Philosophy Discussion Forums

Leontiskos wrote: ↑May 1st, 2023, 12:18 pm

Good_Egg wrote: ↑May 1st, 2023, 10:09 am Does this prove that there are no rational determinists ?

Yes, it does prove that.

Is it, in your view, conceivable that determinism is true ?

Or is it only that it is logically inconsistent for anyone to say that they choose to believe it ?

More specifically, according to the logic at hand one can either say that determinism is irrational or else they can say that self-contradiction is rational. I'll leave that choice up to you.

I think my view is that self-contradiction is irrational but "acting as if" is not. I see no irrationality in believing that stuff is ungraspably complex, and the wave model and particle model are graspable simplifications which each describe certain features of how stuff behaves.

So if you say that wave-particle duality is irrational as a notion of how the universe actually is, I'd tend to agree. But see it as rational as a use of working approximations.

Good_Egg wrote: ↑May 14th, 2023, 1:24 pm

Leontiskos wrote: ↑May 1st, 2023, 12:18 pm

Good_Egg wrote: ↑May 1st, 2023, 10:09 am Does this prove that there are no rational determinists ?

Yes, it does prove that.

Is it, in your view, conceivable that determinism is true ?

Or is it only that it is logically inconsistent for anyone to say that they choose to believe it ?

It is logically possible that determinism is true, but if determinism is true then choices do not exist, and therefore the person who asserts that determinism is true while also believing that they make authentic choices is contradicting themselves.

Good_Egg wrote: ↑May 14th, 2023, 1:24 pm

Leontiskos wrote: ↑May 1st, 2023, 12:18 pm More specifically, according to the logic at hand one can either say that determinism is irrational or else they can say that self-contradiction is rational. I'll leave that choice up to you.

I think my view is that self-contradiction is irrational but "acting as if" is not. I see no irrationality in believing that stuff is ungraspably complex, and the wave model and particle model are graspable simplifications which each describe certain features of how stuff behaves.

So if you say that wave-particle duality is irrational as a notion of how the universe actually is, I'd tend to agree. But see it as rational as a use of working approximations.

You are conflating "acting as if" and "admitting ignorance." They are two different things. If I assert that trees have life and I assert that they do not have life then I have contradicted myself. If I assert that trees have life and I "act as if" they do not have life, then I have also contradicted myself, albeit in a less explicit way.

You are trying to introduce an irrelevant tangent, namely the tangent where one admits that they are ignorant of whether trees have life. No ignorance results in contradiction, at least not in the way we are considering contradiction. A person who admits ignorance is, by definition, not a determinist.

So again, if one admits ignorance about whether trees have life, but then "acts as if" trees do not have life, they are not contradicting themselves in any substantial way. Yet if one asserts that trees have life, but then "acts as if" trees do not have life, they are contradicting themselves in a substantial way. The case of the determinist is the latter, not the former. Therefore your distinction fails to safeguard your conclusion.

That's a step forward, Leontiskos, but it doesn't quite go far enough.

The example I raised previously is of a dice game, where I'm asserting that it is rational to act as if the outcome of a roll of the die is random, even whilst asserting that such outcome is described by deterministic Newtonian physics.

What makes it rational is indeed a form of ignorance.

Imagine I had a dice-rolling machine that was precisely made to ensure that the dice rolled over exactly three times when I pressed the button. So that I could choose to roll a 6 by placing the 6-face uppermost when loading a die into the machine. With such a device, treating the resulting die rolls as random would be self-contradictory, as you say.

The difference between that and a normal die roll is a matter of ignorance, of unpredictability, of the unknowability of the cause-effect chain, rather than any ontological difference.

Can we say the same of choice ? That it is rational for me to treat you as a mind, an agent who makes real choices, even whilst asserting that mind is some sort of emergent property of brains which are governed by a deterministic physics ? But only so long as I am ignorant of the cause-effect pathways involved ?

So that for example if I build an AI which is transparent - meaning that I can trace the logic that makes it say what it says - then it is irrational to act as if it is really choosing. But if it is non-transparent - if the guiding logic is obscured in the complexity of the workings - then acting as if it were genuinely a mind making choices is rational. Because ignorance?
???

Or, to take another example, if Alfie is the sort of person who transparently gets all their opinions from a particular newspaper, is it rational to treat him as something less than a mind ? As an entity whose output is determined rather than chosen ?

Good_Egg wrote: ↑May 15th, 2023, 3:57 am That's a step forward, Leontiskos, but it doesn't quite go far enough.

The example I raised previously is of a dice game, where I'm asserting that it is rational to act as if the outcome of a roll of the die is random, even whilst asserting that such outcome is described by deterministic Newtonian physics.

What makes it rational is indeed a form of ignorance.

Imagine I had a dice-rolling machine that was precisely made to ensure that the dice rolled over exactly three times when I pressed the button. So that I could choose to roll a 6 by placing the 6-face uppermost when loading a die into the machine. With such a device, treating the resulting die rolls as random would be self-contradictory, as you say.

The difference between that and a normal die roll is a matter of ignorance, of unpredictability, of the unknowability of the cause-effect chain, rather than any ontological difference.

Can we say the same of choice ? That it is rational for me to treat you as a mind, an agent who makes real choices, even whilst asserting that mind is some sort of emergent property of brains which are governed by a deterministic physics ? But only so long as I am ignorant of the cause-effect pathways involved ?

So that for example if I build an AI which is transparent - meaning that I can trace the logic that makes it say what it says - then it is irrational to act as if it is really choosing. But if it is non-transparent - if the guiding logic is obscured in the complexity of the workings - then acting as if it were genuinely a mind making choices is rational. Because ignorance?
???

Okay, that was helpful.

So in a game of dice or any game of chance, the key point for the purpose of our discussion is that what is taking place is a competition between more than one agent, and all agents are similarly situated with respect to the outcome of the chance event (namely they are ignorant of the outcome). This is why it makes sense to cast lots. It is why we do it. Of course it also follows, as you say, that the outcome is deterministic in principle but random in practice, and this is due to our lack of knowledge (ignorance).

The reason there is no contradiction in throwing dice is because the proximate act is coming to know the outcome of a chance event, and the more remote end is gambling or some similar thing. This is altogether different from our case of the determinist who thinks he makes authentic choices, and thus your analogy fails. With the determinist there is no competition between agents, there is no gambling, there is no intention to know the outcome of a chance event, etc. There is just a basic contradiction, "All of reality is deterministic and therefore choices do not exist. Also, I make authentic choices." If you think such a contradiction obtains in the case of the gambler, then try to set it out.

The key thing to note is that the gambler's act is not in tension with his presuppositions, and this is because his presuppositions in no way rationally preclude him from gambling. The parallel case for the gambler would be, "Dice are deterministic realities and therefore it makes no sense to gamble. Also, I gamble." The problem is that the consequent, "it makes no sense to gamble," does not follow from the antecedent, "dice are deterministic realities." The reason why is given above, where I identified what exactly a gambler is doing. It is not irrational to gamble given mechanistic physics. It is irrational to believe one is making authentic choices given determinism.

Honestly Good_Egg, the fact of the matter is that intelligent determinists do not even disagree with me here. Folks on these forums, who are confused about determinism and its implications, may disagree with me. But if you read actual determinist philosophers they will freely admit that determinism is incompatible with authentic choices, and with the belief that authentic choices exist.

Leontiskos wrote: ↑May 16th, 2023, 5:52 pm It is not irrational to gamble given mechanistic physics. It is irrational to believe one is making authentic choices given determinism.

If in the heat of the moment the gambler offers up a silent prayer to the gods of chance, then does that act contradict his belief in Newtonian physics ?

I'm locating the irrationality you speak of in the inconsistency of belief in the underlying state of the universe. Rather than in "acting as if" one model applies whilst believing in another.

So it is the belief in the authenticity of his choices that makes the determinist irrational, rather than the act of making choices.

I'm suspecting we don't have any fundamental disagreement here; perhaps I'm being pedantic in thinking your phrase "acting as if" overstates the case.

Think I'm saying that whilst you're right that there is an irrational "acting as if" - doing something that could only conceivably be fruitful if one's firm belief were untrue. But there is also a rational "acting as if", where using a simpler model of reality is efficient even if one doesn't fully believe it.

Good_Egg wrote: ↑May 17th, 2023, 4:08 am

Leontiskos wrote: ↑May 16th, 2023, 5:52 pm It is not irrational to gamble given mechanistic physics. It is irrational to believe one is making authentic choices given determinism.

If in the heat of the moment the gambler offers up a silent prayer to the gods of chance, then does that act contradict his belief in Newtonian physics ?

I'm locating the irrationality you speak of in the inconsistency of belief in the underlying state of the universe. Rather than in "acting as if" one model applies whilst believing in another.

So it is the belief in the authenticity of his choices that makes the determinist irrational, rather than the act of making choices.

I'm suspecting we don't have any fundamental disagreement here; perhaps I'm being pedantic in thinking your phrase "acting as if" overstates the case.

Think I'm saying that whilst you're right that there is an irrational "acting as if" - doing something that could only conceivably be fruitful if one's firm belief were untrue. But there is also a rational "acting as if", where using a simpler model of reality is efficient even if one doesn't fully believe it.

I think I have addressed these angles in previous replies... The way to locate a contradiction is to be precise about the two propositions in question. You keep bringing up this idea of "models", where you are apparently claiming that one can utilize models that they don't really believe in. So I could have a model which says that everything is deterministic, but because I don't really believe this model I am free to act as if things are not deterministic without pain of contradiction.

But if you could adhere to that canon of precision this would be a lot easier. Why are we holding models that we don't believe in? What would that even mean? Presumably you are alluding to a kind of qualified "determinism," such as where one affirms that only the movement of dice are deterministic (i.e. event-causal). But this is just to go back to that very first error I pointed to at the beginning of our conversation, where folks confuse determinism with causation. Effectively I've said that determinism is not compatible with free will, and you keep claiming that it is, but each time you say so you are forced to admit that what you are talking about it not determinism at all. (In this instance the person who does not "fully" believe in a "model of reality" is clearly not a determinist, and therefore this belief is not pertinent to our discussion.)

Leontiskos wrote: ↑May 18th, 2023, 4:45 pm You keep bringing up this idea of "models"...

Yes, I do. I think it is an important part of an adequate philosophy, to recognise that we act based on necessarily-simplified models of a fractally-complex world.

...where you are apparently claiming that one can utilize models that they don't really believe in. So I could have a model which says that everything is deterministic, but because I don't really believe this model I am free to act as if things are not deterministic without pain of contradiction.

The idea of models implies that not every feature or aspect of reality is included in the model. And allows for (but does not necessitate) the converse, that the model may contain aspects or features which are not present in reality.

We act based on our models; doing so without believing that every aspect of them is true (corresponds to reality).

Why are we holding models that we don't believe in? What would that even mean?

It means recognising that the model is a model, holding it to be a useful working approximation.

You might use a ruler to draw a straight line, whilst being fully aware that under a microscope the ruler's edge might appear quite crooked. That's not irrational. The approximation is fit for purpose.

Effectively I've said that determinism is not compatible with free will, and you keep claiming that it is

No. I'm agreeing with you that belief in determinism is incompatible with belief in free will.

Where I'm differing with you is when you extend the alleged incompatibility to "acting as if".

And I apologise if you find the point unduly pedantic.

Good_Egg wrote: ↑May 21st, 2023, 9:28 am

Leontiskos wrote: ↑May 18th, 2023, 4:45 pm...where you are apparently claiming that one can utilize models that they don't really believe in. So I could have a model which says that everything is deterministic, but because I don't really believe this model I am free to act as if things are not deterministic without pain of contradiction.

The idea of models implies that not every feature or aspect of reality is included in the model.

Then rather than functioning as a legitimate argument in favor of determinism, your "deterministic model" literally contradicts determinism. lol

Good_Egg wrote: ↑May 21st, 2023, 9:28 am

Leontiskos wrote: ↑May 18th, 2023, 4:45 pmEffectively I've said that determinism is not compatible with free will, and you keep claiming that it is

No. I'm agreeing with you that belief in determinism is incompatible with belief in free will.

Okay, then perhaps this conversation has come to a close.

Good_Egg wrote: ↑May 21st, 2023, 9:28 amWhere I'm differing with you is when you extend the alleged incompatibility to "acting as if".

And I apologise if you find the point unduly pedantic.

Sophistical, not pedantic. I explained the problem with your "acting as if" idea in detail in <this post>.

One can only "act as if" if they are admitting ignorance and therefore utilizing a "deterministic model," and one can only utilize a "deterministic model" if they deny determinism. This is because, "The idea of models implies that not every feature or aspect of reality is included in the model," and determinism implies that every feature and aspect of reality is deterministic. So your "acting as if" idea does not work to address the topic of this thread.

We cannot act "as if" reality is a way that we know it is not, at least if we want to be rational and true.

Of course it also follows, as you say, that the outcome is deterministic in principle but random in practice, and this is due to our lack of knowledge (ignorance).

What I'm worrying at is the tension between these two statements. Is it irrational to "act as if reality is (in practice) a way that we believe it is not (in principle)" ?

Or does the principle/practice distinction provide an exception to your first statement ?

Can we qualify your first statement to say that it is irrational if both the "acting as if" and the "knowing" refer to principle, or to practice, but not if one of the terms relates to each ?

And then, if we've argued randomness and determinism to a conclusion, does the same apply to choice ?

Can there conceivably be choice in practice despite determinism in principle ? If we again invoke ignorance ?

Good_Egg wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2023, 6:11 am

We cannot act "as if" reality is a way that we know it is not, at least if we want to be rational and true.

Of course it also follows, as you say, that the outcome is deterministic in principle but random in practice, and this is due to our lack of knowledge (ignorance).

What I'm worrying at is the tension between these two statements. Is it irrational to "act as if reality is (in practice) a way that we believe it is not (in principle)" ?

Or does the principle/practice distinction provide an exception to your first statement ?

Can we qualify your first statement to say that it is irrational if both the "acting as if" and the "knowing" refer to principle, or to practice, but not if one of the terms relates to each ?

And then, if we've argued randomness and determinism to a conclusion, does the same apply to choice ?

Can there conceivably be choice in practice despite determinism in principle ? If we again invoke ignorance ?

If principle and practice do not agree, I believe most serious and considered thinkers would recognise that they have work to do...

Good_Egg wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2023, 6:11 am

Leontiskos wrote: ↑April 22nd, 2023, 3:47 pm We cannot act "as if" reality is a way that we know it is not, at least if we want to be rational and true.

Leontiskos wrote: ↑May 16th, 2023, 5:52 pm Of course it also follows, as you say, that the outcome is deterministic in principle but random in practice, and this is due to our lack of knowledge (ignorance).

What I'm worrying at is the tension between these two statements. Is it irrational to "act as if reality is (in practice) a way that we believe it is not (in principle)" ?

Or does the principle/practice distinction provide an exception to your first statement ?

Can we qualify your first statement to say that it is irrational if both the "acting as if" and the "knowing" refer to principle, or to practice, but not if one of the terms relates to each ?

And then, if we've argued randomness and determinism to a conclusion, does the same apply to choice ?

Can there conceivably be choice in practice despite determinism in principle ? If we again invoke ignorance ?

(I added links to those quotes of mine to make the context accessible)

Now if you read that post, it addresses your question in some detail (again, <link>). In the previous post I had pointed out that "acting as if" is a false distinction in the determinism case. Then you raised the question of gambling (or "a dice game") as an attempt to defend your "acting as if" distinction. I addressed the question of gambling in detail, along with why it is different and unrelated to the case of the determinist. Namely, they are different because there is a contradiction in the case of the determinist but not in the case of the gambler. My claims about contradictions presupposed what I said in my previous post about "acting as if," for in that post I gave two examples of "acting as if," one which was self-contradictory and one which was not. The way this cashes out is that non-self-contradictory "acting as if" presupposes an admission of ignorance, and this admission of ignorance is relevant in the gambler's case but not relevant in the determinist's case (i.e. if the determinist admits ignorance about determinism then he is not a determinist at all!). The determinist who holds to determinism in principle but abandons it in practice is engaging in the self-contradictory sort of "acting as if."

In other words, as I said <here>, I have already addressed your questions and objections. You raised your final objection <here>, I addressed it <here>, and after that you just kept repeating the same objection instead of interacting with the answer I already gave. I am not going to answer the objection again. You need to respond to the answer I already gave, or first take the time to try to understand it.

Bahman wrote: ↑March 20th, 2023, 12:37 pm To understand the implication of the question we need to understand what determinism is. Determinism is a doctrine that states that the future state of a system is uniquely determined in terms of the current state of the system. This means that there exists only one option, the future state, at any given time. We however without any doubt say that we experience options in our daily life. We pause and think about options and eventually choose one of them. The very existence of the pause means that the brain is also interrupted as well with the situation so one cannot say, as determinists say, that only one of the options is real. So options are real since otherwise, the state of the brain evolves deterministically without any pause one option is chosen and others are disregarded. Now that we established options are real we face the question of "How could there be options in a deterministic world?".

Firstly, I will offer a shorter definition:) : a deterministic world is a world which is entirely predictable, therefore every action has it´s cause (Hume would disagree here ). For purposes of this post, I will assume that there is a very long chain of these causalities, reaching all the way to the very first event - some might say that this event is the big bang.
Science allows us to predict the future from past experiences (A caused B in the past, therefore we know that if we observe A, B will follow shortly after). If we perfected this tool of science and therefore had knowledge of every cause or effect, that would inevitably imply that thare are strict rules which cannot be defied. After all, why make the assumption that we, human beings, are somehow different from the rest of reality?

Wardwatcher wrote: ↑May 30th, 2023, 3:51 pm

Bahman wrote: ↑March 20th, 2023, 12:37 pm To understand the implication of the question we need to understand what determinism is. Determinism is a doctrine that states that the future state of a system is uniquely determined in terms of the current state of the system. This means that there exists only one option, the future state, at any given time. We however without any doubt say that we experience options in our daily life. We pause and think about options and eventually choose one of them. The very existence of the pause means that the brain is also interrupted as well with the situation so one cannot say, as determinists say, that only one of the options is real. So options are real since otherwise, the state of the brain evolves deterministically without any pause one option is chosen and others are disregarded. Now that we established options are real we face the question of "How could there be options in a deterministic world?".

Firstly, I will offer a shorter definition:) : a deterministic world is a world which is entirely predictable, therefore every action has it´s cause (Hume would disagree here ). For purposes of this post, I will assume that there is a very long chain of these causalities, reaching all the way to the very first event - some might say that this event is the big bang.
Science allows us to predict the future from past experiences (A caused B in the past, therefore we know that if we observe A, B will follow shortly after). If we perfected this tool of science and therefore had knowledge of every cause or effect, that would inevitably imply that thare are strict rules which cannot be defied. After all, why make the assumption that we, human beings, are somehow different from the rest of reality?

If human decision making could be predicted, then the conclusions you mention would apply. Alas it isn't reliably predictable so your guess is unsubstantiated.

LuckyR wrote: ↑June 1st, 2023, 2:30 am

Wardwatcher wrote: ↑May 30th, 2023, 3:51 pm

Bahman wrote: ↑March 20th, 2023, 12:37 pm To understand the implication of the question we need to understand what determinism is. Determinism is a doctrine that states that the future state of a system is uniquely determined in terms of the current state of the system. This means that there exists only one option, the future state, at any given time. We however without any doubt say that we experience options in our daily life. We pause and think about options and eventually choose one of them. The very existence of the pause means that the brain is also interrupted as well with the situation so one cannot say, as determinists say, that only one of the options is real. So options are real since otherwise, the state of the brain evolves deterministically without any pause one option is chosen and others are disregarded. Now that we established options are real we face the question of "How could there be options in a deterministic world?".

Firstly, I will offer a shorter definition:) : a deterministic world is a world which is entirely predictable, therefore every action has it´s cause (Hume would disagree here ). For purposes of this post, I will assume that there is a very long chain of these causalities, reaching all the way to the very first event - some might say that this event is the big bang.
Science allows us to predict the future from past experiences (A caused B in the past, therefore we know that if we observe A, B will follow shortly after). If we perfected this tool of science and therefore had knowledge of every cause or effect, that would inevitably imply that thare are strict rules which cannot be defied. After all, why make the assumption that we, human beings, are somehow different from the rest of reality?

If human decision making could be predicted, then the conclusions you mention would apply. Alas it isn't reliably predictable so your guess is unsubstantiated.

J.D. Haynes conducted an experiment regarding free will. His objective was to predict simple decisions (the subjects were to decide between either adding or subtracting two numbers). He was able to predict the outcome almost 10 seconds ahead with a success rate of 71% (I hope the data I gave is correct, feel free to go check). Obviously these are very simple decisions, but I do not see a reason for me to doubt that science will do a much better job in the future.
Another argument could be based on the fact that we evolved just as any other organism. Just as a cheetah developed teeth in order to hunt, we developed a brain in a similar manner to survive. I struggle to see why we should be any different. We know how atoms and chemicals interact and how substances are made up of atoms. There is an essay written by La Mettrie (which I haven´t read, but it´s title speaks for itself) "L´Homme Machine" (or Man a machine). To sum up: Could it be that we are such complex machines that we ourselves are unable to see through this fog of seemingly unsolvable problems?

Wardwatcher wrote: ↑June 1st, 2023, 10:28 am

LuckyR wrote: ↑June 1st, 2023, 2:30 am

Wardwatcher wrote: ↑May 30th, 2023, 3:51 pm

Bahman wrote: ↑March 20th, 2023, 12:37 pm To understand the implication of the question we need to understand what determinism is. Determinism is a doctrine that states that the future state of a system is uniquely determined in terms of the current state of the system. This means that there exists only one option, the future state, at any given time. We however without any doubt say that we experience options in our daily life. We pause and think about options and eventually choose one of them. The very existence of the pause means that the brain is also interrupted as well with the situation so one cannot say, as determinists say, that only one of the options is real. So options are real since otherwise, the state of the brain evolves deterministically without any pause one option is chosen and others are disregarded. Now that we established options are real we face the question of "How could there be options in a deterministic world?".

Firstly, I will offer a shorter definition:) : a deterministic world is a world which is entirely predictable, therefore every action has it´s cause (Hume would disagree here ). For purposes of this post, I will assume that there is a very long chain of these causalities, reaching all the way to the very first event - some might say that this event is the big bang.
Science allows us to predict the future from past experiences (A caused B in the past, therefore we know that if we observe A, B will follow shortly after). If we perfected this tool of science and therefore had knowledge of every cause or effect, that would inevitably imply that thare are strict rules which cannot be defied. After all, why make the assumption that we, human beings, are somehow different from the rest of reality?

If human decision making could be predicted, then the conclusions you mention would apply. Alas it isn't reliably predictable so your guess is unsubstantiated.

J.D. Haynes conducted an experiment regarding free will. His objective was to predict simple decisions (the subjects were to decide between either adding or subtracting two numbers). He was able to predict the outcome almost 10 seconds ahead with a success rate of 71% (I hope the data I gave is correct, feel free to go check). Obviously these are very simple decisions, but I do not see a reason for me to doubt that science will do a much better job in the future.
Another argument could be based on the fact that we evolved just as any other organism. Just as a cheetah developed teeth in order to hunt, we developed a brain in a similar manner to survive. I struggle to see why we should be any different. We know how atoms and chemicals interact and how substances are made up of atoms. There is an essay written by La Mettrie (which I haven´t read, but it´s title speaks for itself) "L´Homme Machine" (or Man a machine). To sum up: Could it be that we are such complex machines that we ourselves are unable to see through this fog of seemingly unsolvable problems?

Dr Haynes' work doesn't investigate Free Will since no one, including him, understands the processes involved in human decision making. Rather he performs observational studies to see if there is correlation (very different from demonstrating causation) between brain states before decisions and the ultimate decision that is made. You mention that he has demonstrated some minimal to moderate correlation (a coin could "predict" the decision 50% of the time so an fMRI performing it 71% of the time is not dramatic, though is real).

For example if the brain states he observes represent mood, it may be that a subject is slightly more likely to choose "add" instead of "subtract" if they are happy vs sad. This would completely explain his findings, yet would tell us nothing about the presence or absence of either Free Will or Determinism.