Philosophy Discussion Forums

Gertie wrote: ↑January 2nd, 2024, 2:21 pm Otherwise how do you combat such issues, even murder, being down to the happenstance of your or my opinions/intuitions?

Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑January 3rd, 2024, 10:07 am I'm not sure. For a start, is it morally correct to seek to "combat such issues"? And if it is, as many of us believe, then is it really only a matter of opinion? I think yes and no. Individually-held opinions are sometimes shared, sometimes not. The group consensus is as important here as any individual opinion, I think. For we create and implement morality as groups, in the main. Of course individuals have their own moral code, but the most noticeable effect is that of the group's averaged-out POV.

Given that there are no 'objective' justifications for any practical morality, group consensus seems to be the dominant factor. And as I think about that, I wonder if that could be otherwise, never mind whether it *should*?

Gertie wrote: ↑January 4th, 2024, 3:57 pm I think it can and should be.

Otherwise we have the tyranny of the majority for whom (collectively) anything is permissable. And there's no justification for Rights to protect minorities - Might is Right.

You're right tho that without some morality we can justify as 'objective', it's a challenge to our usual ways of achieving moral consensus which is more than majority opinion, it requires a different approach to what morality is, and what it's for.

If we think about how Hume starkly challenges us- how do you get an Ought from an Is (how do you justify a moral duty from the objective state of affairs/how things just are), then the way that makes sense to me is to acknowledge that conscious beings have a stake in how things are. It matters to us. Because we're experiencing subjects with a quality of life we value. (Unlike a rock or a tree or a toaster).

It's the 'mattering to us' which brings meaning and value into the equation when we're judging whether an action is good or bad. It's not 'objective', because it's all about what matters to conscious subjects, our wellbeing - but that doesn't mean it's not the reason why we Ought to treat each other with consideration. Including minorities, even other species. It's the obvious reason to. Imo

I can't see an alternative to consensus, to majority rule. It isn't ideal, as you point out, but it's easily the best we have. When it comes down to it, the tribe can always over-rule the individual, by simple force of numbers, when/if that becomes necessary. This is, I think, something that is unavoidable, in practice. And so I see a balancing (moral) requirement placed upon the tribe — only to use this 'veto' when necessary, never for any lesser reason. This goes as far as is practically possible to solving the shortcomings that you correctly (IMO) identify.

This is far from perfect, but I wonder if it's as close to perfect as we can get, in practice?

Pattern-chaser, I feel attracted to the idea of, not a power elite, but an intellectual elite. However this would be the thin end of very nasty wedge of unamiable right wing power elite.

Belindi wrote: ↑January 7th, 2024, 2:02 pm Pattern-chaser, I feel attracted to the idea of, not a power elite, but an intellectual elite. However this would be the thin end of very nasty wedge of unamiable right wing power elite.

An intellectual elite? I would do much to avoid such a world! Intellect with no emotion, and no humanity, is best avoided, IMO. It tends toward sociopathy or psychopathy, without the balance of feeling, and similar human values.

One might as well ask what could make humour or aesthetics objective. Morality is fundamentally a sensibility to moral implication, ingrained into the species organism by evolution in a hunter-gatherer tribal context.
What has confused the issue is that in order to join hunter-gatherer tribal groups together; to overcome tribal hierarchies, humans elected God as an authority for explicit moral law: thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal etc. And then religion forgot that it was a social contract, and took itself literally, such that, to protect itself as a moral authority, religion denied authority to scientific truth, not least by imprisoning Galileo, declaring science heretical, and embracing Descartes' subjectivism as consistent with religious ideas of the soul.
This was a shortsighted decision on the part of the Church; for in lieu of faith, subjectivism is solipsistic. Descartes is only rescued from the solipsistic implications of his method of radical scepticism by an appeal to God 'who cannot be a deceiver.' Absent of faith, subjective solipsism lends itself to epistemic and moral relativism. And it is in the course of prosecuting moral relativism against morality as religious/political authority, subjectivists demand morality needs to be objective to be compelling (having already excluded objectivism at the epistemic level, tee-hee!) So now we have neither truth nor morality to rely upon, and descend into nihilism. Whereas; had the Church welcomed Galileo 400 years ago, today we would establish in common what is scientifically true, and debate politically, the moral implications of what we agree is objective scientific truth.

Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑January 5th, 2024, 11:14 am I can't see an alternative to consensus, to majority rule. It isn't ideal, as you point out, but it's easily the best we have. When it comes down to it, the tribe can always over-rule the individual, by simple force of numbers, when/if that becomes necessary. This is, I think, something that is unavoidable, in practice. And so I see a balancing (moral) requirement placed upon the tribe — only to use this 'veto' when necessary, never for any lesser reason.

If I take your words literally, then you've become a convert to libertarianism as the objectively moral political philosophy.

You're saying here that there is a moral requirement to maximise liberty. To allow individuals the maximum freedom to do their own thing - whatever seems good to them - constraining them to group norms only when strictly necessary. And that this moral requirement is not something that arises from majority decision, but exists regardless of what the majority desire.

Unfortunately, I suspect that you don't mean it. I'm expecting that your leftist leanings will reassert themselves, and you'll lapse back into defending a "tyranny of the majority" whenever it coincides with your own values/desires/ideas. Probably by weaselling on the meaning of "necessary".

Still, we can enjoy this moment of agreement while it lasts.

Have a free and happy new year...

Good_Egg wrote: ↑January 9th, 2024, 5:12 am

Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑January 5th, 2024, 11:14 am I can't see an alternative to consensus, to majority rule. It isn't ideal, as you point out, but it's easily the best we have. When it comes down to it, the tribe can always over-rule the individual, by simple force of numbers, when/if that becomes necessary. This is, I think, something that is unavoidable, in practice. And so I see a balancing (moral) requirement placed upon the tribe — only to use this 'veto' when necessary, never for any lesser reason.

If I take your words literally, then you've become a convert to libertarianism as the objectively moral political philosophy.

IN other words his choice is personal to him and so subjective, not objective.

You're saying here that there is a moral requirement to maximise liberty.

Obviously that is not "objective". It might be a stated objective. But that is saying something else. This is an opinion.

[/quote] To allow individuals the maximum freedom to do their own thing - whatever seems good to them - constraining them to group norms only when strictly necessary. And that this moral requirement is not something that arises from majority decision, but exists regardless of what the majority desire.
[/quote]
There is a whole world of problem here. One person's freedom is another person's opression.
If you are bringing in "majorities" then minorities are going to have to take up arms. ALl you have is a sort of second hand utilitarianism. What if the majority want to form a collective in which all their choices have to be met with the approval of the whole. Where is freedom then?

Unfortunately, I suspect that you don't mean it. I'm expecting that your leftist leanings will reassert themselves, and you'll lapse back into defending a "tyranny of the majority" whenever it coincides with your own values/desires/ideas. Probably by weaselling on the meaning of "necessary".

Still, we can enjoy this moment of agreement while it lasts.

Have a free and happy new year...

Sadly you have this completely backwards.
You prefer a sort of psycopathic individualism which denies the needs of the many.

Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑January 5th, 2024, 11:14 am I can't see an alternative to consensus, to majority rule. It isn't ideal, as you point out, but it's easily the best we have. When it comes down to it, the tribe can always over-rule the individual, by simple force of numbers, when/if that becomes necessary. This is, I think, something that is unavoidable, in practice. And so I see a balancing (moral) requirement placed upon the tribe — only to use this 'veto' when necessary, never for any lesser reason.

Good_Egg wrote: ↑January 9th, 2024, 5:12 am If I take your words literally, then you've become a convert to libertarianism as the objectively moral political philosophy.

If I were an unreasonable man — and, of course, I am not! — I could claim this comment as an ad hom! I despise Libertarianism, and I firmly believe that there is, nor can there be, no "objective" moral philosophy. Morals are created by us, for our own cultural purposes. It is hard to see how this could be deemed objective.

But I'd better clarify what I said about Libertarianism. I think many people would defend the rights of any and all individuals, but also recognise that they (i.e. all of us) must defer to the group, tribe, or society when that is appropriate. Libertarianism seems to offer no sensible and rational path, but only an extreme one: that individuals must be defended and supported at all costs, and that no form of group, tribe, etc., can ever be allowed to sully that 'freedom'. In other words, the individual is Always Good, and the group is Always Bad (and wrong). This is a nonsense, of course, as extreme positions so often are.

The hard communist centralised-and-directed-economy, where individuals are forced into submission to 'the people', is the opposite extreme, and it's just as unhelpful and unusable as Libertarianism.

The position I outlined in my previous quote (above) seems to say this quite well (?), and so I wonder if you are poking fun at me, when you accuse me of supporting Libertarianism? All workable political systems acknowledge and deal with the dynamic tension between the group and the individual, so that both may thrive and prosper. Extremes such as Libertarianism and hard Communism don't achieve this.

Good_Egg wrote: ↑January 9th, 2024, 5:12 am You're saying here that there is a moral requirement to maximise liberty.

Within practical limits, yes, that's what I'm saying. And that's not only a moral requirement, but a pragmatic one. To restrict liberty unnecessarily causes unrest and bad feeling, which is almost always counter-productive, no matter what your aims might be (as long as they're not too extreme). But it is equally necessary to balance all this with the realisation that sometimes the group will, for its own purposes, constrain liberty in some way(s). And this is OK, even desirable.

Good_Egg wrote: ↑January 9th, 2024, 5:12 am Unfortunately, I suspect that you don't mean it. I'm expecting that your leftist leanings will reassert themselves, and you'll lapse back into defending a "tyranny of the majority" whenever it coincides with your own values/desires/ideas. Probably by weaselling on the meaning of "necessary".

I never say or write that which I don't mean. I can be mistaken, or just plain wrong, but I am always honest. I have never sought to conceal my (proudly-) "leftist leanings", from which I have not deviated, here or elsewhere. Politics is not just one balance, but a huge number of simultaneously-balanced things. One of these balances is that between the individual and the group.

If Libertarian extremists were not in evidence, I, and others like me, would be able to tone down my balancing support for the group, and discuss instead the balanced working of an acceptable political system. But the one thing in politics that must always be opposed is extremism of any sort; it is never desirable — not for moral reasons, but for the pragmatic and real-world reason that it doesn't work.

Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑January 9th, 2024, 10:11 am The hard communist centralised-and-directed-economy, where individuals are forced into submission to 'the people', is the opposite extreme, and it's just as unhelpful and unusable as Libertarianism.

The shared premise here is that there can often occur a tension or conflict between what the individual wants for themself and what the group-leaders want for the group.

You're portraying the possible ways of resolving that tension on a spectrum from hard communism to hard libertarianism, and Ithat seems a helpful perspective.

Some on these boards would say that there is no morally-right position on that spectrum - that morality doesn't exist, or has nothing to say about politics.

Some would say that morality is real and binding but is created by the group, is an artefact of the culture of the group. Which seems to say that as long as the group-leaders are truly articulating the collective will of the group, then individual submission to the will of the group is the moral course. So the morally right answer is at the communist end of the spectrum.

But you said the opposite. You said that there is a moral duty on the group not to enforce group-will on individuals unless necessary. Which says that any position other than the maximum-liberty end of the spectrum is a moral wrong against the individual. Because if a more-libertarian point on the spectrum is possible then the level of coercion involved in whatever midway point you would choose or approve of s not necessary.

I wonder if you are poking fun at me, when you accuse me of supporting Libertarianism?

Beneath the surface tone of friendly teasing I'm making serious points. I see two contradictions in what you're putting forward.

The first is that you seem to be jumping around between different criteria for what is the best place on the spectrum. Is it the point with no unnecessary coercion (I.e. the point where anything more libertarian is unworkable) ? Or the point which maximizes some measure of prospering or thriving ? Or the point which you personally find "appropriate" (which is subjective and seems something akin to an aesthetic judgment) ? These are different criteria which will in general result in different outcomes.

The second is that you're asserting a moral duty that binds the group whilst simultaneously denying that morality has any existence other than as a group norm. If groups (communities, societies) can do morally wrong things then morality must be something outside of what groups decide. Because otherwise all groups are always trivially moral by deciding that what they propose to do is morally right.

Good_Egg wrote: ↑January 9th, 2024, 5:12 am You're saying here that there is a moral requirement to maximise liberty.

Within practical limits, yes, that's what I'm saying. And that's not only a moral requirement, but a pragmatic one. To restrict liberty unnecessarily causes unrest and bad feeling, which is almost always counter-productive, no matter what your aims might be (as long as they're not too extreme). But it is equally necessary to balance all this with the realisation that sometimes the group will, for its own purposes, constrain liberty in some way(s). And this is OK, even desirable.

If it's immoral then no it's not OK...

You're asserting a requirement both moral and pragmatic, then justifying only the pragmatic element. Whereas what we're about here is understanding the nature of moral.

And it's no use trying to qualify moral with "practical". A morality which forbids murder only so long as the alternative is "practical" is no morality. It's fine to argue that "should" implies "can". But the difference between "can" and "can practically" is where the weaselling starts. If you tell yourself that practically and realistically you can't reasonably be expected to refrain from murder then you've already said goodbye to morality.

Lagayscienza wrote: ↑January 5th, 2024, 12:29 am

Gertie wrote: ↑January 4th, 2024, 4:09 pm
OK, so consent would be justified by a 'minimise harm' meta rule.

Then I'm asking what justifies that meta rule? Why not choose a moral meta rule to 'maximise harm' instead? And one of the rules of thumb might be to ignore consent. What justifies 'minimise harm' as moral, but 'maximise harm' not?

Yes, that is the question.

Isn't it moral oughts all the way down? And aren't these always based in our subjective moral sentiments? How can they be objectified?

We agree they can't be 'objectified', that's a pointless endeavour (unless you introduce something like an omni-god imo). Objective Morality is akin to a category error, because the essence of moral right and wrong isn't about measurable, observable, falsifiable truths.

So what is it about?

Well you can say it's simply about our evolved intuitions (honed by environment) and stop there. In Hume's framing, that's just another ''Is'' state of affairs. And we could stop there. You think that's good enough, it more or less works. But I disagree it works well enough, and I think that if we consider what can make sense of right and wrong, of oughts, then it's having a stake in the state of affairs.

That having a stake in the state of affairs then naturally becomes the appropriate grounding for morality, its justification. And it's experiencing subjects who have such a stake, whose quality of life matters.

Good_Egg wrote: ↑January 5th, 2024, 5:29 am

Gertie wrote: ↑January 4th, 2024, 4:09 pm Then I'm asking what justifies that meta rule? Why not choose a moral meta rule to 'maximise harm' instead? And one of the rules of thumb might be to ignore consent. What justifies 'minimise harm' as moral, but 'maximise harm' not?

What makes a meta-rule a meta-rule (rather than a rule) is that it attempts to distill or extract an essence from a load of existing rules.

It's not an answer to the hard question "why be moral?". It's not a refutation of nihilism (type 3) or revelation (type 1). It's not a rule of thumb as to how to minimise harm or maximize wellbeing. Both of those are, it seems to me, alternative meta-rules.

Arguably the human brain does not operate by logic, but by pattern-recognition. It's like one of those puzzles where you have a list of things in set A and a list of things in set not-A and have to induce a rule by which to classify other things as being members or non-members of set A. Applied to the set of morally wrong actions.

A good meta-rule is one that explains all or nearly all of your perceptions as to which acts are wrong or not-wrong. And guides you about all those where your perception leaves you unsure.

You haven't answered what justifies the Consent 'metarule', except it feels right.

Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑January 5th, 2024, 11:14 am

Gertie wrote: ↑January 2nd, 2024, 2:21 pm Otherwise how do you combat such issues, even murder, being down to the happenstance of your or my opinions/intuitions?

Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑January 3rd, 2024, 10:07 am I'm not sure. For a start, is it morally correct to seek to "combat such issues"? And if it is, as many of us believe, then is it really only a matter of opinion? I think yes and no. Individually-held opinions are sometimes shared, sometimes not. The group consensus is as important here as any individual opinion, I think. For we create and implement morality as groups, in the main. Of course individuals have their own moral code, but the most noticeable effect is that of the group's averaged-out POV.

Given that there are no 'objective' justifications for any practical morality, group consensus seems to be the dominant factor. And as I think about that, I wonder if that could be otherwise, never mind whether it *should*?

Gertie wrote: ↑January 4th, 2024, 3:57 pm I think it can and should be.

Otherwise we have the tyranny of the majority for whom (collectively) anything is permissable. And there's no justification for Rights to protect minorities - Might is Right.

You're right tho that without some morality we can justify as 'objective', it's a challenge to our usual ways of achieving moral consensus which is more than majority opinion, it requires a different approach to what morality is, and what it's for.

If we think about how Hume starkly challenges us- how do you get an Ought from an Is (how do you justify a moral duty from the objective state of affairs/how things just are), then the way that makes sense to me is to acknowledge that conscious beings have a stake in how things are. It matters to us. Because we're experiencing subjects with a quality of life we value. (Unlike a rock or a tree or a toaster).

It's the 'mattering to us' which brings meaning and value into the equation when we're judging whether an action is good or bad. It's not 'objective', because it's all about what matters to conscious subjects, our wellbeing - but that doesn't mean it's not the reason why we Ought to treat each other with consideration. Including minorities, even other species. It's the obvious reason to. Imo

I can't see an alternative to consensus, to majority rule. It isn't ideal, as you point out, but it's easily the best we have. When it comes down to it, the tribe can always over-rule the individual, by simple force of numbers, when/if that becomes necessary. This is, I think, something that is unavoidable, in practice. And so I see a balancing (moral) requirement placed upon the tribe — only to use this 'veto' when necessary, never for any lesser reason. This goes as far as is practically possible to solving the shortcomings that you correctly (IMO) identify.

This is far from perfect, but I wonder if it's as close to perfect as we can get, in practice?

I agree democracy is the best available system for organising societies. But it does have this prob of tyranny of the majority. If the majority voted tomorrow to re-introduce slavery, or make women men's chattells again, it would be democratic. But that wouldn't mean it's moral. Majority opinion can't justify morality, it simply reflects our evolved intuitions and environmental influences.

So we need some moral under-girding to our laws and institutions which govern us. That's the source for a balancing moral requirement or veto you mention.

And 'promoting the wellbeing of conscious creatures' is such an all-purpose contender. Something like slavery isn't a good fit when we base our governance on the wellbeing of slaves, as well as those with the power to own them.

And we can use this morality to justify the concept of Rights, which are held as more fundamental than the passing whims of different governments. It's Rights which can set a bar for basic aspects of wellbeing, regardless of majority rule. Equal Rights, the right to vote, to a home, medical care, education, expression, protest, enough resources to live and potentially flourish on, property ownership, bodily autonomy, etc.

Within a moral framework of wellbeing, we can set standards using the concept of Rights, to curtail the might of the majority.

Otherwise there is no balancing moral requirement or veto.

Good_Egg wrote: ↑January 10th, 2024, 10:23 am If it's immoral then no it's not OK...

You're asserting a requirement both moral and pragmatic, then justifying only the pragmatic element. Whereas what we're about here is understanding the nature of moral.

And it's no use trying to qualify moral with "practical". A morality which forbids murder only so long as the alternative is "practical" is no morality. It's fine to argue that "should" implies "can". But the difference between "can" and "can practically" is where the weaselling starts. If you tell yourself that practically and realistically you can't reasonably be expected to refrain from murder then you've already said goodbye to morality.

Yes, this topic is about morality, fair enough. But we were talking about something different, if related. There is no universal ('objective') morality, for politics or for anything else. But it's also true to say that the issues we were discussing have a moral component. But that only refers to our opinions, which are different. What seems moral to me may not seem so to you, so in that sense, there is no morality in politics, but only opinions.

Good_Egg wrote: ↑January 10th, 2024, 10:23 am You said that there is a moral duty on the group not to enforce group-will on individuals unless necessary.

Yes, I did, and I stand by what I wrote.

Good_Egg wrote: ↑January 10th, 2024, 10:23 am Which says that any position other than the maximum-liberty end of the spectrum is a moral wrong against the individual. Because if a more-libertarian point on the spectrum is possible then the level of coercion involved in whatever midway point you would choose or approve of s not necessary.

No, it doesn't "say" any such thing. My observation is a moral one, and a subjective opinion, which seems to me to be common decency. The group is in the position that it can always win, if it chooses to. Therefore, decency says that the group should exercise this ability only when it needs to, because constraining others unnecessarily or unreasonably is not decent behaviour. And yes, that is a moral opinion too. But it does not say that any other position is immoral; it says that the position I described is moral, IMO, and nothing more than that.

Oh, and the opinions I offer do not deliver what you would describe as the "maximum-liberty end of the spectrum", because group decisions that constrain (some) individuals are not uncommon.

Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑January 10th, 2024, 1:56 pm What seems moral to me may not seem so to you, so in that sense, there is no morality in politics, but only opinions.

Moral statements are not about what is, but about what ought to be. Prescriptive, not descriptive.

Where we have different ideas about what is, we try to resolve them by pointing to relevant visible aspects of what is. (E.g. If you think a politician dishonest, you'll justify this by pointing to the occasions when she has knowingly lied - said untrue things about a matter of which she had knowledge).

What happens when we have different ideas about what ought to be ? We can't point to anything that is to resolve such differences.

Does that mean that such ideas are no more than taste-preferences ?

No it doesn't. Because what ought to be, although not visible, has a consistency requirement. We can reason about it. If I make two different statements about what ought to be, you may be able to point out a contradiction and thereby prove my ideas to be mistaken.

Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑January 11th, 2024, 11:29 am ...yes, that is a moral opinion too. But it does not say that any other position is immoral; it says that the position I described is moral, IMO, and nothing more than that.

Note that there is a descriptive use of the word "moral". To say that abortion (for example) is a moral issue is to say that there are true ought-statements about abortion, that it is a topic that has moral weight.

So when you say "that is a moral opinion" that sounds like a descriptive statement (that the opinion/belief/idea/view/perception you're talking about has an element of "ought" about it. Has moral weight.

The opposite of moral in that sense is non-moral. You might, for example, believe that the choice between a high-tax government and a low-tax government is a non-moral choice, that it is purely a matter of taste.

But in the prescriptive sense the opposite of moral (= morally right or morally good) is immoral (= morally wrong or evil). The ought-statement that unnecessary coercion is morally wrong does indeed imply that it is immoral to implement a government that coerces unnecessarily. If A implies B, then if you believe A (even if only as an unevidenced opinion) then you believe B.

So it seems like you're equivocating between descriptive and prescriptive senses.

The above is subject to a couple of caveats.

One is that there can be a situation where it is necessary to choose between two evils. So you might believe that coercion is morally wrong (I.e. that one ought not to do it) but that this is a lesser evil than murder. And that therefore using force or threat to prevent murder is justified, as being less-wrong than the alternative.

But note that such cases of a moral duty giving way to a greater moral duty does not in any way justify a moral duty giving way to non-moral considerations of pragmatism or preference.

The other issue is to do with what you might call "derived wrongness" - the extent that advocating or voting for or turning a blind eye to a morally-wrong action is necessarily morally wrong. Which is a complication I'd rather not go into; I'm not intending to assert here anything on this, either way.

Oh, and the opinions I offer do not deliver what you would describe as the "maximum-liberty end of the spectrum", because group decisions that constrain (some) individuals are not uncommon.

This doesn't follow at all. The fact that something is common or uncommon (descriptively) says nothing at all about whether it is right (prescriptively).

If you're querying my logic (that no unnecessary constraint implies maximum liberty) then you need to find a better argument. You may be correct to question that logic, but the argument you give doesn't stand up.

Gertie wrote: ↑January 10th, 2024, 1:19 pm

Lagayscienza wrote: ↑January 5th, 2024, 12:29 am

Gertie wrote: ↑January 4th, 2024, 4:09 pm
OK, so consent would be justified by a 'minimise harm' meta rule.

Then I'm asking what justifies that meta rule? Why not choose a moral meta rule to 'maximise harm' instead? And one of the rules of thumb might be to ignore consent. What justifies 'minimise harm' as moral, but 'maximise harm' not?

Yes, that is the question.

Isn't it moral oughts all the way down? And aren't these always based in our subjective moral sentiments? How can they be objectified?

We agree they can't be 'objectified', that's a pointless endeavour (unless you introduce something like an omni-god imo). Objective Morality is akin to a category error, because the essence of moral right and wrong isn't about measurable, observable, falsifiable truths.

So what is it about?

Well you can say it's simply about our evolved intuitions (honed by environment) and stop there. In Hume's framing, that's just another ''Is'' state of affairs. And we could stop there. You think that's good enough, it more or less works. But I disagree it works well enough, and I think that if we consider what can make sense of right and wrong, of oughts, then it's having a stake in the state of affairs.

That having a stake in the state of affairs then naturally becomes the appropriate grounding for morality, its justification. And it's experiencing subjects who have such a stake, whose quality of life matters.

Gertie, you say you disagree that our evolved moral intuitions work well enough. I think that in areas of core human morality they do still work well enough. "Murder is just wrong!" All normal humans agree that it is wrong. That is how we feel intuitively about it and why we discourage and punish it. We cannot help but feel this way about it. We feel in our bones that it is abhorrent. However, I agree that today, in certain situations, moral decision making may not be so clear cut and we may need to bring more than intuition to bear. I think those situations arise in circumstances that did not exist out on the savanna. Issues like surgical abortion, assisted dying, cybercrime, etcetera just weren't issues back then when we lived in smallish, dispersed groups as hunter-gathers and therefore evolution was blind to and had no traction them. Today we live in cities of millions and do our hunter-gathering in supermarkets. Perhaps cultural evolution has run ahead of regular evolution so that we have today's "edgy" cases where we have to bring more than intuition to bear in coming to a decision about what to do.

I'm interested in how we can "make sense of right and wrong, of oughts in terms of having a stake in the state of affairs. Is there some metaethical or normative theory that attempts to make sense of morality in this way?