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[Consul]

But the Connectist view presents a whole new of understanding these things:

The Scientific and Physicalist view is that Consciousness is somehow located in the Neurons or is an Emergent Property of Neural Activity. It is a reasonable assumption given that Conscious Activity is Correlated with Neural Activity. But Science has no Theory, Hypothesis, or even a Speculation about how Consciousness could be in the Neurons or an Emergent Property. Science has not been able to show for example, how something like the Experience of Redness is some kind of effect of Neural Activity. In fact, the more you think about the Redness Experience and then think about Neural Activity, the less likely it seems that the Redness Experience is actually some sort of Neural Activity. Science has tried in vain for a hundred years to figure this out. If the Experience of Redness actually was in the Neurons, Science would have had a lot to say about it by now. Something has got to be wrong with their perspective on the problem.

The Inter Mind Model (IMM) can accommodate Consciousness as being in the Neurons or an Emergent Property, but it can also accommodate other concepts of Consciousness. The IMM is structurally a Connection Model, in the sense that the Physical Mind (PM) is connected to the Inter Mind (IM) which is connected to the Conscious Mind (CM). These Connections might be conceptual where all three Minds are actually in the Neurons or an Emergent Property. But these Connections might have more reality to them where the PM, the IM, and the CM are separate things.……

I'm sorry, but I fail to see how your connectionist or interactionist substance trialism can solve the hard problem and explain experiences such as color-impressions.

[SteveKlinko]

But the Connectist view presents a whole new of understanding these things:

The Scientific and Physicalist view is that Consciousness is somehow located in the Neurons or is an Emergent Property of Neural Activity. It is a reasonable assumption given that Conscious Activity is Correlated with Neural Activity. But Science has no Theory, Hypothesis, or even a Speculation about how Consciousness could be in the Neurons or an Emergent Property. Science has not been able to show for example, how something like the Experience of Redness is some kind of effect of Neural Activity. In fact, the more you think about the Redness Experience and then think about Neural Activity, the less likely it seems that the Redness Experience is actually some sort of Neural Activity. Science has tried in vain for a hundred years to figure this out. If the Experience of Redness actually was in the Neurons, Science would have had a lot to say about it by now. Something has got to be wrong with their perspective on the problem.

The Inter Mind Model (IMM) can accommodate Consciousness as being in the Neurons or an Emergent Property, but it can also accommodate other concepts of Consciousness. The IMM is structurally a Connection Model, in the sense that the Physical Mind (PM) is connected to the Inter Mind (IM) which is connected to the Conscious Mind (CM). These Connections might be conceptual where all three Minds are actually in the Neurons or an Emergent Property. But these Connections might have more reality to them where the PM, the IM, and the CM are separate things.……

I'm sorry, but I fail to see how your connectionist or interactionist substance trialism can solve the hard problem and explain experiences such as color-impressions.

It doesn't Explain it because it is a Framework, not an Explanation. The Framework is not supposed to Explain it. But the Framework stipulates that the functionality of an Inter Mind must Exist somewhere, somehow. If the ultimate truth of Conscious Experience is really that it is in the Neurons then that aspect of Neural Activity that causes Conscious Experience will need to be called the Inter Mind aspect of the Neurons.

[Papus79]

I have wondered about the Grant Funding too. These Grants would probably dry up if the granting authorities found out that the Theories were not really Explaining the thing they are supposed to Explain (Conscious Experience).

My thinking on that one is slightly the opposite - ie. that they care much less about the root of consciousness and much more about advances that have direct application (like more certainty that scans can tell whether a person is 'in' or not, or insights that might yield new pathways for anti-senility drugs or even cognitive enhancement).

[Belindi]

Does abduction imply or sometimes imply that the chosen abducted theory is more morally desirable?

The mind-brain identity theory, or the similar dual aspect theory, are morally superior because they lead to the moral conclusion that mitigating circumstances are integrated and absolute.

[SteveKlinko]

I have wondered about the Grant Funding too. These Grants would probably dry up if the granting authorities found out that the Theories were not really Explaining the thing they are supposed to Explain (Conscious Experience).

My thinking on that one is slightly the opposite - ie. that they care much less about the root of consciousness and much more about advances that have direct application (like more certainty that scans can tell whether a person is 'in' or not, or insights that might yield new pathways for anti-senility drugs or even cognitive enhancement).

There are Brain scanning technique that can help determine if someone is "In". These Brain scanning techniques have very little to do with the Theories of Consciousness in the OP. They don't use any of these theories to see if somebody is "In". They merely look at Brain Activity in a general way. They are not calculating Phi for example to see if somebody is "In". They are just detecting Brain Activity in various parts of the Brain.

[Pattern-chaser]

Does abduction imply or sometimes imply that the chosen abducted theory is more morally desirable?

As I understand it, abduction refers to making one's best guess. It barely seems worthy of its own word (to me). Deduction is reliable, induction is not, and abduction is like induction, but with even less justification.

[Consul]

I'm sorry, but I fail to see how your connectionist or interactionist substance trialism can solve the hard problem and explain experiences such as color-impressions.

It doesn't Explain it because it is a Framework, not an Explanation. The Framework is not supposed to Explain it. But the Framework stipulates that the functionality of an Inter Mind must Exist somewhere, somehow. If the ultimate truth of Conscious Experience is really that it is in the Neurons then that aspect of Neural Activity that causes Conscious Experience will need to be called the Inter Mind aspect of the Neurons.

You've complained that all other theories cannot explain experiences, and now you're favouring one that cannot do so either?

As for descriptive "frameworks", I think the ontologically more economical mind-brain identity theory is preferable.

[Consul]

As for descriptive "frameworks", I think the ontologically more economical mind-brain identity theory is preferable.

That is, materialist substance monism rather than substance dualism or substance trialism.

[SteveKlinko]

I'm sorry, but I fail to see how your connectionist or interactionist substance trialism can solve the hard problem and explain experiences such as color-impressions.

It doesn't Explain it because it is a Framework, not an Explanation. The Framework is not supposed to Explain it. But the Framework stipulates that the functionality of an Inter Mind must Exist somewhere, somehow. If the ultimate truth of Conscious Experience is really that it is in the Neurons then that aspect of Neural Activity that causes Conscious Experience will need to be called the Inter Mind aspect of the Neurons.

You've complained that all other theories cannot explain experiences, and now you're favouring one that cannot do so either?

As for descriptive "frameworks", I think the ontologically more economical mind-brain identity theory is preferable.

I think most people think that Science is just around the corner from solving the problem. I am merely pointing out that the theories do not Explain the Conscious Experience problem. Not even a little bit. I make no claim that I have solved it. But I am trying to get people to think in new ways about the Problem.

[Sy Borg]

You won't change Mr Consul's mind in this. I tried for years and he's pretty convinced by the global workspace model.

I think the GW model is one of the most likely possibilities myself, but it has some issues IMO, not least that this has been the assumption for decades yet extensive research (far better funded than other models) can only find "on/off switches" in the brain and correlates between brain states and stated thoughts. Despite the intense focus and resources put towards GW, no sign of a generative mechanism has been found that bridges the gulf that spans from the dynamic patterns of electric charges between neurons to a sense of experience.

Qualia remains a mystery.

[Belindi]

Does abduction imply or sometimes imply that the chosen abducted theory is more morally desirable?

As I understand it, abduction refers to making one's best guess. It barely seems worthy of its own word (to me). Deduction is reliable, induction is not, and abduction is like induction, but with even less justification.

Yes, and I think abduction links to the other discussion about prejudices and biases.

[Belindi]

As for descriptive "frameworks", I think the ontologically more economical mind-brain identity theory is preferable.

That is, materialist substance monism rather than substance dualism or substance trialism.

If substance A and substance B are separate causal systems they would have to relate to each other supernaturally. Moreover for substance dualists mind tends to be more worthy than matter which is a snobbery that can no longer be justified scientifically or morally. Dualistic snobbery legitimates humans wasting their natural environment.

[SteveKlinko]

You won't change Mr Consul's mind in this. I tried for years and he's pretty convinced by the global workspace model.

I think the GW model is one of the most likely possibilities myself, but it has some issues IMO, not least that this has been the assumption for decades yet extensive research (far better funded than other models) can only find "on/off switches" in the brain and correlates between brain states and stated thoughts. Despite the intense focus and resources put towards GW, no sign of a generative mechanism has been found that bridges the gulf that spans from the dynamic patterns of electric charges between neurons to a sense of experience.

Qualia remains a mystery.

Yes, all these theories do the same thing. They specify some Chemical or Electrical, process or property, of the Neurons and then with no chain of Logic proclaim that is Consciousness. They always say Consciousness. They can never Explain a particular Experience. In fact, these theories have taken us no closer to understanding any Conscious Experience. Zero progress. I agree, Qualia remains a mystery.

[SteveKlinko]

As for descriptive "frameworks", I think the ontologically more economical mind-brain identity theory is preferable.

That is, materialist substance monism rather than substance dualism or substance trialism.

If substance A and substance B are separate causal systems they would have to relate to each other supernaturally. Moreover for substance dualists mind tends to be more worthy than matter which is a snobbery that can no longer be justified scientifically or morally. Dualistic snobbery legitimates humans wasting their natural environment.

Only if you think that Quantum Mechanics is Supernatural.

The Mind is more worthy because it is, after all, what you are. The Mind only uses the Material until the Material goes away. It is Incoherent to say that the Mind will waste the Environment if it understands the separation of Mind and Material. With the Dualist concept, the Mind could possibly survive so there can be Consequences for what it did while connected to the Material. The Materialist would be more likely to abuse the Environment since there would be no Existence of Mind after the loss of the Material Body. There would be no consequences because the Material Body and the Mind are gone after Death. Physicalism/Materialism truly is a pitiful Philosophy.

[Pattern-chaser]

The Mind is more worthy because it is, after all, what you are.

Incomplete. "You" are an embodied mind.