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[Belindi]

You feel when you move your elbow joint the movement pertains to yourself. You don't feel when you move a brain cell the movement pertains to yourself. This is because there is neural feedback from the elbow but no neural feedback from the brain cell.

If you had neural feedback from the brain cell you could cause the brain to know what it was doing by stimulating the brain cell with a probe . As it is the only way you know what your brain is doing is via constant correlations.

[Consul]

If "emergence" isn't simply used as a metaphorical (reverse) term for causation—such that "x emerges from y" means "x is caused by y"/y causes x"—, I don't know what emergence is. In my understanding, emergent materialism = causal materialism.

To quote myself:

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"From the perspective of reductive physicalism, conscious states aren't ontologically emergent. There is a distinction between a causal mechanism that is different from what it causes, and a compositional/constitutional mechanism that is identical with what it is a mechanism of. Reductionists are looking for the latter!

In order to avoid a misunderstanding: A compositional/constitutional mechanism of some phenomenon involves causal processes too, but the causation involved in it is "horizontal" or "sideways" causation or interaction that takes place between parts of it on the same level, whereas the causation involved in a causal mechanism of some emergent phenomenon is "vertical" or "upward" causation, where a lower-level event or process causes or produces a higher-level phenomenon (which is different from the mechanism causing or producing it)."

Source: viewtopic.php?p=385906#p385906
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[Sy Borg]

Good OP. Helpful to see all those ideas organised. I think there's a fair bit of overlap between them, eg. I see little difference between GWT and emergence. The idea is, as I understand it, that the neuronal structure needed for consciousness as we know it has emerged, evolved. Like the others, it's just a guess, though.

As regard your question about panpsychism, as I understand it, the units of mind are reflexes. Numerous small reflexes and automatic responses, with entire suites of reflexes responsive to emotions and conscious executive control.

Could be. All speculations are on the table when it comes to Consciousness.

More than could be. There is not much else that is capable of comprising consciousness. Try to think of just one other.

[Consul]

Could be. All speculations are on the table when it comes to Consciousness.

More than could be. There is not much else that is capable of comprising consciousness. Try to think of just one other.

That all are "on the table" doesn't mean that all are equally plausible or probable!

[Sy Borg]

Could be. All speculations are on the table when it comes to Consciousness.

More than could be. There is not much else that is capable of comprising consciousness. Try to think of just one other.

That all are "on the table" doesn't mean that all are equally plausible or probable!

The exclamation mark is noted :)

Seriously, yes, but I am not sure I'd be willing to rule to much out entirely. Reality is most likely weirder than we imagine, with our perceptions less definitively accurate, more simply situationally relevant, than we realise.

While I don't embrace unbridled mysterianism, I do have doubts as to whether human/animal perceptions of space and time are accurate, that space and time are what they seem to be. I suspect that this is why physical theory does not accord with lived experience, as per Einstein's famous quote, "People like us who believe in physics know that the distinction between past, present and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion".

If our current conceptions are largely correct and there's only some details to fill in, then I lean towards IIT and emergence, not miles from your thoughts.

However, our bodies of knowledge have too many unknowns for confidence. It's not just the hard problem but abiogenesis, the singularities of the BB and black holes, dark energy, dark matter, the nature of time, why gravity is so much weaker than other forces, incompatibility of QM and GR, the scale of the universe/multiverse, whether life exists elsewhere in the cosmos, how the fundamental constants of nature came about ... and many more.

Those unknowns are so significant and numerous that I'm inclined to wait and see what new information comes in so I can better try to understand the nature of reality before strongly endorsing any view regarding the hard problem.

[Consul]

Seriously, yes, but I am not sure I'd be willing to rule to much out entirely. Reality is most likely weirder than we imagine, with our perceptions less definitively accurate, more simply situationally relevant, than we realise.

For example, its panpsychistic implications make the integrated-information theory highly implausible. Moreover, its central hypothesis—that there is an equivalence between the measure of integrated information Phi and the degree of consciousness—seems scientifically untestable in principle.

QUOTE>
"…And this leads to a final challenging implication [of IIT]: panpsychism. So long as there is the right kind of mechanism, the right kind of cause-effect structure in a system, there will be non-zero Phi, and there will be consciousness. IIT’s panpsychism is a restrained panpsychism, not the sort in which consciousness is spread out through the entire universe like a thin layer of jam. Rather, consciousness is to be found wherever integrated information – Phi – is to be found. This could be here and there, but not everywhere.

IIT is original, ambitious, and intellectually exuberant. It remains the only neuroscientific theory out there that makes a serious attempt on the hard problem of consciousness. IIT is also most definitely weird, but the fact that something is weird doesn’t mean it’s wrong. Almost everything about modern physics is both weird and less wrong than the physics of the past. But the success of those parts of modern physics that are now established as being less wrong has everything to do with their being experimentally testable. And this is the trouble with IIT. With its audacity comes the heavy price that its primary claim – the equivalence between Phi and conscious level – may be impossible to test."

(Seth, Anil. Being You: A New Science of Consciousness. New York: Dutton, 2021.)
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[Consul]

I suspect that this is why physical theory does not accord with lived experience, as per Einstein's famous quote, "People like us who believe in physics know that the distinction between past, present and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion".

This is probably the most misunderstood Einstein quotation:

"The distinction between past, present, and future is only an illusion, however persistent."
[Letter to Michelangelo Besso, 21 March 1955]

In this interview Tim Maudlin (a philosopher of physics) explains why there is a misunderstanding:

https://youtu.be/hC3ckLqsL5M?t=500

[Sy Borg]

I suspect that this is why physical theory does not accord with lived experience, as per Einstein's famous quote, "People like us who believe in physics know that the distinction between past, present and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion".

This is probably the most misunderstood Einstein quotation:

"The distinction between past, present, and future is only an illusion, however persistent."
[Letter to Michelangelo Besso, 21 March 1955]

In this interview Tim Maudlin (a philosopher of physics) explains why there is a misunderstanding:

https://youtu.be/hC3ckLqsL5M?t=500

I think the interviewee interprets Einstein to fit his own opinions. Is it realistic to posit that Einstein was just telling sweet lies - a scientist devoted to correct understandings? Would you say something that you knew was untrue or misleading to comfort a grieving friend? That would be simply patronising and disrespectful behaviour between adults.

Note that Einstein also said: "Time and space are modes by which we think and not conditions in which we live".

[Sy Borg]

Seriously, yes, but I am not sure I'd be willing to rule to much out entirely. Reality is most likely weirder than we imagine, with our perceptions less definitively accurate, more simply situationally relevant, than we realise.

For example, its panpsychistic implications make the integrated-information theory highly implausible. Moreover, its central hypothesis—that there is an equivalence between the measure of integrated information Phi and the degree of consciousness—seems scientifically untestable in principle.

"…And this leads to a final challenging implication [of IIT]: panpsychism. So long as there is the right kind of mechanism, the right kind of cause-effect structure in a system, there will be non-zero Phi, and there will be consciousness. IIT’s panpsychism is a restrained panpsychism, not the sort in which consciousness is spread out through the entire universe like a thin layer of jam. Rather, consciousness is to be found wherever integrated information – Phi – is to be found. This could be here and there, but not everywhere.

IIT is original, ambitious, and intellectually exuberant. It remains the only neuroscientific theory out there that makes a serious attempt on the hard problem of consciousness. IIT is also most definitely weird, but the fact that something is weird doesn’t mean it’s wrong. Almost everything about modern physics is both weird and less wrong than the physics of the past. But the success of those parts of modern physics that are now established as being less wrong has everything to do with their being experimentally testable. And this is the trouble with IIT. With its audacity comes the heavy price that its primary claim – the equivalence between Phi and conscious level – may be impossible to test."

(Seth, Anil. Being You: A New Science of Consciousness. New York: Dutton, 2021.)

As regards orthodoxy, I think IIT is pretty comfortably the best candidate for understanding both life and consciousness. The fact is that there are particular configurations of matter that live and particular configurations that think. What exactly are those configurations? What, as they say,. breathes fire into the equations?

We will know one answer if we create life without using a prior organism as a base. On the other hand, as per your quote above, how will we know if a thinking machine achieves actual sentience? It may be just mimicking sentience. In that sense, modern AI field has outgrown the Turing test.

My guess is that digestive and reproductive systems or equivalent will be necessary for a machine to achieve sentience. That would give the machine minds an intrinsic function. After all, nervous systems only evolved as an extension of the metabolism and reproductive systems, improving an organism's chances of finding sustenance and mating while better avoiding threats.

[SteveKlinko]

I appreciate your well thought out response. My opinion is that all speculations and theories are on the table when it comes to Consciousness. However, there is no theory or speculation that can Explain any of these Conscious Experiences: Redness, the Standard A Tone, the Salty Taste, the Smell of Bleach, or the Touch of a Rough Surface. If you can find a theory that can Explain any of these then you have got something. I specialize in the Experience of Redness and all the other Colors of Light. I have not been able to find anyone on this Planet that has a good Explanation for the Visual Experience of Redness.

On that specifically I wouldn't trust any answer that didn't get in directly, identify, and examine that process in its native context. The really up close and personal aspects of sensory experience, like the taste of coffee or seeing the color red, would either be hidden so deep in data contexts that we'd have a lot of decoding to get anywhere near them or/and the proper media on which they're happening is something we don't understand and in that case still have a much longer ways to stretch the term physicalism.

Yes, I agree. When Science can understand Redness it will be pulled in under the banner of Physicalism, no matter what new Physics is needed.

[SteveKlinko]

Computers can solve problems but there is no Consciousness happening there.

If computers could solve the problems that I solved, as a software designer, then I would've been out of a job. But they can't, and I wasn't.

To use your terminology, it is irrelevant that the doings of my nonconscious mind only become known to me when I experience them consciously. The fact remains that our nonconscious minds do an enormous amount, at all levels of abstraction, that our conscious minds know nothing of. This doesn't mean that these things are "irrelevant", IMO.

Computers cannot solve most of the problems that Humans can but they can solve certain kinds of problems faster than a Human can.

The subconscious Brain processing is not Irrelevant in and of itself, but it is Irrelevant for understanding Conscious Experience. The output of the Brain processing will involve Neural Activity that is Correlated with the ultimate Conscious Experience, but this does not Explain Conscious Experience. The Neural Activity may someday Explain the Conscious Experience but right now it does not. My job is to keep people thinking about Conscious Experiences themselves. So when I say things like the Brain Processes are Irrelevant I am simply trying to get people to concentrate more on the Experience and less on the Brain Activity. Nobody really has the first Clue about Conscious Experience so all speculations are on the table.

[SteveKlinko]

Next, I would like to talk about Global Workspace Theory (GWT) with respect to Conscious Experience. I include this theory because people will often say that this theory explains Consciousness. In reality, this theory does not even try to Explain Conscious Experiences. This theory is a theory about Organizing our internal thought processes. There is no way this theory can Explain what the IM is within the theory. If I am wrong about this then please, will someone show me how this theory can Explain any Conscious Experience?

You're wrong insofar as GWT does try to explain consciousness. For example, Peter Carruthers argues that "the [global-workspace] theory can provide a fully reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness." "…This chapter shows how global-workspace theory can be developed into a satisfying, fully reductive, explanation of phenomenal consciousness." (Human and Animal Minds, Oxford UP, 2019, pp. 96+116)

We are at a stalemate on this then because I disagree, or at least do not understand how GWT explains anything about the Conscious Experience of Redness, the Standard A Tone, the Salty Taste, and etc. I have read about GWT. Especially, please Explain how Redness is Explained by this.

[SteveKlinko]

Next, I would like to talk about Emergence and Epiphenomenalism with respect to Conscious Experience. Emergence is a Physicalist proposition.

Not always, because there isn't only emergent materialism. There are also emergent mentalism and emergent neutralism.

Emergence proposes that Conscious Experience IS NOT the Neural Activity itself, but rather the Conscious Experience Emerges from the Neural Activity. But the Conscious Experience is still the result of Neural Activity even if you cannot say it IS the Neural Activity.

If "emergence" isn't simply used as a metaphorical (reverse) term for causation—such that "x emerges from y" means "x is caused by y"/y causes x"—, I don't know what emergence is. In my understanding, emergent materialism = causal materialism.

Next, I would like to talk about Eliminativism and Illusionism with respect to Conscious Experience. Eliminativism is another Physicalist proposition.

Not always, because there isn't only eliminative materialism. There are also eliminative mentalism and eliminative neutralism.

Eliminativism proposes that Conscious Experience does not even exist. Illusionism is a sub category of Eliminativism that proposes that Conscious Experience exists only as an Illusion.

…which is to say that only the (introspective) illusion of conscious experience exists, and that conscious experience (itself) doesn't exist.

I had to narrow down the scope of this post to the most popular theories of Consciousness that I have explored. The point of the post was mostly to present that there is a single aspect of all these theories that makes them fail. Ironically, that they do not Explain Consciousness (Conscious Experience).

Your last sentence is in line with the usual reasoning on Illusionism but I find it to be fairly Incoherent. The Illusion of Conscious Experience exists but the the Conscious Experience itself does not exist. What????!!! Could you elaborate on that?

[SteveKlinko]

You feel when you move your elbow joint the movement pertains to yourself. You don't feel when you move a brain cell the movement pertains to yourself. This is because there is neural feedback from the elbow but no neural feedback from the brain cell.

If you had neural feedback from the brain cell you could cause the brain to know what it was doing by stimulating the brain cell with a probe . As it is the only way you know what your brain is doing is via constant correlations.

Yes, but you don't know your Elbow is moving or anything else your Brain is doing until you have some kind of Conscious Experience.

[SteveKlinko]

If "emergence" isn't simply used as a metaphorical (reverse) term for causation—such that "x emerges from y" means "x is caused by y"/y causes x"—, I don't know what emergence is. In my understanding, emergent materialism = causal materialism.

To quote myself:

QUOTE>
"From the perspective of reductive physicalism, conscious states aren't ontologically emergent. There is a distinction between a causal mechanism that is different from what it causes, and a compositional/constitutional mechanism that is identical with what it is a mechanism of. Reductionists are looking for the latter!

In order to avoid a misunderstanding: A compositional/constitutional mechanism of some phenomenon involves causal processes too, but the causation involved in it is "horizontal" or "sideways" causation or interaction that takes place between parts of it on the same level, whereas the causation involved in a causal mechanism of some emergent phenomenon is "vertical" or "upward" causation, where a lower-level event or process causes or produces a higher-level phenomenon (which is different from the mechanism causing or producing it)."

Source: viewtopic.php?p=385906#p385906
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Good distinction.