Philosophy Discussion Forums

arjand wrote: ↑January 31st, 2020, 11:00 am Yes, but then with as a side note that it is to be perceived as such for philosophical contemplation. You are correct that the term "proposition" may be applicable to differentiate between concepts that have a different quality, but it is important to consider that it would only be possible in a local context.

The laws of physics were a proposition. Today, they were a concept. Flaws in the comprehension of reality cannot be acceptable. Therefore, propositions cannot be considered to be intrinsically different from a concept.

https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn ... -universe/

That all just reads like gibberish to me unfortunately.

The intent of my argument was to indicate that what is called "objective" is based on a philosophical concept (the scientific method) and that for morality it may be applicable to take a deeper look at what it is that gives it its characteristic quality.

arjand wrote: ↑January 31st, 2020, 5:06 pm The intent of my argument was to indicate that what is called "objective" is based on a philosophical concept (the scientific method) and that for morality it may be applicable to take a deeper look at what it is that gives it its characteristic quality.

I use "objective" simply to denote something that exists extramentally--basically, something that exists in the world independently of us.

We could use the term in a different way, but the above is the only way that "objective" would do the work that people want it to do, so that "objective" things can be true/false or correct/incorrect.

GE Morton wrote: ↑January 31st, 2020, 12:03 pmLike TP I'm having a hard time puzzling out what you are saying there. I don't know what you mean by "backward reasoning cannot give rise to what is valued." I don't know what "backward reasoning" is, and I've certainly never claimed it "gives rise" to what is valued. What gives rise to values is, in most cases, quite mysterious. We just have them; we can't explain them.*

Nor am I clear as to what you're saying with, "It cannot be the purpose by which life derives value." Values give rise to purposes, not the other way around. If we value something we often undertake to secure it or protect or preserve it. We call a value we are taking actions to secure the purpose of those actions. You seem to be using "purpose" as something independent from the interests and actions of persons (or other sentient creatures). You'll have to spell out how you identify those "purposes" and assess the truth of propositions asserting them.

Value is not a property of things; it is a relation between a thing and a person, the valuer, the relation being that the thing is desired by that person. Propositions asserting values are non-cognitive --- they have no determinable truth values --- unless a valuer is specified.

* This is true for primary values, or "end goods" --- the things we desire "for themselves." Those are unsummoned, spontaneous, and inexplicable. No one who, say, loves chocolate can explain, in any non-circular, informative way, why he loves it. He just does.

But there are also "means goods" --- things we desire because they are useful, or perhaps necessary, to secure some end good. Those are explicable.

It is correct that value requires a valuer. What is called value has passed before it can be valued. It is only after the discovery that it can be considered.

This may explain your statement that the origin of value is a mystery.

What gives rise to values is, in most cases, quite mysterious. We just have them; we can't explain them.

It leads to the implication that what is "good" must be independent from the valuer. What is considered value follows "good". It isn't created by the valuer.

With regard to purpose. Considering that value follows "good", value cannot be an end or purpose by itself as it would result in corruption.

A result applicable to "good" can be evaluated as value. It could be considered the origin of value and the essence of purpose. Value follows from the discovery of "good" and thus the valuer (the human) can find purpose in the serving of life by discovering what is "good".

It may explain why Aristotle considers philosophical contemplation the highest virtue. It is a strive to serve life: the discovery of "good" from which value follows.

Considering that for the concept value to exist, it is required that "good" existed beforehand, it follows that a purpose of life is essential for value to be possible.

From the essentiality of purpose it can be derived that a basis of respect is required for plants and animals. They will serve life similar to humans do and their discovery of "good" will result in intrinsic value that no valuer can imagine beforehand.

My argument is that you cannot stand above life as being life and that you can only serve life. A basis of respect for Nature (plants and animals) could be considered essential.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 31st, 2020, 6:03 pm

arjand wrote: ↑January 31st, 2020, 5:06 pm The intent of my argument was to indicate that what is called "objective" is based on a philosophical concept (the scientific method) and that for morality it may be applicable to take a deeper look at what it is that gives it its characteristic quality.

I use "objective" simply to denote something that exists extramentally--basically, something that exists in the world independently of us.

We could use the term in a different way, but the above is the only way that "objective" would do the work that people want it to do, so that "objective" things can be true/false or correct/incorrect.

It is the consideration that such a concept (exists extramentally) is possible that is at question. Can something be other than a concept (a mentally comprehensible construct)?

I understand the intention to bypass individual bias, but what is it that is being considered? In my opinion it is merely a mentally comprehensible construct (a concept). A status quo (i.e. a dogma or mainstream science) can be considered an individual as well and that would blur the distinctive character that "exists extramentally" intends to establish.

Morality may be related to facets of reality that cannot be proven to exist using the scientific method by which, by definition, they cannot exist extramentally, while they cannot be denied to exist either. An example is "life".

The simple question "what is life?" cannot be answered. Does that prevent an objective consideration that life exists?

arjand wrote: ↑January 31st, 2020, 6:49 pm The simple question "what is life?" cannot be answered.

No idea why you'd say something like that. Aren't you familiar with any philosophy of biology, for example? That's one of the core questions philosophy of biology answers, just like "what is knowledge" with respect to epistemology.

arjand wrote: ↑January 31st, 2020, 6:45 pm

What gives rise to values is, in most cases, quite mysterious. We just have them; we can't explain them.

It leads to the implication that what is "good" must be independent from the valuer. What is considered value follows "good". It isn't created by the valuer.

No, arjand, it is not independent. "Value" is a term for quantifying "goodness." They denote the same thing. A "good" is something someone desires to acquire or retain; an "evil" is something one desires to avoid, or be rid of. Goods and evils together constitute "interests." If someone determines X to be good, he will often be willing to give up something --- time, effort, some other good, in order to gain or retain it. What he will give up is the measure of the value of that good to that agent. If an agent is willing to give up something to obtain something else, the latter has positive value for that agent. If he is willing to give up something to avoid or be rid of something, that thing has negative value, disvalue, for him.

What people count as goods and evils is relentlessly subjective, varying enormously from person to person. "Goodness" and "badness" are not properties of things; they descriptors of people's idiosyncratic reactions or responses to things. One does not "discover" the goodness of a thing; one only discovers the response it arouses in him. It may well arouse a different response in someone else.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 31st, 2020, 7:59 pm

arjand wrote: ↑January 31st, 2020, 6:49 pm The simple question "what is life?" cannot be answered.

No idea why you'd say something like that. Aren't you familiar with any philosophy of biology, for example? That's one of the core questions philosophy of biology answers, just like "what is knowledge" with respect to epistemology.

A recent discussion on a science forum + podcast (University of Cambridge, UK) showed clearly that an answer is not yet available in 2020.

https://www.thenakedscientists.com/foru ... #msg589910

GE Morton wrote: ↑January 31st, 2020, 9:02 pm

arjand wrote: ↑January 31st, 2020, 6:45 pm


It leads to the implication that what is "good" must be independent from the valuer. What is considered value follows "good". It isn't created by the valuer.

No, arjand, it is not independent. "Value" is a term for quantifying "goodness." They denote the same thing. A "good" is something someone desires to acquire or retain; an "evil" is something one desires to avoid, or be rid of. Goods and evils together constitute "interests." If someone determines X to be good, he will often be willing to give up something --- time, effort, some other good, in order to gain or retain it. What he will give up is the measure of the value of that good to that agent. If an agent is willing to give up something to obtain something else, the latter has positive value for that agent. If he is willing to give up something to avoid or be rid of something, that thing has negative value, disvalue, for him.

What people count as goods and evils is relentlessly subjective, varying enormously from person to person. "Goodness" and "badness" are not properties of things; they descriptors of people's idiosyncratic reactions or responses to things. One does not "discover" the goodness of a thing; one only discovers the response it arouses in him. It may well arouse a different response in someone else.

I disagree. What one can perceive as good or bad in the mind is a derivative from "good". The reason is that evil cannot exist by itself.

As philosopher Augustine argued in "On Evil", evil is the corruption of "good".

Whenever a thing is consumed by corruption, not even the corruption remains, for it is nothing in itself, having no subsistent being in which to exist. From this it follows that there is nothing to be called evil if there is nothing good. A good that wholly lacks an evil aspect is entirely good.

...

Nothing evil exists in itself, but only as an evil aspect of some actual entity. Therefore, there can be nothing evil except something good.

https://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl201 ... _evil.html

The evaluation process of the human mind (consciousness) can make a distinction between the quality good or bad but the origin of that evaluation is "good" and never "evil". "good" precedes the valuing by the valuer. If no "good" were to precede it, the valuing would not have the ability to distinguish and thus could not value.

Thus, it can be stated that the origin of intrinsic value or a result applicable to "good" must be independent from the valuer.

arjand wrote: ↑January 31st, 2020, 10:20 pm
I disagree. What one can perceive as good or bad in the mind is a derivative from "good".

One does not perceive good or bad. One deems something good or bad. The goodness or badness is not an objective property of the thing; there is no objective means of measuring the goodness or badness of something, as one may measure its mass, dimensions, chemical composition, duration, etc. Goodness and badness are pseudo-properties we assign to things, depending upon how appealing or unappealing, desirable or undesirable, they are to us. That is why different people will assign different degrees of goodness or badness to the same things, or deem "bad" something others deem "good."

The reason is that evil cannot exist by itself.

That is true. Neither can "good." Both are judgments of a valuer, and are undefined except with reference to some valuer.

As philosopher Augustine argued in "On Evil", evil is the corruption of "good" . . .

Augustine was a Platonist. He adopted much of the nonsense of Plato's idealism.

Thus, it can be stated that the origin of intrinsic value or a result applicable to "good" must be independent from the valuer.

There is no such thing as "intrinsic value." The only value anything has, which can be asserted in a cognitive proposition, is the value imputed to it by some agent. That value will differ from agent to agent. Propositions asserting an "intrinsic value" --- one independent of any valuer --- to something are cognitively meaningless (they have no determinable truth value).

If you want to insist that "good" and "evil" have some sort of existence independent of a valuer you'll need to set forth some objective method of identifying and quantifying those alleged properties.

GE Morton wrote: ↑January 31st, 2020, 11:54 pm
There is no such thing as "intrinsic value." The only value anything has, which can be asserted in a cognitive proposition, is the value imputed to it by some agent. That value will differ from agent to agent. Propositions asserting an "intrinsic value" --- one independent of any valuer --- to something are cognitively meaningless (they have no determinable truth value).

If you want to insist that "good" and "evil" have some sort of existence independent of a valuer you'll need to set forth some objective method of identifying and quantifying those alleged properties.

I just wanted to say this is spot on, in my opinion, and very nicely expressed.

GE Morton wrote: ↑January 31st, 2020, 11:54 pm

The determinability of 'truth' is at question.

The simple question "What is life?" does not have an answer. "life" is considered a mystery but that does not mean that life is merely an assertion by a cognitive proposition.

With evaluating good and bad something similar is at play. What is it that the agent can evaluate that allows it to distinguish between the assertion good and bad? You mentioned that it is a mystery.

GE Morton wrote: ↑January 31st, 2020, 11:54 pmWhat gives rise to values is, in most cases, quite mysterious. We just have them; we can't explain them.

How can a distinction be made of nothing?

It is obvious that a factor may be ignored because of a potentially false belief in a method to describe reality. That method is the scientific method and a dogma with regard to holding the result of that method as the only valid means to explain all facets of reality.

Logically, that which is inevitable for valuing to be possible, is "good", and for the agent to be able to assert it, it will need to have existed beforehand.

Why do humans sleep? It is not likely that humans would see value in sleep. It serves "good" that reaches beyond the comprehension ability of the agent.

If "good" independent from the agent should be considered a factor, that gives rise to the validity of the idea "intrinsic value".

arjand wrote: ↑January 31st, 2020, 9:34 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 31st, 2020, 7:59 pm

No idea why you'd say something like that. Aren't you familiar with any philosophy of biology, for example? That's one of the core questions philosophy of biology answers, just like "what is knowledge" with respect to epistemology.

A recent discussion on a science forum + podcast (University of Cambridge, UK) showed clearly that an answer is not yet available in 2020.

https://www.thenakedscientists.com/foru ... #msg589910

Have a look at this page for example, from the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life/

It begins, "Life is often defined in basic biology textbooks in terms of a list of distinctive properties that distinguish living systems from non-living. "

That would be difficult to do if there is no definition of "life," wouldn't it?

Heck, you should see a definition for "life" in any standard dictionary, even. How is that if we can't define "life"?

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 9:40 amhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life/

That is merely an attempt to reduce the existence of "life" using empirical evidence which is similar to stating "it is alive thus it is life". It is not an answer to the question "what is life?".

arjand wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 10:17 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 1st, 2020, 9:40 amhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life/

That is merely an attempt to reduce the existence of "life" using empirical evidence which is similar to stating "it is alive thus it is life". It is not an answer to the question "what is life?".

If it's not a definition of life, despite tons of folks calling it a definition of life, then you need to be clear about what your idiosyncratic criteria are for something to count as a "definition," and you'd need to make clear from the start that you're using "definition" unusually.

So it seems like your criteria would have something to do with "not merely reducing using empirical evidence," which per your usual, is incredibly murky--you don't communicate clearly at all, and you don't seem to think very clearly. So you'd need to try to lay out your criteria in a clear manner.