Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Steve3007]

I think "emergence" is the concept you mean.

OK, close enough. I wouldn't want to get bogged down in another one of those word definition arguments that often happen here. The key point, to me, is simply to emphasize that a materialist or physicalist worldview doesn't entail stating that everything can be worked out simply by observing the movements of bits of matter, or physical stuff, flying around. Physics is at the base of a tower of disciplines. You can't use physics to predict the outcome of a horse-race (or else physicists would be a lot richer) but that doesn't mean that horses aren't made from physical matter.

[Terrapin Station]

...Any non-instantaneous collision between two objects requires the kinetic energy of those objects to be temporarily converted to potential energy during the collision process. There is a non-zero period of time during which their relative movement (their relative kinetic energy) reduces to zero and kinetic energy is converted to potential energy. In an instantaneous collision there isn't. So this is the only kind of interaction that literal materialism allows.

...and yet instantaneous/impulsive collisions (or any other instantaneous process) are abstract concepts. They don't exist in the real world for the same reason that dimensionless points don't exist in the real world. Therefore literal materialism, if it doesn't allow the real existence of fields and associated potential energy, appears to me to be self-contradictory.

You didn't respond to my earlier post on response to this. Why couldn't we just realize that conservation is simply a theoretical convention?

[Gertie]

Sculptor

.

Heh. That's a bit bold for me.

Two separate issues there really - all we can know directly for certain is our mental experience. But materialism might still be true.

Then there's the issue that even if material stuff exists, we still don't have a handle on how it could explain mental experience. There are speculations - for example mental experience might be a novel emergent property of complex material processes which we find in brains. Or the monist notion that mental experience is physical brain processes.

But then again we might be living in a panpsychic world, or a dualist world, or an Idealist world, or something we haven't thought of. And nobody knows how to test such hypotheses.

Nothing is going to "explain" the world of experience, ever. All we can do is describe it and show where it comes from.

Where 'it comes from' is the field of philosphy of mind. If you're a monist substance materialist you claim experience is reducible to physical processes. And need to make your case. If you say it's inexplicable you should just say that, and agree that materialism is one possibility amongst who knows how many, or perhaps the best model we can hope for.

Sounds like you agree with me that we don't know. Is it impossible to ever know? I'm not sure.

Since we can only have our world of experience to understand our world of experience we are the photographed, the photo and the photographer. Its an endless cycle that it is impossible to break out of.

Yeah it's a conundrum. I think it means we can each only be certain of our own experience. But if we take the leap to assume that our experiences are telling us something about a real world beyond them, we can make better or worse models. Further exploration of the brain might find some 'bridging mechanism', or if we could create sentient AI that could give us clues. That would add weight to materialism, if it shows how it can potentially explain that consciousness is manifested by physical processes. Currently we just have correlation. Or philosophy might come up with a convincing hypothesis.

All we know right now, is that damage and changes to the brain make equal and compensurate changes to aspect of the mind, indivisibly. Physical forces, drugs traumas, all have their effects.
Describing these things in detail has given us amazing insights into the working of the brain/mind.
But like all science, it is fundementally descriptive.

Yes but explanations can be posited from descriptions, and tested. As we get to the more fundamental explanations, and possible explanations underlying the current scientific model, is where testing is a problem.

Dualism is an outdated and empty theory, based on ancient notions of soul. It's not helpful.

The idea of souls arose because people recognised there seemed to be two separate (irreducible) kinds of stuff in the world. Maybe there is.

[Terrapin Station]

Yes. This is what is meant when it is stated that materialism is the view that the only existents are matter and things that supervene on matter. That is how the concept of "supervention" is used. It roughly means that a relatively complex physical system, such as the H2O in your example, can be more than simply the sum of its parts while still not physically consisting of anything other than its parts. At least that's my understanding of supervention in the context of materialism and physicalism.

I'm not sure that someone who believes in emergence in that sense (the sense of there being something emergent that's "more than the sum of the parts") would count as a materialist. There's typically some ambiguity there that needs to be worked out though, namely in just what counts as "parts." Emergence in a robust sense can amount to epiphenomenalism, which isn't materialism.

As a materialist, I don't agree with emergence in that more robust sense. I consider "parts" to be matter, relations and processes (processes are changing relations). As I noted above, I also do not agree with saying that matter "has" properties, as if matter is something different from properties, that matter can then possess or not. Properties are another way of talking about matter/relations/processes. It's not something aside from them.

Supervenience is a way of talking about properties that only obtain when we have specific matter/relations/processes, properties that wouldn't obtain if one of those three aspects were sufficiently different.

[Steve3007]

Why couldn't we just realize that conservation is simply a theoretical convention?

Yes, we could propose that. So then I guess when a real (as opposed to ideal) collision happens between two material objects we'd have to say that some or all of their kinetic energy temporarily disappears and then appears again for reasons that have nothing to do with what is ontologically the case? As far as I'm concerned, we might as well also say the same kind of thing about the existence of matter. Theoretical conventions like this aren't just mathematical games. They describe the apparent behaviour of the world.

[Terrapin Station]

Why couldn't we just realize that conservation is simply a theoretical convention?

Yes, we could propose that. So then I guess when a real (as opposed to ideal) collision happens between two material objects we'd have to say that some or all of their kinetic energy temporarily disappears and then appears again for reasons that have nothing to do with what is ontologically the case? As far as I'm concerned, we might as well also say the same kind of thing about the existence of matter. Theoretical conventions like this aren't just mathematical games. They describe the apparent behaviour of the world.

Why can't we simply say that in a collision, say if A collides with B, A loses energy, and B gains energy after the collision? (We wouldn't need the "kinetic"/"potential" distinction on this view, although we could still use it if you like.) Why would we say this has nothing to do with what is the case ontologically?

Maybe you can think of a real-world observation where the above wouldn't work for some reason?

[Steve3007]

I'm not sure that someone who believes in emergence in that sense (the sense of there being something emergent that's "more than the sum of the parts") would count as a materialist. There's typically some ambiguity there that needs to be worked out though, namely in just what counts as "parts." Emergence in a robust sense can amount to epiphenomenalism, which isn't materialism.

By "more than the sum of the parts" here I'm talking about behaviours which are a function of the relationships between different parts/objects/atoms of a collective entity, like Marvin's example of H2O, and which are not a function of the individual properties of individual parts. As I said to Marvin in my subsequent posts, whatever we call it (supervention, emergence or something else), I think the point is simply to emphasize that whatever building blocks we decide that the world is made from, that doesn't mean we're claiming that we can describe the behaviour of the world in all its complexity just be examining those building blocks. That's why we have a tower of disciplines, with physics at the base, and why, being at the base, naked physics is not actually much use for accurately describing anything of any serious complexity, as the well known joke about physicists trying to predict the outcome of horse races illustrates.

As a materialist, I don't agree with emergence in that more robust sense. I consider "parts" to be matter, relations and processes (processes are changing relations).

OK.

As I noted above, I also do not agree with saying that matter "has" properties, as if matter is something different from properties, that matter can then possess or not. Properties are another way of talking about matter/relations/processes. It's not something aside from them.

Since it's a standard linguistic convention, I don't see any particular problem with saying that matter has properties provided it's clear that, in talking about the properties of matter, we're not talking about something that can somehow be detached from the matter as if it's a separate thing in its own right. As noted previously, you regard energy in this sense and that's why you regard it as incoherent to talk of energy in the absence of matter. It is incoherent, if that is how we regard energy.

Supervenience is a way of talking about properties that only obtain when we have specific matter/relations/processes, properties that wouldn't obtain if one of those three aspects were sufficiently different.

OK.

[Steve3007]

Why can't we simply say that in a collision, say if A collides with B, A loses energy, and B gains energy after the collision?

Because that would only work for an ideal collision in which the energy remains as kinetic energy for the whole time. In real world collisions, the kinetic energy of A is temporarily converted into potential energy, which our literal materialism says doesn't exist.

Maybe you can think of a real-world observation where the above wouldn't work for some reason?

A rubber ball bouncing on the floor during which a point comes when the rubber ball is stationary with respect to the floor but is distorted in such a way that the kinetic energy which it previously had is temporarily stored as electrostatic potential energy due to its constituent atoms being slightly closer together than their equilibrium positions.

[Terrapin Station]

By "more than the sum of the parts" here I'm talking about behaviours which are a function of the relationships between different parts/objects/atoms of a collective entity, like Marvin's example of H2O, and which are not a function of the individual properties of individual parts. As I said to Marvin in my subsequent posts, whatever we call it (supervention, emergence or something else), I think the point is simply to emphasize that whatever building blocks we decide that the world is made from, that doesn't mean we're claiming that we can describe the behaviour of the world in all its complexity just be examining those building blocks. That's why we have a tower of disciplines, with physics at the base, and why, being at the base, naked physics is not actually much use for accurately describing anything of any serious complexity, as the well known joke about physicists trying to predict the outcome of horse races illustrates.

Sure, it's just worth noting that a lot of people use the concept of "emergence" in a stronger way than that, where they're suggesting a sort of epiphenomenalism. So we need to clarify just what people have in mind when they bring up that idea.

If we consider relationships and processes parts, and we don't buy any sort of epiphenomenalism, then nothing is more than the sum of its parts.

It's an issue where those different views are all popular enough that it requires clarification when it's mentioned casually.

Since it's a standard linguistic convention, I don't see any particular problem with saying that matter has properties provided it's clear that, in talking about the properties of matter, we're not talking about something that can somehow be detached from the matter as if it's a separate thing in its own right.

Sure. We just have to be careful because it's common enough in philosophy to see matter and properties as something that can be separated. (And that's especially the case with "secondary properties," when people buy a primary/secondary property distinction.)

[Terrapin Station]

Because that would only work for an ideal collision in which the energy remains as kinetic energy for the whole time. In real world collisions, the kinetic energy of A is temporarily converted into potential energy, which our literal materialism says doesn't exist.

That's only the case if one has a background belief that energy MUST remain constant. But why would we think this? What observation would suggest that energy MUST remain constant?

A rubber ball bouncing on the floor during which a point comes when the rubber ball is stationary with respect to the floor but is distorted in such a way that the kinetic energy which it previously had is temporarily stored as electrostatic potential energy due to its constituent atoms being slightly closer together than their equilibrium positions.

First, the ball is stationary with respect to the floor as long as we ignore the ball's shape and internal structure, but it's not actually stationary with respect to the floor if we don't ignore the ball's shape and internal structure--and the floor's shape and internal structure. As you note, the ball is distorted because its constituent parts, including its molecules/atoms and their component parts are in motion (as is the floor).

But let's say we ignore all of that. The ball has energy n. Let's say it hits the floor and it momentarily (per whatever other changes we use as a reference) stationary. And then it is in motion again, with energy m. What in that observation would make the explanation "The ball collides with B, whereupon it LOSES ENERGY, and then the ball GAINS ENERGY AFTER the collision" not work? Where are we observing something different than that?

You're positing a theoretical, not an observational, statement, based on the background belief that energy must remain constant. That's different than observing something that doesn't fit what I wrote (re losing energy and then gaining energy after the collision).

[Steve3007]

Because that would only work for an ideal collision in which the energy remains as kinetic energy for the whole time. In real world collisions, the kinetic energy of A is temporarily converted into potential energy, which our literal materialism says doesn't exist.

That's only the case if one has a background belief that energy MUST remain constant.

No, it's the case because it's observed to be the case, just as the non-disappearance of objects (conservation of matter) is observed to be the case. Or at least, if this is only the case as a result of a "background belief" then so is pretty much everything else.

Conversation of energy, like other conversation laws, isn't a "background belief" in the sense of being an article of faith. It exists (and stands or falls) as a result of observation. So it exists in exactly the same sense that my belief exists that there is an object in front of me if my eyes detect light hitting them in particular ways. That could be called a "background belief" in the same sense.

Like all proposed universal natural laws, conversation of energy is a generalization from specific observations and therefore it's perfectly possible that it might turn out not to be universal after all. Just as conservation of matter might turn out not to be universal and it might turn out that objects can disappear into "thin air". But so far it hasn't. Likewise with energy.

But why would we think this? What observation would suggest that energy MUST remain constant?

Wrong way round. Observations don't tell us that energy MUST remain constant. The principle that energy remains constant comes from the observations, and each observation either fits with or invalidates that principle. If it invalidates it, the principle is replaced.

The kind of observation which suggests that energy has remained constant again in this case (and that therefore the principle can stay) is the one that shows the existence of potential energy that we are discussing in relation to the rubber ball hitting the ground: observation of objects or their constituent parts being in particular relative positions/configurations.

Relative motion of objects or of their constituent parts indicates the presence of relative kinetic energy. You're not directly seeing kinetic energy; you're seeing motion. Relative positions/configurations of objects or of their constituent parts indicates the presence of potential energy. Again, you're not directly seeing potential energy; you're seeing the positions of things.

Of course, you could dispense with the notions of both kinetic and potential energy just as you could dispense with the notion of objects in front of you. You could decide that the sensation of light hitting your eyes in particular ways is not a result of the presence of objects in front of you. You could decide that objects moving relative to each other doesn't constitute the existence of kinetic energy relative to each other. You could decide that objects being in particular relative spatial configurations doesn't constitute the existence of relative potential energy. But if we do any of these things we break a pattern. And we've observed in the past that patterns persist and are useful in helping us to decide what to regard as extra-mentally existing. If we're not interested in the patterns then we're not interested in anything existing. It's just disconnected sensations.

If we take away just the potential energy from ontological reality, then we've decided that objects in collision just stop for some period of time and then start again for no apparent reason. We have no way of knowing for how long they're going to do this. And in numerous other situations, we've thereby decided that there are holes in reality where we've no idea what's going to happen next, or when. We could do the same with the objects themselves. We could take them away from ontological reality and say that various images appear to us for no apparent reason and that any theories we have of objects reflecting light into eyes are just theoretical constructs. Or we could decide that objects stop existing in reality, and become just theoretical constructs, when we can't see them. Why would we want to do that? If we don't want to do that with the objects that we theorize that we're indirectly observing, why do we want to do it with the potential energy that we theorize that we're indirectly observing?

First, the ball is stationary with respect to the floor as long as we ignore the ball's shape and internal structure, but it's not actually stationary with respect to the floor if we don't ignore the ball's shape and internal structure--and the floor's shape and internal structure...

It is stationary with respect to the floor regardless of what we ignore or don't ignore about its shape. The things to which we do or don't direct our attention don't determine the state of motion of the ball.

...As you note, the ball is distorted because its constituent parts, including its molecules/atoms and their component parts are in motion (as is the floor).

It's distorted shape doesn't tell us that it is in motion. At this point it isn't in motion. It's distorted shape constitutes evidence that it was in motion in the recent past and will be again in the near future. Of course, it might not have been. It might simply have adopted this shape spontaneously for no reason. But we've observed so far that rubber balls don't do that. We've observed patterns in their behaviour. Part of the way that we express our observation of that kind of behaviour is through conservation of energy.

But let's say we ignore all of that. The ball has energy n. Let's say it hits the floor and it momentarily (per whatever other changes we use as a reference) stationary. And then it is in motion again, with energy m. What in that observation would make the explanation "The ball collides with B, whereupon it LOSES ENERGY, and then the ball GAINS ENERGY AFTER the collision" not work? Where are we observing something different than that?

What makes that observation not work is the same thing that makes this observation not work: "The ball doesn't exist. The light hitting my eyes didn't bounce off a ball. It just appeared immediately in front of me.". Where are we observing something different from that? We're not. But we don't believe it because it doesn't fit a consistent pattern with other things that we've observed. Likewise, the idea that the ball just loses some energy and then gains some again doesn't contradict what is observed here but it's not a useful position to take because it doesn't fit a pattern.

You're positing a theoretical, not an observational, statement, based on the background belief that energy must remain constant. That's different than observing something that doesn't fit what I wrote (re losing energy and then gaining energy after the collision).

If I'm doing that, then we're all doing that for everything, including objects. If I say that there is an object in front of me I'm positing a theoretical based on the "background belief" that light hitting my eyes in particular ways must be reflected off something.

[Jklint]

Mind is what the brain creates. Where else is it supposed to come from?

Yes, the mind is what the brain does. Like legs in motion creates walking or running, like water falling from the sky creates rain; the brain in action creates mind.
The mind is wholly dependant on the brain as is evident.

I can't see how it's possible to argue that but there always those who will try.

[Terrapin Station]

No, it's the case because it's observed to be the case,

Sure, so what would you give as an example of an observation of:

(1) conservation of energy,
and
(2) potential energy?

That is, where we're literally observing conservation of energy or potential energy?

[Steve3007]

(2) potential energy?

Relative motion of objects or of their constituent parts indicates the presence of relative kinetic energy. You're not directly seeing kinetic energy; you're seeing motion. Relative positions/configurations of objects or of their constituent parts indicates the presence of potential energy. Again, you're not directly seeing potential energy; you're seeing the positions of things.

If we considered observing objects moving relative to each other to constitute observing kinetic energy then observing objects' relative positions would constitute observing potential energy.

(1) conservation of energy

Noticing that the sums of the energies we observe remain constant. Similar to observing conservation of matter by noticing objects not appearing or disappearing without trace and, if we're being more quantitative about it, measuring their masses.

Would you consider these things to count as "observation"? Or would you think of them as indirect inferences, based on a combination of background beliefs and things we do actually observe? If the latter, would you apply the same to observations of objects? i.e. we could say that we don't observe objects but we infer their existence, based on the background belief that particular patterns passing across our retinas are caused by the existence of objects.

[Terrapin Station]

If we considered observing objects moving relative to each other to constitute observing kinetic energy then observing objects' relative positions would constitute observing potential energy.

So you'd say that relative position is identical to potential energy?

(1) conservation of energy

Noticing that the sums of the energies we observe remain constant. Similar to observing conservation of matter by noticing objects not appearing or disappearing without trace and, if we're being more quantitative about it, measuring their masses.
[/quote]

Both of those cases are only the observation of a particular. But conservation is a general claim, not a claim about particulars.

If the latter, would you apply the same to observations of objects? i.e. we could say that we don't observe objects but we infer their existence, based on the background belief that particular patterns passing across our retinas are caused by the existence of objects.

You can't get to "I have retinas" if you can't observe objects, can you? So no. Idealism/solipsism isn't the default.