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Sorry. 'But a correspondence theory of truth...'

GE Morton wrote: ↑April 7th, 2020, 10:10 am

Belindi wrote: ↑April 7th, 2020, 3:48 am Proof ' properly ' belongs with analytic proof but not with synthetic, empirical proof.

What makes the former "proper" and the latter (presumably) improper? Both are commonplace uses, equally legitimate.

Can GE Morton give an example of any potentially real life situation where it's not immediately obvious whether the context is either Euclidean or diagnostic?

I don't understand the point of the question, Belindi. Are you asking for an example wherein it is not clear whether an alleged "proof" is analytical or empirical?

Yes indeed.I challenge you to give such a real life, everyday, example.

With regards to your first question, you removed from its context what I actually wrote . I actually had written both are legitimate, and the social context makes it obvious which usage is appropriate.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑April 8th, 2020, 1:49 am But a correspondence theory of truth (relevant to factual assertions) depends on the supposed correspondence of terms with named things. There's no correspondence between the words 'snow' and 'white' and what we call snow and white(ness), so there can be no correspondence between the assertion 'snow is white' and the state-of-affairs that it asserts. Correspondence theories are attractively simple - and wrong.

This is something I've repeatedly pointed out in different words to General Electric Morton regarding his semantics (his theory of meaning). But it's not a problem for correspondence if you don't attempt that flawed theory of meaning. The correspondence in question is between the meaning an individual assigns (as the proposition) and the state(s) of affairs as perceived from an individual's spatio-temporal situatedness.

There's no way to avoid something like the above in theories of truth, because we are necessarily talking about the relation of a proposition to something else. So we can't avoid dealing with the meaning an individual assigns. The differences lie in whether they're comparing the meaning they assign with states of affairs in general, or whether they're comparing it with other meanings they've assigned (for coherence theory), with what they feel "works" for them (for pragmatic theory), with what the community says is the case (for consensus theory), etc.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑April 8th, 2020, 1:49 am
But a correspondence theory of truth (relevant to factual assertions) depends on the supposed correspondence of terms with named things.

Yes, it does. But it also assumes more than that --- that there is a structural relationship between the proposition and the state of affairs it asserts. That is where the problems lie, not in the (obvious) correlation between nouns and the things they name. Nouns are verbal symbols, tokens, for things or classes of things. If there was no correlation between the symbol and the thing symbolized it would not be a symbol.

Ah, apparently you're restricting the term "property" to a narrow class of properties, similarly to the way you restrict "exists" to a narrow class of existents. Yes, it is the "is" of predication, and, yes, that dogs are the meaning of the word "dog" is a property of dogs, just as "Capital of France" is a property of Paris, "Home of the Mets" is a property of Shea Stadium, and if Bruno has a niece or nephew, "is an uncle" is a property of Bruno. Properties of things are simply those confirmable facts which can be truly predicated of them.

No, this is an elementary mistake. We call the city 'Paris', then ascribe properties to Paris, such as 'capital city of France'. So the factual assertion 'Paris is the capital city of France' is true, given the way we use those signs. But the name 'Paris' is not a property we ascribe to (predicate of) the city.

Well, I didn't say that the word "Paris" is a property of the city. However, "is called 'Paris'" IS a property of the city, just as, "is the capital of France" is a property of the city. So is, "is (one of) the meaning(s) of the word "Paris."

Calling a class of things 'dogs' doesn't predicate anything of them. Calling a colour 'yellow' doesn't describe the colour.

Yes it does, in both cases. That thing or class of things now has name, which it didn't have before. Your name, "Peter," is a property of you. It would appear on any list of properties prepared by someone asked to describe you, along with height, weight, hair & eye color, place of birth, place of residence, age, etc.

But, crucially, things don't classify and quantify themselves in categories. Linguistic denotation is one-way.

I'm not sure what you're getting at with this "two-way" "quantify themselves" business. Is it your assumption that in order for there to be a correspondence or correlation between X and Y, the relationship must exist without human involvement, or something along those lines? Please clarify this point.

A name no more corresponds with what it names than an arrow corresponds with its target. There is no 'relationship'.

There is no relationship between a fired arrow and its target? Do you think the archer would agree with that?

Belindi wrote: ↑April 8th, 2020, 2:56 am

GE Morton wrote: ↑April 7th, 2020, 10:10 am

What makes the former "proper" and the latter (presumably) improper? Both are commonplace uses, equally legitimate.



I don't understand the point of the question, Belindi. Are you asking for an example wherein it is not clear whether an alleged "proof" is analytical or empirical?

Yes indeed.I challenge you to give such a real life, everyday, example.

I can't think of any. But I haven't given it much thought, because I don't see the point of the question.

With regards to your first question, you removed from its context what I actually wrote . I actually had written both are legitimate, and the social context makes it obvious which usage is appropriate.

Then why the word "properly"?

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑April 8th, 2020, 8:41 am The correspondence in question is between the meaning an individual assigns (as the proposition) and the state(s) of affairs as perceived from an individual's spatio-temporal situatedness.

Er, no, TS. The correspondence is between the word and the class of things it denotes, as understood in a given speech community. If an individual "assigns" some different meaning, whatever may be his " spatio-temporal situatedness," he either does not understand the meaning of that word or is intentionally misusing it.

GE Morton wrote: ↑April 8th, 2020, 11:42 am

Belindi wrote: ↑April 8th, 2020, 2:56 am

Yes indeed.I challenge you to give such a real life, everyday, example.

I can't think of any. But I haven't given it much thought, because I don't see the point of the question.

With regards to your first question, you removed from its context what I actually wrote . I actually had written both are legitimate, and the social context makes it obvious which usage is appropriate.

Then why the word "properly"?

Of course you cannot think of any !

Why did I use the word 'properly' ? Not to confuse you .

GE Morton wrote: ↑April 8th, 2020, 11:49 am Er, no, TS. The correspondence is between the word and the class of things it denotes, as understood in a given speech community.

"As understood"--understanding is a mental state. Only individuals have mental states.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑April 8th, 2020, 7:20 pm

GE Morton wrote: ↑April 8th, 2020, 11:49 am Er, no, TS. The correspondence is between the word and the class of things it denotes, as understood in a given speech community.

"As understood"--understanding is a mental state. Only individuals have mental states.

*Sigh*. Yes, it is. That they understand the meaning is an inference, based on their observable behavior. An explanatory construct. That inference is not necessary to ascertain the meaning of a word. The behavior alone is sufficient.

GE Morton wrote: ↑April 8th, 2020, 7:39 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑April 8th, 2020, 7:20 pm

"As understood"--understanding is a mental state. Only individuals have mental states.

*Sigh*. Yes, it is. That they understand the meaning is an inference, based on their observable behavior. An explanatory construct. That inference is not necessary to ascertain the meaning of a word. The behavior alone is sufficient.

. . . As you forget that we were talking about correspondence, not meaning.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑April 8th, 2020, 8:06 pm

GE Morton wrote: ↑April 8th, 2020, 7:39 pm

*Sigh*. Yes, it is. That they understand the meaning is an inference, based on their observable behavior. An explanatory construct. That inference is not necessary to ascertain the meaning of a word. The behavior alone is sufficient.

. . . As you forget that we were talking about correspondence, not meaning.

Yes, we were, TP. We were talking about the correspondence of words with things, or classes of things. I.e., their meanings. And you're still confusing understanding, or knowing, a meaning (a mental process) with the meaning (a non-mental fact established behaviorally).

GE Morton wrote: ↑April 8th, 2020, 11:38 am

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑April 8th, 2020, 1:49 am
But a correspondence theory of truth (relevant to factual assertions) depends on the supposed correspondence of terms with named things.

Yes, it does. But it also assumes more than that --- that there is a structural relationship between the proposition and the state of affairs it asserts. That is where the problems lie, not in the (obvious) correlation between nouns and the things they name. Nouns are verbal symbols, tokens, for things or classes of things. If there was no correlation between the symbol and the thing symbolized it would not be a symbol.

1 It's precisely the assumption of a structural relationship between a factual assertion and a state-of-affairs that undermines the claim of correspondence.
2 Please explain the supposedly obvious corespondence between the word 'snow' and the stuff we call snow. Please explain the supposed agreement, similarity, harmony, close connection or equivalence between those two things. (These are dictionary 'equivalents' for the word 'correspondence'.)

No, this is an elementary mistake. We call the city 'Paris', then ascribe properties to Paris, such as 'capital city of France'. So the factual assertion 'Paris is the capital city of France' is true, given the way we use those signs. But the name 'Paris' is not a property we ascribe to (predicate of) the city.

Well, I didn't say that the word "Paris" is a property of the city. However, "is called 'Paris'" IS a property of the city, just as, "is the capital of France" is a property of the city. So is, "is (one of) the meaning(s) of the word "Paris."

Once again, this is conflating and confusing two completely different things. A property is a feature of reality, not the predicate of a declarative clause, such as 'is called Paris'. To repeat: a thing's name is not a property of that thing.

Calling a class of things 'dogs' doesn't predicate anything of them. Calling a colour 'yellow' doesn't describe the colour.

Yes it does, in both cases. That thing or class of things now has name, which it didn't have before. Your name, "Peter," is a property of you. It would appear on any list of properties prepared by someone asked to describe you, along with height, weight, hair & eye color, place of birth, place of residence, age, etc.

Nope, you misunderstand the meaning of 'property' and 'predicate' (noun) and 'predicate' (verb) in this context. Naming and describing are completely separate and different linguistic operations. The name 'Peter' doesn't describe me in any way whatsoever. The predicate 'is bored with this elementary nonsense' does describe me.

But, crucially, things don't classify and quantify themselves in categories. Linguistic denotation is one-way.

I'm not sure what you're getting at with this "two-way" "quantify themselves" business. Is it your assumption that in order for there to be a correspondence or correlation between X and Y, the relationship must exist without human involvement, or something along those lines? Please clarify this point.

Your misunderstanding - and the mistake of correpondence theories - is that there are two sets of things with a one (or more)-to-one relationship between them, so that the linguistic operation of naming is a simple (what you call 'obvious') matter of hooking up elements in one set with one (or sometimes more than one) element in the other set. The delusion is that features of reality organise themselves in the way that we organise (identify, categorise, name and describe) them using language.

A name no more corresponds with what it names than an arrow corresponds with its target. There is no 'relationship'.

There is no relationship between a fired arrow and its target? Do you think the archer would agree with that?

Think about it. Does an arrow identify, define and delimit its own target? Does a name identify, define and delimit what it names? This delusion - mistaking what we say about things for the way things are - the myth of propositions - runs very deep - for many of us for most of the time, too deep to recognise and neutralise. You're not alone.

GE Morton wrote: ↑April 8th, 2020, 8:31 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑April 8th, 2020, 8:06 pm

. . . As you forget that we were talking about correspondence, not meaning.

Yes, we were, TP. We were talking about the correspondence of words with things, or classes of things. I.e., their meanings. And you're still confusing understanding, or knowing, a meaning (a mental process) with the meaning (a non-mental fact established behaviorally).

We were talking about the correspondence theory of truth. That can't be the same thing as meaning, because the correspondence theory of truth is about the relationship between propositions and states of affairs. Propositions ARE meanings (they're the meanings of declarative sentences). So you're wanting to say that the correspondence theory of truth is about the meaning of meaning and states of affairs? (In other words, you're wanting to say that the relationship in question between meaning and states of affairs is meaning?)

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑April 9th, 2020, 6:15 am
2 Please explain the supposedly obvious corespondence between the word 'snow' and the stuff we call snow. Please explain the supposed agreement, similarity, harmony, close connection or equivalence between those two things. (These are dictionary 'equivalents' for the word 'correspondence'.)

Well, first, those words are not equivalents (synonyms) of "correspondence," though one or more of them can be substituted for it in certain contexts. The relevant sense of "correspond" here is correlation:

"Definition of correlate (intransitive verb):

"1a: to bear reciprocal or mutual relations : CORRESPOND
"If two things correlate, a change in one thing results in a similar or opposite change in the other thing.

"(transitive verb):

"1a: to establish a mutual or reciprocal relation between"

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/correlate

In the case of "snow," the correlation consists in the fact that that word is used to denote that "stuff" in English-speaking speech communities. It does not entail that there is any similarity, equivalence, etc., between the word and the things it denotes.

Well, I didn't say that the word "Paris" is a property of the city. However, "is called 'Paris'" IS a property of the city, just as, "is the capital of France" is a property of the city. So is, "is (one of) the meaning(s) of the word "Paris."

Once again, this is conflating and confusing two completely different things. A property is a feature of reality, not the predicate of a declarative clause, such as 'is called Paris'. To repeat: a thing's name is not a property of that thing.

I can't believe this is so hard to get across. I just agreed that a word, a name, is not a property of a thing. What IS a property of a thing is the fact that a particular city is called "Paris" in some speech community. That is an empirical, verifiable, "feature of reality" --- as real as that the city is the capital of France. So I assume you are still restricting the word "property" to some narrow class of attributes predicable of things. That restriction is arbitrary and inconsistent with common uses and understandings of that term. That Alfie is married is a property of Alfie; that he was born in Sweden is a property of Alfie; that he is a philosophy professor is a property of Alfie; that he was named "Alfie" by his parents and is called "Alfie" in a certain speech community are properties of Alfie.

I assume that narrow class of attributes you're willing to call "properties" are the physical properties of a thing --- Alfie's height, weight, hair and eye color, etc. Surely you realize how incomplete and uninformative such a limited description of Alfie would be.

Nope, you misunderstand the meaning of 'property' and 'predicate' (noun) and 'predicate' (verb) in this context. Naming and describing are completely separate and different linguistic operations.

They are different, but not completely separate. Whenever you name something you add something to its description. You add a new property.

"We have a new puppy. We got him from the pound. He is a Spaniel-Schnauzer mix, brown and white, with floppy Spaniel ears and a short, wiry Schnauzer coat. We've named him Rosco."

His name is now one of his properties, just like his former home, his ears, color, etc.

The name 'Peter' doesn't describe me in any way whatsoever.

What!? Of course it does. It is very likely the most definitive, widely relied-upon property used for identifying you. Someone trying to find you will not be looking for people with a certain height and weight. They will look up your name in the phone book.

You need to forget all the metaphyical/ontological nonsense surrounding the concept of a "property." A property of a thing is simply any confirmable fact about or observable feature of a thing that helps us identify a thing and distinguish it from other things. There are, to be sure, different classes or categories of properties, such as "local" and "non-local." Local properties are those that can be determined by observing the thing; non-local properties require confirmation of some fact beyond the thing. "Alfie is bald" is an example of the former; "Alfie is Swedish" is an example of the latter.

Your misunderstanding - and the mistake of correpondence theories - is that there are two sets of things with a one (or more)-to-one relationship between them, so that the linguistic operation of naming is a simple (what you call 'obvious') matter of hooking up elements in one set with one (or sometimes more than one) element in the other set. The delusion is that features of reality organise themselves in the way that we organise (identify, categorise, name and describe) them using language.

Are you claiming that there is not a 1-to-1 correspondence between the word "dog" and the set of domestic canines? And of course "features of reality" don't "organize themselves" into sets or classes or categories. Organizing "reality" is something WE do, in order to understand it and communicate about it. Where did I ever claim that reality "organizes itself"? Are you claiming that in order for there to be a correspondence between two (or more) sets or things, they must somehow "organize themselves"?

I'm still not sure what you're getting at with that "two-way" "quantify themselves" business.

There is no relationship between a fired arrow and its target? Do you think the archer would agree with that?

Think about it. Does an arrow identify, define and delimit its own target? Does a name identify, define and delimit what it names? This delusion - mistaking what we say about things for the way things are - the myth of propositions - runs very deep - for many of us for most of the time, too deep to recognise and neutralise. You're not alone.

No, the arrow does not choose its target. Why do you think that is necessary? The "way things are" (in that case) is that the archer has chosen a target for the arrow. That is what establishes a relationship, a correlation or correspondence, between the arrow and the target. The mistake here is your supposition that what we say about things or how we interact with things is not part of "reality." They are not only features of "reality," they define it.

GE Morton wrote: ↑April 9th, 2020, 8:19 pm

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑April 9th, 2020, 6:15 am
2 Please explain the supposedly obvious corespondence between the word 'snow' and the stuff we call snow. Please explain the supposed agreement, similarity, harmony, close connection or equivalence between those two things. (These are dictionary 'equivalents' for the word 'correspondence'.)

Well, first, those words are not equivalents (synonyms) of "correspondence," though one or more of them can be substituted for it in certain contexts. The relevant sense of "correspond" here is correlation:

"Definition of correlate (intransitive verb):

"1a: to bear reciprocal or mutual relations : CORRESPOND
"If two things correlate, a change in one thing results in a similar or opposite change in the other thing.

Again, please explain how this applies to the supposed correspondence between the word 'snow' and the stuff we call snow. What 'similar or opposite change' would occur in the one or the other?

"(transitive verb):

"1a: to establish a mutual or reciprocal relation between"

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/correlate

Where is the mutuality or reciprocity between the word 'snow' and the stuff we call snow? This is merely to repeat the claim.

In the case of "snow," the correlation consists in the fact that that word is used to denote that "stuff" in English-speaking speech communities. It does not entail that there is any similarity, equivalence, etc., between the word and the things it denotes.

So you agree there's no similarity, connection, harmony, equivalence - or, I assume, mutuality or reciprocity - in a word, correspondence - between the word 'snow' and the stuff we call snow. And you think 'correlation' nails it. Oh-kay.

Once again, this is conflating and confusing two completely different things. A property is a feature of reality, not the predicate of a declarative clause, such as 'is called Paris'. To repeat: a thing's name is not a property of that thing.

I can't believe this is so hard to get across. I just agreed that a word, a name, is not a property of a thing. What IS a property of a thing is the fact that a particular city is called "Paris" in some speech community. That is an empirical, verifiable, "feature of reality" --- as real as that the city is the capital of France. So I assume you are still restricting the word "property" to some narrow class of attributes predicable of things. That restriction is arbitrary and inconsistent with common uses and understandings of that term. That Alfie is married is a property of Alfie; that he was born in Sweden is a property of Alfie; that he is a philosophy professor is a property of Alfie; that he was named "Alfie" by his parents and is called "Alfie" in a certain speech community are properties of Alfie.

I assume that narrow class of attributes you're willing to call "properties" are the physical properties of a thing --- Alfie's height, weight, hair and eye color, etc. Surely you realize how incomplete and uninformative such a limited description of Alfie would be.

Nope, you misunderstand the meaning of 'property' and 'predicate' (noun) and 'predicate' (verb) in this context. Naming and describing are completely separate and different linguistic operations.

They are different, but not completely separate. Whenever you name something you add something to its description. You add a new property.

Ah, a moment of clarity? In what way is naming different from describing? Could it be that we decribe things (predicate things of them) by using names of other things? For example, we may describe dogs by saying 'dogs are quadrupeds'. And we don't describe dogs by saying 'we call those things dogs'. Q What are these strange things I'm about to see? A We call them dogs. Q And what are dogs? Can you describe them for me, so I'll recognise them? A Well, one way to recognise them is that we call them dogs. (Thanks.)

"We have a new puppy. We got him from the pound. He is a Spaniel-Schnauzer mix, brown and white, with floppy Spaniel ears and a short, wiry Schnauzer coat. We've named him Rosco."

His name is now one of his properties, just like his former home, his ears, color, etc.

But you just wrote ' a word, a name, is not a property of a thing'. You seem confused.

List Rosco's properties. Well, for one thing, we call him Rosco. (One property of dogs is that we call them dogs.) (Dogs are mammalian quadrupeds with non-retractile claws and are called dogs.) (Are you joking?)

The name 'Peter' doesn't describe me in any way whatsoever.

What!? Of course it does. It is very likely the most definitive, widely relied-upon property used for identifying you. Someone trying to find you will not be looking for people with a certain height and weight. They will look up your name in the phone book.

In a line up of all the Peters, in what way would the name Peter describe or help to identify me? Do the names in the phone book describe the people named? If I changed my name by deed poll to David, what would be the correlative or corresponding change in me? (Your confusion is profound.)

You need to forget all the metaphyical/ontological nonsense surrounding the concept of a "property." A property of a thing is simply any confirmable fact about or observable feature of a thing that helps us identify a thing and distinguish it from other things. There are, to be sure, different classes or categories of properties, such as "local" and "non-local." Local properties are those that can be determined by observing the thing; non-local properties require confirmation of some fact beyond the thing. "Alfie is bald" is an example of the former; "Alfie is Swedish" is an example of the latter.

So you agree that a property is a feature of reality, not the predicate of a declarative clause. That's progress. Where we disagree is here: you think that our calling some animals 'dogs' and other animals 'cats' is picking out a property of dogs and cats that helps us to identify and distinguish them from each other, and from all the non-cats and non-dogs. And I think that's patent nonsense. You're just wrong. And I simply don't understand why you find the fact that naming is not describing so hard to grasp.

Your misunderstanding - and the mistake of correpondence theories - is that there are two sets of things with a one (or more)-to-one relationship between them, so that the linguistic operation of naming is a simple (what you call 'obvious') matter of hooking up elements in one set with one (or sometimes more than one) element in the other set. The delusion is that features of reality organise themselves in the way that we organise (identify, categorise, name and describe) them using language.

Are you claiming that there is not a 1-to-1 correspondence between the word "dog" and the set of domestic canines? And of course "features of reality" don't "organize themselves" into sets or classes or categories. Organizing "reality" is something WE do, in order to understand it and communicate about it. Where did I ever claim that reality "organizes itself"? Are you claiming that in order for there to be a correspondence between two (or more) sets or things, they must somehow "organize themselves"?

So you agree that 'the set of domestic canines' isn't self-identifying. And I assume you agree there's nothing canine about the word 'dog', or the word 'canine'. The sign doesn't, in some primitive magical way, contain the signified. That was Saussure's big mistake.

I'm still not sure what you're getting at with that "two-way" "quantify themselves" business.

Things don't identify and quantify themselves in sets - as you've agreed. There are no categories in reality, but only things that can be categorised in different ways for different purposes.

Think about it. Does an arrow identify, define and delimit its own target? Does a name identify, define and delimit what it names? This delusion - mistaking what we say about things for the way things are - the myth of propositions - runs very deep - for many of us for most of the time, too deep to recognise and neutralise. You're not alone.

No, the arrow does not choose its target. Why do you think that is necessary? The "way things are" (in that case) is that the archer has chosen a target for the arrow. That is what establishes a relationship, a correlation or correspondence, between the arrow and the target. The mistake here is your supposition that what we say about things or how we interact with things is not part of "reality." They are not only features of "reality," they define it.

Hooray. The arrow doesn't choose its own target. But if there were a correspondence between the arrow and its target, the two would be united in some magical way, so that the arrow (the name) couldn't but hit that one target. It would be a 'property' of the target that the arrow must hit it. And we could check that the thing we name with the name actually is the thing we name with the name. We could check that reality conforms to the ways we talk about it.

To summarise where you're going wrong:

1 Naming is not describing. The name 'dog' doesn't describe (and isn't a property of) the things we call dogs.
2 There's no correspondence between a name and the thing(s) we name with the name - because a one-way relationship isn't a correspondence.
3 The correspondence claim - 'snow is white' is true because snow is white - is a tautology.