GE Morton wrote: ↑February 14th, 2021, 1:14 am
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑February 13th, 2021, 4:19 pm
No dictionary definition of the word 'objectivity' that I've come across mentions the public confirmability of propositions - or propositions at all. Perhaps you have one that does. But to call other definitions - such as 'unbiased' or 'independent from opinion' or 'relying on facts' - spurious is plainly false. It seems you've invented your own use for the word.
You're munging the terms "objective" and "objectivity" together. I mentioned before that "objective" can apply to persons, as well to propositions. We say that a person is objective if he is, as you say, unbiased, relies on facts, etc. "Objectivity" denotes the practice of observing those constraints when forming opinions, solving problems, reaching judgments. It is applicable to persons and their decision-making methodology. We can never know, however, what considerations entered into someone's opinions or judgments; we can't read his mind. All we can judge is what he says --- what propositions he utters. It is those propositions we can characterize as objective or subjective --- by the criteria I've given.
Here is one definition of "objective":
2 a: of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers : having reality independent of the mind
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/objective
I did not, BTW, call "independent from opinion," or "relying on facts" "spurious." They are perfectly accurate and functional when applied to persons and their reasoning processes. They don't apply to propositions, however.
If instead objectivity is to do with facts and reliance on them, and subjectivity with judgements, beliefs and opinions, then moral objectivism is, as I said, the claim that there are moral facts - and not the public confirmability of moral assertions - whatever that means.
A "fact" is a proposition which asserts some state of affairs which is publicly confirmable. If a moral proposition asserts some state of affairs which is publicly confirmable, then it, too, is a "fact," just as any other proposition which asserts a confirmable state of affairs.
I'm still interested in what you think "morality" is, and what counts a "moral assertion."
(I think I've already explained what I think morality is and what counts as a moral assertion. But I'm happy to come back to that later. For now, we're discussing the nature and function of moral assertions such as 'slavery is wrong'.)
Perhaps you didn't notice that the Merriam-Webster definition of 'objective' makes no mention of propositions or their public verifiability. So your definition of the word 'objectivity' - 'public verifiability of a proposition' - is your choice. As you say, 'You're free to attach any spurious definitions you like to...terms, of course'. And the rest of us are free to reject your definition and the argument you make using it.
But anyway, here's your definition of a fact-as-proposition:
'A "fact" is a proposition which asserts some state of affairs which is publicly confirmable. If a moral proposition asserts some state of affairs which is publicly confirmable, then it, too, is a "fact," just as any other proposition which asserts a confirmable state of affairs.'
And this is obviously incorrect. The predicate should be 'is publicly confirmed', not 'is publicly confirmable'. So your conditional should be as follows:
If a moral proposition asserts some state of affairs which is publicly confirmed, then it, too, is a "fact," just as any other proposition which asserts a [publicly] confirmed state of affairs.
And I think your definition of a fact is this: A fact is a proposition which asserts a publicly confirmed state-of-affairs.
Before we go on, do you agree that that's your definition of a fact? If not, please re-phrase it.