Re: How could there be options in a deterministic world?
Posted: April 8th, 2023, 7:04 pm
Leontiskos wrote: ↑April 8th, 2023, 12:52 pmLet's use Lucky's definition:
This is a controverted question,* but I take a very commonsensical approach to these questions. If God's foreknowledge yields necessitated events then the events cannot be free. Apart from Calvinists, these debates hinge on the question of whether foreknowledge yields necessitation, not whether necessitation is incompatible with freedom. The vast, vast majority of theists acknowledge that necessitation is incompatible with freedom.
Rather, you are denying (4) in attributing causal power to agents. This is a denial of determinism. The implicit premise in question is this: <If Determinism is true, then all causation is event causation>. But only theistic determinists would dispute such a premise, and Sculptor is not one of those.
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As I said in my last post:
You are saying that he calls "heads" because of his free choice, not because of antecedent conditions/causes/events. This is not only not Determinism, it contradicts Determinism.
- "When Martin Luther appeals to conscience he is not claiming that he is physically or logically unable to perform a different act, and this is precisely what he would need to have said if he had wanted to follow Calvin. Being constrained by determinism and being constrained by reason or conscience are two different things. Folks act contrary to reason and conscience all the time."
What is your definition of Determinism?
* The forum is preventing me from posting a link to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. If you do a web search for, "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Foreknowledge and Free Will," you will find the web page.
My definition of Determinism is that antecedent state 1 always leads to resultant state 2, never 3. And Free Will I define as antecedent state 1 can lead to multiple possible resultant states, say 2 and 3 (and likely others).Antecedent state 1 always does lead to resultant state 2. That's obvious. It's just that we don't know what the resultant state is until it occurs. (An exception might be some sort of multiverse.)
Thus Determinism cannot coincide with Free Will.
Since there is always an antecedent state, and always a resultant state; one leads to the other. Whether one "determines" or "causes" the other is problematic, which is why we are having this discussion. Free will is obviously irrelevant to whether state 1 is followed by state 2. If we define state 2 as the resultant state it will always occur, because whatever does occur will be state 2.
Once state 2 has occurred, it was inevitable.
Nonetheless, why does this negate the possibility of free will? Perhaps the resultant state is the result of someone's freely decided option.
Think of a card came. The deck is shuffled. The player has to guess what card will be dealt next. However, a kibitzer can see the other side of the cards and he knows that the King of Hearts is on the top of the deck. Would it be normal usage to say that the kibitzer has "caused" the King of Hearts to be the next card dealt? Or did the shuffle "cause" the order of the cards, and the kibitzer has a special king of knowledge. Couldn't the same be true about knowing the future? We are like the player. We can't see the future. So we freely opt to do something. Once we opt, we can (like Martun Luther) "do no other". Of course the person (being?) who can see the future knows what we will choose (just as the kibitzer knows which card is next), but he doesn't force us to choose as we do. He just knows (or intuits) what choice we will make.
P.s. Lucky's conclusion is illogical. State i cannot lead to "multible (possible) resultant states" unless we believe in a multiverse. It can lead to (not cause) only one, and that one was once infinitely unlikely.