Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Sculptor1]

Incomplete. "You" are an embodied mind.

Implied in the statement is that the Mind is what you are in the Long Run.

We are Connected Minds, not Embodied Minds.

Are we?
That's easy to say, but you have nothing to back it up.

My speculation is as good as the Physicalist/Materialist speculation. There is Zero Explanation how the Material Produces the Conscious Experience.

Not so.
What you laughingly called a "speculation" is where all the evidence reigns.

[Sy Borg]

I've noticed you moving to a Dennettesque denial that the hard problem exists.

I do not deny that there is a real explanatory problem; and, as opposed to Dennett, I am an unequivocal realist about experiential qualia.

Maybe I'm wrong but your recent posts suggest that you are edging in that direction.

Thinking about your earlier comment about neuronal activity being qualia, I suspect that's a dead end. Putting aside the obvious, that neurons themselves don't feel anything, the idea seems to not entirely link the two phenomena, that there's a gap.

[Consul]

Maybe I'm wrong but your recent posts suggest that you are edging in that direction.

Thinking about your earlier comment about neuronal activity being qualia, I suspect that's a dead end. Putting aside the obvious, that neurons themselves don't feel anything, the idea seems to not entirely link the two phenomena, that there's a gap.

I beg to differ, because I think neuroreductionism about experiences is the only explanatory approach that's not a dead end: Experiences are high-level neural processes which are composed of lower-level nonexperiential neural processes. The constitutive neural mechanisms of the stream of experience aren't something different from it, because they are (identical with) it.

Footnote:
I don't regard qualia as qualities of experiences but of experiencers (subjects of experience); so an experience consists in the having or (better) undergoing of an experiential quale by a subject.

[Sy Borg]

Maybe I'm wrong but your recent posts suggest that you are edging in that direction.

Thinking about your earlier comment about neuronal activity being qualia, I suspect that's a dead end. Putting aside the obvious, that neurons themselves don't feel anything, the idea seems to not entirely link the two phenomena, that there's a gap.

I beg to differ, because I think neuroreductionism about experiences is the only explanatory approach that's not a dead end: Experiences are high-level neural processes which are composed of lower-level nonexperiential neural processes. The constitutive neural mechanisms of the stream of experience aren't something different from it, because they are (identical with) it.

Footnote:
I don't regard qualia as qualities of experiences but of experiencers (subjects of experience); so an experience consists in the having or (better) undergoing of an experiential quale by a subject.

It does not make sense to me. Neuronal activity is neuronal activity and and qualia is qualia. They are not the same. Neuronal activity and qualia are closely related, especially in humans. However, they are not the same phenomenon, just as the LEDs of a TV are not the same as the movie.

[Consul]

It does not make sense to me. Neuronal activity is neuronal activity and and qualia is qualia. They are not the same. Neuronal activity and qualia are closely related, especially in humans. However, they are not the same phenomenon, just as the LEDs of a TV are not the same as the movie.

(To say that all experiences are neural processes is not to say that all neural processes are experiences.)

QUOTE>
"When, using our introspective powers, we turn our attention to our own minds we find nothing that suggests that the mental processes we are monitoring are processes in the brain. Indeed, I think that many would have held, up to quite recently, that introspective evidence shows, perhaps conclusively, that the mind is not the brain. We can call this the Argument from Introspection. The brain may be the immediate cause that sustains the mind in its operations, upholders of this argument often concede, but it is not the mind itself.
I believe that there is a simple observation that explains why the anti-materialist position should seem attractive even while it may be false. Unfortunately, I had not noticed the point when I published my book A Materialist Theory of the Mind (1968), so I was not able to include it in the book. But I did publish a little article in Analysis in 1968: 'The Headless Woman Illusion and the Defence of Materialism'. This illusion is brought about by exhibiting a woman (or, of course, a man!) against a totally black background with the head of the woman swathed with the same black material. It is apparently very striking, and could lead unsophisticated persons to think that the woman lacks a head. It is clear what is going on here. The spectators cannot see the head, and as a result make a transition to a strong impression that there was no head to see. An illegitimate operator shift is at work, taking people from not seeing the head to seeming to see that the woman did not have a head. The shift of the 'not', the operator, occurs because it is, in the circumstances, the natural and normally effective way to reason. If you can’t see anybody in the room, you may conclude, very reasonably, there is nobody in the room. In general you will be right. In the same way, we emphatically do not perceive introspectively that the mind is material process in our heads, so we have the impression that it is not material. This seems to nullify the force of the Argument from Introspection, while still explaining the seductiveness of that reasoning."

(Armstrong, D. M. Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. pp. 106-7)

"Many opponents think that materialism is phenomenologically implausible. Simple introspection, they are inclined to think, reveals to us that the mind is definitely not something neurophysiological.
It seems though, that even if materialism is true, there is a natural illusion of the human mind that makes it seem introspectively implausible. It is dramatically illustrated by the Headless Woman illusion, which may still occasionally be seen at fairs and such like. (I have not been lucky enough to see it for myself, but have heard two seemingly reliable reports.) A person posed on a stage against a completely black background, but with a black cloth concealing the head, will give a very strong impression of lacking a head. The mind, it seems, moves naturally from the lack of perception of the head to the false perception of the lack of a head. What cannot be perceived seems not to be there. In much ordinary life this transition will take us from truth to truth. If you can't see anybody in the room, then it is very likely that there is nobody there. But in more theoretical contexts we may be led into error. A failure to be aware of the material nature of the mind, which seems to be a true deliverance of introspection, may be expected to generate the impression that the mind is not material even if the mind is material. I published this as a brief note in Analysis in 1968. The illusion may also help to explain, at least in part, the stubborn impression of irreducibility presented by the secondary qualities."

(Armstrong, D. M. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. Rev. ed. London: Routledge, 1993. p. xix)
<QUOTE

[Consul]

Neuronal activity is neuronal activity and and qualia is qualia. They are not the same. Neuronal activity and qualia are closely related, especially in humans.

How do you think are they related?

[Sy Borg]

Neuronal activity is neuronal activity and and qualia is qualia. They are not the same. Neuronal activity and qualia are closely related, especially in humans.

How do you think are they related?

Heh, wouldn't we all like to know :)

Initially, metabolism was fundamental. Senses (which preceded) neurons evolved to protect the metabolism. With senses, a metabolism is more likely to notice feeding opportunities and less likely to blunder blindly into danger. Then the senses expanded to support reproduction behaviours.

In time, nervous systems evolved to be so integrated with the metabolism (and emergent circulatory system to support larger metabolisms) that damage to the nervous system was just as dangerous to many life forms as damage to metabolic organs.

Broadly, information processing systems evolved to protect energy processing systems.

In humans, the nervous system has evolved to the point where the roles have reversed, where energy processing serves information processing. However, they are never truly separated. Energy processing organs process a small amount of information internally and information processing systems process a small amount of energy internally. Thus, my guess is that qualia is generated in what might be considered an extended global workspace, that involves the very complex interaction between the metabolic and nervous/sensory systems.

I don't discount the idea of the brain filtering universal consciousness, but if I had to bet my house on the answer to the hard problem, I'd choose the above extension of the GW model.

[Faustus5]

Thus, my guess is that qualia is generated in what might be considered an extended global workspace, that involves the very complex interaction between the metabolic and nervous/sensory systems.

The all important question is "And then what?". What do the qualia actually do once they are generated? What's the point? Do they cause any further effects that are evolutionary beneficial, or are they just epiphenomenal? And if they do cause any further effects, what's the biochemical story there?

[Belindi]

The evolutionary advantage of qualia is the same as the evolutionary advantage of purposive subjects of experience.

You can see that umbrellas, loads of gravel, cups of tea, or bottles of oxygen don't intend or purpose but are simply nothing but their own histories. Men and other living things evolve by means of intending or purposing. Men as a species are slightly different from other purposive beings as we evolve mostly along the cultural channel.

[Sy Borg]

Thus, my guess is that qualia is generated in what might be considered an extended global workspace, that involves the very complex interaction between the metabolic and nervous/sensory systems.

The all important question is "And then what?". What do the qualia actually do once they are generated? What's the point? Do they cause any further effects that are evolutionary beneficial, or are they just epiphenomenal? And if they do cause any further effects, what's the biochemical story there?

I don't know. I expect that one with qualia is able to more flexibly deal with the environment than one without qualia, but that is already adding one guess upon another.

[Pattern-chaser]

I think the GW model is one of the most likely possibilities myself, but it has some issues IMO, not least that this has been the assumption for decades yet extensive research (far better funded than other models) can only find "on/off switches" in the brain and correlates between brain states and stated thoughts. Despite the intense focus and resources put towards GW, no sign of a generative mechanism has been found that bridges the gulf that spans from the dynamic patterns of electric charges between neurons to a sense of experience.

There seems to be an ontological "gulf", but I think that's a deceptive appearance fueled by thousands of years of dualistic thinking. I think certain "dynamic patterns of electric charges between neurons" are (identical with) experiences; so the stream of experience is a stream of neuroelectric energy.

It seems likely - i.e. it is not 'proven' - that this is so. But so what? The abyss dividing neurons from philosophy remains. I fall back on the example I have used many times: the executable computer program Micro$oft Word is a collection of bytes, and it is also a word processor with many and varied functional capabilities. But the latter is difficult to see when we think in terms of the former. The gap of abstraction between the two is too large to bridge easily. So we correctly and sensibly do not try to span that abyss. Instead, we refer to one extreme, or the other, depending on context. What else should we do?

[SteveKlinko]

Implied in the statement is that the Mind is what you are in the Long Run.

We are Connected Minds, not Embodied Minds.

How may disembodied minds be connected when minds can't experience each others' qualia?

Minds are insulated from each other in Conscious Space. They seem to need to connect to Physical Space to Communicate. But there is probably direct Mind to Mind Communication possible when the Physical Mind (Brain) is quieted, or when two Minds are disconnected from their Physical Minds.

But in that case there would no incoming information from the senses, and the disconnected mind would be reduced to facing the future from memorised information.

Although qualia can be remembered absolute mind is not absolute at all unless experiences of physical space and the feeling of purpose towards the future are included.

Of course, nobody knows what happens after a Disconnection like in Death.

[SteveKlinko]

Implied in the statement is that the Mind is what you are in the Long Run.

We are Connected Minds, not Embodied Minds.

Are we?
That's easy to say, but you have nothing to back it up.

My speculation is as good as the Physicalist/Materialist speculation. There is Zero Explanation how the Material Produces the Conscious Experience.

Not so.
What you laughingly called a "speculation" is where all the evidence reigns.

Laughingly? I am quite serious. There is no Evidence in Speculations. The Speculation must be proven and the Evidence must be found for any theory of Conscious Experience.

[SteveKlinko]

Maybe I'm wrong but your recent posts suggest that you are edging in that direction.

Thinking about your earlier comment about neuronal activity being qualia, I suspect that's a dead end. Putting aside the obvious, that neurons themselves don't feel anything, the idea seems to not entirely link the two phenomena, that there's a gap.

I beg to differ, because I think neuroreductionism about experiences is the only explanatory approach that's not a dead end: Experiences are high-level neural processes which are composed of lower-level nonexperiential neural processes. The constitutive neural mechanisms of the stream of experience aren't something different from it, because they are (identical with) it.

Footnote:
I don't regard qualia as qualities of experiences but of experiencers (subjects of experience); so an experience consists in the having or (better) undergoing of an experiential quale by a subject.

Ok, that's a valid Speculation. Now give me one Clue, anything, even the thinnest chain of Logic, that can take you from Neural Activity to things like the Experience of Redness, the Experience of the Standard A Tone, the Experience of the Taste of Salt, and etc. Go ahead pick any Conscious Experience (Quale) that you like and show me how it is in the Neurons, an effect of Neural Activity, anything the Neurons do. These Conscious Experiences just seem to float there in some sort of Conscious Space. These Conscious Experiences refuse to be pushed back into the Neurons. A hundred years of Science trying to push them into the Neurons has failed to produce any Explanations. It's time to stop the Physicalist/Materialist Dead End and start thinking in new ways.

[Sculptor1]

Are we?
That's easy to say, but you have nothing to back it up.

My speculation is as good as the Physicalist/Materialist speculation. There is Zero Explanation how the Material Produces the Conscious Experience.

Not so.
What you laughingly called a "speculation" is where all the evidence reigns.

Laughingly? I am quite serious. There is no Evidence in Speculations. The Speculation must be proven and the Evidence must be found for any theory of Conscious Experience.

Eveything you say is speculation. However the physicalist materialist theory is ALL evidence based without exception. It is definitively evidence based.
And it demonstrates and indelible and continous link between the brain and consciousness, which other theories choose to ignore.
It is a fact that consciousness is a physical phenomenon. If you can't work from that point of view then you are just speculating about hot air