Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[SteveKlinko]

Good OP. Helpful to see all those ideas organised. I think there's a fair bit of overlap between them, eg. I see little difference between GWT and emergence. The idea is, as I understand it, that the neuronal structure needed for consciousness as we know it has emerged, evolved. Like the others, it's just a guess, though.

As regard your question about panpsychism, as I understand it, the units of mind are reflexes. Numerous small reflexes and automatic responses, with entire suites of reflexes responsive to emotions and conscious executive control.

Could be. All speculations are on the table when it comes to Consciousness.

More than could be. There is not much else that is capable of comprising consciousness. Try to think of just one other.

I can think of a totally different perspective where Conscious Experience is Experienced in a Conscious Mind that exists in some sort of Conscious Space. Very speculative but as good as anything I have seen so far.

[Sy Borg]

Good OP. Helpful to see all those ideas organised. I think there's a fair bit of overlap between them, eg. I see little difference between GWT and emergence. The idea is, as I understand it, that the neuronal structure needed for consciousness as we know it has emerged, evolved. Like the others, it's just a guess, though.

As regard your question about panpsychism, as I understand it, the units of mind are reflexes. Numerous small reflexes and automatic responses, with entire suites of reflexes responsive to emotions and conscious executive control.

Could be. All speculations are on the table when it comes to Consciousness.

More than could be. There is not much else that is capable of comprising consciousness. Try to think of just one other.

I can think of a totally different perspective where Conscious Experience is Experienced in a Conscious Mind that exists in some sort of Conscious Space. Very speculative but as good as anything I have seen so far.

That idea would come under panpsychism, or even religion.

I have a similar "wild idea", that this is not the first ever universe, but perhaps there have been many before us, maybe even trillions or more. What if a species in one of those previous universes kept evolving and advancing without dying out - right through the trillion-year star forming era and beyond, ultilising the remaining black holes to advance further? They would transcend biology and become so advanced that they can solve every existential threat that the universe threw at them/it. So, when the next big bang arrives, they/it would continue on, seemingly immaterial to us, still in the background of our own universe.

[Consul]

This is probably the most misunderstood Einstein quotation:

"The distinction between past, present, and future is only an illusion, however persistent."
[Letter to Michelangelo Besso, 21 March 1955]

In this interview Tim Maudlin (a philosopher of physics) explains why there is a misunderstanding:

https://youtu.be/hC3ckLqsL5M?t=500

I think the interviewee interprets Einstein to fit his own opinions.

No, he doesn't!

Is it realistic to posit that Einstein was just telling sweet lies - a scientist devoted to correct understandings? Would you say something that you knew was untrue or misleading to comfort a grieving friend? That would be simply patronising and disrespectful behaviour between adults.

Yes, that is "realistic", because, as Maudlin explains, what Einstein writes in that informal letter of condolence (or something else to the same effect) is nowhere to be found in any of his scientific publications.

Note that Einstein also said: "Time and space are modes by which we think and not conditions in which we live".

Source please!
Anyway, as far as I know, Einstein was a realist about space and time (united as absolute spacetime) rather than a Kantian idealist about it.

[Consul]

Anyway, as far as I know, Einstein was a realist about space and time (united as absolute spacetime) rather than a Kantian idealist about it.

Einstein's relationship to Kant seems more complicated than I thought; so I need to do more research.
See e.g. this (downloadable) paper: https://www.researchgate.net/publicatio ... n_and_Kant

[Sy Borg]

This is probably the most misunderstood Einstein quotation:

"The distinction between past, present, and future is only an illusion, however persistent."
[Letter to Michelangelo Besso, 21 March 1955]

In this interview Tim Maudlin (a philosopher of physics) explains why there is a misunderstanding:

https://youtu.be/hC3ckLqsL5M?t=500

I think the interviewee interprets Einstein to fit his own opinions.

No, he doesn't!

Oh yes he does! And it appears you do too.

Is it realistic to posit that Einstein was just telling sweet lies - a scientist devoted to correct understandings? Would you say something that you knew was untrue or misleading to comfort a grieving friend? That would be simply patronising and disrespectful behaviour between adults.

Yes, that is "realistic", because, as Maudlin explains, what Einstein writes in that informal letter of condolence (or something else to the same effect) is nowhere to be found in any of his scientific publications.

Note that Einstein also said: "Time and space are modes by which we think and not conditions in which we live".

Source please!

Alyesa Forsee, Albert Einstein, Theoretical Physicist (p 81)

The above quote makes your claim that Einstein was merely telling condescending lies to cheer up a friend look rather shaky. The additional quote rather suggests that Einstein was offering his friend a particular angle of his conceptions of time and space that he found comforting - but it wasn't a patronising lie, as you claim. That would be little better than saying "She's in heaven with Jesus now".

Also note that there are other unconventional quotes by Einstein that his more orthodox followers tend to ignore, dismissing them as the whimsy of an eccentric genius while treating his technical work as gospel. It's simply cherry-picking, not unlike Christians with the Bible, focusing on the parts they like and forgetting the bits they don't like.

Anyway, as far as I know, Einstein was a realist about space and time (united as absolute spacetime) rather than a Kantian idealist about it.

Why would you assume that the only possible options are orthodoxy and idealism?

[Consul]

Note that Einstein also said: "Time and space are modes by which we think and not conditions in which we live".

Source please!

Alyesa Forsee, Albert Einstein, Theoretical Physicist (p 81)

Thanks! I'd like to read the context within which that statement occurs, but unfortunately I have no access to Forsee's book.
Anyway, I doubt that Einstein really disbelieved in the objective reality of space&time (spacetime).

The above quote makes your claim that Einstein was merely telling condescending lies to cheer up a friend look rather shaky. The additional quote rather suggests that Einstein was offering his friend a particular angle of his conceptions of time and space that he found comforting - but it wasn't a patronising lie, as you claim. That would be little better than saying "She's in heaven with Jesus now".

Maudlin's point is that it's simply not part of Einstein's scientific theories that time as such or the distinction between the past, the present, and the future is unreal.

Anyway, as far as I know, Einstein was a realist about space and time (united as absolute spacetime) rather than a Kantian idealist about it.

Why would you assume that the only possible options are orthodoxy and idealism?

Well…

QUOTE>
"The reciprocal relationship of epistemology and science is of noteworthy kind. They are dependent upon each other. Epistemology without contact with science becomes an empty scheme. Science without epistemology is—insofar as it is thinkable at all—primitive and muddled. However, no sooner has the epistemologist, who is seeking a clear system, fought his way through to such a system, than he is inclined to interpret the thought-content of science in the sense of his system and to reject whatever does not fit into his system. The scientist, however, cannot afford to carry his striving for epistemological systematic that far. He accepts gratefully the epistemological conceptual analysis; but the external conditions, which are set for him by the facts of experience, do not permit him to let himself be too much restricted in the construction of his conceptual world by the adherence to an epistemological system. He therefore must appear to the systematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous opportunist: he appears as realist insofar as he seeks to describe a world independent of the acts of perception; as idealist insofar as he looks upon the concepts and theories as the free inventions of the human spirit (not logically derivable from what is empirically given); as positivist insofar as he considers his concepts and theories justified only to the extent to which they furnish a logical representation of relations among sensory experiences. He may even appear as Platonist or Pythagorean insofar as he considers the viewpoint of logical simplicity as an indispensable and effective tool of his research."

(Einstein, Albert. "Remarks to the Essays Appearing in this Collective Volume." In Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, 663-688. New York: MJF Books, 1970. pp. 683-4)
<QUOTE

[Consul]

You're wrong insofar as GWT does try to explain consciousness. For example, Peter Carruthers argues that "the [global-workspace] theory can provide a fully reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness." "…This chapter shows how global-workspace theory can be developed into a satisfying, fully reductive, explanation of phenomenal consciousness." (Human and Animal Minds, Oxford UP, 2019, pp. 96+116)

We are at a stalemate on this then because I disagree, or at least do not understand how GWT explains anything about the Conscious Experience of Redness, the Standard A Tone, the Salty Taste, and etc. I have read about GWT. Especially, please Explain how Redness is Explained by this.

I read Carruthers' book, but I still know too little about GWT's technical details; so you'll have to consult GWT experts for an answer (especially Bernard Baars and Stanislas Dehaene).

Chalmers is one of those who think that GWT fails to provide reductive explanations of subjective experiences:

QUOTE>
"Baars brings all sorts of experimental evidence to bear in establishing his main thesis: consciousness is a kind of global workspace in a distributed system of intelligent information processors. When processors gain access to the global workspace, they broadcast a message to the entire system, as if they had written it on a blackboard. The contents of the global workspace are the contents of consciousness.

Baars uses this model to explain a remarkable number of properties of human processing. The model provides a very suggestive framework for explaining a subject's access to information, and its role in attention, reportability, voluntary control, and even the development of a self-concept. The global workspace framework is therefore well suited to explaining consciousness in its whole bundle of psychological senses. There is at least a general theory of awareness on offer.

But there is no reductive explanation of experience to be found here. The question of why these processes should give rise to experience is simply not addressed. One might suppose that according to the theory, the contents of experience are precisely the contents of the workspace. But even if this is so, nothing internal to the theory explains why it is that the information within the global workspace is experienced. The best the theory can do is to say that the information is experienced because it is globally accessible. But now the question arises in a different form: Why should global accessibility give rise to conscious experience? This bridging question is not addressed in Baar's work."

(Chalmers, David J. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. p. 112)
<QUOTE

[Consul]

We are at a stalemate on this then because I disagree, or at least do not understand how GWT explains anything about the Conscious Experience of Redness, the Standard A Tone, the Salty Taste, and etc. I have read about GWT. Especially, please Explain how Redness is Explained by this.

I read Carruthers' book, but I still know too little about GWT's technical details; so you'll have to consult GWT experts for an answer (especially Bernard Baars and Stanislas Dehaene).

Two questions:

"Generic Consciousness: What conditions/states N of nervous systems are necessary and (or) sufficient for a mental state, M, to be conscious as opposed to not?
…
Specific Consciousness: What neural states or properties are necessary and/or sufficient for a conscious perceptual state to have content X rather than Y?"

The Neuroscience of Consciousness: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cons ... roscience/

Does the global (neuronal) workspace theory answer these questions? It gives a reductionistic answer to the question of generic consciousness, but I don't know if it also gives (detailed) reductionistic answers to questions concerning specific consciousness such as sensations of red.

See e.g.: Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis

[Consul]

…which is to say that only the (introspective) illusion of conscious experience exists, and that conscious experience (itself) doesn't exist.

Your last sentence is in line with the usual reasoning on Illusionism but I find it to be fairly Incoherent. The Illusion of Conscious Experience exists but the the Conscious Experience itself does not exist. What????!!! Could you elaborate on that?

I'm not saying that illusionism is coherently comprehensible, but one thing is clear—and illusionists such as Keith Frankish are aware of this: For the sake of consistency, the "illusion of phenomenality" in question cannot be an experiential or phenomenal illusion. That is, it cannot consist in a deceptive subjective experience or appearance; for if it did, illusionism would be self-refuting. So it seems that illusionists must use "illusion" in the sense of "false belief": Phenomenal consciousness is an illusion in the sense that we are fooled by nonphenomenal introspective representations into falsely believing in its existence.

"Of course, it is essential to this approach that the posited introspective representations are not themselves phenomenally conscious ones. It would be self-defeating to explain illusory phenomenal properties of experience in terms of real phenomenal properties of introspective states."

(Frankish, Keith. "Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness." In Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, edited by Keith Frankish, 11-39. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2017. p. 14)

[Sy Borg]

Note that Einstein also said: "Time and space are modes by which we think and not conditions in which we live".

Source please!

Alyesa Forsee, Albert Einstein, Theoretical Physicist (p 81)

Thanks! I'd like to read the context within which that statement occurs, but unfortunately I have no access to Forsee's book.
Anyway, I doubt that Einstein really disbelieved in the objective reality of space&time (spacetime).

The above quote makes your claim that Einstein was merely telling condescending lies to cheer up a friend look rather shaky. The additional quote rather suggests that Einstein was offering his friend a particular angle of his conceptions of time and space that he found comforting - but it wasn't a patronising lie, as you claim. That would be little better than saying "She's in heaven with Jesus now".

Maudlin's point is that it's simply not part of Einstein's scientific theories that time as such or the distinction between the past, the present, and the future is unreal.

Disagree. Einstein was pointing out that the way we perceive reality is not actually how it works; it's just a perception (unspoken: perceptions of mammals evolved to survive and breed, not to perceive actual reality).

Anyway, as far as I know, Einstein was a realist about space and time (united as absolute spacetime) rather than a Kantian idealist about it.

Why would you assume that the only possible options are orthodoxy and idealism?

Well…

QUOTE>
"The reciprocal relationship of epistemology and science is of noteworthy kind. They are dependent upon each other. Epistemology without contact with science becomes an empty scheme. Science without epistemology is—insofar as it is thinkable at all—primitive and muddled. However, no sooner has the epistemologist, who is seeking a clear system, fought his way through to such a system, than he is inclined to interpret the thought-content of science in the sense of his system and to reject whatever does not fit into his system. The scientist, however, cannot afford to carry his striving for epistemological systematic that far. He accepts gratefully the epistemological conceptual analysis; but the external conditions, which are set for him by the facts of experience, do not permit him to let himself be too much restricted in the construction of his conceptual world by the adherence to an epistemological system. He therefore must appear to the systematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous opportunist: he appears as realist insofar as he seeks to describe a world independent of the acts of perception; as idealist insofar as he looks upon the concepts and theories as the free inventions of the human spirit (not logically derivable from what is empirically given); as positivist insofar as he considers his concepts and theories justified only to the extent to which they furnish a logical representation of relations among sensory experiences. He may even appear as Platonist or Pythagorean insofar as he considers the viewpoint of logical simplicity as an indispensable and effective tool of his research."

(Einstein, Albert. "Remarks to the Essays Appearing in this Collective Volume." In Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, 663-688. New York: MJF Books, 1970. pp. 683-4)
<QUOTE

Yet both could be more wrong than they ever imagined was possible. If our conceptions of reality are fundamentally flawed due to limitations in evolved animal senses and brains, the debates between epistemologists and scientists might simply be debates about reality's meta content. One can never quite be certain, given the significant gaps in our knowledge as regards the nature of reality.

[SteveKlinko]

Could be. All speculations are on the table when it comes to Consciousness.

More than could be. There is not much else that is capable of comprising consciousness. Try to think of just one other.

I can think of a totally different perspective where Conscious Experience is Experienced in a Conscious Mind that exists in some sort of Conscious Space. Very speculative but as good as anything I have seen so far.

That idea would come under panpsychism, or even religion.

I have a similar "wild idea", that this is not the first ever universe, but perhaps there have been many before us, maybe even trillions or more. What if a species in one of those previous universes kept evolving and advancing without dying out - right through the trillion-year star forming era and beyond, ultilising the remaining black holes to advance further? They would transcend biology and become so advanced that they can solve every existential threat that the universe threw at them/it. So, when the next big bang arrives, they/it would continue on, seemingly immaterial to us, still in the background of our own universe.

Yes, I have also thought of that one. But I think we will need to exist as Conscious Minds only. I don't see continuation of any Physical manifestations of ourselves surviving through a Big Bang cycle.

[SteveKlinko]

You're wrong insofar as GWT does try to explain consciousness. For example, Peter Carruthers argues that "the [global-workspace] theory can provide a fully reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness." "…This chapter shows how global-workspace theory can be developed into a satisfying, fully reductive, explanation of phenomenal consciousness." (Human and Animal Minds, Oxford UP, 2019, pp. 96+116)

We are at a stalemate on this then because I disagree, or at least do not understand how GWT explains anything about the Conscious Experience of Redness, the Standard A Tone, the Salty Taste, and etc. I have read about GWT. Especially, please Explain how Redness is Explained by this.

I read Carruthers' book, but I still know too little about GWT's technical details; so you'll have to consult GWT experts for an answer (especially Bernard Baars and Stanislas Dehaene).

Chalmers is one of those who think that GWT fails to provide reductive explanations of subjective experiences:

QUOTE>
"Baars brings all sorts of experimental evidence to bear in establishing his main thesis: consciousness is a kind of global workspace in a distributed system of intelligent information processors. When processors gain access to the global workspace, they broadcast a message to the entire system, as if they had written it on a blackboard. The contents of the global workspace are the contents of consciousness.

Baars uses this model to explain a remarkable number of properties of human processing. The model provides a very suggestive framework for explaining a subject's access to information, and its role in attention, reportability, voluntary control, and even the development of a self-concept. The global workspace framework is therefore well suited to explaining consciousness in its whole bundle of psychological senses. There is at least a general theory of awareness on offer.

But there is no reductive explanation of experience to be found here. The question of why these processes should give rise to experience is simply not addressed. One might suppose that according to the theory, the contents of experience are precisely the contents of the workspace. But even if this is so, nothing internal to the theory explains why it is that the information within the global workspace is experienced. The best the theory can do is to say that the information is experienced because it is globally accessible. But now the question arises in a different form: Why should global accessibility give rise to conscious experience? This bridging question is not addressed in Baar's work."

(Chalmers, David J. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. p. 112)
<QUOTE

That's a good quote, and it confirms that GWT does not Explain Conscious Experience. But since it cannot Explain Conscious Experience I say it does not Explain Consciousness in general either. I don't even really think there is some sort of Generalized Consciousness thing. It is always and only some sort of Conscious Experience. The Primacy of Conscious Experience must be appreciated.

[SteveKlinko]

We are at a stalemate on this then because I disagree, or at least do not understand how GWT explains anything about the Conscious Experience of Redness, the Standard A Tone, the Salty Taste, and etc. I have read about GWT. Especially, please Explain how Redness is Explained by this.

I read Carruthers' book, but I still know too little about GWT's technical details; so you'll have to consult GWT experts for an answer (especially Bernard Baars and Stanislas Dehaene).

Two questions:

"Generic Consciousness: What conditions/states N of nervous systems are necessary and (or) sufficient for a mental state, M, to be conscious as opposed to not?
…
Specific Consciousness: What neural states or properties are necessary and/or sufficient for a conscious perceptual state to have content X rather than Y?"

The Neuroscience of Consciousness: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cons ... roscience/

Does the global (neuronal) workspace theory answer these questions? It gives a reductionistic answer to the question of generic consciousness, but I don't know if it also gives (detailed) reductionistic answers to questions concerning specific consciousness such as sensations of red.

See e.g.: Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis

Let me ask a question to your questions: What is General or Generic Consciousness as a separate thing from Conscious Experience?

[SteveKlinko]

…which is to say that only the (introspective) illusion of conscious experience exists, and that conscious experience (itself) doesn't exist.

Your last sentence is in line with the usual reasoning on Illusionism but I find it to be fairly Incoherent. The Illusion of Conscious Experience exists but the the Conscious Experience itself does not exist. What????!!! Could you elaborate on that?

I'm not saying that illusionism is coherently comprehensible, but one thing is clear—and illusionists such as Keith Frankish are aware of this: For the sake of consistency, the "illusion of phenomenality" in question cannot be an experiential or phenomenal illusion. That is, it cannot consist in a deceptive subjective experience or appearance; for if it did, illusionism would be self-refuting. So it seems that illusionists must use "illusion" in the sense of "false belief": Phenomenal consciousness is an illusion in the sense that we are fooled by nonphenomenal introspective representations into falsely believing in its existence.

"Of course, it is essential to this approach that the posited introspective representations are not themselves phenomenally conscious ones. It would be self-defeating to explain illusory phenomenal properties of experience in terms of real phenomenal properties of introspective states."

(Frankish, Keith. "Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness." In Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, edited by Keith Frankish, 11-39. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2017. p. 14)

I just think Illusionism is Insane Denial of the purpose for Conscious Experience. The Conscious Visual Experience, for example, helps us to not walk into walls and not walk off cliffs during the day. If the Experience had no basis in any kind of reality we would be effectively blind. That beautiful High Resolution Wide Screen full Color Visual Experience that is embedded in the front of our faces is how we are able to safely move around in the world. The Conscious Visual Experience is the last stage of Processing in the Visual Processing chain.

[Pattern-chaser]

If a particular Brain activity does not result in some kind of Conscious Experience, then it is irrelevant.

Consider yourself, consciously and deliberately, deciding to move your arm. Before the moment you make your conscious decision, your nonconscious mind has already initiated the action.

I think it's a mistake to consider our minds to be limited to the 'conscious mind' and/or consciousness. There's a lot more going on than that.