Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Sculptor1]

No, my feeling that torturing infants for fun is unspeakably AWFUL, is not one that could ever be changed. My feelings, and the feelings of the vast majority of humans on such a matter, will always coincide. Can you imagine a world in which such a thing could ever be considered acceptable? I can't.

You seem to be jumping around between three different ideas:

- the idea that right and wrong don't exist at all (is that nihilism? Do what you want, and pay the social price ?)

- the idea that it is morally wrong for you to act against your moral sentiments, and morally wrong for me to act against mine, but there's no basis for anyone to judge between the two. I'd call that "subjectivism".

- the idea that social consensus of the tribe determines what is right and wrong. Known as "social constructivism" ?

In trying to make a distinction between "core" and "edge"
examples, you seem to be suggesting that your feeling (that it's wrong to torture puppies, for example) is a different type of thing depending on whether other people in general agree with you. That seems obviously false.

I'm not a mind-reader, I can only go by what you say....

And can you answer the big question of what would be the basis of your moral reasoning.


If you want to make a claim for moral objectivity, then you would have to state your aim.
What is the purpose, or aim of morals?
Since such a purpose would of necessity guide the formation of your rules.
Can you say with certainty that those aims are universal or objectively true, or are they nothing more than aspiriation that are not shared by others.
If so are those "others" to be placed outside your moral scheme and rendered anathema?

Sorry Sculptor, that makes no sense to me. Things that objectively exist don't need a purpose, they just are.

I'm a visually-oriented person, so I liken apprehension of moral truths to colour vision. If you ask the purpose of blue, I can't answer you.

Morals cannot be objective.
That is the point.

[Good_Egg]

Accepting all of this will not transform one into a deranged, cannibalistic serial killer.

It won't. Most of us have no particular desire to be a cannibal, and accepting your philosophy will not create such a desire.

What it does do is to take away a reason for not acting on any antisocial desires that we might already have.

What you call a "moral sentiment" - that stealing (for example) is wrong - is actually, I suggest, a link between an emotion (guilt ? shame ? wrongness ?) and a concept of stealing (that is an abstraction from particular acts - of taking other people's stuff - that one has contemplated).

You're asserting that that link is arbitrary. Sure, you feel that it's there, and can maybe do some hand-waving about how imagining it has evolutionary advantages. But it's not real. Because if you had been born with a different set of genes or grown up in a different culture, you might feel differently.

You're saying that the link shares the property of all imaginary things and all falsehoods, in that it does not correspond to any objective reality.

Once you realise in your intellect that the link is imaginary, it no longer binds you strongly. There is no "nice nihilism" in which we all agree to carry on behaving as if it was real when we know it's not. Doesn't work.

The objectivist position is that feelings are not sovereign. There is a basis for judging them - that one is true or appropriate and another is not.

How can you know that the link between stealing and wrongness is real ? From the combination of recognising other people as beings like yourself and the negative emotions of loss and anger and frustration and powerlessness when someone steals from you.

[Lagayascienza]

Good_Egg, naive moral realism is the default position of most people. We can thank evolution for that. Obviously, nothing is going to convince you that morality is not objective. And that's fine. Nothing hinges on it. Moral realists will go on acting in ways they feel is right just a non-realists will go on on doing what they feel is right. People always have and always will generally do what they feel is right. So nothing changes. The discussion is about the ontological status of moral value and has few, if any, practical implications.

[Good_Egg]

People always have and always will generally do what they feel is right.

No. Good people generally always have and always will do what they believe to be right, using both their reason and their moral intuition. Whilst bad people do whatever they feel like and to hell with everybody else.

Your insistence on evolutionarily-determined feelings as a necessary and sufficient descriptor of all human action is an impoverished reductionist view of human psychology. Which is inadequate to the richness of human mental experience. Which includes moral struggle, heroism, depravity, conscience, the conflict between love and duty,, and much more.

To be, or not to be, that is the question. Let's see - how do I feel this morning ?

Here I stand, I can do no other. Which is to say that standing here gratifies my feelings...

[Lagayascienza]

Cool. You must go with what you believe. All any of us can do is go with what we feel/believe to be true. Some people think moral values can be proven to be objectively true. Others don't agree. It makes little practical difference. As I said before, we are here discussing neither practical nor normative ethics. We are discussing metaethics, that is, we are discussing the ontological status of moral value.

[Lagayascienza]

I am a non-realist when it comes to morality. I believe that torturing toddlers for fun is unspeakably awful and absolutely deplorable behaviour. I’m guessing that most moral realists will feel the same. If this is so, then the only difference between us is that the realist thinks that they can prove objectively that such abominable behaviour is morally wrong (or at least that it could be so proved) whereas I don’t think I can prove it. Therefore, I must accept my subjective feeling that the behaviour is unspeakably awful and to be deplored, without the added belief that I can prove that it is objectively wrong. That’s the best I can do. But do I need more? I cannot see that I do need more. I cannot see that I need to be able to prove objectively that the deplorable behaviour is morally wrong. Why are my feelings about the behaviour not enough?

I would love someone to demonstrate that any moral argument is valid and sound. That is, that its premises are undeniably true, and that the conclusion follows logically from those premises.

For example, let’s say someone wants to argue that stealing is morally wrong. They might want to proceed as follows:

It says in the Bible that stealing is wrong.
The Bible cannot be wrong.
Therefore, stealing is wrong.

Or they might want to argue like this:

Stealing causes harm.
We ought not cause harm.
Therefore stealing is wrong.

Or:

My Dad says stealing is wrong.
I believe that what my dad says is true.
Therefore, stealing is wrong.

Or,

I hate theft.
I hate things that are morally wrong.
Therefore stealing is morally wrong.

It is easy to see that these arguments do not succeed. So, my question is: Can someone give us a logical argument that proves stealing is morally wrong?

That would be very instructive. And if such an argument is forthcoming, I will love to have been proved wrong, and I will become a moral realist.

[Gertie]

I am a non-realist when it comes to morality. I believe that torturing toddlers for fun is unspeakably awful and absolutely deplorable behaviour. I’m guessing that most moral realists will feel the same. If this is so, then the only difference between us is that the realist thinks that they can prove objectively that such abominable behaviour is morally wrong (or at least that it could be so proved) whereas I don’t think I can prove it. Therefore, I must accept my subjective feeling that the behaviour is unspeakably awful and to be deplored, without the added belief that I can prove that it is objectively wrong. That’s the best I can do. But do I need more? I cannot see that I do need more. I cannot see that I need to be able to prove objectively that the deplorable behaviour is morally wrong. Why are my feelings about the behaviour not enough?

I would love someone to demonstrate that any moral argument is valid and sound. That is, that its premises are undeniably true, and that the conclusion follows logically from those premises.

For example, let’s say someone wants to argue that stealing is morally wrong. They might want to proceed as follows:

It says in the Bible that stealing is wrong.
The Bible cannot be wrong.
Therefore, stealing is wrong.

Or they might want to argue like this:

Stealing causes harm.
We ought not cause harm.
Therefore stealing is wrong.

Or:

My Dad says stealing is wrong.
I believe that what my dad says is true.
Therefore, stealing is wrong.

Or,

I hate theft.
I hate things that are morally wrong.
Therefore stealing is morally wrong.

It is easy to see that these arguments do not succeed. So, my question is: Can someone give us a logical argument that proves stealing is morally wrong?

That would be very instructive. And if such an argument is forthcoming, I will love to have been proved wrong, and I will become a moral realist.

I'll have a go. Sort of.

To make my case we have to think about what could make morality 'real' or objective'. These are terms related to knowing. We agree something is objective or real based on inter-subjective agreement, and this method is good for physical stuff which can be observed and measured. Science is based on this type of falsifiability. We all agree morality isn't physical in that way. Then there's reasoning, can we reason our way to Right and Wrong? I'd say we can only do that if we have some foundation which gets to the heart of what morality is about, what it's for.

My position is that Harris put his finger on this, with his moral foundation based on 'the wellbeing of conscious creatures.' Why isn't that just a subjective opinion of what morality is appropriately about? Well, if we think of a world made only of rocks interacting according to the laws of physics, morality is irrelevant, meaningless. It's only with the advent of experiencing agents that morality becomes meaningful. For two reasons - firstly we need agency to make moral choices, and secondly only when we make choices which affect other conscious creatures are we affecting anything meaningful. I can smash a rock, and the only meaning it has is for me. But if I smash another person or other conscious creature, it's meaningful to them too. It matters to them whether I help or harm them, my decisions matter to them.

That means the qualiative nature of conscious experience gives subjects interests - a stake in the state of affairs. It's conscious experience which brings meaning, value, purpose, mattering - wellbeing - into the world. And that meaning and mattering, that having a stake in the state of affairs, is the appropriate arena for Oughts. Otherwise everything is just physics - Hume's ''Is.''

So it's wrong for me to harm you by stealing your stuff, and vice versa. (Or at least it's right overall for societies to follow that rule of thumb).

The terms 'real' and 'objective' aren't a great fit for this position, but neither is 'subjective', as in just an opinion, evolved social predispositions, or Humean intuition. I'd say that's the wrong way to think about morality, it leads us to inventing a god of the gaps to give morality a quasi-physical grounding, or on the other hand leaves us with the dilemma of 'everything is permissable'. We can do better than that.



So in a nutshell:

- Subjects have conscious experience.

- Conscious experience endows subjects' existence with qualiative meaning and mattering, which give them interests in the 'Is' state of affairs.

- These interests are the grounding for oughts.

[Lagayascienza]

So in a nutshell:

- Subjects have conscious experience.

- Conscious experience endows subjects' existence with qualiative meaning and mattering, which give them interests in the 'Is' state of affairs.

- These interests are the grounding for oughts.

Thanks, Gertie.
I'm learning a lot on this forum about stances other than the hardline logical approach of Anglo-American Analytic philosophy. I may not be able to objectively prove that stealing is morally wrong but I can see that, if I take an approach based in first person experience of value something rational can be said about this and other moral issues.
I want to read you post more closely before responding more fully to it.

[Pattern-chaser]

...insistence on evolutionarily-determined feelings as a necessary and sufficient descriptor of all human action is an impoverished reductionist view of human psychology.

Agreed. Feelings are a fundamental part of the human 'psyche', but far from the *only* part.

[Gertie]

...insistence on evolutionarily-determined feelings as a necessary and sufficient descriptor of all human action is an impoverished reductionist view of human psychology.

Agreed. Feelings are a fundamental part of the human 'psyche', but far from the *only* part.

Well Hume cottoned on to the fact that we have these predispositions to approve/disapprove of certain things, a sort of yuck/yum response. Much, much later evolutionary psychology is beginning to show the evolved neurobiology involved with this in our social species. Hume was basically right. In his terms, this is simply the ''Is'' of evolved human nature.

Knowing this, the challenge then becomes is there another way to justify morality, the concept of Right and Wrong which has emerged from our evolved social/moral intuitions?

Philosophy has obsessed over whether we can find an ''objective'' justification, which we can reach via reason, god or some other way. And once pointed to, everyone can agree yes that is true.

So far, no cigar. A pointless pursuit imo. But one which leaves us with the scary thought that without that, ''everything becomes permissable''. And it's just a happenstance of our species' evolution that we (mostly) don't act like ruthless psychopaths.

So imo we have to look afresh at how we might justify the concept of right and wrong, and justify oughts.

[Good_Egg]

... the scary thought that without that, ''everything becomes permissable''. And it's just a happenstance of our species' evolution that we (mostly) don't act like ruthless psychopaths.

There is an ethic- not sure of the proper philosophical name for it - which says that everything is permissible with the consent of all those involved. Consent-based ethics, if you will.

If consent justifies all (taking someone's stuff, ending their life, deceiving them, etc) then the thing that all wrongs have in common is that they amount to treating an involved person as non-involved or a non-person.

If it is objectively true that some being is or is not a person, and is or is not involved, then that's an objective basis for at least part of morality.

[Pattern-chaser]

So far, no cigar. A pointless pursuit imo.

Agreed, again.

But one which leaves us with the scary thought that without that, ''everything becomes permissible''.

It does? How does that follow? [Sincere question, not a challenge.]

And it's just a happenstance of our species' evolution that we (mostly) don't act like ruthless psychopaths.

So imo we have to look afresh at how we might justify the concept of right and wrong, and justify oughts.

Yet another point on which we agree.

[Gertie]

... the scary thought that without that, ''everything becomes permissable''. And it's just a happenstance of our species' evolution that we (mostly) don't act like ruthless psychopaths.

There is an ethic- not sure of the proper philosophical name for it - which says that everything is permissible with the consent of all those involved. Consent-based ethics, if you will.

If consent justifies all (taking someone's stuff, ending their life, deceiving them, etc) then the thing that all wrongs have in common is that they amount to treating an involved person as non-involved or a non-person.

If it is objectively true that some being is or is not a person, and is or is not involved, then that's an objective basis for at least part of morality.

What might be the underlying concept of morality which would justify consent as foundational?

[Gertie]

So far, no cigar. A pointless pursuit imo.

Agreed, again.

But one which leaves us with the scary thought that without that, ''everything becomes permissible''.

It does? How does that follow? [Sincere question, not a challenge.]

And it's just a happenstance of our species' evolution that we (mostly) don't act like ruthless psychopaths.

So imo we have to look afresh at how we might justify the concept of right and wrong, and justify oughts.

Yet another point on which we agree.

Yeah, we do agree objective morality is the wrong approach. I'll get you to buy into my alternative one of these days .

The only way objective morality can work imo is by positing a god as the ultimate source and arbiter of what is right and wrong. That would give us something to point to and see the truth of - if god was point-to-able!

The ''everything is permissible'' fear is a factor in driving such a search, tho as Lagayscienza has pointed out earlier, we're a social species who aren't simply uncaring and selfish, our success relies on not being sociopaths. But the idea of being inherently flawed, along with being watched and judged every moment, even having our thoughts judged by a god, is a powerful one. So it's a position I tend to associate with religion. Or the Hobbsian idea of human nature which is still pervasive, rather than say the science of evolutionary psychology. It implies we can't be good without submission to a higher authority.

[Lagayascienza]

What's wrong with morality being subjective? It works. Our subjective sense of right and wrong is enough. We “intuit” right from wrong based on our evolved core human morality. Things only matter because they matter to us based on our subjective moral sentiments, which is tautologous. It doesn't not make morality objective but our morality doesn’t need to be objective.

Gertie mentioned Sam Harris and his notion of the wellbeing of conscious creatures. But of course we value well being! Evolution made sure we did. Those sentiments are always already there as Heidegger might say. The values of moral right or wrong that we attach to actions are entirely human. But they are all we need. We don’t need them to be objectively true.