Leon
I'll give it one last good faith try your way, but if we're not to keep going round in circles you need to absorb my position as I state it on its own terms. The reason I have to tediously repeat it, is because the objections are answered within my position. Please take a moment to take it in without jumping to comparisons with other positions it reminds you of, and give it a fair go.
Gertie wrote: ↑August 9th, 2021, 1:08 pmThis shouldn't be this difficult and frustrating. Lets re-boot.
Unfortunately issues that have baffled philosophers for 300 years are difficult. Our age has imbibed that confusion.
My position -
We collectively treat issues as objective if they are falsifiable via observation/measurement (maths). Like every case of shared knowledge this involves inter-subjective comparison of the content of our experience.
I answered this point in detail in this post, beginning with the words, "There is a second issue," and ending with the words, "Do you disagree that this is knowledge by consensus?" You made this assertion six different times in your previous post.
Gertie wrote: ↑ August 6th, 2021, 4:52 am Leontiskos wrote: ↑ July 30th, 2021, 1:10 am ...What I mean when I say that the brother or the pro-lifer makes an "ought"-claim is that they intend their claim to be normative. In the first place I wanted to attend to the matter of intention. OK, lets agree …
Good, I agree.
There is also a second issue...
I wanted you to simply lay out your foundation here, so we'd hopefully stop talking past each other, but you went on instead to dissect my position again in ways which I consider answered within my position.
In this post you claim at multiple points that you want to, "Forget stipulative and M1 stuff." That is, you want to concede my points about intersubjective agreement, stipulation, and M1. At the same time, a fair portion of your reply still engages this question about stipulative claims, and therefore I think the issue is still pertinent.
So the second issue has to do with stipulative claims vs. substantive claims. We are in agreement that they both exist and that they are different. A crucial further point is that scientific claims can be either and moral claims can be either. Regarding the scientific side, I gave the examples of helium and heliocentrism in my last post. Now when you talk about, "calling things objectively true," and "third-person falsification," and, "the fact that a hanging is happening in front of it," it seems to me that you are still working in the stipulative or intersubjective sphere. We can examine this claim with two different concepts: verification and adjudication.
My position outlines the playing field in which
all shared/public knowledge and opinions, etc inevitably happen - ie the inter-subjective comparing of the contents of our own private consciousness experience. This includes building a shared model of the physical 'real world' and labelling aspects of it together, like ''tangerine'' and ''clementine''.
The physical aspects are by their nature observable and measurable, and falsifiable using that methodology (the scientific method) and this the basis upon which we generally assign the stamp of objective fact. (Scientific measurability is abstract, but in its falsifiability role it relies on a concrete something to measure).
It's the methodology which justifies the distinction 'objective' here.
So for me the fact that we label this thing a tangerine and that thing a clementine isn't a big deal. If we disagree which pre-agreed category this something fits in, we just need to observe/measure more closely.
Agreed? If so, my position covers this.
Verification is what we do when we want to confirm or verify that what we believe to be true is in fact true. Your claim is that if there is a hanging happening in front of us, we might second-guess ourselves and turn to our neighbor, saying, "Are you seeing this too!?" Your claim is that scientific claims are objective because they are falsifiable and checkable in this way. Adjudication is similar, but it is about adjudicating a dispute between two parties who disagree. So you would say that if my neighbor disagrees and says there is no hanging occurring, we could always ask another person or the larger community since the hanging is, "third person observable/measurable."
Yes, fine.
But this whole concept you have presented is still stipulative, based on intersubjective agreement, for you are essentially taking a poll. How does a poll get us beyond intersubjective agreement? How could Copernicus' view have been objectively true if objective truth is based on a majority vote and he was contra mundum? Let's call this view that objective propositions are obtained by intersubjective agreement, "Knowledge by consensus." It is my guess that popular level arguments against objective morality, such as Peter's, are based on knowledge by consensus, where knowledge is reducible to consensus.
As I say,
all shared/public knowledge, (including the model we create together of the real physical world which we share), is based in comparing notes, it can't be done any other way. This is the context established before we start making distinctions between 'objective reality' and 'subjective opinion'. If this is your point, it's one I've actually made over and over.
Do you hold to knowledge by consensus?
In as much as all shared/public knowledge could be called knowledge by consensus, sure. I don't think it adds anything to my stated position which specifies the role of inter-subjective comparing of notes,
and then goes on to describe how we collectively agree what to treat as objectively true , individual subjective opinion, etc
Gertie wrote: ↑August 6th, 2021, 4:52 amIf it is observable/measurable/falsifiable we treat it as a fact, objective knowledge of reality, by comparing the content of our experience which is the source of our knowledge. This is the scientific method.
So this last quote of yours makes your point most concisely. You appear to be subscribing to knowledge by consensus. You think that the epitome of objective knowledge is rooted in empirical realities which are "observable/measurable/falsifiable." You say that we should compare our claims with others to see if they agree with us. If they do we can count it as objective knowledge or fact. Since the strongest agreement occurs with empirical claims, empirical knowledge is the epitome of 'objectivity'. Do you disagree that this is knowledge by consensus?
What I actually say is we treat this third person observational/measurable knowledge as objectively true shared/public knowledge about the real world. (What we're actually doing is comparing notes based on the limited and flawed content of our subjective private conscious experience - hence it is inter-subjective). So yes, 'objective' is a consensus we arrive at using a particular methodology. Using this particular methodology we'd expect any normally functioning human to agree with our own observations/measurements, and so we can treat it as true/real/objective/fact.
I'm flummoxed why you can't just agree with this much and we can move on?
And yes, this particular consensus methodology is probably as good as it gets for us limited, flawed observers and thinkers re determining the real nature of physical/observable things.
Gertie wrote: ↑August 6th, 2021, 4:52 am...Note it can't be applied to abstract concepts like morality, which isn't third person falsifiable via observation/measurement.
Gertie wrote: ↑August 6th, 2021, 4:52 am...Morality is an abstract concept, it can't be observed/measured this way, and moral claims can't be falsified this way.
Gertie wrote: ↑August 6th, 2021, 4:52 am...But an abstract concept like morality isn't checkable in that way. It doesn't have a mind independent existence 'out there' we can observe.
Gertie wrote: ↑August 6th, 2021, 4:52 am...The morality of hanging isn't observable/measurable/falsifiable in that way. Is the distinction I'm making clear now?
Gertie wrote: ↑August 6th, 2021, 4:52 am...But a moral claim/opinion isn't falsifiable via observation/measurement. We'd need to use different criteria to establish the objectivity. I'm still unclear what yours are?
Gertie wrote: ↑August 6th, 2021, 4:52 amSo to support the claim that morality is objective, you need a different method to the way scientific claims are falsiable.
First it should be noted that abstract concepts need not lack intersubjective agreement. An easy example is mathematical or geometrical truths, such as the theorems governing the properties of triangles.
Yes this is true, we categorise knowledge in many types of ways, not just about the existence of physical observable stuff and personal opinions. Measurement can be seen as abstract itself, so on what basis is it a methodology for falsification? Not something I've thought about, but here goes.
I'd say it's that measurement's reliability is rooted in third person observation. Once normally functioning humans have observed and measured enough three-sided shapes we can note patterns which we assume will always hold. We give these observable patterns law-like status. This pattern observation also allows us to establish abstract notions like causality, the existence of gravity without being able to observe gravitons, etc, create the scientific model we currently have of what the real world is made of and how it works. But without something third person observable (eg a three sided shape), the measurement falsifiability is lost. Once we establish the patterns and rules based in third person observation we can treat them as facts, and manipulate them purely conceptually.
Until a new third person observable discovery suggests there's an error somewhere (or someone spots an error in the maths/conceptualised manipulation), then the theory/concept has to adapt. The truth/reliability of theoretical physics and maths is still grounded in third person/shared/public observation. I think. Yes?
Now you say that morality isn't observable/measurable/falsifiable "in that way." In what way? In the case of empirical claims you were taking a poll. You were asking others if they agreed with your belief. Why can't we do the same with morality? Why not take a poll and ask if they agree with our belief?
So it can't be right that morality lacks objectivity because it is abstract. Lots of abstract things possess objectivity.
See above. I can't make a third person accessible observation tomorrow to falsify a moral opinion.
So back to my question to you - on what basis should I treat a moral opinion as falsifiable, if not this one of observation/measurement?
The initial difference seems to be that when we ask someone about an empirical claim they are going to consult their senses, whereas when we ask them about a moral claim they are going to consult their mind. Yet they would also consult their mind if we asked them about triangles, or algebra, or historical facts, or rules of grammar, etc. It seems to me that the distinction you have in mind isn't empirical vs. abstract, but rather consensus vs. non-consensus. That is, consensus obtains with regard to empirical claims and abstract mathematical claims, but not with abstract moral claims.
Once again, the distinction I'm pointing out is methodological. You can find consensus in all types of ways, but we don't treat them all as facts. We've done algebra, we could do history and grammar too if we had 300 years to spare. But we don't need to if you simply accept that falsifiability via third person observation and measurement is what we treat as objective truth for the reasons given.
It doesn't have to be the only methodology tho. If you can justify another, I might agree. And if that justification includes moral opinions, bingo! Then we just have to persuade everyone else to treat it as objectively true too.
Look it's just the way it is that directly known knowledge is in the form of first person private conscious experience. Whether it's seeing an ice cream, the taste of chocolate ice cream, liking the taste; or feeling happy, reading a history book, thinking with that linguistic narrative voice in our head we call reasoning, or seeing a hanging. Some of those things are third person falsifiable when we share the content of our private first person experience with each other, some aren't. We give this objective status to third person observable/measurable (physical) stuff because we can check with other and every normally functioning human will agree.
The physical event of a hanging fits that falsifiability criteria, an opinion about its morality doesn't.
I've now said this more ways than I should need to. I don't care if you call it consensus. But if that consensus framing is the justification for claiming there's no difference between ''Ought to agree this is a tangerine'' and ''Ought to agree hanging is morally right/wrong'', then there must be a different ought foundation than falsification via observation/measurement. Agreed?
So here the onus moves on to you to dispute the basis of my analysis (which as I say, is just the way it is), or provide a different methodology, or something else, to support the tangerine ought claim. So far I still don't know what your foundation for an alternative way treat moral opinions as objective is, except it involves intention. This might be an interesting approach, I might agree, who knows. But the link to objectivity still isn't obvious to me.
Here you are very Kantian and are talking about, "consistent working models of reality," and, "a model of reality which is comprehensible to us." This takes us right back to stipulation and intersubjective agreement. You have again moved away from the idea that we can make true claims about reality. Instead we are limited to making claims with regard to our intersubjective agreement, which must have the same "limitations and faults" of each individual member. So instead of looking for truth you settle for "consistent working models of reality." Again, this is consensus, not real objectivity. The object of your knowledge is a collection of converging opinions, not reality.
Right, I don't believe humans have the ability to have direct/certain/complete knowledge of the real world. Do you believe we do? If so, that's a whole nother debate. If not, we can move on. Which is it?
Gertie wrote: ↑ August 6th, 2021, 4:52 am Leontiskos wrote: ↑ July 30th, 2021, 1:10 am ...What I mean when I say that the brother or the pro-lifer makes an "ought"-claim is that they intend their claim to be normative. In the first place I wanted to attend to the matter of intention. OK, lets agree …
I don't know if you have been following my conversation with Peter,
No sorry.
but I have fleshed out the obligation there. The basic idea is that we have an obligation to seek and believe truth. The argument I gave was that we have an obligation to believe the conclusions of sound arguments. That is, the conclusions of arguments we believe to be sound. One of our concrete disagreements was over H2O. He doesn't think we have an obligation to believe that the molecular makeup of water is H2O. I think we do.
(OK. But I don't agree we treat the molecular make up of water as objective fact on the basis of sound argument, we do it on the basis of... wait for it.... observation and measurement!).
Re your argument that we have an obligation to seek and believe truth -
- What is the underlying underlying foundation for the obligation?
- Are you assuming humans can in principle know the complete, fault-free truth of what it is to be eg a tangerine? (Obviously I disagree)
- And wouldn't it still necessarily require methodologies for establishing what should and shouldn't be treated as objective/true/fact? If so what?
But if facts and objectivity are nothing more than consensus and intersubjective agreement, then I don't see why we would have any obligation to believe them.
Well the way I see it, in practice we just do agree to treat certain things as objective based on the inter-subjective methodological basis of observation and measurement, because it's third person/inter-subjectively falsifiable. Simple as that, it makes sense and it enables us to create this usefully coherent, reliable, predictable, publically methodologically falsifiable, inter-subjective model of the public world we share.
Nor would it make sense for the brother to claim that his sister ought to believe that the fruit is a tangerine. Nor would it make sense to claim that we have an obligation to believe that water is made up of H2O. Nor would it make sense to say that we have an obligation to believe the conclusions of sound arguments. But that's absurd - reductio ad absurdum. Therefore facts and objectivity must be more than mere intersubjective agreement, stipulation, and "consistent working models."
The consistency of the model relies on falsifiability tho. Otherwise nothing can be reliably inter-subjectively agreed about the properties of tangerines.(Then we go on to agree to label all objects with these specific properties we all observe as ''tangerines'', which I understood to be the M1/M2 distinction you initially made, and which I'm happy to move on from).
If our shared observations and measurements are consistent, we treat them as facts and go on to treat patterns in observations as law-like truths about the world - until a new contradictory observation or measurement comes up. Then we try to falsify that. If we can't, we adjust our model to account for it.
So you can say we 'ought' to believe something which is falsifiable via observation and measurement, on the underlying basis that every normally functioning human observer/measurer would agree. But this method of falsification, establishing inter-subjectively agreed truths, is only possible for things which are third person observable/measurable. Moral opinions aren't.
Again I don't know what else to do but keep repeating the same points. And now I've run out of steam so I'm stopping there. If we can't make some progress now, and move on from what I originally referred to as 'clearing away the weeds', I'm done.
So if you want to succinctly lay out your own position, and any remaining objections with mine, we can move on in a more focussed way.
[If you're interested in my views on morality in general, Goldstein's thoughts on Mattering are a good place to start, tho my framing is a little different. My formal education is philosophy is limited to theology].