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Empirical evidence for the existence of life can at most be seen as following the trail of a mystery. It doesn't define anything of "life" per se.

arjand wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 10:39 am Empirical evidence for the existence of life can at most be seen as following the trail of a mystery. It doesn't define anything of "life" per se.

A response that does nothing at all to set out what your criteria for definitions would be. That's what you'd need to do here. You're calling something considered a definition not a defintion. If you're going to do that, you need to set out criteria for what counts as a definition (in general).

It seems kind of like you don't really know what definitions are, by the way. (That is, it seems like you're unfamiliar with the conventional idea of what a definition is.)

arjand wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 6:27 am
The determinability of 'truth' is at question.

What question would that be? I've given one fairly well-accepted definition above. Do you think it inadequate?

The simple question "What is life?" does not have an answer. "life" is considered a mystery . . .

So you've said several times. But it is well-defined by biologists. I don't know what you consider mysterious about it.

With evaluating good and bad something similar is at play. What is it that the agent can evaluate that allows it to distinguish between the assertion good and bad? You mentioned that it is a mystery.

As I said before, one does not "distinguish" good from bad; that presumes that goodness or badness are properties of things, which they aren't. Someone with normal eyesight can distinguish a red light from a green light, because the color of the light is a property of the light. But things deemed good or bad have no such property. They do have, typically, many other properties however, some of which a particular person may find appealing or attractive or beneficial or pleasing, for one reason or another. If so, he will deem those things "good." Someone else may find those same things with those same properties obnoxious, irritating, offensive, unpleasant, and deem them "bad." The mystery to which I referred are the factors causing those evaluations to differ from person to person. Some people prefer chocolate ice cream to vanilla; other prefer the opposite. They likely have to do with small neurological differences from person to person, which trigger different affective responses to the same stimuli, and also with differences in previous experience with the things evaluated, or with similar things. But it has nothing to do with the properties of the thing, which (by hypothesis) are the same for all perceiving agents.

Logically, that which is inevitable for valuing to be possible, is "good", and for the agent to be able to assert it, it will need to have existed beforehand.

Nothing is "logically inevitable" for evaluating a thing, other than that the thing exists. How different people respond to and evaluate that thing is due to differences in people, not in the thing.

You need to deal with the obvious subjectivity of evaluative judgments, arjand. It plainly and decisively refutes your thesis.

"life" can indeed have many meanings. It can be a word with a given meaning that could be a definition as such. A philosophical definition is an example. That is not relevant in the context of the discussion.

"life" itself is not defined. It is unknown what the origin of "life" is or what it is. Only from empirical evidence one could formulate a perspective with the purport "it is alive thus it is life". Empirical evidence doesn't define anything about "life" per se.

The fact that "life" cannot be defined has implications for morality. How can "life" be considered a factor if it cannot be defined? It means that "life" cannot be assigned a value. When "life" is inexplicable, one could just as well consider life meaningless or an effect of pure randomness. It would be possible for "life" to be reduced to nothing that requires consideration other than that on individual or corporate level.

It could be dangerous. For example, it ultimately means that "life" demands no more respect than for example a stone or oil in the ground. Big Pharma like companies are on their way to corrupt Nature and are already investing trillions of USD per year in synthetic biology.

Big Pharma considers synthetic biology their "frontier for growth" and funnels all their money to it.

Big pharma raises bet on biotech as frontier for growth
https://www.ft.com/content/80a21ca2-136 ... f78404524e

My argument is that it is important to not factor out potentially immeasurable factors such as "life". By doing so, it can result in objective morality.

arjand wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 1:42 pm
"life" itself is not defined.

I have idea why you persist in so claiming. It is quite well-defined. Any standard dictionary will give several perfectly satisfactory definitions:

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/life

I suppose you're assuming there is some transcendental, mystical aspect to it that defies explanation. Sorry, but I don't see it.

It means that "life" cannot be assigned a value. When "life" is inexplicable, one could just as well consider life meaningless or an effect of pure randomness. It would be possible for "life" to be reduced to nothing that requires consideration other than that on individual or corporate level.

But life is assigned a value, by every valuer. They all assign different values to different lives.

My argument is that it is important to not factor out potentially immeasurable factors such as "life". By doing so, it can result in objective morality.

An objective morality does not require a mystical (i.e., undefinable, immeasurable, transcendental) foundation.

First sentence above should have read, "no idea."

arjand wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 1:42 pm "life" can indeed have many meanings. It can be a word with a given meaning that could be a definition as such. A philosophical definition is an example. That is not relevant in the context of the discussion.

"life" itself is not defined. It is unknown what the origin of "life" is or what it is. Only from empirical evidence one could formulate a perspective with the purport "it is alive thus it is life". Empirical evidence doesn't define anything about "life" per se.

The fact that "life" cannot be defined has implications for morality. How can "life" be considered a factor if it cannot be defined? It means that "life" cannot be assigned a value. When "life" is inexplicable, one could just as well consider life meaningless or an effect of pure randomness. It would be possible for "life" to be reduced to nothing that requires consideration other than that on individual or corporate level.

It could be dangerous. For example, it ultimately means that "life" demands no more respect than for example a stone or oil in the ground. Big Pharma like companies are on their way to corrupt Nature and are already investing trillions of USD per year in synthetic biology.

Big Pharma considers synthetic biology their "frontier for growth" and funnels all their money to it.

Big pharma raises bet on biotech as frontier for growth
https://www.ft.com/content/80a21ca2-136 ... f78404524e

My argument is that it is important to not factor out potentially immeasurable factors such as "life". By doing so, it can result in objective morality.

Do you not understand what's being asked of you when someone asks you to give your criteria for what's to count as a definition?

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 1:38 pm

arjand wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 6:27 amThe determinability of 'truth' is at question.

What question would that be? I've given one fairly well-accepted definition above. Do you think it inadequate?

At question is whether the result of the scientific method is the only valid means to explain reality. Could it explain life, counsiousness and "good"?

The scientific method has resulted in a belief in uniformitarianism (a dogma) that could result in a stubborn exclusion of some aspects of reality. One could argue that "life" is something to consider, but as you mention, it would be based on a value that one gives to life, while in reality, "life" may not be subjective.

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 1:38 pm

With evaluating good and bad something similar is at play. What is it that the agent can evaluate that allows it to distinguish between the assertion good and bad? You mentioned that it is a mystery.

As I said before, one does not "distinguish" good from bad; that presumes that goodness or badness are properties of things, which they aren't. Someone with normal eyesight can distinguish a red light from a green light, because the color of the light is a property of the light. But things deemed good or bad have no such property. They do have, typically, many other properties however, some of which a particular person may find appealing or attractive or beneficial or pleasing, for one reason or another. If so, he will deem those things "good." Someone else may find those same things with those same properties obnoxious, irritating, offensive, unpleasant, and deem them "bad." The mystery to which I referred are the factors causing those evaluations to differ from person to person. Some people prefer chocolate ice cream to vanilla; other prefer the opposite. They likely have to do with small neurological differences from person to person, which trigger different affective responses to the same stimuli, and also with differences in previous experience with the things evaluated, or with similar things. But it has nothing to do with the properties of the thing, which (by hypothesis) are the same for all perceiving agents.

One does distinguish "good" from the opposite before it can value anything in relation to itself. The "good" that is indicated isn't an assertion of properties but something that precedes the valuing and even the being itself. The simple logic to prove this is the consideration that something cannot give rise to itself.

You stated that that the origin of values is a mystery. It may hint at the correctness of the consideration that something cannot give rise to itself.

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 1:38 pmWhat gives rise to values is, in most cases, quite mysterious. We just have them; we can't explain them.

Your assumption would be mystical despite the fact that you suggest that (random?) neurological differences could explain causality for values to arise from nothingness.

My argument is that "good", despite that it is not comprehensible, like "life", must precede the valuing to provide the nessesary ability to distinghish by which value can derive meaning.

Without the distinghising of "good" with the opposite, value can have no meaning. Thus "good" should precede the valuing and because the valuer cannot give rise to itself, it must have existed beforehand, indepdendent from the valuer.

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 1:38 pm

Logically, that which is inevitable for valuing to be possible, is "good", and for the agent to be able to assert it, it will need to have existed beforehand.

Nothing is "logically inevitable" for evaluating a thing, other than that the thing exists. How different people respond to and evaluate that thing is due to differences in people, not in the thing.

You need to deal with the obvious subjectivity of evaluative judgments, arjand. It plainly and decisively refutes your thesis.

It is a bold statement, but despite that, my statement was applicable to valuing itself, not the evaluating of a thing.

Evaluative judgements on an individual level (perspective bound) may be subjective. The "good" that precedes it as a factor may not be. As such, it can provide a basis for universality and objective morality.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 3:32 pmDo you not understand what's being asked of you when someone asks you to give your criteria for what's to count as a definition?

At question is whether an empirical definition can provide comprehension of what it is that is defined. It appears not.

arjand wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 4:13 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 3:32 pmDo you not understand what's being asked of you when someone asks you to give your criteria for what's to count as a definition?

At question is whether an empirical definition can provide comprehension of what it is that is defined. It appears not.

"Do you not understand . . .?"

Answers to that would include, "I do understand." "I do not understand."

Answers wouldn't include "At question is . . . "

At any rate, so if you're saying not simply something about whether there's a definition of something, but whether "an empirical definition can provide comprehension," then you need to state it that way. "There isn't an empirical definition of 'life' that can provide comprehension of life."

At which point we can start to figure out what you're talking about.

First off, what makes the difference between an "empirical definition" in your usage and a "non-empirical definition" (or whatever else you're differentiating an "empirical definition" from)?

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 2:41 pmI have idea why you persist in so claiming. It is quite well-defined. Any standard dictionary will give several perfectly satisfactory definitions:

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/life

I suppose you're assuming there is some transcendental, mystical aspect to it that defies explanation. Sorry, but I don't see it.

The definitions on your link are all similar to the statement it is alive thus it is life (empirical definitions).

a) the quality that distinguishes a vital and functional being from a dead body

What does that definition define about life? The definition merely proves that that one has followed a trail and states "I saw something".

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 2:41 pm But life is assigned a value, by every valuer. They all assign different values to different lives.

The assigning of value cannot arise from nothing. Logically, the origin is "good" which is to be discovered before the valuer can assign value.

"good" must precede the valuing to provide the necessary ability to distinguish by which value can derive meaning. The valuer discovers "good" from which value follows.

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 2:41 pm An objective morality does not require a mystical (i.e., undefinable, immeasurable, transcendental) foundation.

I did not suggest a mystical or transcendental aspect to explain "life". My argument is that it is important to not factor out "life", if only by acknowledging it as a (yet) unknown. You could see it as a demand for humility in the face of what cannot be known beforehand.

arjand wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 4:11 pm
At question is whether the result of the scientific method is the only valid means to explain reality.

Well, if by "valid" you mean coherent, consistent, and productive of useful answers, and makes claims which are confirmable and falsifiable, then yes --- it seems to be the only method we have that satisfies those criteria. If you know of another method that does so please set it forth.

Could it explain life, counsiousness and "good"?

It explains life very well. I've explained "good" above. Consciousness is difficult, mainly because the term is ill-defined.

The scientific method has resulted in a belief in uniformitarianism (a dogma) that could result in a stubborn exclusion of some aspects of reality.

Please set forth another method for elucidating these alleged aspects.

One could argue that "life" is something to consider, but as you mention, it would be based on a value that one gives to life, while in reality, "life" may not be subjective.

I never said that life is subjective. I said that values that various agents place on it is subjective. "Life" is an objective property of a certain class of biochemical structures and systems.

One does distinguish "good" from the opposite before it can value anything in relation to itself. The "good" that is indicated isn't an assertion of properties but something that precedes the valuing and even the being itself. The simple logic to prove this is the consideration that something cannot give rise to itself.

The only "distinguishing" being done in judging something to be good or bad is between the meanings of those two terms, which are a linguistic convention (as are the meanings of all terms). The former is applied to things which please us or satisfy us in some way; the latter to things which displease or dissatisfy us. Which term is applied to a particular thing varies from agent to agent (because different things please/displease different people).

And I don't know what you think "arises from itself," or think that I'm claiming does so. Whether Alfie deems X good or bad arises from Alfie's personal idiosyncrasies --- his neurological makeup, his spectrum of affective responses, his prior experience with things like X.

Your assumption would be mystical despite the fact that you suggest that (random?) neurological differences could explain causality for values to arise from nothingness.

Values don't "arise" from anything. They are assigned to things by agents. What value is assigned to a given thing by a given agent is determined by personal characteristics of that agent. You persist in conceiving them as properties of things, existing independently from valuers. I've explained why that is a non-viable hypothesis; it is refuted by the fact that the same thing will be valued differently by different agents --- a fact true of nearly everything to which anyone assigns a value.

My argument is that "good", despite that it is not comprehensible, like "life", must precede the valuing to provide the nessesary ability to distinghish by which value can derive meaning.

The meaning of "value" is perfectly clear: it is a measure of what an agent will give up to secure something he considers "good," or to be rid of something he considers "bad." Which of those pseudo-properties are applied to a given thing, and what the agent will give up to obtain it or avoid it, varies from agent to agent.

It is a bold statement, but despite that, my statement was applicable to valuing itself, not the evaluating of a thing.

I have no idea what you have in mind with "valuing itself." There is no "valuing" separate from a valuer and something assigned a value. "Valuing" is simply the act of placing a value, positive or negative, on something. What value is placed on what things varies from agent to agent; what value a given agent places on X can be determined by observing his subsequent behavior with respect to X.

The "good" that precedes it as a factor may not be. As such, it can provide a basis for universality and objective morality.

There is no "good" that precedes the assignment of that pseudo-property to a thing by an agent. Once assigned it will have that property relative to him, but not necessarily for anyone else.

I've been following arjand's discussion with GE Morton and Terrapin Station with interest.

I may be wrong, but it seems to turn on the nature of value - what it means to value something, and where the value lies. And it seems obvious to me that value doesn't and can't lie or be in the thing valued. We may value clean water, but clean water isn't a value. Maybe the nominal use of 'value' is what confuses us. We talk about 'having values' and ask 'What are their moral values?', as though values are things and so could be properties of things. Bewitched by the devices of our language.

With regard to the OP question, the only thing that could make morality objective is the real existence of moral value as a feature of reality independent from opinion - so that a moral assertion such as 'slavery is wrong' is not an expression of an opinion - a value-judgement - but a factual claim about reality, with a truth-value. But in another forum I've just been assured (by a theist, as it happens) that the crux of moral realism is simply that moral facts exist. With reasoning of that calibre, it's game over.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑February 2nd, 2020, 5:07 am I've been following arjand's discussion with GE Morton and Terrapin Station with interest.

I may be wrong, but it seems to turn on the nature of value - what it means to value something, and where the value lies. And it seems obvious to me that value doesn't and can't lie or be in the thing valued. We may value clean water, but clean water isn't a value. Maybe the nominal use of 'value' is what confuses us. We talk about 'having values' and ask 'What are their moral values?', as though values are things and so could be properties of things. Bewitched by the devices of our language.

With regard to the OP question, the only thing that could make morality objective is the real existence of moral value as a feature of reality independent from opinion - so that a moral assertion such as 'slavery is wrong' is not an expression of an opinion - a value-judgement - but a factual claim about reality, with a truth-value. But in another forum I've just been assured (by a theist, as it happens) that the crux of moral realism is simply that moral facts exist. With reasoning of that calibre, it's game over.

Just explain to him that facts are states of affairs--basically ways that existents happen to be (in relation to each other). In order for there to be an objective moral fact, it has to be the case that there's a non-mental state of affairs that amounts to something like "murder is wrong." Otherwise all we have are subjective moral facts, where it's a fact that "Joe feels that murder is wrong," or "99.999% of the people in the world feel that murder is wrong" (whatever the percentage would turn out to be).

There's often quibbling over the defintions of those terms--just what a fact is, just what objective/subjective are, etc. Some people seem to approach this as if the exact definitions of the terms are going to matter for either side of the argument. They don't. We could use any term. The terms don't change what's the case, what the implications of things are.

What matters is that to do the work that some people want to do--where they can say that someone is wrong about "murder isn't wrong" in a way at all like they could be wrong about "the moon is made of green cheese," moral stances need to be something found in the world outside of persons' feeling about behavior among moral agents. Otherwise it's simply a matter of having a different feeling than someone else (even if it's a different feeling than 99.999-whatever% of someone elses). The amount of people who agree with each other is irrelevant, because saying that 99.999% of people agree, therefore what they think is right is the argumentum ad populum fallacy.