Philosophy Discussion Forums

Atla wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 1:43 pm No they aren't, you are ignoring the very issue. There is no known reason why it would be necessarily true that we shouldn't break our "unbreakable" promises.

Go ahead and try to define "promise" or "vow" in a way that jibes with your claim.

Well, I've been away from this forum for a few months, but not surprised to find this thread still going strong. Tough to decide where to jump back in, but your reply to Gertie, below, is as good a place as any:

Leontiskos wrote: ↑August 13th, 2021, 3:05 pm
Throughout this conversation I have pointed out your odd usage of saying we "treat things as objective." Let's draw this out since it is an important wrinkle in your argument. If something is objectively true then it is true regardless of how it is treated. That is the whole meaning of objectivity.

No, it isn't. Though your last sentence above is true, it is not the "whole meaning." It is a popular vernacular meaning, but not one that draws a cogent distinction between objective and subjective beliefs. What is lacking is any means of determining what is and is not "objectively true." Without that we have no means of deciding whether any proposition is objective or subjective.

As I argued many pages back, "objective" and "subjective," like "true" and "false," are properties of propositions. Things-in-the-world, e.g., states-of-affairs or "facts," are "objective" only derivatively, to the extent they are asserted by true objective propositions.

The difference between an objective proposition and a subjective one is that the truth conditions for the former (e.g., "Paris is the capital of France," "water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen") are publicly confirmable, while the truth conditions for the latter ("I have a headache," or, "I prefer Beethoven's music to Mozart's") are only privately confirmable. All of those may be true, of course, and all constitute knowledge.

Here's the link to that orginal analysis:

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=15726&start=106

The problem with knowledge by consensus or knowledge by intersubjective agreement is similar. Taking a poll and seeing if there is a consensus will not tell us about objective reality. It will only tell us about the opinions of the group we are polling. Something which is objectively true is always true regardless of opinion, or agreement, or consensus. For example, "Water is made up of H2O." You can take a poll, and even if there is a unanimous consensus that water is not H2O, it wouldn't matter. It is still objectively true that water is made up of H2O. If you took a poll that indicates the opposite you would be forced to "treat as objective" the claim that water is not made up of H2O. In that case your "objective" "fact" is not objective, and is in fact false. Knowledge is not constituted by consensus (or by intersubjective agreement). "Knowledge by consensus" fails.

That is all true prima facie but, again, it neglects to mention any method for justifying the belief, say, that water is H2O. We are justified in declaring a consensus that it is not H2O false because we agree what are the truth conditions for "Water is H2O" and can observe that they are satisifed. Knowledge does not depend upon consensus, but in most cases they are pretty closely correlated.

This is your larger point: "I can make a third person accessible observation to falsify a geometrical opinion, but I can't make a third person accessible observation to falsify a moral opinion."

We could rephrase the first part of that claim in three different forms, all of which arrive at the same problem:

• I can make [a third person accessible observation] to falsify a geometrical opinion.
• I can make [an objective observation] to falsify a geometrical opinion.
• I can make [an observation based on consensus] to falsify a geometrical opinion.

The problem is that you can't do that, as consensus is merely stipulative (see above). So the truer claim would be, "I can't make a third person accessible observation to falsify a geometrical opinion, and I can't make a third person accessible observation to falsify a moral opinion." As I noted at the outset, you are in the same boat with regard to scientific and moral claims (as well as abstract mathematical claims).

I'm a bit confused here: She can't do what? She can't make a third-person-accessible observation to falsify a scientific or moral claim? Why not?

This is your argument as I understand it:

P1. Objective knowledge exists if and only if there is consensus. ("Knowledge by consensus")
P2. Consensus obtains in science.*
P3. Consensus does not obtain in morality.
C4. Therefore, science counts as objective knowledge. (From P1 & P2)
C5. Therefore, morality does not count as objective knowledge. (From P1 & P3)

*The reason that consensus obtains in science is because science studies that which is observable/measurable/falsifiable

You keep defending P2 and P3. My point is that P1 is false. And if P1 is false then C5 is invalid (as is C4). You seem to think you have proved C4 and you keep asking me why I reject C5. My point is that you haven't proved C4, and therefore you have no valid reason to reject C5.

Your argument here is sound, but I'm not sure Gertie would agree that P1 correctly expresses her view. We are all in possession of much objective knowledge around which there is no consensus, mainly because most people don't possess that knowledge at all (e.g., "There are three blossoms currently on the black-eyed susan in my garden").

The takeaway here is that before we can approach the OP's question we have to agree on the meanings of "objective" and "subjective," and define them in a way that does not depend upon dubious epistemological assumptions.

GE Morton wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 8:10 pm Well, I've been away from this forum for a few months, but not surprised to find this thread still going strong. Tough to decide where to jump back in, but your reply to Gertie, below, is as good a place as any:

Welcome back.

GE Morton wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 8:10 pm

Leontiskos wrote: ↑August 13th, 2021, 3:05 pm
Throughout this conversation I have pointed out your odd usage of saying we "treat things as objective." Let's draw this out since it is an important wrinkle in your argument. If something is objectively true then it is true regardless of how it is treated. That is the whole meaning of objectivity.

No, it isn't. Though your last sentence above is true, it is not the "whole meaning." It is a popular vernacular meaning, but not one that draws a cogent distinction between objective and subjective beliefs. What is lacking is any means of determining what is and is not "objectively true." Without that we have no means of deciding whether any proposition is objective or subjective.

As I argued many pages back, "objective" and "subjective," like "true" and "false," are properties of propositions. Things-in-the-world, e.g., states-of-affairs or "facts," are "objective" only derivatively, to the extent they are asserted by true objective propositions.

The difference between an objective proposition and a subjective one is that the truth conditions for the former (e.g., "Paris is the capital of France," "water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen") are publicly confirmable, while the truth conditions for the latter ("I have a headache," or, "I prefer Beethoven's music to Mozart's") are only privately confirmable. All of those may be true, of course, and all constitute knowledge.

Here's the link to that orginal analysis:

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=15726&start=106

Yes, I am familiar with your arguments back at the start of the thread. In fact of all the users I have read on this forum you strike me as the most persuasive, and I have a longer post drafted to you that I haven't yet submitted. I didn't know if you would come back so I was taking my time with it.

I don't have any prima facie problem with your idea of confirmability as the litmus test of objectivity. I think it is a good approach. I was actually going to recommend that Gertie look at some of your earlier posts on that topic.

GE Morton wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 8:10 pm

Leontiskos wrote: ↑August 13th, 2021, 3:05 pmWe could rephrase the first part of that claim in three different forms, all of which arrive at the same problem:

• I can make [a third person accessible observation] to falsify a geometrical opinion.
• I can make [an objective observation] to falsify a geometrical opinion.
• I can make [an observation based on consensus] to falsify a geometrical opinion.

I'm a bit confused here: She can't do what? She can't make a third-person-accessible observation to falsify a scientific or moral claim? Why not?

The point was that for Gertie the green clauses are interchangeable. I.e.: A third-person accessible observation = an objective observation = an observation based on intersubjectivity/consensus. My conversation with Gertie revealed that when she is using these phrases she is ultimately referring to consensus.

(GE Morton, what follows is the first half of the post I had drafted to you. The second half was a defense of Aristotle, who you had criticized in your early posts to Arjand. The reason I haven't posted this draft is because I am waffling on whether to take up an Aristotelian position in this thread.)

Hello GE Morton. Thanks again for your posts in this thread, as they are very strong. I was finally able to needle all the way to your first post on page 7. I want to press you a bit on your own moral system and then look at Aristotle.

GE Morton wrote: ↑January 25th, 2020, 7:03 pm We start with a couple of universal, objective facts...

I think your moral proposal is plausible and coherent, and it strikes me as a form of utilitarianism. As I understand it you have constructed a system where each participant's subjectively-defined welfare is 'equally' advanced, and the system is available to anyone who wishes to opt in. It is quasi-objective in the sense that the desires of each participant are publicly known and are the very thing that constitute the system itself. Something like this could serve as a model for a highly pluralistic society which attempts to accommodate a number of widely differing perspectives.

GE Morton wrote: ↑January 25th, 2020, 7:03 pmThough what each person counts as a good or evil is subjective, that they do consider various things as goods or evils is objective. So a goal to the effect, "Develop principles and rules of interaction which will allow all agents to maximize welfare as each defines it" is a morally neutral goal; it is universal, it assumes no values and begs no moral questions.

I do not agree that this systematic goal is morally neutral. By my definition something is moral if it presupposes a normative state of affairs for human thoughts, judgments, or behavior. But your principle implies that human thoughts, judgments, and behavior ought to be oriented towards this particular goal. It is a very democratic and morally thin goal, but it is moral all the same. If you want to maintain that the goal is morally neutral could you give your definition of moral neutrality?

GE Morton wrote: ↑January 25th, 2020, 7:03 pmThe goal of a theory, however, is not a personal goal; it does not assert any particular interest of any particular person. It is indifferent to personal goals. But it does require a consensus among everyone interested in a viable theory of the subject matter in question. There is, I think, a consensus that the aim of ethics is to secure and advance "the good," or "the good life," in some sense. If there is, and if we agree that what constitutes "the good" or "the good life" differs from person to person, then the goal stated above becomes "quasi-objective."

Along the same lines as my last point, there are some personal goals that are common to all participants, and these would be goals such as, "To have a working system," "To have equal representation," "To achieve a particular conception of maximized welfare," etc. Those are the only personal goals presupposed by your theory, which is beginning to look a lot like classical liberalism.

GE Morton wrote: ↑January 30th, 2020, 8:53 pmThe Equal Agency postulate does not demand "equal treatment" in the popular sense; that is a moral principle and thus would beg the question as a postulate in a moral theory, the aim of which is to rationally derive moral principles from non-moral facts. It only stipulates that all agents within the scope of the theory have the same status and that any principles or rules developed apply in the same way to all agents.

I also don't see how the Equal Agency postulate could fail to be a moral principle. That everyone ought to be treated the same is a moral principle analogous to the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment.

Best,
Leontiskos

Leontiskos wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 5:31 pm

Atla wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 1:43 pm No they aren't, you are ignoring the very issue. There is no known reason why it would be necessarily true that we shouldn't break our "unbreakable" promises.

Go ahead and try to define "promise" or "vow" in a way that jibes with your claim.

It was defined that way, again you are ignoring the very issue. There is no reason why defining a vow to be "unbreakable" would necessarily mean that we ought not break them. Do you think our definitions override reality?

GE Morton wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 8:10 pm Well, I've been away from this forum for a few months, but not surprised to find this thread still going strong. Tough to decide where to jump back in, but your reply to Gertie, below, is as good a place as any:

Leontiskos wrote: ↑August 13th, 2021, 3:05 pm
Throughout this conversation I have pointed out your odd usage of saying we "treat things as objective." Let's draw this out since it is an important wrinkle in your argument. If something is objectively true then it is true regardless of how it is treated. That is the whole meaning of objectivity.

No, it isn't. Though your last sentence above is true, it is not the "whole meaning." It is a popular vernacular meaning, but not one that draws a cogent distinction between objective and subjective beliefs. What is lacking is any means of determining what is and is not "objectively true." Without that we have no means of deciding whether any proposition is objective or subjective.

As I argued many pages back, "objective" and "subjective," like "true" and "false," are properties of propositions. Things-in-the-world, e.g., states-of-affairs or "facts," are "objective" only derivatively, to the extent they are asserted by true objective propositions.

The difference between an objective proposition and a subjective one is that the truth conditions for the former (e.g., "Paris is the capital of France," "water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen") are publicly confirmable, while the truth conditions for the latter ("I have a headache," or, "I prefer Beethoven's music to Mozart's") are only privately confirmable. All of those may be true, of course, and all constitute knowledge.

Here's the link to that orginal analysis:

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=15726&start=106

The problem with knowledge by consensus or knowledge by intersubjective agreement is similar. Taking a poll and seeing if there is a consensus will not tell us about objective reality. It will only tell us about the opinions of the group we are polling. Something which is objectively true is always true regardless of opinion, or agreement, or consensus. For example, "Water is made up of H2O." You can take a poll, and even if there is a unanimous consensus that water is not H2O, it wouldn't matter. It is still objectively true that water is made up of H2O. If you took a poll that indicates the opposite you would be forced to "treat as objective" the claim that water is not made up of H2O. In that case your "objective" "fact" is not objective, and is in fact false. Knowledge is not constituted by consensus (or by intersubjective agreement). "Knowledge by consensus" fails.

That is all true prima facie but, again, it neglects to mention any method for justifying the belief, say, that water is H2O. We are justified in declaring a consensus that it is not H2O false because we agree what are the truth conditions for "Water is H2O" and can observe that they are satisifed. Knowledge does not depend upon consensus, but in most cases they are pretty closely correlated.

This is your larger point: "I can make a third person accessible observation to falsify a geometrical opinion, but I can't make a third person accessible observation to falsify a moral opinion."

We could rephrase the first part of that claim in three different forms, all of which arrive at the same problem:

• I can make [a third person accessible observation] to falsify a geometrical opinion.
• I can make [an objective observation] to falsify a geometrical opinion.
• I can make [an observation based on consensus] to falsify a geometrical opinion.

The problem is that you can't do that, as consensus is merely stipulative (see above). So the truer claim would be, "I can't make a third person accessible observation to falsify a geometrical opinion, and I can't make a third person accessible observation to falsify a moral opinion." As I noted at the outset, you are in the same boat with regard to scientific and moral claims (as well as abstract mathematical claims).

I'm a bit confused here: She can't do what? She can't make a third-person-accessible observation to falsify a scientific or moral claim? Why not?

This is your argument as I understand it:

P1. Objective knowledge exists if and only if there is consensus. ("Knowledge by consensus")
P2. Consensus obtains in science.*
P3. Consensus does not obtain in morality.
C4. Therefore, science counts as objective knowledge. (From P1 & P2)
C5. Therefore, morality does not count as objective knowledge. (From P1 & P3)

*The reason that consensus obtains in science is because science studies that which is observable/measurable/falsifiable

You keep defending P2 and P3. My point is that P1 is false. And if P1 is false then C5 is invalid (as is C4). You seem to think you have proved C4 and you keep asking me why I reject C5. My point is that you haven't proved C4, and therefore you have no valid reason to reject C5.

Your argument here is sound, but I'm not sure Gertie would agree that P1 correctly expresses her view. We are all in possession of much objective knowledge around which there is no consensus, mainly because most people don't possess that knowledge at all (e.g., "There are three blossoms currently on the black-eyed susan in my garden").

The takeaway here is that before we can approach the OP's question we have to agree on the meanings of "objective" and "subjective," and define them in a way that does not depend upon dubious epistemological assumptions.

Epistemology is not enough when we are talking about objective reality. It is impossible to define the philosophically interesting usage of 'objective' without reference to ontic reality .

If some theory of existence could be absolutely true, as could be the case, and this theory of existence is based on the premise that the total of individual minds = absolute mind then subjective minds become absolute mind and both of those aspects objectively exist.

Belindi wrote: ↑August 19th, 2021, 7:33 am
Epistemology is not enough when we are talking about objective reality. It is impossible to define the philosophically interesting usage of 'objective' without reference to ontic reality.

Well, methinks that "philosophically interesting" usage you seem to have in mind is a philosophical quagmire. Definitions in which the definiendum is more obscure than the definiens are never informative or useful.

If some theory of existence could be absolutely true, as could be the case, and this theory of existence is based on the premise that the total of individual minds = absolute mind then subjective minds become absolute mind and both of those aspects objectively exist.

You make my case.

Atla wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 11:54 pm

Leontiskos wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 5:31 pm

Atla wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 1:43 pm No they aren't, you are ignoring the very issue. There is no known reason why it would be necessarily true that we shouldn't break our "unbreakable" promises.

Go ahead and try to define "promise" or "vow" in a way that jibes with your claim.

It was defined that way...

Again, what is your definition of "promise"? Give me your definition.

Atla wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 11:54 pmThere is no reason why defining a vow to be "unbreakable" would necessarily mean that we ought not break them. Do you think our definitions override reality?

And there is no reason why defining "gun" as "a weapon from which a shot is discharged by gunpowder" would mean that guns are such weapons. ...Except for the fact that a definition aims at a true description of some reality. That's.. y'know.. what a definition is.

If you have a way to talk about promises apart from words and definitions, I'm all ears.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 7:26 amGetting legally divorced likewise has objective aspects--again, such as documents related to it--but as something that people are doing, it's also largely a way of THINKING about relationships, and thus it's subjective.

Yeah? Tell that to Bill Gates whose recent divorce cost him ~$76 billion.

Leontiskos wrote: ↑August 19th, 2021, 5:10 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 7:26 amGetting legally divorced likewise has objective aspects--again, such as documents related to it--but as something that people are doing, it's also largely a way of THINKING about relationships, and thus it's subjective.

Yeah? Tell that to Bill Gates whose recent divorce cost him ~$76 billion.

How would that it cost him billions amount to marriage (and divorce) being something other than a way that people think about relationships?

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑August 19th, 2021, 6:42 pmHow would that it cost him billions amount to marriage (and divorce) being something other than a way that people think about relationships?

Because paying someone $76 billion requires more than thinking.

Would you agree that an employment contract establishes objective obligations?

Leontiskos wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 8:56 pm
I think your moral proposal is plausible and coherent, and it strikes me as a form of utilitarianism.

As long as that term is understood loosely. Any rational moral theory must be consequentialist in the long run.

As I understand it you have constructed a system where each participant's subjectively-defined welfare is 'equally' advanced, and the system is available to anyone who wishes to opt in. It is quasi-objective in the sense that the desires of each participant are publicly known and are the very thing that constitute the system itself.

Not (necessarily) equally advanced. The extent to which any individual's interests or welfare is advanced will depend upon many variable factors, particularly his own talents, strengths, diligence, and ambition, as well as "dumb luck." The only thing equal (per theory) is that the same rules apply to all agents.

GE Morton wrote: ↑January 25th, 2020, 7:03 pmThough what each person counts as a good or evil is subjective, that they do consider various things as goods or evils is objective. So a goal to the effect, "Develop principles and rules of interaction which will allow all agents to maximize welfare as each defines it" is a morally neutral goal; it is universal, it assumes no values and begs no moral questions.

I do not agree that this systematic goal is morally neutral. By my definition something is moral if it presupposes a normative state of affairs for human thoughts, judgments, or behavior. But your principle implies that human thoughts, judgments, and behavior ought to be oriented towards this particular goal. It is a very democratic and morally thin goal, but it is moral all the same. If you want to maintain that the goal is morally neutral could you give your definition of moral neutrality?

" . . . your principle implies that human thoughts, judgments, and behavior ought to be oriented towards this particular goal."

No, it does not. It does not recommend any particular goal. It does, however, assume that all moral systems have some goal, some raison d'etre (which means that moral "oughts" are instrumental "oughts," i.e., rules or practices which objectively advance or facilitate that goal). It then assumes that the overriding goal, purpose, of most moral theories over the centuries has been to advance human welfare, per some understanding of that term (even religious moralities, by assuring adherents of an "afterlife").

The theory does not, however, assert any obligation to adopt that goal, any more than the rules of baseball oblige anyone to play that game. As I've said on several occasions, someone who does not share that goal --- e.g., egoists, elitists, amoralists, et al, will have no use for my moral theory. Their rejection of it doesn't render it unsound, however.

GE Morton wrote: ↑January 25th, 2020, 7:03 pmThe goal of a theory, however, is not a personal goal; it does not assert any particular interest of any particular person. It is indifferent to personal goals. But it does require a consensus among everyone interested in a viable theory of the subject matter in question. There is, I think, a consensus that the aim of ethics is to secure and advance "the good," or "the good life," in some sense. If there is, and if we agree that what constitutes "the good" or "the good life" differs from person to person, then the goal stated above becomes "quasi-objective."

Along the same lines as my last point, there are some personal goals that are common to all participants, and these would be goals such as, "To have a working system," "To have equal representation," "To achieve a particular conception of maximized welfare," etc. Those are the only personal goals presupposed by your theory, which is beginning to look a lot like classical liberalism.

I'm not sure who you're counting as a "participant." Certainly everyone who has faced any moral dilemma or given any thought to moral theory will share the goal of devising a satisfying and workable morality. But that is obviously not true of everyone in any modern society. Nor, surely, is a desire to "achieve a particular conception of maximized welfare." The theory does, to be sure, propose and assume a particular conception of human welfare. Whether that conception is sound and rationally defensible is a separate, non-moral, question.

I also don't see how the Equal Agency postulate could fail to be a moral principle. That everyone ought to be treated the same is a moral principle analogous to the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment.

The theory defines "Moral Agent." The Equal Agency postulate follows from that definition, i.e., the rules apply in the same way to anyone who qualifies as a moral agent, there being no basis in the theory for applying them differently to different agents. The postulate has moral import, of course, but it is not per se a moral imperative; it is a logical one.

BTW, the Equal Agency postulate does not entail that "everyone ought to be treated the same." It only entails that the principles and rules of the theory apply equally to all. How people "treat" one another covers far more ground. It is (as you suggested) similar to the legal concept of "equal protection of the law" --- e.g., everyone, white, black, male, female, old, young, rich, poor, etc. --- who runs a red light pays the same fine. But it doesn't require you to invite all of your neighbors to your backyard BBQ.

Leontiskos wrote: ↑August 19th, 2021, 7:13 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑August 19th, 2021, 6:42 pmHow would that it cost him billions amount to marriage (and divorce) being something other than a way that people think about relationships?

Because paying someone $76 billion requires more than thinking.

If we're just saying that it requires pushing keys on a keyboard and so on, sure. But that doesn't make the state of being married or divorced or any related oughts obtain independently of thought.

Would you agree that an employment contract establishes objective obligations?

Of course not. Obligations are solely factors of thought, and as I noted above, things like paper with ink marks on it have no objective meaning. There is no objective meaning period.

Leontiskos wrote: ↑August 19th, 2021, 5:01 pm

Atla wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 11:54 pm

Leontiskos wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 5:31 pm

Atla wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 1:43 pm No they aren't, you are ignoring the very issue. There is no known reason why it would be necessarily true that we shouldn't break our "unbreakable" promises.

Go ahead and try to define "promise" or "vow" in a way that jibes with your claim.

It was defined that way...

Again, what is your definition of "promise"? Give me your definition.

Atla wrote: ↑August 18th, 2021, 11:54 pmThere is no reason why defining a vow to be "unbreakable" would necessarily mean that we ought not break them. Do you think our definitions override reality?

And there is no reason why defining "gun" as "a weapon from which a shot is discharged by gunpowder" would mean that guns are such weapons. ...Except for the fact that a definition aims at a true description of some reality. That's.. y'know.. what a definition is.

If you have a way to talk about promises apart from words and definitions, I'm all ears.

Look up "promise" in any dictionary, we all know what it means. This isn't about definitions, but about the is-ought issue which you haven't yet touch upon.

Leontiskos wrote: ↑August 19th, 2021, 5:01 pm .

Reminder: we aren't in court here or whatever using a rather specific language for a rather specific purpose, we are more generally philosophizing here.

Human history was (and still is) greatly shaped by "absolute morals" handed by all kinds of "Gods" and such. This can be called objective morality, it is objectively true that we "should / ought to" behave this way or that way, regardless of what anyone thinks. Behaving this way is objectively right, behaving that way is objectively wrong. It's not for us to decide, interpret.

The question is, whether or not such objective morals actually exist. (They could also exist in the absence of Gods.)