Philosophy Discussion Forums

arjand wrote: ↑May 2nd, 2021, 10:40 pm Do you believe in intrinsic existence without mind? Do you believe that mind has a cause within the scope of physical reality?

Yes and yes. I'm a realist and a physicalist (aka "materialist").

If your answer is yes to both, how is it possible to not believe in determinism?

Determinism hasn't been a standard view in the sciences for well over 100 years. Why it persists on boards like this I don't know . .. well, or I suppose I do know, and it's because people on boards like this aren't very familiar with the conventional wisdom of contemporary science. Not that that conventional wisdom would have to be correct, of course, but realist/physicalist yet non-deterministic views shouldn't be novel to anyone.

To make a choice that wasn’t merely the next link in the unbroken chain of causes, you’d have to be able to stand apart from the whole thing, a ghostly presence separate from the material world yet mysteriously still able to influence it. But of course you can’t actually get to this supposed place that’s external to the universe, separate from all the atoms that comprise it and the laws that govern them. You just are some of the atoms in the universe, governed by the same predictable laws as all the rest.

Again, this isn't actually the conventional wisdom in the sciences and it hasn't been for well over 100 years. I think it's at least 140 years now since that sort of view has been the conventional wisdom.

Just for a bit more info, for one, especially on the philosophical side of things, not every realist (in general) is a realist on physical laws. That is, you can believe that an external world exists, that we are bodies in a physical world, etc., while not believing that objective (extramental) physical laws exist per se--especially because physical laws per se would have to exist as real abstracts somehow, and many of us reject the proposition of there being ANY real abstracts. Real abstracts that somehow arch over or rule over many particulars would particularly be difficult to square with physicalism.

Another alternative, however, if one still buys that there are real physical laws per se--and this is a very common belief in the sciences in the last century plus, is that some physical laws are probabilistic in nature (ontologically so, not just epistemically so) rather than deterministic.

arjand wrote: ↑May 2nd, 2021, 6:51 pm

Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑April 28th, 2021, 9:41 am

arjand wrote: ↑April 28th, 2021, 8:09 am The cited study shows that all particles in the Cosmos are entangled by their 'identical nature'.

Are we saying here that all collections of identical particles are intrinsically a Bose-Einstein condensate?

Can you please explain in more detail (e.g. with references) how the quality Non-Uniqueness would be explained/applicable with Bose-Einstein condensate?

No, I'm afraid I can't. This topic seems to be suggesting that all identical particles exhibit (quantum) entanglement. As far as I know, the only example of this is a Bose-Einstein condensate - a collection of particles that are all quantum-entangled. All I'm asking is whether this is the subject of this topic, or whether the "entanglement" mentioned is something else entirely. I'm seeking to understand the question, not proffering an answer.

Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑May 3rd, 2021, 8:39 amNo, I'm afraid I can't. This topic seems to be suggesting that all identical particles exhibit (quantum) entanglement. As far as I know, the only example of this is a Bose-Einstein condensate - a collection of particles that are all quantum-entangled. All I'm asking is whether this is the subject of this topic, or whether the "entanglement" mentioned is something else entirely. I'm seeking to understand the question, not proffering an answer.

What is implied with the cited study, is 'entangled by identical nature', which is different from entanglement between an amount of particles.

If entanglement (non-locality) on the basis of 'identical nature' or kind is possible, what would it imply about reality? This is essentially the subject of the discussion.

The part about the history of the Big Bang theory/religion was merely added to show that the idea that the Universe is infinite may be suppressed for religious or other motives. If that would be the case, then it may be important to be aware of that when investigating the potential implications of the cited study.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 3rd, 2021, 8:27 am

arjand wrote: ↑May 2nd, 2021, 10:40 pm Do you believe in intrinsic existence without mind? Do you believe that mind has a cause within the scope of physical reality?

Yes and yes. I'm a realist and a physicalist (aka "materialist").

The idea that facts are outside the scope of a perspective (i.e., that facts are valid without philosophy) necessarily lays at the basis of the idea that reality is 'real'. At question would be if the 'magical' belief that lays at the basis of that idea can possibly be valid. If it is proven otherwise then ontological realism would lose its ground.

You explained before that within the view of ontological realism there are just two options available to explain a fact or existent: it either magically sprung into existence, or it magically always existed. You reasoned the following conclusion:

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑April 28th, 2021, 5:01 pm Those are the only two options, and they're both counterintuitive. Nevertheless, there's no other choice.

If both options for an explanation for your idea are considered counterintuitive, then, from the ontological realism perspective that you represent, there is a strong clue that something is likely wrong.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 3rd, 2021, 8:27 am

If your answer is yes to both, how is it possible to not believe in determinism?

Determinism hasn't been a standard view in the sciences for well over 100 years. Why it persists on boards like this I don't know . .. well, or I suppose I do know, and it's because people on boards like this aren't very familiar with the conventional wisdom of contemporary science. Not that that conventional wisdom would have to be correct, of course, but realist/physicalist yet non-deterministic views shouldn't be novel to anyone.

That's not correct. See debatingfreewill.com for an example (2021, by professors Daniel C. Dennet and Gregg D. Caruso).

https://www.amazon.com/Rejecting-Retrib ... ks&sr=1-14 (2021)

Psychiatry is an example of a science that is based on the idea that the human mind is a product of the building blocks of reality. As can be seen in that field, there is a serious movement that intends to replace the retributive criminal justice system with preventative psychiatric measures, and they're actually winning because it is very easy to denounce a 'belief' in free will.

Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑May 3rd, 2021, 8:39 amThis topic seems to be suggesting that all identical particles exhibit (quantum) entanglement. As far as I know, the only example of this is a Bose-Einstein condensate - a collection of particles that are all quantum-entangled. All I'm asking is whether this is the subject of this topic, or whether the "entanglement" mentioned is something else entirely.

arjand wrote: ↑May 3rd, 2021, 9:55 am What is implied with the cited study, is 'entangled by identical nature', which is different from entanglement between an amount of particles.

OK.

arjand wrote: ↑May 3rd, 2021, 9:55 am If entanglement (non-locality) on the basis of 'identical nature' or kind is possible, what would it imply about reality?

That QM, science's most successful theory ever, is wrong?

arjand wrote: ↑May 3rd, 2021, 9:57 am At question would be if the 'magical' belief that lays at the basis of that idea . . .

C'mon, be serious.

You explained before that within the view of ontological realism there are just two options available to explain a fact or existent: it either magically sprung into existence, or it magically always existed.

That has nothing to do with realism. It logically exhausts the possibilities for existents period, real, ideal, physical, nonphyhsical, whatever they might be. For any initial existent, either it always existed or it "came from nothing." There are no other logical possibilities. If we're talking about something that's not an initial existent, then other existents could create it as a third option.

If both options for an explanation for your idea are considered counterintuitive, then, from the ontological realism perspective that you represent, there is a strong clue that something is likely wrong.

Again, that wasn't at all about realism. It applies to everything.

That's not correct.

Yeah, it is. I didn't say anything like 100% of scientists/whatever have this view. But it's correct that determinism hasn't been the conventional wisdom in a long time.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 3rd, 2021, 3:55 pm

arjand wrote: ↑May 3rd, 2021, 9:57 am At question would be if the 'magical' belief that lays at the basis of that idea . . .

C'mon, be serious.

Is it not 'magical' to assume that an 'existent', which is to be considered of possessing a certain quality that justifies the idea 'objective reality', either always existed or "came from nothing"?

What exactly is the legitimization for the assumption that an existent is 'real' if it is not a belief or 'magical thinking'?

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 3rd, 2021, 3:55 pm That has nothing to do with realism. It logically exhausts the possibilities for existents period, real, ideal, physical, nonphyhsical, whatever they might be. For any initial existent, either it always existed or it "came from nothing." There are no other logical possibilities. If we're talking about something that's not an initial existent, then other existents could create it as a third option.

My argument is that the error is made to exclude the observer (mind) from the consideration. The idea that an 'existent' has a certain quality that requires a cause, is at question.

One has merely the begin of a pattern as ground for the assumption that an 'existent' is real (a certainty), which is empirical (a retro-perspective).

A pattern (value) cannot be the origin of itself. The begin that is introduced by pattern recognition (the observing mind) is necessarily the begin of the world itself. Any inference within the scope of a pattern cannot be evidence of anything 'real'.

You once mentioned the following:

arjand wrote: ↑January 31st, 2021, 10:58 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 26th, 2021, 11:29 am There are a number of curious things here.

First, why would "what causes reality to exist" be necessary for knowing whether there is reality? (Keeping in mind that by "reality" here we're referring to the objective world.)

Because without such knowledge, one can pose anything, from 'random chance' to 'illusion' to 'magic' to a simulation by aliens. Such a situation does not allow one to make a claim that poses that reality is 'real'.

Before one can assume an 'existent' to have a certain quality that allows one to consider it to be objectively real, it will be important to be able to answer the fundamental questions such as "why does the existent exist?" (i.e. what can explain causality).

When you have to admit that there are just two possible options for an explanation, and that both options are counter-intuitive, perhaps something is wrong with the idea of objective reality / ontological realism.

Recent scientific studies confirm that the concept objective reality may not be valid.

(2019) Quantum physics: objective reality doesn't exist
Clearly these are all deeply philosophical questions about the fundamental nature of reality. Whatever the answer, an interesting future awaits.
https://phys.org/news/2019-11-quantum-p ... oesnt.html

arjand wrote: ↑May 4th, 2021, 1:22 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 3rd, 2021, 3:55 pm

arjand wrote: ↑May 3rd, 2021, 9:57 am At question would be if the 'magical' belief that lays at the basis of that idea . . .

C'mon, be serious.

Is it not 'magical' to assume that an 'existent', which is to be considered of possessing a certain quality that justifies the idea 'objective reality', either always existed or "came from nothing"?

What exactly is the legitimization for the assumption that an existent is 'real' if it is not a belief or 'magical thinking'?

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 3rd, 2021, 3:55 pm That has nothing to do with realism. It logically exhausts the possibilities for existents period, real, ideal, physical, nonphyhsical, whatever they might be. For any initial existent, either it always existed or it "came from nothing." There are no other logical possibilities. If we're talking about something that's not an initial existent, then other existents could create it as a third option.

My argument is that the error is made to exclude the observer (mind) from the consideration. The idea that an 'existent' has a certain quality that requires a cause, is at question.

One has merely the begin of a pattern as ground for the assumption that an 'existent' is real (a certainty), which is empirical (a retro-perspective).

A pattern (value) cannot be the origin of itself. The begin that is introduced by pattern recognition (the observing mind) is necessarily the begin of the world itself. Any inference within the scope of a pattern cannot be evidence of anything 'real'.

You once mentioned the following:

arjand wrote: ↑January 31st, 2021, 10:58 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 26th, 2021, 11:29 am There are a number of curious things here.

First, why would "what causes reality to exist" be necessary for knowing whether there is reality? (Keeping in mind that by "reality" here we're referring to the objective world.)

Because without such knowledge, one can pose anything, from 'random chance' to 'illusion' to 'magic' to a simulation by aliens. Such a situation does not allow one to make a claim that poses that reality is 'real'.

Before one can assume an 'existent' to have a certain quality that allows one to consider it to be objectively real, it will be important to be able to answer the fundamental questions such as "why does the existent exist?" (i.e. what can explain causality).

When you have to admit that there are just two possible options for an explanation, and that both options are counter-intuitive, perhaps something is wrong with the idea of objective reality / ontological realism.

Recent scientific studies confirm that the concept objective reality may not be valid.

(2019) Quantum physics: objective reality doesn't exist
Clearly these are all deeply philosophical questions about the fundamental nature of reality. Whatever the answer, an interesting future awaits.
https://phys.org/news/2019-11-quantum-p ... oesnt.html

??? First, you seem to not be getting, or to simply be ignoring (maybe because you're objecting to it, but you're not very well explaining just what the objection is supposed to be) that "initial existents either always existed or 'came from nowhere'" is NOT ABOUT REALISM. It's a truism about whatever existents we posit, real, ideal, whatever.

I mean, I just explained that in the post you're responding to, but you're not addressing it, and you're instead continuing to double-down on the misconception that it's something unique to realism.

Why are you doing that? Why did I bother explaining to you that that was nothing particularly about realism if you're just going to ignore the correction?

If you disagree that it's not just about realism (although you'd be disagreeing with what I had in mind in my comments, but we can ignore that), then you need to provide an argument as to why it would just be about realism and that other ontological posits would avoid it.

Again, this is why I don't like posting lengthy comments on these boards. Even when we try to keep things simple and just deal with one issue at a time, people just gloss over it, they don't address the one, simple issue, they don't address points made, they don't answer questions. Why would anyone type 50 different issues that are not going to be addressed, questions that are not going to be answered, things that are just going to be glossed over, when a single, simple thing isn't even dealt with?

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 4th, 2021, 6:16 pm ??? First, you seem to not be getting, or to simply be ignoring (maybe because you're objecting to it, but you're not very well explaining just what the objection is supposed to be) that "initial existents either always existed or 'came from nowhere'" is NOT ABOUT REALISM. It's a truism about whatever existents we posit, real, ideal, whatever.

There is something that precedes the assumption that there are just 'two options' to explain an existent. It is ontological realism at the core, the idea that an existent is 'real' and requires a cause (the idea that it either 'always existed' or 'came from nowhere').

What I intended to denote is that you hold 'objective reality' as something non-disputable while that idea is based on the belief that underlays ontological realism. That underlying belief is questionable.

You previously mentioned the following, which provides evidence:

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 4th, 2021, 6:16 pm First, why would "what causes reality to exist" be necessary for knowing whether there is reality? (Keeping in mind that by "reality" here we're referring to the objective world.)

The fact that you consider that there are just two possible options to explain an existent, and that it applies to any ontological theory, including ontological idealism, and that you find those two options 'counter intuitive', indicates that the underlying belief or assumption that 'objective reality' is something to assume within any context of thinking, may be wrong.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 4th, 2021, 6:20 pm I mean, I just explained that in the post you're responding to, but you're not addressing it, and you're instead continuing to double-down on the misconception that it's something unique to realism.

Why are you doing that? Why did I bother explaining to you that that was nothing particularly about realism if you're just going to ignore the correction?

As mentioned, the idea that an 'existent' is real (and thus a start point for explaining the fundamental nature of reality), is based on the belief that underlays ontological realism. It is the belief that objective reality is ultimately something non-disputable within any context of thinking.

The error is perhaps to be found in the idea that causality ultimately applies to any attempt to explain the fundamental nature of reality. As shown in the OP, many major philosophers have used causality to conclude that the Universe must have had a begin or "First Cause".

My argument has been that a "First Cause" cannot logically exist, because a begin implies the start of a pattern and a pattern is bound by observation, thus, the observer (mind) must precede reality and cannot have a begin.

The cited study in the OP indicates that 'entanglement by kind' is possible. This could be a major clue to explain the fundamental nature of reality.

arjand wrote: ↑May 5th, 2021, 12:49 pm There is something that precedes the assumption that there are just 'two options' to explain an existent. It is ontological realism at the core, the idea that an existent is 'real' and requires a cause (the idea that it either 'always existed' or 'came from nowhere').

This isn't right, though.

If we're limiting our domain of discourse to the ideal, as opposed to the real, we're still talking about existents, we're just talking about ideal existents rather than real existents.

And there's no "requirement for a cause." The options are that either an initial existent suddenly appeared, with no cause, or otherwise it always existed--again where they would obviously be no cause for that.

What I'm talking about here is rather a metaphysical "first principle"--a logical necessity for existents. Metaphysics and ontology are by no means limited to the real universe of discourse, but it is limited (by definition), to existing entities, whatever they may be.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 5th, 2021, 5:06 pm

arjand wrote: ↑May 5th, 2021, 12:49 pm There is something that precedes the assumption that there are just 'two options' to explain an existent. It is ontological realism at the core, the idea that an existent is 'real' and requires a cause (the idea that it either 'always existed' or 'came from nowhere').

This isn't right, though.

If we're limiting our domain of discourse to the ideal, as opposed to the real, we're still talking about existents, we're just talking about ideal existents rather than real existents.

Idealism has several forms, and some of those pose that reality doesn't exist. When the origin of what is named 'reality' is conscious mind, then, one can reason that whatever that can be indicated as 'existent' is merely meaning within the scope of a perception.

Within modern philosophy there are sometimes taken to be two fundamental conceptions of idealism:

1. something mental (the mind, spirit, reason, will) is the ultimate foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of reality, and
2. although the existence of something independent of the mind is conceded, everything that we can know about this mind-independent “reality” is held to be so permeated by the creative, formative, or constructive activities of the mind (of some kind or other) that all claims to knowledge must be considered, in some sense, to be a form of self-knowledge.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/

The simple logical truth that something cannot be the origin of itself makes it obvious that a pattern or value cannot be the origin of consciouss mind, and thus, that when one refers to an 'existent' within the scope of a perception, one is not subjected to it either magically being sprung out of nothing, or magically always existed, as the two only options for an explanation.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 5th, 2021, 5:06 pmAnd there's no "requirement for a cause." The options are that either an initial existent suddenly appeared, with no cause, or otherwise it always existed--again where they would obviously be no cause for that.

Your explicit notion that both options for an explanation of an existent are 'counter-intuitive' indicates that the requirement for a cause is assumed within the frame of thinking that gives rise to the idea that those two options are the only available options to explain an existent.

The following provides evidence. You have excluded the requirement for a 'cause' based on the assumption that 'objective reality' is to be considered non-disputable.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 4th, 2021, 6:16 pm First, why would "what causes reality to exist" be necessary for knowing whether there is reality? (Keeping in mind that by "reality" here we're referring to the objective world.)

The certainty that one assumes by means of conscious experience (e.g. your notion that it is not required to know the cause of reality to know that it is real, when it concerns 'objective reality') originates from perceived value (a pattern), which is a retro-perspective and cannot provide evidence of existence.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 5th, 2021, 5:06 pm What I'm talking about here is rather a metaphysical "first principle"--a logical necessity for existents. Metaphysics and ontology are by no means limited to the real universe of discourse, but it is limited (by definition), to existing entities, whatever they may be.

When you argue that an existent necessarily exists and thus is subject to a "first principle", then you are referring to ontological realism. The term necessity when it concerns ontology is equal to 'real'.

The notion "first principle" indicates an existent by itself, similar to the requirement of a "First Cause" in causality. (causality is a first principle). At question would be if the assumption that gives rise to the idea that such a principle (or 'existent') is required to explain the fundamental nature of reality, is valid.

Is it valid to believe that based on conscious experience, one can pose that 'objective reality' is (non-disputably) real?

One has merely the begin of a pattern to ground the assumption that existence is a certainty, which is empirical (a retro-perspective) and not evidence of anything 'real'.

arjand wrote: ↑May 5th, 2021, 6:40 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 5th, 2021, 5:06 pm

arjand wrote: ↑May 5th, 2021, 12:49 pm There is something that precedes the assumption that there are just 'two options' to explain an existent. It is ontological realism at the core, the idea that an existent is 'real' and requires a cause (the idea that it either 'always existed' or 'came from nowhere').

This isn't right, though.

If we're limiting our domain of discourse to the ideal, as opposed to the real, we're still talking about existents, we're just talking about ideal existents rather than real existents.

Idealism has several forms, and some of those pose that reality doesn't exist. When the origin of what is named 'reality' is conscious mind, then, one can reason that whatever that can be indicated as 'existent' is merely meaning within the scope of a perception.

Within modern philosophy there are sometimes taken to be two fundamental conceptions of idealism:

1. something mental (the mind, spirit, reason, will) is the ultimate foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of reality, and
2. although the existence of something independent of the mind is conceded, everything that we can know about this mind-independent “reality” is held to be so permeated by the creative, formative, or constructive activities of the mind (of some kind or other) that all claims to knowledge must be considered, in some sense, to be a form of self-knowledge.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/

The simple logical truth that something cannot be the origin of itself makes it obvious that a pattern or value cannot be the origin of consciouss mind, and thus, that when one refers to an 'existent' within the scope of a perception, one is not subjected to it either magically being sprung out of nothing, or magically always existed, as the two only options for an explanation.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 5th, 2021, 5:06 pmAnd there's no "requirement for a cause." The options are that either an initial existent suddenly appeared, with no cause, or otherwise it always existed--again where they would obviously be no cause for that.

Your explicit notion that both options for an explanation of an existent are 'counter-intuitive' indicates that the requirement for a cause is assumed within the frame of thinking that gives rise to the idea that those two options are the only available options to explain an existent.

The following provides evidence. You have excluded the requirement for a 'cause' based on the assumption that 'objective reality' is to be considered non-disputable.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 4th, 2021, 6:16 pm First, why would "what causes reality to exist" be necessary for knowing whether there is reality? (Keeping in mind that by "reality" here we're referring to the objective world.)

The certainty that one assumes by means of conscious experience (e.g. your notion that it is not required to know the cause of reality to know that it is real, when it concerns 'objective reality') originates from perceived value (a pattern), which is a retro-perspective and cannot provide evidence of existence.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 5th, 2021, 5:06 pm What I'm talking about here is rather a metaphysical "first principle"--a logical necessity for existents. Metaphysics and ontology are by no means limited to the real universe of discourse, but it is limited (by definition), to existing entities, whatever they may be.

When you argue that an existent necessarily exists and thus is subject to a "first principle", then you are referring to ontological realism. The term necessity when it concerns ontology is equal to 'real'.

The notion "first principle" indicates an existent by itself, similar to the requirement of a "First Cause" in causality. (causality is a first principle). At question would be if the assumption that gives rise to the idea that such a principle (or 'existent') is required to explain the fundamental nature of reality, is valid.

Is it valid to believe that based on conscious experience, one can pose that 'objective reality' is (non-disputably) real?

One has merely the begin of a pattern to ground the assumption that existence is a certainty, which is empirical (a retro-perspective) and not evidence of anything 'real'.

The comment isn't a means of suggesting what might exist. One might want to posit meaning, or mind, or whatever, and one might want to posit that as the sole (sort of) existent that occurs. Whatever one posits, one has to posit some sort of existent (which can be just a process of whatever--there's no limit on what it could be). Among whatever one posits as existing, there will be some initial existent(s)--perhaps everything one posits, perhaps just some subset. Those initial existents either suddenly just started existing, with no cause (otherwise they couldn't just suddenly start existing and they wouldn't be the initial existents) or they simply always existed.

If you can think of another logical option there, present it.

Those two options are counterintuitive simply because it's difficult for us to imagine if not even make sense of things just spontaneously "popping" into existence "out of nothing" (hence the off-repeated "something can't come from nothing" as if that notion is inarguable) and it's difficult for us to imagine if not even make sense out of infinite backwards temporal extension.

Again, and it's very annoying that I need to keep repeating this, what I'm writing here has absolutely nothing to do with assuming that there is anything objective. You're simply unable to comprehend what writing if you keep thinking that.

Dammit, I just can't avoid typos on this board, especially when posting from my kindle: "oft-repeated" that should have been.