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Fafner

Then you should give some evidence from Russell's and Wittgenstein's writings (and anyway, I can use examples from Russell without subscribing to his views, so it just doesn't matter whether he would agree with me or not).

I already did; I suggested you had a look at Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' and the introduction by Russell.

The idea is that a sentence like "the first person who is going to be born in the year 2017 will be a female" is either true or false, and if it's a true then it's a fact about the world, whether we can know it or not.

It will be a fact about the world only when it happens; and when it happens we will have to determine its truth empirically.

Until it happens then there is no experiment, observation, sum, definition etc. which could show your claim to be true or false, so it cannot be a fact.

Once again; Is 'God is omnipotent' also a 'fact about the world'? Surely it is a claim about God. And for it to be true, God would have to exist. Otherwise we are in the strange position of saying that a non-existent God might still be omnipotent.

I don't think it's correct. It's possible to write the truth table of a sentence like "if something is a Glog then it's also a Quog" without knowing what the terms mean (and in fact they mean nothing).

Yes, just as we can write '2+3=5' without knowing 'a quantity of 5 of what?'. But a 'synthetic a priori' proposition (in your sense) would be one that does have an 'of what'. Glog etc. has to be about a 'thing'. The object is to have proved beyond contradiction an equivalent of 'there are 5 apples', such that the normal philosophical doubts that would attend such a statement as an empirical claim no longer apply.

When I wrote 'you have to fix the meanings of the terms you want to turn into symbols that can be used in logic' it is true that one possibility would be that it was simply of the 'Glog/Quog' type. In that case, since it doesn't involve a claim about objects, then the meaning of 'true' or 'false' in the truth table wouldn't concern objects either.

Similarly, if we formulate a proposition, like your one about 'a person who is going to be born' we need to look carefully at what that phrase means; Is an unborn person an object? And so on. We can't just assign it a letter symbol in a logical form until we are clear what that symbol represents.

It was just an example to illustrate that there are true sentences which describe logically impossible objects, like the example "there's no square circles". Do you really dispute that it's a true statement?

It is true, but it is not about an object.

As it stands, it is ambiguous. It could mean; 'They are such things as square circles, but these particular objects are not square circles.' That would be about objects and could be true or false. Instead (I take it), it denies that there could be such objects as square circles.

To assert a 'non-object' isn't to assert of sort of object. We can see this because a non-square circle has identical properties to a non-triangle and a non-mountain and a non-anything else. (Apples multiplied by zero is the same thing as pears multiplied by zero.) If the 'object' bit of that 'non-object' is the same as the object in any 'no-object', then you are asserting 'no-thing'.

Similarly, if you put it into a formula, how would you write it? If P stands for square circles, then you are saying there are P x 0 (zero). But we can work that sum out, and the answer again is 0. Zero is not a proposition; it has no content; you cannot use 'nothing' to prove 'something'.

Londoner wrote:I already did; I suggested you had a look at Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' and the introduction by Russell.

Then show me the relevant passages (and in any case, Wittgenstein latter rejected the views he expressed in the tractatus as you may know).

It will be a fact about the world only when it happens; and when it happens we will have to determine its truth empirically.

Alright, so what about "there's a possibility that the first person to be born in the year 2017 is going to be a female"? This is something which is true already. The same is with the example of the 6 meter tall man.

Similarly, if we formulate a proposition, like your one about 'a person who is going to be born' we need to look carefully at what that phrase means; Is an unborn person an object? And so on. We can't just assign it a letter symbol in a logical form until we are clear what that symbol represents.

But we know what an unborn person means: a person that doesn't exist yet. You don't need to do any fancy metaphysics to understand the idea or to know that it's true that there could be people in the future, so the burden is on you to show that there's a problem about this idea because all normal speakers of English understand it perfectly well.

It was just an example to illustrate that there are true sentences which describe logically impossible objects, like the example "there's no square circles". Do you really dispute that it's a true statement?

It is true, but it is not about an object.

Of course it's not about an object de-re, but it is about an object de-dicto. "there are no square circles" means that no object in reality has the properties of being both square and circular, and this is clearly a claim about objects (even though a negative one).

Then show me the relevant passages (and in any case, Wittgenstein latter rejected the views he expressed in the tractatus as you may know).

This is philosophy. I'm sorry but I can't copy-paste a few sentences that give the whole argument, sometimes you just have to read the whole thing. However, you are fortunate in this case because, as I have mentioned several times, Russell wrote an introduction which explains the problem that Wittgenstein is addressing. It is available online. It really isn't that long or difficult.

And let us remember that in this part of our exchange what you are demanding is that I prove that those 'who studied the subject seriously' are interested in how language relates to logic and the requirements of a 'logical language'(see post 140). Certainly Wittgenstein etc. reconsidered their ideas, but the subject of their investigation remained the same.

Alright, so what about "there's a possibility that the first person to be born in the year 2017 is going to be a female"? This is something which is true already.

But also "there's a possibility that the first person to be born in the year 2017 is going to be a male".

So if we symbolise the female as 'F', then your proposition is 'F or not F'. The two terms cancel each other out.

Unless you are saying that the chances are other than 50/50 (which actually they are), but that is a scientific claim and its truth or falsity would depend on empirical evidence.

Of course it's not about an object de-re, but it is about an object de-dicto. "there are no square circles" means that no object in reality has the properties of being both square and circular, and this is clearly a claim about objects (even though a negative one).

'No object in reality has the properties of being both square and circular'. Yet you say it is 'clearly a claim about objects'. So does the square circle 'exist as an object in non-reality', this being a different state to 'not existing as an object in reality'?

This is strange stuff, made stranger by the introduction terms like de-re, which are to do with intension and the philosophy of language - the stuff you say philosophers discussing this subject aren't interested in. Can this and the claim about objects, that are objects, but don't exist in reality, really be from the same post which included the remark:

You don't need to do any fancy metaphysics to understand the idea ... so the burden is on you to show that there's a problem about this idea because all normal speakers of English understand it perfectly well.

Londoner wrote:This is philosophy. I'm sorry but I can't copy-paste a few sentences that give the whole argument, sometimes you just have to read the whole thing. However, you are fortunate in this case because, as I have mentioned several times, Russell wrote an introduction which explains the problem that Wittgenstein is addressing. It is available online. It really isn't that long or difficult.

And let us remember that in this part of our exchange what you are demanding is that I prove that those 'who studied the subject seriously' are interested in how language relates to logic and the requirements of a 'logical language'(see post 140). Certainly Wittgenstein etc. reconsidered their ideas, but the subject of their investigation remained the same.

I'm not claiming any expertise on Russell or Wittgenstein, but from what I know and read neither of them said anything remotely close to what you claim (again, unless you give any specific references).

Anyway, today when you take a university level class in logic (and I took several) one of the first things that you are taught is how to formalize expressions of natural language in logical notation, and among other things all students are told that that sentences of the form "if, then..." should be understood as "P->Q". Let's just concentrate on this particular point which is not very controversial, and we don't need to discuss the views of Russell or Wittgenstein to settle it, or decide on the big question about the relation between logic and natural language (unless you can cite any particular argument that directly bears on conditionals).

So if we symbolise the female as 'F', then your proposition is 'F or not F'. The two terms cancel each other out.

No, they don't cancel each other. If it was possible that P but it happened that Q, it doesn't mean that P wasn't really possible. Ever heard about countefactuals? It is still a fact that Romney could've won the elections even though he didn't, because Obama's victory wasn't a necessary truth but a contingent event.

'No object in reality has the properties of being both square and circular'. Yet you say it is 'clearly a claim about objects'. So does the square circle 'exist as an object in non-reality', this being a different state to 'not existing as an object in reality'?

What I mean is that sentences with an empty reference can still have a meaning as being about an object.

Compare it with the de re/de dicto distinction. Let's say that "Jack believes that someone is a spy". This sentence can either be understood as Jack believing about a particular person that he is a spy (de re), or that Jack believing that there is a spy out there while he may be wrong about this (de dicto). In the first sense Jack's belief depends essentially on the existence of an object but in the second it doesn't. So there are two senses of talking or thinking about an object- one commits you to it's existence and the other doesn't, and there's nothing paradoxical here. (and also consider: "Jack told me a story about him seeing a spy, even though no one was there" - a story about a non existent spy is still a story about a spy, and this seems to me a perfectly natural use of language).

Fafner

I'm not claiming any expertise on Russell or Wittgenstein, but from what I know and read neither of them said anything remotely close to what you claim (again, unless you give any specific references).

You don't need any expertise.

Google 'tractatus logico-philosophicus pdf'

Scroll down to where the introduction begins on page 7.

Just read the first page. Russell tells you what the book is about. Don't read further. But in that case, please do not start extracting odd sentences out of context and demand I explain them!

No, they don't cancel each other. If it was possible that P but it happened that Q, it doesn't mean that P wasn't really possible.

Yes; the operative word is possible. Let's ask, what is the subject of your sentence: "there's a possibility that the first person to be born in the year 2017 is going to be a female"?

Why not consider, what would be the negation of your sentence? It isn't "there's a possibility that the first person to be born in the year 2017 is going to be a male". That does not contradict your own assertion at all because to say "there is a possibility of a female" also says "there is the possibility of a male".

So using the word 'possibility' takes away the assertive character of 'female'. Your sentence says 'there's a possibility that the first person to be born in the year 2017 is going to be a male or a female'.

So we can see the subject, the thing the negation has to apply to, is that word 'possibility'. And most would respond; That isn't true! There isn't a 'possibility', there is a 'certainty' that a person will be male or female - because that is the meaning of 'person'.

So when we cut out all the misleading references to particular sexes and the future, we see your proposition is analytic (and, unless you have some unusual understanding of 'person', false.)

This isn't some mysterious stuff from Wittgenstein. It is what our grandparents would have called 'parsing'.

Let's say that "Jack believes that someone is a spy". This sentence can either be understood as Jack believing about a particular person that he is a spy (de re), or that Jack believing that there is a spy out there while he may be wrong about this (de dicto). In the first sense Jack's belief depends essentially on the existence of an object but in the second it doesn't.

This is mixed up. "Jack believes that someone is a spy" is a fact about Jack, not about spies. It is true if it correctly describes Jack's mental state. "Jack believes impossible things" can also be true...because it describes Jack, not the things.

The de re/de dicto stuff concern our understanding of the subject of Jack's belief; it points out that the description has an ambiguity. Is his belief 'that Jones is a spy' or that 'spies exist'? But the fact that we cannot tell this from a particular statement doesn't mean that the two are the same thing. We can ask him; 'Which do you mean, Jack?'

What I mean is that sentences with an empty reference can still have a meaning as being about an object.

Neither version has this thing you call an 'empty reference'. The reference is to spies; for either belief to be sound involves the necessity that at least one spy-object exists, somewhere.

Contrast this to your 'square circles'. The problem with this term is that you say it references an object, but also that it is not an object that does, or can, exist.

Londoner wrote:Just read the first page. Russell tells you what the book is about. Don't read further. But in that case, please do not start extracting odd sentences out of context and demand I explain them!

I read it, and...?

So when we cut out all the misleading references to particular sexes and the future, we see your proposition is analytic (and, unless you have some unusual understanding of 'person', false.)

How it is analytic? (and there is no such thing a "false analytical statements").

It's neither analytical that if someone is a human being then he is either a male of female (we may discover tomorrow a human being without gender, that wouldn't make him a non human by definition) and it's not analytic that it's possible for people to exist in the future, it's not a fact about language and the meanings of the terms.

Neither version has this thing you call an 'empty reference'. The reference is to spies; for either belief to be sound involves the necessity that at least one spy-object exists, somewhere.

No, the de dicto reading doesn't require spies to exist. Suppose he believes that there's a spy in his neighborhood, he can believe this even if he's wrong and there are no spies in his neighborhood.

Contrast this to your 'square circles'. The problem with this term is that you say it references an object, but also that it is not an object that does, or can, exist.

No I'm not saying that "square circles" refer to objects. But just forget it.

It is also a good stand the a baby's human brain develops through experience but not all things can't be explained by an experience. Empiricists are also right in some other way that really knowledge can be attained by an experience. However, we need also to examine what kind of knowledge is it or we need to determined whether we deal with a practical knowledge or an intellectual knowledge. A priori knowledge is possible in any other way as well as a posteriori. They worked in a different way that is why we interpret things differently. The two kinds of knowledge (a priori and a posteriori) have distinctive tasks as well as distinctive fields.

I read it, and...?

I thought that might happen. That is why every so often I put in a bit to remind us what point we were discussing, most recently in post 153.

It's neither analytical that if someone is a human being then he is either a male of female (we may discover tomorrow a human being without gender, that wouldn't make him a non human by definition)

No, you don't get it. To say one thing is 'possible' is not to say that the other alternatives are 'impossible'. If it is 'possible ' that some human is a girl, that says it is also 'possible' that they won't be. Inventing a third sex doesn't change that.

No, the de dicto reading doesn't require spies to exist. Suppose he believes that there's a spy in his neighborhood, he can believe this even if he's wrong and there are no spies in his neighborhood.

Yes, somebody can have a mistaken belief. This has nothing to do with either the meaning of 'de dicto' or the synthetic a priori.

No I'm not saying that "square circles" refer to objects. But just forget it.

Yet you are saying:

"there are no square circles" means that no object in reality has the properties of being both square and circular, and this is clearly a claim about objects

And I am more than happy to forget it!

I think I will give this one a rest. In these discussions we may not convince the other party, but I think it is still useful as the effort to search for the right words to present our view makes us to clarify and refine our ideas. I hope we can both agree on that.

This topic is just another of those many debated by philosophers who know nothing about biology and just look for virtual problems, while there are none.

The expression "a priori knowledge" is utterly idiotic, it's oxymoron. In common sense use, knowledge is by definition something you LEARN with time. On the other hand human has severla characteristics like biological construction, chemistry composition, physical posture etc. that make person human. These characteristics define HOW and WHAT person will experience the world and gain knowledge. So, these characterstics are a priori, while knowledge (understood as simply as possible - the kid goes to shool and learns, for example, capital cities of various countries) is a posteriori.

Scott wrote:Even before birth, a human baby's brain is experiencing developments as a result of experiences that happened to its mother and evolutionarily-gained traits through experiences that happen to its ancestors over time. But of course all those statements rely on the definition of experience and what is and is not experience.

I'm a bit lost, are we talking knowledge or experience? Not eevery experience is knowledge (I'm still talking common sense) and if you'll try to broaden both terms to impossible extents you'll end up in another foggy debate about meanings of definitions.

They way human operates is his characteristics, not knowledge. Knowledge always comes from outside - the fact that you are born with future capability of laughing to your parents and saying 'mama' is not knowledge.

Londoner wrote:No, you don't get it. To say one thing is 'possible' is not to say that the other alternatives are 'impossible'. If it is 'possible ' that some human is a girl, that says it is also 'possible' that they won't be. Inventing a third sex doesn't change that.

The point is that facts about possible states of affairs are facts about the world, they are not analytic.

Yes, somebody can have a mistaken belief. This has nothing to do with either the meaning of 'de dicto' or the synthetic a priori.

Then you don't know what de dicto means. Read Quine's "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes" (and Russell essentially made the same point with his primary/secondary occurrence distinction).

No I'm not saying that "square circles" refer to objects. But just forget it.

Yet you are saying:

"there are no square circles" means that no object in reality has the properties of being both square and circular, and this is clearly a claim about objects

And I am more than happy to forget it!

Again, the claim is that there are two sense of "being about" an object, one commits you to its existence the other doesn't.

I think I will give this one a rest. In these discussions we may not convince the other party, but I think it is still useful as the effort to search for the right words to present our view makes us to clarify and refine our ideas. I hope we can both agree on that.

Fair enough.

Fafner88 wrote:How it is analytic? (and there is no such thing a "false analytical statements").

I think there is. An analytically false statement is or implies the negation of an analytically true statement. For instance, "Bachelors are married" is an analytic falsity.

-- Updated May 16th, 2014, 2:37 pm to add the following --

EMTe wrote:The expression "a priori knowledge" is utterly idiotic, it's oxymoron. In common sense use, knowledge is by definition something you LEARN with time. On the other hand human has severla characteristics like biological construction, chemistry composition, physical posture etc. that make person human. These characteristics define HOW and WHAT person will experience the world and gain knowledge. So, these characterstics are a priori, while knowledge (understood as simply as possible - the kid goes to shool and learns, for example, capital cities of various countries) is a posteriori.

The state of knowledge is one thing and the source of knowledge another. And it is not true by definition of "knowledge" that the source of all knowledge is external perception or internal perception (introspection).

Consul wrote:How it is analytic? (and there is no such thing a "false analytical statements").

I think there is. An analytically false statement is or implies the negation of an analytically true statement. For instance, "Bachelors are married" is an analytic falsity.

A negation of an analytic statement is not itself analytic but simply a contradiction. "Bachelors are married" can be said to be false by virtue of its meaning, but it doesn't make the sentence itself analytic (only the negation of the sentence is analytic). Being analytic means being a true sentence, to quote from SEP: "“Analytic” sentences . . . are those whose truth seems to be knowable by knowing the meanings of the constituent words alone".

What do you mean by "state of knowledge", Consul? Knowledge is facts you learn about the world - how to operate crane, how many moons Jupiter has, what is gross domestic product of Vanuatu. "State of knowledge" is some dim expression that desperately tries to make world harder to understand for others and is as such philosophical which equals to being stupid.

Source of knowledge is always external, because you learn from interactions with environment. What comes from inside of you is not knowledge, but your innate characteristics. The whole problem, in my opinion, with you philosophers is that you constantly confuse expressions and broaden or narrow their meanings to create false problems. Instead of accepting some kind of practical division between knowledge and experience (and many other terms) you discuss their limits which is totally pointless and absurd loss of vital energy.

EMTe wrote:What do you mean by "state of knowledge", Consul? Knowledge is facts you learn about the world - how to operate crane, how many moons Jupiter has, what is gross domestic product of Vanuatu. "State of knowledge" is some dim expression that desperately tries to make world harder to understand for others and is as such philosophical which equals to being stupid.

Source of knowledge is always external, because you learn from interactions with environment. What comes from inside of you is not knowledge, but your innate characteristics. The whole problem, in my opinion, with you philosophers is that you constantly confuse expressions and broaden or narrow their meanings to create false problems. Instead of accepting some kind of practical division between knowledge and experience (and many other terms) you discuss their limits which is totally pointless and absurd loss of vital energy.

But the things which are most often said to be known a priori are not observable facts about the external environment (i.e. mathematics), so to argue that a priori knowledge is a contradiction because it doesn't come from the outside is to miss the point. I mean, no one claims that somebody can know a priori that Paris is the capital of France or that Dolphins are mammals, the claim is rather that there's a special class of non-empirical prepositions which truth can be grasped by reason alone.

Fafner88 wrote:

Consul wrote:I think there is. An analytically false statement is or implies the negation of an analytically true statement. For instance, "Bachelors are married" is an analytic falsity.

A negation of an analytic statement is not itself analytic but simply a contradiction.

It is a contradiction, but a statement contradicting an analytic truth is (adequately called) an analytic falsity.

Fafner88 wrote:"Bachelors are married" can be said to be false by virtue of its meaning, but it doesn't make the sentence itself analytic (only the negation of the sentence is analytic). Being analytic means being a true sentence, to quote from SEP: "“Analytic” sentences . . . are those whose truth seems to be knowable by knowing the meanings of the constituent words alone".

Thus formulated, analytic propositions/statements/sentences are analytically true ones, so that all analytic propositions are analytic truths. But this is not the case if the following formulation is used (which I think is preferable to the one above):
"Analytic sentences are those whose truth-value seems to be knowable by knowing the meanings of the constituent words alone."
Thus formulated, an analytic proposition/statement/sentence is either analytically true, an analytic truth or analytically false, an analytic falsity.