Philosophy Discussion Forums

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑August 11th, 2020, 10:14 pm
We use the word fact in two completely different ways, to mean 'a state-of-affairs that is or was the case' or 'a description of a state-of-affairs with the truth-vakue true. And it's a mistake to confuse or conflate the two uses.

For the purposes of a philosophical discussion that distinction is idle. It is essentially Russell's distinction between "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description." But 99% of the knowledge we have, and 100% of the "facts" asserted in philosophical discussions, are knowledge by description. In those (or any) discussions we have no access to the "facts" (in your first sense) asserted; only to the propositions asserting them.

I use the term factual assertion to denote an assertion that claims to describe a state-of-affairs that is or was the case. If it it or was the case, the factual assertion is true, and we call it a fact. So a factual assertion may be true or false.

Well, no, with respect to the second sentence. An assertion "A" that is false is not a "factual assertion." It is only a factual assertion if it is true.

By contrast, a non-factual assertion doesn't claim to describe a state-of-affairs that is or was the case, so it has no truth-value.

All propositions assert the existence of some state of affairs. They are "factual" if (and only if) they are true.

Instead, it expresses a value-judgement about a state-of-affairs. Moral and aesthetic assertions are prominent examples.

While propositions expressing moral or aesthetic judgments commonly are mere value judgments, they need not be. They will not be if some cogent moral axiom or standard of beauty is postulated and thus establishes a context. In that case "Act X is morally wrong, " or "Painting Y lacks aesthetic merit" can be true, factual, and objective. They merely assert that X and Y do not conform to, or are inconsistent with, the postulated standard.

Please can you provide an example of what you think is a moral fact - given that a moral assertion is one that says something is morally right or wrong? (I believe no such thing exists, which is why morality isn't and can't be objective.)

I think you've asked that before (or perhaps someone else did), and I answered.

Sure: "Slavery is morally wrong."

That proposition is true because "morally wrong" means, "inconsistent with a sound moral theory." The axiom of the moral theory to which it is referred asserts that the aim of morality is to develop principles and rules governing human interactions which enable all agents in a moral field to maximize their welfare. One rule derivable from that axiom would be one to prohibit slavery, since enslaving someone reduces his welfare. Hence "slavery is morally wrong" is true and objective.

But of course, if you have some different notion of what "morality" means or what is its aim, then "Slavery is wrong" could be false.

Belindi wrote: ↑August 12th, 2020, 7:41 am
Moral facts and physical/material facts of science all relate to man -made frames and paradigms. There are no eternal moral facts, no eternal aesthetic facts, no eternal philosophical facts, and no eternal scientific facts that we can possibly know about. Moral facts, aesthetic facts, philosophical facts and scientific facts are all of them pro tem / working hypotheses.

Inserting "eternal" into each of those forces them into the realm of the "transcendental." I agree that talk of the "ding an sich" is vacuous, but most propositions asserting "facts" don't make any such assumption. They merely assert some state of affairs, with the implications that that state of affairs is publicly verifiable.

GE Morton wrote: ↑August 12th, 2020, 11:55 am

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑August 11th, 2020, 10:14 pm
We use the word fact in two completely different ways, to mean 'a state-of-affairs that is or was the case' or 'a description of a state-of-affairs with the truth-vakue true. And it's a mistake to confuse or conflate the two uses.

For the purposes of a philosophical discussion that distinction is idle. It is essentially Russell's distinction between "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description." But 99% of the knowledge we have, and 100% of the "facts" asserted in philosophical discussions, are knowledge by description. In those (or any) discussions we have no access to the "facts" (in your first sense) asserted; only to the propositions asserting them.

And there's the myth of propositions at work - as it is in the JTB truth condition: S knows that p iff p is true. There's no such thing as propositional belief and knowledge. There are only beliefs and knowledge-claims expressed by means of propositions, which are nothing more than factual assertions - linguistic expressions. What we mean when we say we know something constitutes what we call knowledge - and there's no other metaphysical court of appeal. And if we communicate what we know linguitically, what we communicate is not linguistic knowledge. That idea mistakes what we say for what we know.

I use the term factual assertion to denote an assertion that claims to describe a state-of-affairs that is or was the case. If it it or was the case, the factual assertion is true, and we call it a fact. So a factual assertion may be true or false.

Well, no, with respect to the second sentence. An assertion "A" that is false is not a "factual assertion." It is only a factual assertion if it is true.

Notice 'I use the term...' I'm explaining the distinction between a factual and a non-factual assertion. The function of factual assertions is to communicate what you and Russell call knowledge by description of states-of-affairs or features of reality - what philosophers often call facts, to distinguish them from propositions.

By contrast, a non-factual assertion doesn't claim to describe a state-of-affairs that is or was the case, so it has no truth-value.

All propositions assert the existence of some state of affairs. They are "factual" if (and only if) they are true.

Again, I'm explaining a different use of 'factual', to mean 'claiming something about reality that may or may not be the case'. I do this because the term 'proposition' - apart from denoting an abstract fiction - fails to distinguish between factual assertions with truth-value and non-factual assertions, which have no truth-value. And your claim below about the supposed possible truth of a moral or aesthetic proposition demonstrates the confusion I'm trying to expose and remove.

Instead, it expresses a value-judgement about a state-of-affairs. Moral and aesthetic assertions are prominent examples.

While propositions expressing moral or aesthetic judgments commonly are mere value judgments, they need not be. They will not be if some cogent moral axiom or standard of beauty is postulated and thus establishes a context. In that case "Act X is morally wrong, " or "Painting Y lacks aesthetic merit" can be true, factual, and objective. They merely assert that X and Y do not conform to, or are inconsistent with, the postulated standard.

And here's the inevitable mistake. You think that a moral or aesthetic axiom or postulate is a claim that must be or be taken to be true - that it has a truth-value: this is the standard of goodness / beauty. But that obviously isn't a factual assertion with a truth-value. To deny it is merely to reject that standard - and perhaps posulate another standard, which will also not have a truth-value. And it follows that 'X is morally wrong' and 'Y is ugly', deduced from the postulate or axiom, are not, as you claim, 'true, factual, and objective'. What is indeed true, factual and objective is that those derived assertions are consistent with the postulate or axiom. But nothing more.

An entailment from a non-factual assertion can't be factual - and therefore a fact. And since, as you agree, a factual assertion can't entail a moral (or aesthetic) assertion - which expresses a value-judgement - the supposedly objective edifice of your sound moral theory evaporates.

Please can you provide an example of what you think is a moral fact - given that a moral assertion is one that says something is morally right or wrong? (I believe no such thing exists, which is why morality isn't and can't be objective.)

I think you've asked that before (or perhaps someone else did), and I answered.

Sure: "Slavery is morally wrong."

That proposition is true because "morally wrong" means, "inconsistent with a sound moral theory." The axiom of the moral theory to which it is referred asserts that the aim of morality is to develop principles and rules governing human interactions which enable all agents in a moral field to maximize their welfare. One rule derivable from that axiom would be one to prohibit slavery, since enslaving someone reduces his welfare. Hence "slavery is morally wrong" is true and objective.

As explained, your moral axiom isn't a factual assertion with a truth-value; it doesn't entail the moral conclusion 'slavery is morally wrong'; and that conclusion isn't, as you claim, true and objective. All that may be true and objective is its consistency with the axiom.

But of course, if you have some different notion of what "morality" means or what is its aim, then "Slavery is wrong" could be false.

It's not a factual assertion at all, so it can't be true or false, and it can't be a fact - a true factual assertion.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑August 13th, 2020, 1:27 am
And there's the myth of propositions at work - as it is in the JTB truth condition: S knows that p iff p is true.

???

"S knows that P IFF P is true" is not true per the JTB theory of knowledge (I assume you mean the "justified true belief" theory). Per that theory "S knows that P" is true IFF 1) S believes that P, and 2) S's belief that P is justified, and 3) P is true. That theory has well-known problems, as I'm sure you know.

There's no such thing as propositional belief and knowledge.

Are you dismissing Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description?

There are only beliefs and knowledge-claims expressed by means of propositions, which are nothing more than factual assertions - linguistic expressions.

Only beliefs and knowledge claims? Where/when/how does knowledge enter the picture? Perhaps you can explain your understanding of what constitutes knowledge.

Also, please explicate this "myth of propositions."

What we mean when we say we know something constitutes what we call knowledge - and there's no other metaphysical court of appeal.

Are you saying here that meanings --- presumably of true propositions -- constitute knowledge?

And if we communicate what we know linguitically, what we communicate is not linguistic knowledge. That idea mistakes what we say for what we know.

Well, I'd agree there --- I think. I would understand "linguistic knowledge" to mean knowledge of the syntax, semantics, evolution, etc., of a language or language family. But the knowledge gained via description --- which constitutes most of what we know --- is not a distinct type, or category, of knowledge. The "by description," or "linguistic," adjective merely denotes the means by which we gained it.

Notice 'I use the term...' I'm explaining the distinction between a factual and a non-factual assertion. The function of factual assertions is to communicate what you and Russell call knowledge by description of states-of-affairs or features of reality - what philosophers often call facts, to distinguish them from propositions.

The distinction between a "factual assertion" and a non-factual one is that the former is true and the latter false, or perhaps undecidable.
Yes, there is a distinction between a state of affairs and the proposition asserting it, the former being the "fact" asserted. All propositions assert some state of affairs; whether it is "factual" depends upon whether that state of affairs exists, i.e., whether the proposition is true or false.

Again, I'm explaining a different use of 'factual', to mean 'claiming something about reality that may or may not be the case'. I do this because the term 'proposition' - apart from denoting an abstract fiction - fails to distinguish between factual assertions with truth-value and non-factual assertions, which have no truth-value.

An assertion that has no truth value is not a proposition. It will only fail to have a truth value because one or more of the terms is undefined (and so how to go about confirming or disconfirming it is unknowable), or because it is ill-formed, i.e., it violates some semantic or syntactical rule. The truth value of a proposition may be indeterminate, however, if verification of the asserted state of affairs, though possible in principle, is currently impossible in practice ("There is life on Mars").

And here's the inevitable mistake. You think that a moral or aesthetic axiom or postulate is a claim that must be or be taken to be true - that it has a truth-value: this is the standard of goodness / beauty. But that obviously isn't a factual assertion with a truth-value.

Oh, no. No axiom must be taken as true, if you mean there is some logical necessity compelling it. That could only be the case if the axiom was a tautology, in which case it would be vacuous. The axiom in question merely sets forth what the term "morality" is thought (by many people) to entail, what is its aim. That it is so understood (by those people) is a "fact," and a proposition so asserting is true. So the question then becomes, "What principles, rules, further that aim?" Those answers will also have truth values; they will be "factual."

Nothing, of course, compels anyone to that understanding of "morality," or that aim in constructing one.

You also seem to misunderstand the concept of a "standard." Like axioms, propositions asserting standards are posited to be true. Hence they are. They are the "fixed point" against which something else is measured.

To deny it is merely to reject that standard - and perhaps posulate another standard, which will also not have a truth-value.

Well, standards per se, not being propositions, don't have truth values (only propositions have truth values). But propositions asserting them do --- by hypothesis.

And it follows that 'X is morally wrong' and 'Y is ugly', deduced from the postulate or axiom, are not, as you claim, 'true, factual, and objective'. What is indeed true, factual and objective is that those derived assertions are consistent with the postulate or axiom. But nothing more.

Nothing more is needed. All that is being claimed is that "X" and "Y" are inconsistent with some axiom or standard. That they are or not is a "fact;" and the propositions asserting either that they are or not are either true or false. You seem to be assuming that "X is wrong," to be true, must express some law of nature, some physical, empirically verifiable state of affairs, or perhaps some transcendental "reality." But all that it asserts is that X is or is not compatible with a certain axiom, does or does not further a certain goal. Moral "oughts" are thus instrumental "oughts," just as is, "If you wish to drive a nail, you ought to get a hammer." But of course, you won't need a hammer if you have no desire to drive a nail. Similarly with moral constraints and duties --- if you have no interest in the aim set forth in that axiom you are free to ignore them.

GE Morton wrote: ↑August 11th, 2020, 11:39 am
I'm afraid it is you who is making a fundamental mistake. It seems to derive from an eccentric conception of what constitutes a "fact."

Your last sentence above reveals the problem: you assume that what counts as a "fact" can be determined prior to knowing whether the proposition asserting it is true. That is mistaken. A "fact" is whatever is asserted by a true proposition, and whatever a true proposition asserts is a "fact." I.e., "true" and "factual" are logically equivalent . . . .

Surely he was using "fact" as a "state of affairs" and NOT as "what is asserted by a true proposition."

There are no propositions and thus no true propositions if persons never exist. But there are states of affairs if persons never exist.

When we say that "there are no moral facts" what we mean is that there are no (extramental) moral facts, in the "states of affairs" sense, where we're referring to something occurring independently of persons.

And for moral facts in the sense of "Joey's position on whether it's morally permissible to murder," "Betty's intuition that it's okay to taze your spouse if you spouse cheated on you," etc., there's no way to argue for any normative that others should follow, else they be in error.

GE Morton wrote: ↑August 12th, 2020, 12:05 pm

Belindi wrote: ↑August 12th, 2020, 7:41 am
Moral facts and physical/material facts of science all relate to man -made frames and paradigms. There are no eternal moral facts, no eternal aesthetic facts, no eternal philosophical facts, and no eternal scientific facts that we can possibly know about. Moral facts, aesthetic facts, philosophical facts and scientific facts are all of them pro tem / working hypotheses.

Inserting "eternal" into each of those forces them into the realm of the "transcendental." I agree that talk of the "ding an sich" is vacuous, but most propositions asserting "facts" don't make any such assumption. They merely assert some state of affairs, with the implications that that state of affairs is publicly verifiable.

Nothing transcends nature. I agree talk of the thing in itself is vacuous. However not every fact is publicly verifiable, as access to what seems to be the case is sometimes limited to private experience.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑August 15th, 2020, 11:42 am
Surely he was using "fact" as a "state of affairs" and NOT as "what is asserted by a true proposition."

Those are identical. States of affairs are precisely what is asserted by true propositions, nothing more or less.

There are no propositions and thus no true propositions if persons never exist. But there are states of affairs if persons never exist.

No, there aren't. A "state of affairs" is a verbal construct that attempts to convey a percept someone has had. While we may justifiably posit the existence of an external world independent of our percepts and the concepts we construct to describe it, we can say nothing about this "noumenal" realm, including what "states of affairs" might prevail within it or regarding it. The very concept of a "state of affairs," like all other concepts, depends upon humans (or perhaps other sentient creatures).

When we say that "there are no moral facts" what we mean is that there are no (extramental) moral facts, in the "states of affairs" sense, where we're referring to something occurring independently of persons.

Well, of course there can be no moral facts independent of persons, since morality has to do with interactions between persons. There would be no facts concerning, say, baseball, either, if there was no such thing as baseball. No facts concerning gravitation if there were no massive bodies, etc.

"States of affairs," BTW, are not restricted to phenomena independent of persons. "Alfie loves Annabelle," "Bruno believes the Earth is flat," "Chauncey prefers chocolate ice cream to vanilla" also assert states of affairs.

And for moral facts in the sense of "Joey's position on whether it's morally permissible to murder," "Betty's intuition that it's okay to taze your spouse if you spouse cheated on you," etc., there's no way to argue for any normative that others should follow, else they be in error.

A "moral fact" has nothing to do with anyone's "position" or intuition. It has to to do with the relationship between a moral judgment and a moral axiom. That judgment X conflicts with axiom Y is also a "fact," a state of affairs.

As I mentioned earlier to Peter, you seem to want to restrict the terms "fact" and "state of affairs," and even "reality," to physical phenomena. But that is an arbitrary restriction, and contrary to common usages of all those terms.

"There are more things in heaven and Earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

Belindi wrote: ↑August 15th, 2020, 1:32 pm
Nothing transcends nature. I agree talk of the thing in itself is vacuous. However not every fact is publicly verifiable, as access to what seems to be the case is sometimes limited to private experience.

I agree. The latter are subjective propositions. Subjective propositions may well be true. "I have a headache" can be true, a "fact," though verifiable by no one but me.

GE Morton wrote: ↑August 15th, 2020, 10:26 am

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑August 13th, 2020, 1:27 am
And there's the myth of propositions at work - as it is in the JTB truth condition: S knows that p iff p is true.

???

"S knows that P IFF P is true" is not true per the JTB theory of knowledge (I assume you mean the "justified true belief" theory). Per that theory "S knows that P" is true IFF 1) S believes that P, and 2) S's belief that P is justified, and 3) P is true. That theory has well-known problems, as I'm sure you know.

There's no such thing as propositional belief and knowledge.

Are you dismissing Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description?

There are only beliefs and knowledge-claims expressed by means of propositions, which are nothing more than factual assertions - linguistic expressions.

Only beliefs and knowledge claims? Where/when/how does knowledge enter the picture? Perhaps you can explain your understanding of what constitutes knowledge.

Also, please explicate this "myth of propositions."

What we mean when we say we know something constitutes what we call knowledge - and there's no other metaphysical court of appeal.

Are you saying here that meanings --- presumably of true propositions -- constitute knowledge?

And if we communicate what we know linguitically, what we communicate is not linguistic knowledge. That idea mistakes what we say for what we know.

Well, I'd agree there --- I think. I would understand "linguistic knowledge" to mean knowledge of the syntax, semantics, evolution, etc., of a language or language family. But the knowledge gained via description --- which constitutes most of what we know --- is not a distinct type, or category, of knowledge. The "by description," or "linguistic," adjective merely denotes the means by which we gained it.

Notice 'I use the term...' I'm explaining the distinction between a factual and a non-factual assertion. The function of factual assertions is to communicate what you and Russell call knowledge by description of states-of-affairs or features of reality - what philosophers often call facts, to distinguish them from propositions.

The distinction between a "factual assertion" and a non-factual one is that the former is true and the latter false, or perhaps undecidable.
Yes, there is a distinction between a state of affairs and the proposition asserting it, the former being the "fact" asserted. All propositions assert some state of affairs; whether it is "factual" depends upon whether that state of affairs exists, i.e., whether the proposition is true or false.

Again, I'm explaining a different use of 'factual', to mean 'claiming something about reality that may or may not be the case'. I do this because the term 'proposition' - apart from denoting an abstract fiction - fails to distinguish between factual assertions with truth-value and non-factual assertions, which have no truth-value.

An assertion that has no truth value is not a proposition. It will only fail to have a truth value because one or more of the terms is undefined (and so how to go about confirming or disconfirming it is unknowable), or because it is ill-formed, i.e., it violates some semantic or syntactical rule. The truth value of a proposition may be indeterminate, however, if verification of the asserted state of affairs, though possible in principle, is currently impossible in practice ("There is life on Mars").

And here's the inevitable mistake. You think that a moral or aesthetic axiom or postulate is a claim that must be or be taken to be true - that it has a truth-value: this is the standard of goodness / beauty. But that obviously isn't a factual assertion with a truth-value.

Oh, no. No axiom must be taken as true, if you mean there is some logical necessity compelling it. That could only be the case if the axiom was a tautology, in which case it would be vacuous. The axiom in question merely sets forth what the term "morality" is thought (by many people) to entail, what is its aim. That it is so understood (by those people) is a "fact," and a proposition so asserting is true. So the question then becomes, "What principles, rules, further that aim?" Those answers will also have truth values; they will be "factual."

Nothing, of course, compels anyone to that understanding of "morality," or that aim in constructing one.

You also seem to misunderstand the concept of a "standard." Like axioms, propositions asserting standards are posited to be true. Hence they are. They are the "fixed point" against which something else is measured.

To deny it is merely to reject that standard - and perhaps posulate another standard, which will also not have a truth-value.

Well, standards per se, not being propositions, don't have truth values (only propositions have truth values). But propositions asserting them do --- by hypothesis.

And it follows that 'X is morally wrong' and 'Y is ugly', deduced from the postulate or axiom, are not, as you claim, 'true, factual, and objective'. What is indeed true, factual and objective is that those derived assertions are consistent with the postulate or axiom. But nothing more.

Nothing more is needed. All that is being claimed is that "X" and "Y" are inconsistent with some axiom or standard. That they are or not is a "fact;" and the propositions asserting either that they are or not are either true or false. You seem to be assuming that "X is wrong," to be true, must express some law of nature, some physical, empirically verifiable state of affairs, or perhaps some transcendental "reality." But all that it asserts is that X is or is not compatible with a certain axiom, does or does not further a certain goal. Moral "oughts" are thus instrumental "oughts," just as is, "If you wish to drive a nail, you ought to get a hammer." But of course, you won't need a hammer if you have no desire to drive a nail. Similarly with moral constraints and duties --- if you have no interest in the aim set forth in that axiom you are free to ignore them.

I've just managed to lose a detailed response to this. If I have time, I'll do it all again. But I think we've rehearsed much of it before.

As for the myth of propositions, I think that comes under the myth of abstract things. And here's something I posted elsewhere that may explain what I mean by that.

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

What's the definition of morality?' looks like a reasonable question.

But we use the word definition and its cognates in different ways. To define a word, such as morality, is to explain how we use it or could use it. But by contrast, to define a thing is to describe it, which is a radically different linguistic operation. Question: is a definition of morality an explanation of how we use or could use the word; or is it a description of a thing?

Next question: is what we call morality a thing of some kind, with properties, that can therefore be described? If it is a thing of some kind, then it certainly isn't a real thing like a dog or a tree. So is it an abstract thing? If so, is an abstract thing a thing that exists in some way or other, and does it have properties that can be described, using factual assertions with truth-value, in the way a dog or a tree can be described?

The myth of abstract things runs deep and strong through the history of philosophy. But it's an ancient metaphysical delusion. An abstract noun, such as morality is not the name of a thing of some kind that exists somewhere, somehow, and that therefore has properties that can be described. Or, to be more cautious, pending evidence for the existence of abstract things, belief that they exist is irrational. (The dodge-claim that abstract things are concepts in minds - more abstract things - doesn't fix the problem.)

And since a definition of morality isn't a description of a thing - a kind of thing that may or may not exist, and that has properties - then it can only be an explanation of how we use the word morality and its cognates and related words. And this applies to all the important abstract nouns that philosophy deals with: truth, knowledge, identity, causation, beauty, and so on.

'What's the definition of morality?' looks like a reasonable question. But misunderstanding it takes us straight down a rabbit hole.

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

As I understand it, you think a thing exists if it helps us explain or describe a feature of our experience - so you think abstract things such as propositions exist. I reject that position as a form of anthropocentric idealism. And unless its use of 'thing' and 'exist' is explained, it equivocates on those words as applied to abstract things. But we'll never agree about this.

Since propositions are nothing more than assertions - typically linguistic expressions, which are real - then, applying Occam's razor, to the bonfire with propositions. Huzzah.

GE Morton wrote: ↑August 15th, 2020, 2:07 pm Those are identical.

They're not identical. I said why immediately after this.

we can say nothing about this "noumenal" realm, including what "states of affairs" might prevail within it or regarding it.

First off, us saying something about it is not the same as it. That's just the point (that completely flew over your head).

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑August 15th, 2020, 4:18 pm

GE Morton wrote: ↑August 15th, 2020, 2:07 pm Those are identical.

They're not identical. I said why immediately after this.

And I rebutted your "why" immediately after that. Did it fly over your head?

we can say nothing about this "noumenal" realm, including what "states of affairs" might prevail within it or regarding it.

First off, us saying something about it is not the same as it. That's just the point (that completely flew over your head).

All we can know of "how it is" is what we can perceive. Are you claiming we cannot accurately describe what we perceive?

PS: You're not merely claiming the trivial truth that a proposition about X is not identical with X, are you?

GE Morton wrote: ↑August 15th, 2020, 6:37 pm PS: You're not merely claiming the trivial truth that a proposition about X is not identical with X, are you?

But here's what you said earlier.

Terrapin Station wrote: Surely he was using "fact" as a "state of affairs" and NOT as "what is asserted by a true proposition."

GEM repied: Those are identical. States of affairs are precisely what is asserted by true propositions, nothing more or less.

So to clarify, do you think a state-of-affairs is identical to what is asserted by a true proposition - or not?

Do you conflate what we say about things with the way things are? If so, that's an obvious mistake.

We seem to be bogged down in epistemology and ontology again. So I feel the need to rewind and try to clarify the lines of our disagreement. My argument is this.

A moral assertion, such as 'slavery is wrong', expresses a value-judgement about slavery. It doesn't make a factual claim with a truth-value, which is why it isn't false to say 'slavery is not morally wrong' - as did most of our ancestors until very recently. Nothing in reaity can verify or falsify either of those moral assertions, precisely because they don't have truth-value. No moral assertion has truth-value - we just either accept or reject it - so no moral assertion can be a fact - in the sense of 'true factual assertion'. And since objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts, no facts means no objectivity.

As I understand it, GEM's argument is this.

A moral assertion, such as 'slavery is wrong', can be true if it is consistent with an axiom, postulate or goal, such as 'promote the well-being of everyone equally' - and that in this way morality is or can be objective. He says the moral 'ought' is merely instrumental: if we want to promote the well-being of everyone equally, then we ought not to enslave anyone. And since consistency with an axiom is verifiable, factual assertions about consistency have truth-value and can be facts - true factual assertions. So again, since objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts, in this way morality is or can objective. The choice of axiom is subjective, but what follows can be objective.

Before I set out my counter-argument, does anyone have any thoughts - particuarly GEM, obviously? Anything to tweak, correct or add?