gad-fly wrote: ↑September 9th, 2022, 10:14 pmCorrect. Being beautiful isn't a necessary condition. Indeed, a work of art does not have to be beautiful. Conditions:
a. It has to be created.
Consider the following argument:
1. Some artworks are (ontologically) abstract objects.
2. All (ontologically) abstract objects are uncreated (uncreatable).
3. Therefore, some artworks are uncreated.
For example, if you think this argument is sound, then if Beethoven's 9th symphony—the symphony
itself, not any printed score of it or any of its performances!—is an abstract object, it is not (literally) true that Beethoven
created it, with "to create" meaning "to bring into existence".
If this strikes you as blatantly implausible, you can reject that argument by rejecting premise 1 or premise 2, and accepting its negation: All artworks are (ontologically) concrete objects, or some artworks are both (ontologically) abstract and created.
My point is that this a contentious issue among philosophers of art, so it is not obviously or trivially true that all artworks must satisfy the creation condition
by definition.
See: Platonism and its critics:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/art- ... /#PlatCrit
gad-fly wrote: ↑September 9th, 2022, 10:14 pmb. It must be unique, not duplicated, repeated, or copied.
I'm not so sure:
"Many debates over monism and rivals to that position have hinged on the question of reproduction and multiple instances, the thought being that in the case of at least some works, adequate technologies of reproduction yield more than one instance of an artistic artifact, and therefore of the work (an entailment that does not go unchallenged, as we shall see below). For example, it would be highly implausible to contend that Henri Cartier-Bresson’s famous photographic work, “Behind the Gare Saint-Lazare, Paris” (1932), consists in the negative used to make prints, or in the first or any other single print of this picture. Multiply instantiated works form one major category, then, while singular or non-reproducible ones form another."
Multiple vs. singular artistic items:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/art- ... ngArtiItem
Given the distinction between
(abstract) types and
(concrete) tokens, one could argue that—provided this distinction is meaningfully applicable to it at all—an artwork
qua type is necessarily unique (non-reproducible, non-repeatable), but there can be many reproducible or repeatable tokens of it. To use the above example, one could argue that Cartier-Bresson's photography “Behind the Gare Saint-Lazare, Paris” is a unique artwork-type that can have many printed tokens.
Unfortunately, given this line of argumentation, you have the ontological problem that Cartier-Bresson's photography thereby becomes an
abstract object—and how could he have created an abstract object? Note that the film negative he doubtless created is not itself an abstract object, but a concrete, material one!
Type-token distinctions:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/art- ... peTokeDist
Types and Tokens:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/types-tokens/
gad-fly wrote: ↑September 9th, 2022, 10:14 pmc. Its creation arises from the desire to exhibit an idea, but not to serve a function in the first place.
Take paintings of war, rape, destruction. etc. You cannot call them beautiful, even if you can recognize them as works of art.
What if an artist creates a scary sculpture and puts it in his garden for the main purpose of deterring evil spirits? Here function comes first!