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[GE Morton]

They are if any presumed differences are indiscernible.

"Discernible" there refers simply to being numerically discernible. Two instances of something(s).

Not sure to what your "there" above refers, but a discernible difference in Leibniz's sense does not mean "numerically discernible." Any two or more instances of anything are numerically discernible; else we could not know there are two instances. Your definition makes all things and instances thereof discernible, thus rendering the criterion useless and the identity of any two or more things impossible. It is another reductio ad absurdum. Leibniz speaks of numerical identity, but not "numerical discernibility." That seems to be a criterion you have invented.

Per Leibniz, two (or more) apparent things are identical if none has any discernible property not shared by all the others. That the things may be viewed at different times is irrelevant.

"1. Formulating the Principle
"The Identity of Indiscernibles (hereafter called the Principle) is usually formulated as follows: if, for every property F, object x has F if and only if object y has F, then x is identical to y. Or in the notation of symbolic logic:

"∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) → x=y."

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/iden ... scernible/

No two occurrences are literally the same, including two occurrences in time.

Every pair of occurrences occur at different times or places, by definition. Else you would not know you have a pair. Again, you render the notion of identity impossible, and the word useless.

Meanings are never objective.

Only if you consider meanings to be things "in people's heads." Which leads to your earlier reductio.

[GE Morton]

There was no claim that there was. There are two different pointing events, and of course they're not the same. But we were not talking about pointing events; the question was whether the word "dog" had the same meaning to both subjects. What is the same in the two events is the photo pointed to, indicating the referent of that word as understood by the two subjects.

You're saying if they're pointing at exactly the same time (from whose point of reference?) at the same (as in numerically just one) photo?

No. I said nothing about time. When they point to them is irrelevant. If Alfie points to the collie photo today and Bruno points to it tomorrow they attach the same meaning to the word "dog." As for whether the photos are the same from one day to the next, if Alfie can discern no differences between the photo he viewed yesterday and the one he views today, then they are the same photo.

Again, discernibility here is merely about two different times. Two different times results in two different things. Nothing is identical through time. No two "instances" of anything are identical, spatially or temporally.

"Quantum" differences are irrelevant for virtually all purposes involving a need to know whether two apparent things are, or are not, identical.

[Peter Holmes]

I've lost the plot of your disagreement with each other - so this is just a side-bar in reaction to the point about identity. Viz, talk of what we call identity - sameness and difference - is always within a descriptive context. Any things we call the same by one criterion we can call different by another criterion - without exception. Discernability and indiscernability aren't independent properties of things, because identity itself isn't a property.

Well, the point is that two pointings, two temporal instances of a photo, etc. aren't literally the same. Sameness is a judgment about resemblance.

I think you're missing the point. The expression 'literally the same' means nothing outside a descriptive context for identitiy, and therefore sameness and difference. There is no non-descriptive description. Leibniz thought - as have many philosophers for ages - that identity, sameness and difference - and so discernability - are, somehow, metaphysical things or properties that can be identified, named and described. It's an ancient delusion.

[Terrapin Station]

Well, the point is that two pointings, two temporal instances of a photo, etc. aren't literally the same. Sameness is a judgment about resemblance.

I think you're missing the point. The expression 'literally the same' means nothing outside a descriptive context for identitiy, and therefore sameness and difference. There is no non-descriptive description. Leibniz thought - as have many philosophers for ages - that identity, sameness and difference - and so discernability - are, somehow, metaphysical things or properties that can be identified, named and described. It's an ancient delusion.

If we're trying to claim extramental "sharing" based on sameness, then we've painted ourselves into a corner if the things in question aren't literally the same and instead require interpretation to judge "the same." There's nothing extramental about that.

[Peter Holmes]

I think you're missing the point. The expression 'literally the same' means nothing outside a descriptive context for identitiy, and therefore sameness and difference. There is no non-descriptive description. Leibniz thought - as have many philosophers for ages - that identity, sameness and difference - and so discernability - are, somehow, metaphysical things or properties that can be identified, named and described. It's an ancient delusion.

If we're trying to claim extramental "sharing" based on sameness, then we've painted ourselves into a corner if the things in question aren't literally the same and instead require interpretation to judge "the same." There's nothing extramental about that.

I think the 'mental/extramental distinction is meaningless, because there is no mental realm or reality. Like all supposed abstract things, the mind is a misleading fiction inherited from the bad old days when we took substance-dualism seriously.

So there is only sharing based on purely conventional, social criteria for identity - sameness and difference. There's no such thing as essential, fundamental or absolute identity, of which our judgements can be only interpretations.

[Terrapin Station]

I think the 'mental/extramental distinction is meaningless,

That's too bad, because very clearly there is a subset of brain activity that amounts to mentality, and we can be talking about that or we can be talking about the complement of it (stuff that's not that subset of brain activity that amounts to mentality).

So there is only sharing based on purely conventional, social criteria for identity - sameness and difference.

How you get from a social event like an utterance or pointing to anything like a semantic association?

[Peter Holmes]

I think the 'mental/extramental distinction is meaningless,

That's too bad, because very clearly there is a subset of brain activity that amounts to mentality, and we can be talking about that or we can be talking about the complement of it (stuff that's not that subset of brain activity that amounts to mentality).

'A subset of brain activity that amounts to mentality'? Talk about the mind and mental things fills our everyday conversations. But, to my knowledge, there's not one shred of evidence for the existence of any other than physical substance - the electro-chemical processes that constitute 'brain activity'.

So there is only sharing based on purely conventional, social criteria for identity - sameness and difference.

How you get from a social event like an utterance or pointing to anything like a semantic association?

How did you and I get to know how to use the words we're using here? Do you think something other than stimulus-response training was needed? Is the meaning of a word anything other than the way(s) we use it?

[Terrapin Station]

A subset of brain activity that amounts to mentality'? Talk about the mind and mental things fills our everyday conversations. But, to my knowledge, there's not one shred of evidence for the existence of any other than physical substance - the electro-chemical processes that constitute 'brain activity'.

Say what? I don't understand "There's not one shred of evidence for the existence of any other than physical substance." Again, mentality is a subset of brain activity. You're not thinking that I'm saying that the brain isn't physical are you?
The response is mental. Thinking about sounds, gestures, etc. and assigning mental associations to them. Meaning is those mental associations. There's nothing to "the way we use a word" that would amount to meaning on its own. They way we use words is simply via making sounds, making gestures, etc. If we don't mentally make associations with that stuff, it is nothing like meaning.

[Terrapin Station]

Oops re the quote mark-up there, lol

[Peter Holmes]

Say what? I don't understand "There's not one shred of evidence for the existence of any other than physical substance." Again, mentality is a subset of brain activity. You're not thinking that I'm saying that the brain isn't physical are you?
The response is mental. Thinking about sounds, gestures, etc. and assigning mental associations to them. Meaning is those mental associations. There's nothing to "the way we use a word" that would amount to meaning on its own. They way we use words is simply via making sounds, making gestures, etc. If we don't mentally make associations with that stuff, it is nothing like meaning.

Since what we've always called 'the mental' is actually physical - synaptic firing - there's no need to talk about 'mental associations' - or to say that what we call 'meaning' is a mental thing. The 'responses' are all physical, an there's no private mental world in which we're shut off from each other.

[Terrapin Station]

Say what? I don't understand "There's not one shred of evidence for the existence of any other than physical substance." Again, mentality is a subset of brain activity. You're not thinking that I'm saying that the brain isn't physical are you?
The response is mental. Thinking about sounds, gestures, etc. and assigning mental associations to them. Meaning is those mental associations. There's nothing to "the way we use a word" that would amount to meaning on its own. They way we use words is simply via making sounds, making gestures, etc. If we don't mentally make associations with that stuff, it is nothing like meaning.

Since what we've always called 'the mental' is actually physical - synaptic firing - there's no need to talk about 'mental associations' - or to say that what we call 'meaning' is a mental thing. The 'responses' are all physical, an there's no private mental world in which we're shut off from each other.

It's physical. But it's private, too, because what we're talking about are physical properties from the (spatio-temporal) point of reference of being the physical phenomena in question. Other people can't experience that, because they're not at the same spatio-temporal point of reference (and can not be).

[GE Morton]

If we're trying to claim extramental "sharing" based on sameness, then we've painted ourselves into a corner if the things in question aren't literally the same and instead require interpretation to judge "the same." There's nothing extramental about that.

Several times you've used the phrase, "literally the same." I suspect your meaning there is, "identical/indistinguishable in every respect." And of course, no two things are identical in that sense, or even any given thing from one moment to the next. Which fact is completely irrelevant to the issue at hand, i.e., whether Alfie and Bruno attach the same meaning to (say) the word "dog."

As Peter Homes points out, the meaning of "identical" or "same" is context-dependent; it means, "Are they the same in the respects of interest in this context, or different?" For example, an artist may contract with a printer to produce 100 signed prints of one of his paintings. The artist, the gallery owner, and the customers who view them judge them all the same; there are no differences among them of interest to any interested party. Purchasers are indifferent as to whether they are sent print #9 or #28. That there will be microscopic differences among them detectable by laboratory instruments is irrelevant.

If Alfie and Bruno point to the same photo when asked the meaning of "dog," then they share the meaning of that word. What happens in their respective heads cannot be known by anyone but them, respectively, and is irrelevant to the "shared" question. That question is answered by their behavior, not by anything "mental."

The photos pointed to are the same if the parties involved can discern no differences between presentations. Any microscopic changes which may have occurred between presentations are also irrelevant.

[Terrapin Station]

Several times you've used the phrase, "literally the same." I suspect your meaning there is, "identical/indistinguishable in every respect." And of course, no two things are identical in that sense, or even any given thing from one moment to the next. Which fact is completely irrelevant to the issue at hand, i.e., whether Alfie and Bruno attach the same meaning to (say) the word "dog."

As Peter Homes points out, the meaning of "identical" or "same" is context-dependent; it means, "Are they the same in the respects of interest in this context, or different?"

As I've pointed out many times in this case, "the same" is thus a (mentally-sourced) judgment that an individual makes. Including that the individual makes the (mentally-sourced) judgment about interest.

If Alfie and Bruno point to the same photo when asked the meaning of "dog," then they share the meaning of that word.

Which can only be the case to a (mentally-sourced) judgment about the pointing being the same, as well as a judgment about just what the pointing is making an association with--the whole dog, a dog part, a picture of an animal, etc.

What happens in their respective heads cannot be known by anyone but them, respectively, and is irrelevant to the "shared" question.

Whether it's irrelevant entirely depends on the concerns of the person making the judgment.

That question is answered by their behavior, not by anything "mental."

It's ONLY answered by someone making a judgment about their behavior, which is entirely mental.

The photos pointed to are the same if the parties involved can discern no differences between presentations.

"Discerning a difference" in that sense is a mental event, too. And it depends on the individuals involved.

[GE Morton]

How you get from a social event like an utterance or pointing to anything like a semantic association?

Public events like utterances and pointing determine whether there is a semantic association between a word and a thing, for a given person. There is no other basis for claiming that such an association exists.

[GE Morton]

As I've pointed out many times in this case, "the same" is thus a (mentally-sourced) judgment that an individual makes. Including that the individual makes the (mentally-sourced) judgment about interest.

Of course it is a judgment. And of course judgments are "mentally sourced." But the sources of judgments are irrelevant to the question of whether Alfie associates the word "dog" with a certain species of animal, exemplars of which he points out. His behavior alone answers the question of whether such an association exists. What brain processes may have been involved in establishing or mediating that association are irrelevant; no third party needs any information of that kind to know that for Alfie "dog" means some member of the canine family.

Which can only be the case to a (mentally-sourced) judgment about the pointing being the same, as well as a judgment about just what the pointing is making an association with--the whole dog, a dog part, a picture of an animal, etc.

Ah, Quine's "gavagai" problem. But that is an issue only when trying to learn an unfamiliar language. We know from Alfie's other behavior that he is fluent in English and understands its conventions. From his other behavior --- not from what may be "in his head."

Whether it's irrelevant entirely depends on the concerns of the person making the judgment.

Which judgment --- Alfie's and Bruno's, or that of the third party judging whether they share the meaning of "dog"?

We don't care about anyone's judgments until they manifest themselves in some behavior. Judgments, and all other thought processes, go on inside a "black box." All we can know about those processes is what we infer or just guess, rightly or wrongly, from behavior.