Faustus
Welcome to the board by-the-way
Gertie wrote: ↑
Yesterday, 6:43 pm
That's still slippery imo, because it's not just that we 'describe' a conscious experience, it exists regardless of whether we describe it.
His position is that the task of explaining consciousness is merely to explain how people come to have the beliefs that they do regarding their inner experiences. So our descriptions of what it is like to have an experience are the only raw data we have to work with.
And my position is that I have the experience of a pain in my toe whether or not I then go to see a doctor who asks me to describe that pain. The experience's existence is not dependant on describing it to someone else, its reality is known from a 'direct' first person perspective.
Well, not the only--button presses, brain scans, pulse rates and the like can also be added to the ledger. I should maybe open up a page on the chapter where he talks about the heterphenomenological method in Consciousness Explained.
The problem is that brain scans etc are measuring correlated physical processes, but we don't know the nature of the correlation.
To privilege this over direct experience because it's inherently private and therefore isn't readily amenable to our usual shared/public/observable/measurable materialist methodologies, and then calling directly known experiential states an 'illusion', is **** backwards. It's saying that if a phenomenon isn't apparently amenable to our current materialist scientific method, then trust the method rather than what you directly know to exist. Akin to trying to cram a square peg into a comfortably familiar round hole, by claiming the corners are illusions.
Or, we can say this looks like a problem which presents a novel challenge where our reliable old scientific toolkit might not be up to the task. I'm with Chalmers on that.
I'm happy to give any link you think helpful a go, but I find Dennett frustrating to read and hopeless at constructing a coherent case for his flashy claims.
Gertie wrote: ↑
Yesterday, 6:43 pm
And it's not 'in much the same way' as an icon of a file 'represents' the physical processes. The file icon is a symbol, mental experiences are things in themselves with their own specific types of properties.
We'll have to agree to disagree on this one. I really think he's right here, and that mental states and experiences are genuinely symbolic and representative in nature.
Well, those words can be used in different ways. We can functionally frame experiential states as representations of physical sensory processes for example. Photons hitting the retina, which cause a network of neural processes somehow resulting in me experiencing an image of a red apple. It wouldn't be controversial to frame that experience of seeing a red apple as a symbolic representation of the world I'm interacting with. Or even a symbolic representaion of that entire physical interactive process. Because we have discovered a correlation.
But that doesn't make the experience of seeing a red apple in itself any less real. With its own particular properties which aren't accounted for in a simultaneous physical description. I don't see how a picture of a file on a screen is comparable.