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[popeye1945]

Terrapin,

It could be said I think that only half of your brain is enclosed within your skull, the other half being the physical world as an object. The saying that subject and object stand or fall together, meaning, without biological consciousness, there is no object[ read cognitively] and without the object, there is no consciousness[ cognitively]. You might think of it as the world of objects is the fuel consciousness works upon, without which there is nothing.

[Peter Holmes]

Sorry, but definitions - as either explanations of the uses of words, or description of things - are, uncontroversially, matters of opinion - even if the opinions is wide or universal.

A definition states the accepted, understood meaning of a word in a given speech community, how it is commonly used. It either does or does not correctly state that use. When it does, it is a fact. I.e., "Word X means Y among speakers of L" is either true or false, which can be determined empirically.

Why? Your faith in a morality that is 'formal' and 'constructed via logical argument' is quaint. Perhaps Aristotle's contempt for women and slaves demonstrates the objectivity of such moral systems. After all, rationality is the aim.

Oh, my. My "faith" in logical argument? Doesn't everyone who purports to be a philosopher have "faith" in logical argument? Are you suggesting that because some logical arguments are invalid, reliance on logic and rationality is "quaint" and may be set aside as passe?

This is just false. Every single so-called 'public morality' has contained judgements about what should be considered acceptable and unacceptable - and those are matters of opinion. There's nothing factual about them.

You're no doubt speaking of vernacular moralities. I agree.

What we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case, or a description of such a feature of reality. And neither of those is 'moral' in the sense of 'morally right or wrong'. The expression 'moral fact' is incoherent. There are only facts about which there can be moral opinions, which are necessarily subjective.

Part of the problem here is your narrow conception of what the term "reality" (like "existent" and "thing") denotes.

A "moral" proposition is one which asserts a principle or rule governing interactions between agents in a social setting, the aim of which is preserving and improving the welfare of the agents in that setting, or one which declares a given act to be either commanded by, or consistent or inconsistent with, such a rule or principle. Whether a rule or act is or is not consistent with that aim is empirically determinable. It is a fact, and an aspect of "reality."

I note that, as usual, you don't actually address my point, which is that your position is contradictory, and therefore incoherent.

You claim that the words 'ought', 'should', 'right' and 'wrong' in moral assertions are purely instrumental, denoting publicly confirmable consistency with a goal - as in 'if we want to drive safely, we ought not to jump the lights'.

And yet you claim we ought to have this moral system (as defined), and we ought to act consistently with our goals.

Question: with what goals are those two claims consistent?

I think your answers must be circular, and therefore question-begging.

[GE Morton]

Sorry, but definitions - as either explanations of the uses of words, or description of things - are, uncontroversially, matters of opinion - even if the opinions is wide or universal.

A definition states the accepted, understood meaning of a word in a given speech community, how it is commonly used. It either does or does not correctly state that use. When it does, it is a fact. I.e., "Word X means Y among speakers of L" is either true or false, which can be determined empirically.

Why? Your faith in a morality that is 'formal' and 'constructed via logical argument' is quaint. Perhaps Aristotle's contempt for women and slaves demonstrates the objectivity of such moral systems. After all, rationality is the aim.

Oh, my. My "faith" in logical argument? Doesn't everyone who purports to be a philosopher have "faith" in logical argument? Are you suggesting that because some logical arguments are invalid, reliance on logic and rationality is "quaint" and may be set aside as passe?

This is just false. Every single so-called 'public morality' has contained judgements about what should be considered acceptable and unacceptable - and those are matters of opinion. There's nothing factual about them.

You're no doubt speaking of vernacular moralities. I agree.

What we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case, or a description of such a feature of reality. And neither of those is 'moral' in the sense of 'morally right or wrong'. The expression 'moral fact' is incoherent. There are only facts about which there can be moral opinions, which are necessarily subjective.

Part of the problem here is your narrow conception of what the term "reality" (like "existent" and "thing") denotes.

A "moral" proposition is one which asserts a principle or rule governing interactions between agents in a social setting, the aim of which is preserving and improving the welfare of the agents in that setting, or one which declares a given act to be either commanded by, or consistent or inconsistent with, such a rule or principle. Whether a rule or act is or is not consistent with that aim is empirically determinable. It is a fact, and an aspect of "reality."

I note that, as usual, you don't actually address my point, which is that your position is contradictory, and therefore incoherent.

You made several points in the post to which I responded. I answered each. There was no claim of inconsistency in that post to which to respond.

You claim that the words 'ought', 'should', 'right' and 'wrong' in moral assertions are purely instrumental, denoting publicly confirmable consistency with a goal - as in 'if we want to drive safely, we ought not to jump the lights'.

Yes.

And yet you claim we ought to have this moral system (as defined), and we ought to act consistently with our goals.

Oh, no. I've never claimed "we ought to have this moral system." Or any particular moral system. That would indeed be circular. I've only claimed that protecting and improving people's welfare has been the underlying aim of virtually all moral systems over the centuries, and that determining what principles and rules further that aim is a pragmatic and objective undertaking. If you don't share that aim then you have no need for those rules, or perhaps for any morality at all.

"Oughts" are only meaningful with reference to some goal. But we can't have an "ought" to pursue a certain goal. That would presume some further goal, ad infinitum. The goal must be a given.

As for, "we ought to act consistently with our goals," yes --- that is implied by the concept of a goal.

[Terrapin Station]

Terrapin,
Yes, I fully agree, but, what you have quoted as what I have said, does not belong to me. All meaning is subjective, it is subjectively applied to the objects of the physical world. Meaning is never the actual property of the object, but always the subject. Meaning is the effect of stimulus and cognitive judgement of biological consciousness identified as the object.

Yeah, I screwed up the quotation formatting.

Re "Meaning is the effect of stimulus and cognitive judgement of biological consciousness identified as the object," I have no idea what that's saying really.

[popeye1945]

Yeah ok, maybe I could have stated it more clearly. Here goes, the object can be thought of as cause, its reflected light is going out from it to you. Perception of the said object can be said to be your reaction to that object. Think of all the objects around you as causes, they affect you and as a result, your biology taking in this data produces a biological readout/ a summation, which is then known as apparent reality. Let me know if I am being any clearer.

[Peter Holmes]

As for, "we ought to act consistently with our goals," yes --- that is implied by the concept of a goal.

An 'is' (a fact) cannot entail an 'ought', unless the inference begs the question.

Therefore, the 'is' of having a goal cannot entail the 'ought' of acting consistently with that goal.

Talk of implication, conceptual or otherwise, merely begs the question. The same fallacy is evident in the claim that making promises entails keeping them.

That action X is consistent with goal Y doesn't entail the conclusion that, if we want goal Y, we ought to do X. The 'ought' there is contraband.

[Terrapin Station]

Yeah ok, maybe I could have stated it more clearly. Here goes, the object can be thought of as cause, its reflected light is going out from it to you. Perception of the said object can be said to be your reaction to that object. Think of all the objects around you as causes, they affect you and as a result, your biology taking in this data produces a biological readout/ a summation, which is then known as apparent reality. Let me know if I am being any clearer.

That makes more sense but I'm not clear on what you're thinking the connection is here to meaning. It's weird that the bit I didn't understand seemed to be part of your theory of meaning, but above you seem to only be talking about your theory of perception.

[Terrapin Station]

As for, "we ought to act consistently with our goals," yes --- that is implied by the concept of a goal.

An 'is' (a fact) cannot entail an 'ought', unless the inference begs the question.

Therefore, the 'is' of having a goal cannot entail the 'ought' of acting consistently with that goal.

Talk of implication, conceptual or otherwise, merely begs the question. The same fallacy is evident in the claim that making promises entails keeping them.

That action X is consistent with goal Y doesn't entail the conclusion that, if we want goal Y, we ought to do X. The 'ought' there is contraband.

At best he'd be saying that that's a conventional way of thinking about goals, but then that would amount to an argumentum ad populum.

[GE Morton]

As for, "we ought to act consistently with our goals," yes --- that is implied by the concept of a goal.

An 'is' (a fact) cannot entail an 'ought', unless the inference begs the question.

Therefore, the 'is' of having a goal cannot entail the 'ought' of acting consistently with that goal.

Talk of implication, conceptual or otherwise, merely begs the question. The same fallacy is evident in the claim that making promises entails keeping them.

That action X is consistent with goal Y doesn't entail the conclusion that, if we want goal Y, we ought to do X. The 'ought' there is contraband.

A clever argument! But the "is/ought" fallacy only arises with the so-called "moral" sense of "ought." In the instrumental sense, "You ought to do X given goal Y" only means, "Y is an effective and opportune means of accomplishing X," or, "Y is the best available action for accomplishing X." E.g., "If you wish to drive a nail, you ought to get a hammer."

It is the "moral" sense of "ought" that is "contraband."

And, yes, having a goal entails that one will take effective, opportune actions to attain it. Actions are evidence of intentions. If someone claims to have a certain goal, but consistently fails to take actions to attain it, we would fairly conclude his claim was false.

[popeye1945]

That makes more sense but I'm not clear on what you're thinking the connection is here to meaning. It's weird that the bit I didn't understand seemed to be part of your theory of meaning, but above you seem to only be talking about your theory of perception.
[/quote]

It might help to keep in mind that only through a conscious subject [person ] does perception occur. You perceive a rock and you determine it is hard, it is only as hard as you are soft, hard and soft are meanings. The light coming to you from the rock is a stimulus, the stimulus affects you and thus you are affected, this is perception, and this is the beginning of a process of understanding. The understanding is, how does this perception affect my biological being, how it effects you is what its meaning comes to be, just as the experience of water is that you find it wet. So, this substance water is wet stuff.

[Terrapin Station]

And, yes, having a goal entails that one will take effective, opportune actions to attain it. Actions are evidence of intentions. If someone claims to have a certain goal, but consistently fails to take actions to attain it, we would fairly conclude his claim was false.

You could conclude that, but then your take on "having a goal" doesn't really amount to what the person is thinking. They could be thinking something very different than what their actions evidence. So you'd basically be redefining this is behavioral terms, where you'd be leaving the mental phenomena simply not dealt with.

[GE Morton]

You could conclude that, but then your take on "having a goal" doesn't really amount to what the person is thinking.

Quite correct. The only evidence we can ever have for what another person is thinking is what they say and what they do. I.e., their actions.

[Terrapin Station]

You could conclude that, but then your take on "having a goal" doesn't really amount to what the person is thinking.

Quite correct. The only evidence we can ever have for what another person is thinking is what they say and what they do. I.e., their actions.

Sure, "So you'd basically be redefining this is behavioral terms, where you'd be leaving the mental phenomena simply not dealt with."

[Peter Holmes]

As for, "we ought to act consistently with our goals," yes --- that is implied by the concept of a goal.

An 'is' (a fact) cannot entail an 'ought', unless the inference begs the question.

Therefore, the 'is' of having a goal cannot entail the 'ought' of acting consistently with that goal.

Talk of implication, conceptual or otherwise, merely begs the question. The same fallacy is evident in the claim that making promises entails keeping them.

That action X is consistent with goal Y doesn't entail the conclusion that, if we want goal Y, we ought to do X. The 'ought' there is contraband.

A clever argument! But the "is/ought" fallacy only arises with the so-called "moral" sense of "ought." In the instrumental sense, "You ought to do X given goal Y" only means, "Y is an effective and opportune means of accomplishing X," or, "Y is the best available action for accomplishing X." E.g., "If you wish to drive a nail, you ought to get a hammer."

It is the "moral" sense of "ought" that is "contraband."

And, yes, having a goal entails that one will take effective, opportune actions to attain it. Actions are evidence of intentions. If someone claims to have a certain goal, but consistently fails to take actions to attain it, we would fairly conclude his claim was false.

1 To repeat, that action X is consistent with (or will achieve) goal Y doesn't entail the conclusion that, if we want goal Y, we ought to do X. It just means what it says: doing X will achieve goal Y.

2 There's no deductive entailment from having a goal to acting to attain it. And that's why negating the conclusion doesn't produce a contradiction. Or if it does, the inference is question-begging.

[GE Morton]

1 To repeat, that action X is consistent with (or will achieve) goal Y doesn't entail the conclusion that, if we want goal Y, we ought to do X. It just means what it says: doing X will achieve goal Y.

Well yes, it does, if "ought" is understood in the instrumental sense I gave above.

2 There's no deductive entailment from having a goal to acting to attain it.

That depends on the definition assumed for "goal." Per most dictionaries, it does:

"1. : the end toward which effort is directed : AIM"

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/goal

"2. The object of a person's ambition or effort; an aim or desired result."

https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/goal

If no effort is directed toward something claimed to be goal, then it is not a goal.