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[anonymous66]

Thanks for the info on Integrated Information Theory (IIT). That looks interesting, and I've never heard of it. If the wiki page is correct, proponents of IIT start by accepting that consciousness is real.

[Consul]

Jack Smart was an Identity Theorist. His argument was that mental states/events/process in phenomenal consciousness were identical (in a strict sense of the word) with neural states/events/processessin the brain.

No one disputes that mental states/events/processess that are experienced in phenomenal (waking/dream) consciousness are correlated with biological brain states/events/process like neuronal firing, etc. But to claim a strict relationship of identity between the two is utter madness.

What Smart is saying , in short,is that if you are having a dream one night of, say, a bright yellow bird flying through a park, then that yellow dream bird( which , BTW, does exist as genuine component of reality - i.e. does actually exist as a thing while you are dreaming it) is identical to a bunch of firing neurons etc; in some particular part of your brain. But living nerve tissue in your brain is never bright yellow in colour, it has no beak or feathers nor any wings, right ? End of story.

No, the identity theory cannot be dismissed that easily!

As for your example, your first mistake is to suppose that when you dream of a yellow bird, a yellow bird "does exist as [a] genuine component of reality"/"does actually exist as a thing". Of course, you can dream of an existent/real bird that you know; but no matter whether or not the bird you're dreaming of exists/is real, dreams of birds don't contain birds but mental images, in this case dream images of birds. A mental bird-image is not a bird; and of course it doesn't have bird features such as feathers and wings.

What is a mental image? Imagination is the (reconstructive or freely creative) simulation of sensation/sensory perception. To use Hume's famous distinction between "impressions and ideas", with Humean ideas being mental images, that is to say that mental images are (complexes of) simulated sense-impressions or sense-qualities such as (phenomenal) colors (e.g. (phenomenal) yellow). So to imagine a yellow bird is to simulate seeing one; and to simulate seeing a yellow bird is to experience a complex of certain simulated sense-qualities or quasi-percepts such as an imaginative (phenomenal) yellow. Now the important point is that the imaginative/simulative sense-qualities of which mental images are composed may well be identical to (complex or structural) physical properties of brains.

[Consul]

J.J. "Jack" Smart became famous overnight after he published a paper called "Are Sensations Brain Processes". This paper was a masterful exercise in rhetoric - in semantic gymnastics - but the bottom line is that qualia like, say phenomenal red ( i.e. the perception in consciousness of the colour red) are not identical in any strict sense with biological brain matter. It is that simple. To argue that they are is nonsense.

Of course, to say that phenomenal properties (qualia) are identical to "brain matter", i.e. to neurons or neural tissue, is to commit an ontological category mistake, since properties (qualities/attributes/features) aren't things (objects/substances) or stuffs; but that's not what reductive materialists (materialist identity theorists) say. What they say is that phenomenal properties are identical to (and composed of) physical/neurological properties of brains, and there's nothing nonsensical about saying so.

[Consul]

What [reductive materialists] say is that phenomenal properties are identical to (and composed of) physical/neurological properties of brains, and there's nothing nonsensical about saying so.

To be more precise, among the reductive materialists there are both internalists and externalists about qualia. According to materialist qualia internalism ("cerebralism" or "endocephalism"), qualia are in the head/brain, being (complex/structural) neurophysiological properties of the CNS. According to materialist qualia externalism, qualia are not in the head/brain, because they are physical properties of perceived external objects. For example, phenomenal colors are identified with physical microstructural properties of the surfaces of objects seen.

(I find qualia externalism very implausible, because there is a relevant distinction between physical colors and phenomenal colors. The former may be reductively identifiable with microphysical properties of brain-external material surfaces, but the latter are not.)

"The theory that I would like to uphold is that the secondary qualities are to be identified with the properties of objects as they begin to be revealed to us by the advance of scientific knowledge. Consider the blue surface of the mouse pad that I have beside my computer. It presents itself as a fairly uniform darkish blue surface with very small white specks in the pattern. I want to accept that the surface is for the most part blue. Perception presents us with the blueness as an objective property of something in the world and I think we should accept this, accept that the blue colour is in the world qualifying the pad. Science presents us with an apparently very different account involving light waves interacting with the fine structure of the physical surface of the pad reflecting light waves into my eyes. But I want to identify the colour surface with what the physicists tell us is going on there. It is a second identity theory alongside the identity of mental processes with brain processes."

(Armstrong, D. M. Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. pp. 109)

See: Color > Reductive Color Physicalism

[Consul]

Thanks for the info on Integrated Information Theory (IIT). That looks interesting, and I've never heard of it. If the wiki page is correct, proponents of start by accepting that consciousness is real.

Here's a short introduction written by the man who is the father of ITT, Giulio Tononi: http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Int ... ion_theory

Also see: IIT in the IEP

[Gertie]

If the assumption is that the physical is what is real, and consciousness reduces to the physical... then consciousness must be some kind of illusion created by physical "stuff".

If the thinking is that both the physical and consciousness are real, as Consul seems to imply, then that sounds like dualism. And that is what seems likely to me. Property dualism- consciousness is a basic property of this universe that we find ourselves in. It's not a complete theory. But it's a theory worth pursuing. Consciousness is certain. If I know anything I know I'm conscious.

Right. Not many philosophers suggest consciousness (or to be precise experiential states) aren't real, because duh, you and I directly know they are (at least I do, and that's all anyone can say with absolute certainty). The Churchlands put forward Eliminative Materialism, and Dennett ambiguously flirts with consciousness as an 'illusion', but one thing each of us is certain of is that experiential states exist.

If we assume that the content of our experiential states (what we perceive) relates to a real, existing world 'out there' which we share, then we can compare notes and come to shared/objective knowledge of it. There's no way of knowing if my green is your blue (the 'inverted qualia' issue) because experiential states are inherently private/subjective, but never-the-less we can objectively/sharedly agree that when I point to a green apple you see it too, and we can have a coherent shared language for what we see. That's our basis for 'justified true belief', or objective empiricism. Which the scientific method builds on. (We know our sensory and cognitive abilities are flawed and limited, evolved for utility rather than Ultimate Truth, but still we are able to create successful shared working models of the universe).

But the scientific method runs into problems when addressing experiential states, because it deals with the objective/shared/public realm of 'out there' - shared/objective, measurable 'stuff'', not the private subjective experiential realm. Hence Chalmers calls it The Hard Problem, it's not apparently amenable to our usual methods of shared/objective/empirical/scientific knowing.

So we're left with hypothesising based on what we observe. We know humans have experiential states (well I know I do and assume you do) , which appear to correlate with physical brain processes. And we know brains are the most complex things we know of. These are our major clues to understanding how experiential states might arise.

Given these clues, it seems like there are two options. Either experiential states are a fundamental and irreducible property of the universe. Or they are a novel emergent property of (perhaps but not necessarily highly complex) physical processes. For example we describe the properties of H2O molecules in a different way to how we describes the properties of ocean waves, but ocean waves are reducible to to the processes of H2O molecules. As are steam and ice, which have different emergent properties. Water, steam and ice are the conceptual equivalent of Property Dualism, novel emergent properties of H2O molecules in motion. Where-as the the hypothesis that experiential states are a fundamental property of the universe (Panpsychism) is Substance Dualism - the universe is made up of two fundamental/irreducible types of stuff - the physical and the experiential.

I'm sure you know all this, and sorry to belabour the obvious, but it leads to the problem for proponents of Emergence.

The problem for emergentists is that emergent examples like H2O and water/ice/steam are all able to be accounted for/predictable in our scientific/objective materialist model of how the universe works. Where-as that model doesn't predict that a different type of stuff, subjective experiential states, would emerge from material physical processes. So is it reasonable to analogise from the 'realm' and rules of objective/quantifiable/material stuff to that of subjective/qualiative/ immaterial states?

[anonymous66]

@Gretie
I'm not sure if we're on the same page here and defining these terms in the same way.
My understanding is as follows: Panpsychism is a form of property dualism (In this thread, I'm using the the terms interchangeably). If property dualism (PD) is true, then there is only one substance. People who adhere to PD are monists about substances, but accept property dualism. If property dualism is true, then consciousness is an irreducible property of the universe. If PD, then just as things have mass and length, they also have a consciousness (although simple objects would have a very simple form of consciousness).

Substance dualism (SD) is the theory that there is more than one substance. If SD, then there are physical substances and a mental substances. (or physical stuff and soul stuff). People who believe we have souls believe in SD.

[anonymous66]

I meant to say, "If PD then there are mental properties are an irreducible property of the universe". Consciousness is a mental property. If PD then every physical thing has mental properties and is conscious.

[Consul]

Except our scientific knowledge of the world doesn't predict or explain conscious emergence, any more than it does eg panpsychism.

Not yet, but the neuroscientists are working hard to solve the hard problem of consciousness and to close the explanatory gap between mind and brain.

Subjective experience being associated with brains is simply something we have observed. From testing for neural correlation in humans who we can pretty safely assume to have experiential states like ourselves, we can then assume that other species with similar substrates (complex organic brains) and associated correlated behaviour, have subjective experience similarish to humans.

Those assumptions based on observation of similarity make sense, but they're not an explanation which can include or exclude less similar entities.

Even if emergence (one guess) is the right way to think about the relationship between physical processes and experiential states, we don't know what processes are necessary and sufficient, or even whether the type of substate matters. And relying on recognising human-like similarities in non-human, even non-biological, processes could easily mislead us. There's no reason to expect daffodil experiential states would be anything like a human's, so looking for close similarities doesn't help. Likewise computers, rocks, China or the whole universe.

As I already said, there's no reason to expect there to be such a phenomenon as plant experience. Arguably, all experiential states are states of animal brains, and the basic structure and function of animal nervous systems is always the same: they are all networks of electrochemically interacting neurons. (This is not to say that there are no differences at all between human brains and other animal brains.)

Of course, a myriad of neural processes take place in nervous systems, only some (kinds) of which are both necessary and sufficient for consciousness; and these neural correlates or mechanisms of consciousness haven't yet been identified with sufficient precision and in sufficient microscopic detail. But, again, the neuroscientists are working on it!

For suggested solutions to the problem of other (conscious) minds, see:

Other Minds > Solutions to the Problem

Also see: Animal Consciousness

Analogical inferences to other (conscious) minds are epistemologically problematic, yet justifiably possible (even if they don't yield objective certainties but only probabilities).

"Many philosophers and scientists have either argued or assumed that consciousness is inherently private, and hence that one's own experience is unknowable to others. While language may allow humans to cross this supposed gap by communicating their experience to others, this is allegedly not possible for other animals. Despite the controversy in philosophical and scientific circles, it remains a matter of common sense to most people that some animals do have conscious experiences. Most people, if asked why they think familiar animals such as their pets are conscious, would point to similarities between the behavior of those animals and human behavior — for example, animals seem to visibly express pleasure and displeasure and a variety of emotions, their behavior seems to be motivated by seeking food, comfort, social contact, etc., they seem aware of their surroundings and able to learn from experience. Similarity arguments for animal consciousness thus have roots in common sense observations. But they may also be bolstered by scientific investigations of behavior and the comparative study of brain anatomy and physiology, as well as considerations of evolutionary continuity between species. Neurological similarities between humans and other animals have been taken to suggest commonality of conscious experience; all mammals share the same basic brain anatomy, and much is shared with vertebrates more generally. Even structurally different brains may be neurodynamically similar in ways that enable inferences about animal consciousness to be drawn." (Source: see above link!)

Bottom line, without an established explanatory theory of the relationship between physical processes and experiential states (crucially the necessary and sufficient conditions), or a way to test for experiential states, any or none of current speculations could be on the right track.

The fact that our usual ways of knowing stuff (science) and our ability to test competing hypotheses don't seem to help us here, should make us cautious about claiming we know what is (currently at least) unknowable. Chalmers calls it 'the hard problem' precisely because it doesn't seem amenable to our usual methodologies. Which suggests there might well be more going on than we realise, perhaps are even equipped to recognise or understand.

The ontology of the mind and its relationship with the brain is one thing, and the epistemology of other minds is another.

The philosophy of mind/consciousness is part of what Donald Williams called speculative cosmology; but materialism/physicalism—either its emergentist or its reductionist version—is on the right track. And the assumption that all mental/experiential states are brain states cannot be called purely speculative anymore, because it's strongly supported by scientific evidence.

Mysterianism about the mind-body/brain problem might be true. We human apes might be "cognitively closed" with respect to this problem, i.e. too stupid to solve it (in a humanly intelligible way). But there's no justification for defeatism until all scientific attempts at solving the hard problem of consciousness have failed; and the neuroscience of consciousness is not at its end but at its beginning, with nobody being able to predict how explanatorily successful it will be in the future. The neuroscientists may be hundreds or thousands of years away from a successful (reductionist-materialist) solution and explanation, but this in no way means that the neuroscience of consciousness is in principle doomed to failure.

Of course, as long as the hard problem is scientifically unsolved and there are explanatory gaps, (antimaterialist) dualists can continue to cling to their wishful "dualism-of-the-gaps".

[Consul]

Mysterianism about the mind-body/brain problem might be true. We human apes might be "cognitively closed" with respect to this problem, i.e. too stupid to solve it (in a humanly intelligible way). But there's no justification for defeatism until all scientific attempts at solving the hard problem of consciousness have failed; and the neuroscience of consciousness is not at its end but at its beginning, with nobody being able to predict how explanatorily successful it will be in the future. The neuroscientists may be hundreds or thousands of years away from a successful (reductionist-materialist) solution and explanation, but this in no way means that the neuroscience of consciousness is in principle doomed to failure.

Moreover, even if human scientists should never be able to solve the hard problem and to close the explanatory gap (in reductionist-materialist terms), it wouldn't follow that no other animal species in the universe could be able to do so. Nor would it follow that reductive materialism is therefore false. There might be superhumanly intelligent nonhuman scientists on another planet who have already solved the hard problem and closed the explanatory gap.

[BigBango]

@Gretie
I'm not sure if we're on the same page here and defining these terms in the same way.
My understanding is as follows: Panpsychism is a form of property dualism (In this thread, I'm using the the terms interchangeably). If property dualism (PD) is true, then there is only one substance. People who adhere to PD are monists about substances, but accept property dualism. If property dualism is true, then consciousness is an irreducible property of the universe. If PD, then just as things have mass and length, they also have a consciousness (although simple objects would have a very simple form of consciousness).

Substance dualism (SD) is the theory that there is more than one substance. If SD, then there are physical substances and a mental substances. (or physical stuff and soul stuff). People who believe we have souls believe in SD.

I meant to say, "If PD then there are mental properties are an irreducible property of the universe". Consciousness is a mental property. If PD then every physical thing has mental properties and is conscious.

I am not that familiar with PD. I would say Nagel and Searle are "Duel Aspect" philosophers and Whitehead is, as you say, a pan psychic. However, Whitehead is a "Monist" asserting that the fundamental substrate of everything is that of "actual entities" which are conscious beings. Aristotelian Metaphysics, that we use to guide our thinking in both common language and science (the nature of physical substance e.g.), only gains a shred of credibility due to the fact that the actual entities of what we consider physical substance choose to become the same from moment to moment, therefore giving the appearance of being a substance of a particular type.

[SimpleGuy]

Thanks to BigBango i know now that mental properties are an irreducible porperty of the universe. BigBango knows what group theory is all about.

[SimpleGuy]

Thanks to BigBango i know now that mental properties are an irreducible porperty of the universe. BigBango knows what group theory is all about.

[Consul]

OK, sorry. My point is that anyone who argues Identity Theory is a plausible thesis in TOM is barking mad.

Which theory (regarding the psychophysical relationship) do you regard as plausible or the most plausible one?

[Consul]

If the thinking is that both the physical and consciousness are real, as Consul seems to imply, then that sounds like dualism.

But it isn't dualism unless consciousness is either said to be non-/hyperphysical (and thus to be physically irreducible) or said to be physical sui generis (and thus to be irreducible to the physical entities from which it emerges). The former is an "extra-materialistic" dualism, and the latter is an "intra-materialistic" dualism (= emergentistic materialism).

And that is what seems likely to me. Property dualism- consciousness is a basic property of this universe that we find ourselves in. It's not a complete theory. But it's a theory worth pursuing.

What exactly does it mean to say that "consciousness is a basic property of this universe"?

First of all, does it mean that the universe as a whole is a subject of consciousness, that there is a world-consciousness/-mind/-soul/-spirit (= holistic panpsychism/cosmopsychism), or that all or some kinds of elementary particles are subjects of consciousness (= atomistic panpsychism/micropsychism)?

What makes panpsychism qua non-emergentist/fundamentalist property dualism so utterly incredible is its absurd claim that consciousness/experience and subjects of it have always existed in the universe since the first instant after the Big Bang when there were no particles, atoms, or molecules but only a superhot plasma: https://web.njit.edu/~gary/202/Lecture26.html