Lagayscienza wrote: ↑December 23rd, 2023, 3:10 pm
What's wrong with morality being subjective? It works. Our subjective sense of right and wrong is enough. We “intuit” right from wrong based on our evolved core human morality. Things only matter because they matter to us based on our subjective moral sentiments, which is tautologous. It doesn't not make morality objective but our morality doesn’t need to be objective.
Gertie mentioned Sam Harris and his notion of the wellbeing of conscious creatures. But of course we value well being! Evolution made sure we did. Those sentiments are always already there as Heidegger might say. The values of moral right or wrong that we attach to actions are entirely human. But they are all we need. We don’t need them to be objectively true.
Sorry for the delay.
You seem to be making two related points, the tautology of ''mattering'', and that evolution has already equipped us well enough to value wellbeing, so our evolved social predispositions are a good enough basis for morality - yes?
Mattering -
I perhaps wasn't clear about how I'm using this as part of an argument, which neither relies on morality being 'objective', nor on the 'Is' of the happenstance of our particular species' evolved 'yuck/yum' intuitions. How might we otherwise ground the concept of morality - of right and wrong, and oughts. My argument basically goes that Mattering, as a (qualiative what it is like) aspect of conscious experience, is the source of Interests. And then I say Interests are the appropriate basis for distinguishing between the Is state of affairs, and what the state of affairs Ought to be when we take into account Interests. (This prominence of Mattering is adapted from Goldstein, and it's something so obvious we hardly think about it, but it's not tautological as a grounding).
And imo it's a way of finding an appropriate grounding for Morality, without being scuppered by either Emotivism (yuck/yum) or Moral Realism (objective or God). The elusive holy grail of moral philosophy is right under our noses, if we just recognise it.
Emotivism -
Your other point is that we don't need such a grounding, because Emotivism works fine. That evolution has already equipped us to value our own wellbeing, and as a social species to value that of others. We don't need the concept of morality or oughts, just call our evolved social intuitions ''Morality'' and job done. (Note the implicit acknowledgement that morality is a right fit with our social nature).
I agree to an extent, but not entirely. We don't necessarily need a concept of morality to generally act with consideration of others, but we are also evolved to value self-care, to be selfish. There will inevitably be conflicts there. And our natural circle of care tends to correlate with genetic closeness and those we actively form bonds with. This is tied to the up close and personal nature of much of our evolved social neurobiological mechanisms. Which were fine for when we lived in tribes, but
not for our globalised world of inter-dependence on strangers.
In tribal times our bonding could be reinforced by mirror neurons underlying empathy, by acts of reciprocal altruism, showing affection and grooming, sharing tasks and resources, sharing tribal narratives and archetypes, and so on. Knowing who can be trusted, and who can't. But
strangers don't have those ingroup bonding attachments and were potential competitors for local resources, and potential threats. They were the outgroup, The Other.
Today, in our vastly larger and more sophisticated world, we need replacements for reliance our neurologically based predispositions - like reason, institutions, laws, government, education, trade, treaties and so on to try to mitigate the effects of in-group/out-group tribalism. And
these need an under-girding of a concept of morality.
Still, tribalism is such a strong instinct, we'll form tribal potentially violent allegiances over almost anything - from nationalism, identity politics, class, ideology, religion, to football teams. When I look around the world I see culture clashes, religious strife, territorial conflicts, capitalist exploitation, animal commodification - it's not exactly the best of all possible worlds. Our natural predispositions weren't designed for our modern world, and don't allow for moral progress. A unifying concept of morality such as Harris's Wellbeing of conscious creatures is still needed. Concepts like the social contract, democracy and rights which flow from such a moral foundation are still needed. And philosophy can contribute there, without having to argue from some Objective justification.
