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[Terrapin Station]

I'm focusing on composition because that's exactly what I'm talking about--what things are ontically, where they're located, what they're properties of, etc. That's what's at issue here.

No, it isn't the issue. The issue is what meaning must be given "meaning" --- what it must denote --- in order for the word to be functional in communication. It does not denote marks on paper or anything in anyone's head.

You need to deal with the reductio ad absurdum pointed out earlier.

I already explained it's not a reductio because communication doesn't work anything like you believe it does. That one has an alternate view on how communication works doesn't make it a reductio just because it wouldn't make sense with your mistaken view.

You don't just willy-nilly make up some bs account of what meaning is because it fits the fiction you're creating. You have to do with what really exists, how it really works, etc.

[GE Morton]

I already explained it's not a reductio because communication doesn't work anything like you believe it does.

Perhaps you can explain how you think it works (and how you think I think it works).

Unless the meanings of words are shared by speaker and hearer linguistic communication --- transference of information --- cannot occur. Unless those meanings are publicly accessible and objectively verifiable --- if they are things "in people's heads" --- they will not, and cannot, be shared. It's as simple as that.

[Terrapin Station]

I already explained it's not a reductio because communication doesn't work anything like you believe it does.

Perhaps you can explain how you think it works (and how you think I think it works).

Unless the meanings of words are shared by speaker and hearer linguistic communication --- transference of information --- cannot occur. Unless those meanings are publicly accessible and objectively verifiable --- if they are things "in people's heads" --- they will not, and cannot, be shared. It's as simple as that.

In what sense are you using "share." Do you mean literally the same "item" being passed to someone, so that two people can somehow possess a numerically identical whatever? Do you mean "share" in a "show and tell" way--that is, a public display, without literally passing that item to someone else?

[GE Morton]

In what sense are you using "share." Do you mean literally the same "item" being passed to someone, so that two people can somehow possess a numerically identical whatever? Do you mean "share" in a "show and tell" way--that is, a public display, without literally passing that item to someone else?

Alfie and Bruno are shown, or hear, the word "dog" and are shown a card with three photos, of a collie, a Persian cat, and a giraffe, and asked which animal shown is the meaning of "dog."

Then they are shown three more photos, of a lion, a turtle, and a bulldog. They are again asked which photo shows the meaning of "dog." If they both point to the collie and bulldog photos, then their understandings of the meaning of that word is shared.

[Terrapin Station]

In what sense are you using "share." Do you mean literally the same "item" being passed to someone, so that two people can somehow possess a numerically identical whatever? Do you mean "share" in a "show and tell" way--that is, a public display, without literally passing that item to someone else?

Alfie and Bruno are shown, or hear, the word "dog" and are shown a card with three photos, of a collie, a Persian cat, and a giraffe, and asked which animal shown is the meaning of "dog."

Then they are shown three more photos, of a lion, a turtle, and a bulldog. They are again asked which photo shows the meaning of "dog." If they both point to the collie and bulldog photos, then their understandings of the meaning of that word is shared.

So "shared" refers to your abstraction/judgment about the photos (or the pointing) being "the same" on the two different instances?

[GE Morton]

Alfie and Bruno are shown, or hear, the word "dog" and are shown a card with three photos, of a collie, a Persian cat, and a giraffe, and asked which animal shown is the meaning of "dog."

Then they are shown three more photos, of a lion, a turtle, and a bulldog. They are again asked which photo shows the meaning of "dog." If they both point to the collie and bulldog photos, then their understandings of the meaning of that word is shared.

So "shared" refers to your abstraction/judgment about the photos (or the pointing) being "the same" on the two different instances?

That they both pointed to the same photos is not an "abstraction/judgment." It is an empirical fact. Why do you put the phrase "the same" in quotes? Is there a question as to what "same" means?

[Terrapin Station]

So "shared" refers to your abstraction/judgment about the photos (or the pointing) being "the same" on the two different instances?

That they both pointed to the same photos is not an "abstraction/judgment." It is an empirical fact. Why do you put the phrase "the same" in quotes? Is there a question as to what "same" means?

I'm a nominalist. We could be talking about the same photo (numerically) for both people, but their pointing can't be the same, because the pointing is numerically distinct. Bob's pointing can not be the same as Joe's pointing.

So you'd be talking about an abstract interpretation, on your part, regarding the pointing being "the same." It's not literally the same. Even if they're pointing to literally the same picture (which they'd have to be doing at exactly the same time, because identity through time doesn't hold), their pointing is numerically distinct, and the nonidentity of discernibles is the case.

[Peter Holmes]

That they both pointed to the same photos is not an "abstraction/judgment." It is an empirical fact. Why do you put the phrase "the same" in quotes? Is there a question as to what "same" means?

I'm a nominalist. We could be talking about the same photo (numerically) for both people, but their pointing can't be the same, because the pointing is numerically distinct. Bob's pointing can not be the same as Joe's pointing.

So you'd be talking about an abstract interpretation, on your part, regarding the pointing being "the same." It's not literally the same. Even if they're pointing to literally the same picture (which they'd have to be doing at exactly the same time, because identity through time doesn't hold), their pointing is numerically distinct, and the nonidentity of discernibles is the case.

I've lost the plot of your disagreement with each other - so this is just a side-bar in reaction to the point about identity. Viz, talk of what we call identity - sameness and difference - is always within a descriptive context. Any things we call the same by one criterion we can call different by another criterion - without exception. Discernability and indiscernability aren't independent properties of things, because identity itself isn't a property.

[Terrapin Station]

I'm a nominalist. We could be talking about the same photo (numerically) for both people, but their pointing can't be the same, because the pointing is numerically distinct. Bob's pointing can not be the same as Joe's pointing.

So you'd be talking about an abstract interpretation, on your part, regarding the pointing being "the same." It's not literally the same. Even if they're pointing to literally the same picture (which they'd have to be doing at exactly the same time, because identity through time doesn't hold), their pointing is numerically distinct, and the nonidentity of discernibles is the case.

I've lost the plot of your disagreement with each other - so this is just a side-bar in reaction to the point about identity. Viz, talk of what we call identity - sameness and difference - is always within a descriptive context. Any things we call the same by one criterion we can call different by another criterion - without exception. Discernability and indiscernability aren't independent properties of things, because identity itself isn't a property.

Well, the point is that two pointings, two temporal instances of a photo, etc. aren't literally the same. Sameness is a judgment about resemblance.

[GE Morton]

I'm a nominalist. We could be talking about the same photo (numerically) for both people, but their pointing can't be the same, because the pointing is numerically distinct. Bob's pointing can not be the same as Joe's pointing.

So you'd be talking about an abstract interpretation, on your part, regarding the pointing being "the same." . . .

There was no claim that there was. There are two different pointing events, and of course they're not the same. But we were not talking about pointing events; the question was whether the word "dog" had the same meaning to both subjects. What is the same in the two events is the photo pointed to, indicating the referent of that word as understood by the two subjects.

Even if they're pointing to literally the same picture (which they'd have to be doing at exactly the same time, because identity through time doesn't hold), their pointing is numerically distinct, and the nonidentity of discernibles is the case.

True, but irrelevant to the question at hand. Moreover temporal non-identity is also irrelevant to the issue, unless the differences over time are discernible.

[GE Morton]

Discernability and indiscernability aren't independent properties of things, because identity itself isn't a property.

Agree. Those terms do not ascribe properties to things; they bear on what can be known about particular things by an observer. They are epistemological, not ontological, predicates.

[GE Morton]

Well, the point is that two pointings, two temporal instances of a photo, etc. aren't literally the same.

They are if any presumed differences are indiscernible.

Sameness is a judgment about resemblance.

True. But (as mentioned before) some judgments are objective (they are objective if the propositions asserting them are objective).

[Terrapin Station]

Well, the point is that two pointings, two temporal instances of a photo, etc. aren't literally the same.

They are if any presumed differences are indiscernible.

"Discernible" there refers simply to being numerically discernible. Two instances of something(s).

No two occurrences are literally the same, including two occurrences in time.

Sameness is a judgment about resemblance.

True. But (as mentioned before) some judgments are objective (they are objective if the propositions asserting them are objective).
[/quote]

Meanings are never objective.

[Terrapin Station]

There was no claim that there was. There are two different pointing events, and of course they're not the same. But we were not talking about pointing events; the question was whether the word "dog" had the same meaning to both subjects. What is the same in the two events is the photo pointed to, indicating the referent of that word as understood by the two subjects.

You're saying if they're pointing at exactly the same time (from whose point of reference?) at the same (as in numerically just one) photo?

True, but irrelevant to the question at hand. Moreover temporal non-identity is also irrelevant to the issue, unless the differences over time are discernible.

Again, discernibility here is merely about two different times. Two different times results in two different things. Nothing is identical through time. No two "instances" of anything are identical, spatially or temporally.

[Terrapin Station]

Discernability and indiscernability aren't independent properties of things, because identity itself isn't a property.

Agree. Those terms do not ascribe properties to things; they bear on what can be known about particular things by an observer. They are epistemological, not ontological, predicates.

This is incorrect. The identity of indiscernibles/non-identity of discernibles is a nominalistic logical and ontological principle hinging on whether we're talking about two (or more) "instances" or "occasions" of something; it's referring to any numerical distinctness, whether someone actually notices the numerical distinctness or not. Simply put, identity doesn't obtain, logically or ontologically, if we're talking about two things spatially or temporally.