history, and theology. Many different categories can be combined into one, as is exemplified in the Mytho-Historical genre of Genesis 1-11 that seeks to start theology off right.

What the Problem of Evil tries to do is point out an internal contradiction in the existence of a maximally perfect being and the existence of evil. Proposing that there are secondary, free beings that create evil means that there is no contradictions. Inventing a proposition does not mean that the proposition is implausible. It seeks to resolve conflict within a theory.

[LuckyR]

I'm aware of church history. I believe the current orthodoxy covers what is best exegetically determined. Heresies have been established, sects have been banned, etc... That does nothing to determine the truth of what was claimed by Orthodoxy. The Old Testament God is hard to reconcile with the New Testament God just based on history or just based on literature or just based on theology. A proper reading will fit these all together because the Old Testament is not literature, history, or theology, it is literature, history, and theology. Many different categories can be combined into one, as is exemplified in the Mytho-Historical genre of Genesis 1-11 that seeks to start theology off right.

What the Problem of Evil tries to do is point out an internal contradiction in the existence of a maximally perfect being and the existence of evil. Proposing that there are secondary, free beings that create evil means that there is no contradictions. Inventing a proposition does not mean that the proposition is implausible. It seeks to resolve conflict within a theory.

Well the Problem of Evil, since it is applied to gods, is trying to describe the (objectively) indescribable, since gods are metaphysical and thus can only be described subjectively.

Thus the logic of the Problem of Evil will resonate with some (be an actual problem) and not with others (whose mindset will likely provide a "workaround" to resolve the "problem", such that it's not a problem).

[lincoy3411]

I'm aware of church history. I believe the current orthodoxy covers what is best exegetically determined. Heresies have been established, sects have been banned, etc... That does nothing to determine the truth of what was claimed by Orthodoxy. The Old Testament God is hard to reconcile with the New Testament God just based on history or just based on literature or just based on theology. A proper reading will fit these all together because the Old Testament is not literature, history, or theology, it is literature, history, and theology. Many different categories can be combined into one, as is exemplified in the Mytho-Historical genre of Genesis 1-11 that seeks to start theology off right.

What the Problem of Evil tries to do is point out an internal contradiction in the existence of a maximally perfect being and the existence of evil. Proposing that there are secondary, free beings that create evil means that there is no contradictions. Inventing a proposition does not mean that the proposition is implausible. It seeks to resolve conflict within a theory.

Well the Problem of Evil, since it is applied to gods, is trying to describe the (objectively) indescribable, since gods are metaphysical and thus can only be described subjectively.

Thus the logic of the Problem of Evil will resonate with some (be an actual problem) and not with others (whose mindset will likely provide a "workaround" to resolve the "problem", such that it's not a problem).

To view metaphysics a subjective discipline is wrong. This has been virtually universally rejected by contemporary philosophers. The popularizer of that theory, that science is the only objective discipline and metaphysical talk is meaningless, came to reject that theory. Karl Popper was that person.

[Gertie]

What the Problem of Evil tries to do is point out an internal contradiction in the existence of a maximally perfect being and the existence of evil. Proposing that there are secondary, free beings that create evil means that there is no contradictions. Inventing a proposition does not mean that the proposition is implausible. It seeks to resolve conflict within a theory.

I think we're at the point where we're going round in circles. Yes, the Problem of Evil points out an apparent contradiction in one hypothesised version of a creator God. How can a world chokka with unjust and systemic suffering be the will of an all-powerful and all benevolent God. After all, it's also claimed that it's within this God's power to create eternal perfect bliss, but instead we must suffer the trials he created for us. Including the demons he created who indiscriminately torture and kill us, no matter how good we are.

And none of this can be evidenced, any more than any other creation story. I could make one up right now with no evidence, and it would be equally plausible in terms of internal coherence - and if you pointed out an inconsitency, I'd just make something else up to solve it. As Plantinga did.

Still, it might be true, it's impossible to disprove. But if I read a story someone made up about the tri-omni God, I'd neither find it plausible or benevolent. You do, and that's fine.

However, we live in a time when we have a naturalistic account for the way the world is, both good and bad. An explanatory account which contains vast and intricate detail based on empirical evidence. More-over we use this account to make testable predictions, which support its reliability. Without making stuff up out of nowhere simply to justify a preference. Of course it's more plausible.

This latter approach works for us in almost every practical aspect of our lives. We couldn't survive without it. I suppose an acid test comparison is if your child gets dangerously ill, do you rush to the hospital or pray to cast out the demon. Thankfully most of us now agree the former is a more demonstrably plausible approach when we're put to the test.

[LuckyR]

I'm aware of church history. I believe the current orthodoxy covers what is best exegetically determined. Heresies have been established, sects have been banned, etc... That does nothing to determine the truth of what was claimed by Orthodoxy. The Old Testament God is hard to reconcile with the New Testament God just based on history or just based on literature or just based on theology. A proper reading will fit these all together because the Old Testament is not literature, history, or theology, it is literature, history, and theology. Many different categories can be combined into one, as is exemplified in the Mytho-Historical genre of Genesis 1-11 that seeks to start theology off right.

What the Problem of Evil tries to do is point out an internal contradiction in the existence of a maximally perfect being and the existence of evil. Proposing that there are secondary, free beings that create evil means that there is no contradictions. Inventing a proposition does not mean that the proposition is implausible. It seeks to resolve conflict within a theory.

Well the Problem of Evil, since it is applied to gods, is trying to describe the (objectively) indescribable, since gods are metaphysical and thus can only be described subjectively.

Thus the logic of the Problem of Evil will resonate with some (be an actual problem) and not with others (whose mindset will likely provide a "workaround" to resolve the "problem", such that it's not a problem).

To view metaphysics a subjective discipline is wrong. This has been virtually universally rejected by contemporary philosophers. The popularizer of that theory, that science is the only objective discipline and metaphysical talk is meaningless, came to reject that theory. Karl Popper was that person.

Well part of your (and according to you, a lot of "contemporary" philosopher's) problem is conflating "subjective" with "meaningless". They're not synonymous.

[Pattern-chaser]

I agree this argument only works for a definition of ''God'' as ''the all-powerful and all-benevolent creator of the universe.''

Doesn't it go one step farther than this? Isn't it something like God, the all-powerful and all-benevolent creator, who created the entire universe for the sole use and benefit of human beings? For it seems to me that, without that final proviso, the 'problem of evil' just disappears in a puff of smoke.

[Gertie]

I agree this argument only works for a definition of ''God'' as ''the all-powerful and all-benevolent creator of the universe.''

Doesn't it go one step farther than this? Isn't it something like God, the all-powerful and all-benevolent creator, who created the entire universe for the sole use and benefit of human beings? For it seems to me that, without that final proviso, the 'problem of evil' just disappears in a puff of smoke.

I suppose it depends on what'' benevolent'' means to you.  For me you can only be meaningfully benevolent to experiencing subjects, who can experience flourishing or suffering as a result. (Benevolence is meaningless in a world of only rocks and gases interacting).  I think this is implicit in how the Problem of Evil (or Suffering) is generally understood, but others may differ.

So for many of us,  the Problem of Suffering encompasses every sentient creature, not just humans.  And the systemic suffering of evolutionary competition and predation is a common point made re The Problem of Suffering.  Who would benevolently and deliberately create a system, out of all possible systems,  where-by you have to kill or die, cause suffering in order to flourish?  It's horrible - by my imperfect standards anyway.

And notably free will isn't a theodicy applicable to those species which represent the overwhelming amount of suffering in the world. 

[Pattern-chaser]

So for many of us,  the Problem of Suffering encompasses every sentient creature, not just humans.  And the systemic suffering of evolutionary competition and predation is a common point made re The Problem of Suffering.  Who would benevolently and deliberately create a system, out of all possible systems,  where-by you have to kill or die, cause suffering in order to flourish?  It's horrible - by my imperfect standards anyway.

I think the problem underlying this is that, if there is no death, then everything is immortal, and there can be no new generation(s) after the first few, because the Universe will already be full. So the result is a static and unchanging Universe; it can't be otherwise. I think this is why there is birth, followed, in due course, by death. Life, individual life, is ephemeral. That's how it looks to me, anyway.

As for suffering, that's often/usually a precursor to death, isn't it? I.e. suffering is part of the dying 'process'...?

[Gertie]

So for many of us,  the Problem of Suffering encompasses every sentient creature, not just humans.  And the systemic suffering of evolutionary competition and predation is a common point made re The Problem of Suffering.  Who would benevolently and deliberately create a system, out of all possible systems,  where-by you have to kill or die, cause suffering in order to flourish?  It's horrible - by my imperfect standards anyway.

I think the problem underlying this is that, if there is no death, then everything is immortal, and there can be no new generation(s) after the first few, because the Universe will already be full. So the result is a static and unchanging Universe; it can't be otherwise. I think this is why there is birth, followed, in due course, by death. Life, individual life, is ephemeral. That's how it looks to me, anyway.

As for suffering, that's often/usually a precursor to death, isn't it? I.e. suffering is part of the dying 'process'...?

Well we're dealing with an all-powerful, all-knowing God here, who can create whatever type of universe he considers most benevolent. Who can create eternal heavenly bliss, where apparently death and space isn't a prob. Or anything else, beyond our mortal imagination.

To support the tri-omni God hypothesis you have to support the claim that this the most benevolent of all possible worlds. That's a high standard. If it's possible to make even one tiny change, which would result in one critter suffering less, then that would be a more perfectly benevolent world. We humans try to alleviate suffering for ourselves and each other all the time, so it looks do-able.

A counter to this is that we couldn't know the ultimate consequences of even a tiny change, which could actually make thing worse. The Greater Good or Mysterious Ways type of theodicy. And fair enough, we can't know that. But we can't know otherwise either, only look at which seems more likely. Another problem there is apparently this God gives us free will in order for us to willingly try to act for the good in his image, which implies it's possible for the world to be made better.

Bottom line, to look around and see all the unnecessary and unjust suffering in the world makes it intuitively hard for me to believe this is a creation of perfect benevolence by an unknowable creator which has unlimited power.


Where-as on the other hand, we have have an evidence-based and predictively falsifiable account of evolution, natural disasters, disease and so on. Which means that nowadays we don't have to invent unknowable deities and demons to account for why the world is the way it is with regard to natural suffering. Thank goodness. Or we'd still be exorcising demons from sick people, sacrificing to volcanoes and burning witches.

[Count Lucanor]

The Problem of Evil, as most of us know, can be stated like this:

1) God is the all-powerful and all-benevolent creator of the universe.
2) Evil exists in that universe.
3) If God is all-powerful, and yet evil exists, God must not be all-benevolent.
4) If God is all-benevolent, and yet evil exists, God must not be all-powerful.
5) So, the all-powerful and all-benevolent God does not exist.

The argument is sound provided that you accept its definition of God.

However, the definition depends on a conception of God that is akin to our conception of geometric shapes. For example, if a polygon has three angles, then it is a triangle. If it has some other number of angles, it is not. So too with the definition of God in the argument above: If a being is all-powerful and all-benevolent, then it is God. If the being lacks one or both of these characteristics, then it is not.

However, most theists conceive of God as a person rather than a geometric shape. The former, unlike the latter, can have characteristics that are apparent but not actual.

For example, consider a nonce person we'll call "Greg," a thirty-year-old man who lives in a middle-class neighborhood with a low crime rate. Greg helps little old ladies across the street. People trust him to babysit their children, and he has never violated that trust. He has no criminal record. His neighbors praise him frequently for his cheerful willingness to help them whenever he can. In light of all this, people in his social universe credit him with consistent moral goodness.

That's because the latter people do not know that Greg is a serial killer who abducts people from a neighboring city, takes them to a secret sound-proof room beneath his kitchen floor, and uses the equipment there to process them into canned dog food, which he feeds to his dog. Greg finds his clandestine activity to be ... well, let's just say personally gratifying. It's best not to be too specific about the type of gratification on a family-oriented philosophy forum.

Now imagine that Greg is found out, thanks to a brilliant detective on the local police force. The neighbors are shocked. The neighbors say that Greg is not the consistently good man that they thought he was. <b>But the neighbors do not say that Greg does not exist.</b> They might say that the good Greg they knew did not exist, but they would say so only in a metaphorical sense. They would know that, literally, Greg still exists because Greg is a person and, as such, can have apparent rather than real characteristics. He can lack an apparent characteristic and still be Greg.

If we conceive of God as a person, rather than some mathematical entity, then God can exist even if he lacks one of these two characteristics: a) being all-powerful, and b) being all-benevolent.

Indeed, I once knew someone who lost his children in a natural disaster. He credits God with the strength to carry on after that tragedy, but does not believe that God is all-powerful. (Yes, this is real.)

As for a God who is all-powerful but not all-benevolent, such a being would constitute a good theistic explanation of many of the events we all read about in newspapers.

That's my argument. What do you think?

I am curious about why these are the types of attributes considered when theorizing about some god that might exist. Let’s clarify from the start that defining this god is an exercise of pure theoretical speculation, as there is no empirical ground from which one could launch such investigation, there’s no observable divine phenomena.

Omnipotence and omni benevolence could be attributes of the theoretical god we’re dealing with here, but how about other attributes. Actually we can come up with a series of properties that this deity could have or be missing, and all their combinations make it possible to describe the same god differently:

omnipotent / not omnipotent
omni benevolent / not omni benevolent
omnipresent / not omnipresent
omniscient / not omniscient
eternal / not eternal

In theory, our god could be defined as being omnipotent, not omni benevolent, omnipresent, but not omniscient and not eternal. There’s nothing stopping us from theorizing it that way or another, let’s say that this god is not omnipotent, but omni benevolent, omniscient, and so on. There are, though, some combinations that are contradictory, so they would not be allowed, but that is beyond the point. The point is that reducing your definition to just a couple of attributes, which are not even clarified as to whether they are essential or accidental attributes, will not say much. There’s also the issue of a divine entity having only essential and not accidental attributes, but that’s precisely what needs to be put in an argument. Just the same as the OP presents the case of omni benevolence being contingent, accidental, non-essential, the case could be made that omnipotence is not essential to this deity.

I will add that this ambiguity is a key element in the way most if not all theists argue about the existence of their god. Just when you think you nailed the proper definition and proceed to demonstrate that “this god cannot exist”, they will bring up a slightly different definition that will keep their deity safe from logical demonstrations. It’s an open case fallacy.

[lincoy3411]

What the Problem of Evil tries to do is point out an internal contradiction in the existence of a maximally perfect being and the existence of evil. Proposing that there are secondary, free beings that create evil means that there is no contradictions. Inventing a proposition does not mean that the proposition is implausible. It seeks to resolve conflict within a theory.

I think we're at the point where we're going round in circles. Yes, the Problem of Evil points out an apparent contradiction in one hypothesised version of a creator God. How can a world chokka with unjust and systemic suffering be the will of an all-powerful and all benevolent God. After all, it's also claimed that it's within this God's power to create eternal perfect bliss, but instead we must suffer the trials he created for us. Including the demons he created who indiscriminately torture and kill us, no matter how good we are.

And none of this can be evidenced, any more than any other creation story. I could make one up right now with no evidence, and it would be equally plausible in terms of internal coherence - and if you pointed out an inconsitency, I'd just make something else up to solve it. As Plantinga did.

Still, it might be true, it's impossible to disprove. But if I read a story someone made up about the tri-omni God, I'd neither find it plausible or benevolent. You do, and that's fine.

However, we live in a time when we have a naturalistic account for the way the world is, both good and bad. An explanatory account which contains vast and intricate detail based on empirical evidence. More-over we use this account to make testable predictions, which support its reliability. Without making stuff up out of nowhere simply to justify a preference. Of course it's more plausible.

This latter approach works for us in almost every practical aspect of our lives. We couldn't survive without it. I suppose an acid test comparison is if your child gets dangerously ill, do you rush to the hospital or pray to cast out the demon. Thankfully most of us now agree the former is a more demonstrably plausible approach when we're put to the test.

Just because a system of thought is internally coherent does not mean it is likely to be true. There could very well be two internally coherent systems of thought. That is why you must provide a critique of a view contrary to yours as well as a positive reason for yours. All I am seeking to do in this thread is critique atheism as a system of thought. The negation of atheism does not imply theism; that would be its complement. The same goes with theism; its negation is not atheism. It could be a meaningless question because it is not adopted in a linguistic system that can properly express it, or there may be no ontological or determinable truth value to the question.

[lincoy3411]

I'm aware of church history. I believe the current orthodoxy covers what is best exegetically determined. Heresies have been established, sects have been banned, etc... That does nothing to determine the truth of what was claimed by Orthodoxy. The Old Testament God is hard to reconcile with the New Testament God just based on history or just based on literature or just based on theology. A proper reading will fit these all together because the Old Testament is not literature, history, or theology, it is literature, history, and theology. Many different categories can be combined into one, as is exemplified in the Mytho-Historical genre of Genesis 1-11 that seeks to start theology off right.

What the Problem of Evil tries to do is point out an internal contradiction in the existence of a maximally perfect being and the existence of evil. Proposing that there are secondary, free beings that create evil means that there is no contradictions. Inventing a proposition does not mean that the proposition is implausible. It seeks to resolve conflict within a theory.

Well the Problem of Evil, since it is applied to gods, is trying to describe the (objectively) indescribable, since gods are metaphysical and thus can only be described subjectively.

Thus the logic of the Problem of Evil will resonate with some (be an actual problem) and not with others (whose mindset will likely provide a "workaround" to resolve the "problem", such that it's not a problem).

To view metaphysics a subjective discipline is wrong. This has been virtually universally rejected by contemporary philosophers. The popularizer of that theory, that science is the only objective discipline and metaphysical talk is meaningless, came to reject that theory. Karl Popper was that person.

Well part of your (and according to you, a lot of "contemporary" philosopher's) problem is conflating "subjective" with "meaningless". They're not synonymous.

Subjective means a belief held by the subject, an opinion.
Objective means a true statement.
Meaningless means that no truth value can be assigned to a proposition. Complete subjectivity and a meaningless property of a truth value are biconditionally true - one cannot be true if the other is.

Just because something implies there is some subjectivity in a belief does not imply it is not objective. Regardless, I'm not sure how this applies to metaphysics.

[Gertie]

What the Problem of Evil tries to do is point out an internal contradiction in the existence of a maximally perfect being and the existence of evil. Proposing that there are secondary, free beings that create evil means that there is no contradictions. Inventing a proposition does not mean that the proposition is implausible. It seeks to resolve conflict within a theory.

I think we're at the point where we're going round in circles. Yes, the Problem of Evil points out an apparent contradiction in one hypothesised version of a creator God. How can a world chokka with unjust and systemic suffering be the will of an all-powerful and all benevolent God. After all, it's also claimed that it's within this God's power to create eternal perfect bliss, but instead we must suffer the trials he created for us. Including the demons he created who indiscriminately torture and kill us, no matter how good we are.

And none of this can be evidenced, any more than any other creation story. I could make one up right now with no evidence, and it would be equally plausible in terms of internal coherence - and if you pointed out an inconsitency, I'd just make something else up to solve it. As Plantinga did.

Still, it might be true, it's impossible to disprove. But if I read a story someone made up about the tri-omni God, I'd neither find it plausible or benevolent. You do, and that's fine.

However, we live in a time when we have a naturalistic account for the way the world is, both good and bad. An explanatory account which contains vast and intricate detail based on empirical evidence. More-over we use this account to make testable predictions, which support its reliability. Without making stuff up out of nowhere simply to justify a preference. Of course it's more plausible.

This latter approach works for us in almost every practical aspect of our lives. We couldn't survive without it. I suppose an acid test comparison is if your child gets dangerously ill, do you rush to the hospital or pray to cast out the demon. Thankfully most of us now agree the former is a more demonstrably plausible approach when we're put to the test.

Just because a system of thought is internally coherent does not mean it is likely to be true.

? You brought up internal consistency as a defence for Plantinga inventing demons, I'm pointing out that doesn't make it true.

There could very well be two internally coherent systems of thought. That is why you must provide a critique of a view contrary to yours as well as a positive reason for yours.

That's what the post you're replying to does, please read it again.

All I am seeking to do in this thread is critique atheism as a system of thought. The negation of atheism does not imply theism; that would be its complement. The same goes with theism; its negation is not atheism. It could be a meaningless question because it is not adopted in a linguistic system that can properly express it, or there may be no ontological or determinable truth value to the question.

Wrong thread? Looks like a pedantic side-step anyway.

[lincoy3411]

What the Problem of Evil tries to do is point out an internal contradiction in the existence of a maximally perfect being and the existence of evil. Proposing that there are secondary, free beings that create evil means that there is no contradictions. Inventing a proposition does not mean that the proposition is implausible. It seeks to resolve conflict within a theory.

I think we're at the point where we're going round in circles. Yes, the Problem of Evil points out an apparent contradiction in one hypothesised version of a creator God. How can a world chokka with unjust and systemic suffering be the will of an all-powerful and all benevolent God. After all, it's also claimed that it's within this God's power to create eternal perfect bliss, but instead we must suffer the trials he created for us. Including the demons he created who indiscriminately torture and kill us, no matter how good we are.

And none of this can be evidenced, any more than any other creation story. I could make one up right now with no evidence, and it would be equally plausible in terms of internal coherence - and if you pointed out an inconsitency, I'd just make something else up to solve it. As Plantinga did.

Still, it might be true, it's impossible to disprove. But if I read a story someone made up about the tri-omni God, I'd neither find it plausible or benevolent. You do, and that's fine.

However, we live in a time when we have a naturalistic account for the way the world is, both good and bad. An explanatory account which contains vast and intricate detail based on empirical evidence. More-over we use this account to make testable predictions, which support its reliability. Without making stuff up out of nowhere simply to justify a preference. Of course it's more plausible.

This latter approach works for us in almost every practical aspect of our lives. We couldn't survive without it. I suppose an acid test comparison is if your child gets dangerously ill, do you rush to the hospital or pray to cast out the demon. Thankfully most of us now agree the former is a more demonstrably plausible approach when we're put to the test.

Just because a system of thought is internally coherent does not mean it is likely to be true.

? You brought up internal consistency as a defence for Plantinga inventing demons, I'm pointing out that doesn't make it true.

There could very well be two internally coherent systems of thought. That is why you must provide a critique of a view contrary to yours as well as a positive reason for yours.

That's what the post you're replying to does, please read it again.

All I am seeking to do in this thread is critique atheism as a system of thought. The negation of atheism does not imply theism; that would be its complement. The same goes with theism; its negation is not atheism. It could be a meaningless question because it is not adopted in a linguistic system that can properly express it, or there may be no ontological or determinable truth value to the question.

Wrong thread? Looks like a pedantic side-step anyway.

I don't see why it's a pedantic side-step. Internal coherence means it could be true, but does not imply that it is true. You need positive reason for that. Your post is a critique of religion (if you can call it that, as it just uses semantical tricks to make things seem more or less implausible in our modern culture). Your support of empirical and testable predictions is not exclusive to atheism, so you can't use that to support your own stance. You'd need other arguments.

[Gertie]

I think we're at the point where we're going round in circles. Yes, the Problem of Evil points out an apparent contradiction in one hypothesised version of a creator God. How can a world chokka with unjust and systemic suffering be the will of an all-powerful and all benevolent God. After all, it's also claimed that it's within this God's power to create eternal perfect bliss, but instead we must suffer the trials he created for us. Including the demons he created who indiscriminately torture and kill us, no matter how good we are.

And none of this can be evidenced, any more than any other creation story. I could make one up right now with no evidence, and it would be equally plausible in terms of internal coherence - and if you pointed out an inconsitency, I'd just make something else up to solve it. As Plantinga did.

Still, it might be true, it's impossible to disprove. But if I read a story someone made up about the tri-omni God, I'd neither find it plausible or benevolent. You do, and that's fine.

However, we live in a time when we have a naturalistic account for the way the world is, both good and bad. An explanatory account which contains vast and intricate detail based on empirical evidence. More-over we use this account to make testable predictions, which support its reliability. Without making stuff up out of nowhere simply to justify a preference. Of course it's more plausible.

This latter approach works for us in almost every practical aspect of our lives. We couldn't survive without it. I suppose an acid test comparison is if your child gets dangerously ill, do you rush to the hospital or pray to cast out the demon. Thankfully most of us now agree the former is a more demonstrably plausible approach when we're put to the test.

Just because a system of thought is internally coherent does not mean it is likely to be true.

? You brought up internal consistency as a defence for Plantinga inventing demons, I'm pointing out that doesn't make it true.

There could very well be two internally coherent systems of thought. That is why you must provide a critique of a view contrary to yours as well as a positive reason for yours.

That's what the post you're replying to does, please read it again.

All I am seeking to do in this thread is critique atheism as a system of thought. The negation of atheism does not imply theism; that would be its complement. The same goes with theism; its negation is not atheism. It could be a meaningless question because it is not adopted in a linguistic system that can properly express it, or there may be no ontological or determinable truth value to the question.

Wrong thread? Looks like a pedantic side-step anyway.

I don't see why it's a pedantic side-step. Internal coherence means it could be true, but does not imply that it is true. You need positive reason for that. Your post is a critique of religion (if you can call it that, as it just uses semantical tricks to make things seem more or less implausible in our modern culture). Your support of empirical and testable predictions is not exclusive to atheism, so you can't use that to support your own stance. You'd need other arguments.

Point out the ''semantic tricks'' in my post.