Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Terrapin Station]

Yes, you can ignore conventions if you wish. You can coin idiosyncratic meanings for common words if you wish, if you're unconcerned about being understood.

First off, how many times are you going to repeat that nonsense?

If Joe defines "box" as "any cloud in the sky," then we can understand Joe as long as we know that he defines "box" that way.

Are you arguing that that's not possible? If so, present the argument. If not, then stop saying that we can't understand someone if they use idiosyncratic definitions.

[GE Morton]

No. The fact that pleasure is pursued and pain avoided shows that they have positive and negative values to the pursuers and the avoiders.

Of course. If Alfie pursues X he will place some value on it. If he avoids it he will place some disvalue on it. That is how we determine the value of something to Alfie --- by observing what he pursues and avoids. But those are not "intrinsic values." They are values assigned to X by Alfie.

They do not have to be "determined", by which I assume you mean the same as "measured".

A minor point, but no, those are not the same. The first is qualitative, the second quantitative. We can determine that "Alfie values X" is true by observing whether he invests some time, money, effort pursuing X. We can determine that "The value of X to Alfie is V" is true by observing how much time, effort, etc., Alfie is willing to invest to secure X. The latter is quantitative.

These are extrinsic valuations, and extrinsic valuations which differ from intrinsic values can be mistaken. The masochist and the ascetic are simply getting it wrong.

Alfie assigns positive value to X. Bruno, an ascetic, assigns negative value to it. Why is Bruno "wrong" --- because his valuation of X doesn't agree with Alfie's?

Alfie's valuation is as "extrinsic" as Bruno's.

My position is based on empirical observation and argument. You have provided neither evidence nor argument to support yours. And stop giving me reading lists. I am not your student, and my tutor was a far better philosopher than you will ever be.

Well, the empirical facts are that for any X you name, some will place positive value on it, others negative value or no value. So, to what empirical observations are you referring? How do you determine the "intrinsic" value of X other than by observing what some valuer will give up to acquire or avoid it?

What are the public truth conditions for, "The ("intrinsic") value of X is V"?

[GE Morton]

If we've proved that P, then it can't be the case that not-P. But it's a core tenet of empirical claims, especially as scientific claims, that any claim is falsifiable. What it means for a claim to be falsifiable is that it wouldn't be impossible to change any claim that P to not-P instead--it simply requires evidence for not-P. In other words, all scientific claims are open to revision. But this can't be the case if we've proved that P. That's the whole gist of science as opposed to something like religion, where for the latter there are unfalsifiable claims that must be accepted dogmatically.

Again, you're attaching an idiosyncratic meaning to a common word --- in this case, truncating a broader meaning to a narrower one. Here is the common definition:

"PROVE (transitive verb):

"1a: to establish the existence, truth, or validity of (as by evidence or logic)."

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prove

Empirical propositions are proved via evidence. Logical or mathematical propositions are proved via deduction.

[GE Morton]

Yes, you can ignore conventions if you wish. You can coin idiosyncratic meanings for common words if you wish, if you're unconcerned about being understood.

First off, how many times are you going to repeat that nonsense?

If Joe defines "box" as "any cloud in the sky," then we can understand Joe as long as we know that he defines "box" that way.

Yes, he can. But why would he, instead of using "clouds," unless he is trying bamboozle hearers into accepting some nonsensical claims about boxes?

[Peter Holmes]

I agree with much of what you say. But this assertion - 'no empirical claim is literally provable' - seems puzzling. And that may be because I don't understand it. But anyway, here are some thoughts about it - and they relate to GEM's argument about the objectivity of moral assertions.

If by 'provable' we mean 'testable', then, of course, any empirical claim is testable, if only in principle. But that means testable against some standard for what we count as truth. And if 'provable' means 'capable of being shown to be true', then the same applies: what does it mean to say an assertion is true?

No, it doesn't refer to "testable."

If we've proved that P, then it can't be the case that not-P. But it's a core tenet of empirical claims, especially as scientific claims, that any claim is falsifiable. What it means for a claim to be falsifiable is that it wouldn't be impossible to change any claim that P to not-P instead--it simply requires evidence for not-P. In other words, all scientific claims are open to revision. But this can't be the case if we've proved that P. That's the whole gist of science as opposed to something like religion, where for the latter there are unfalsifiable claims that must be accepted dogmatically.

Okay. So just to check. Your view is that a factual assertion such as 'the earth orbits the sun' can't be proven (shown to be true), because some evidence could turn up to falsify it. Have I got that right?

[Terrapin Station]

No, it doesn't refer to "testable."

If we've proved that P, then it can't be the case that not-P. But it's a core tenet of empirical claims, especially as scientific claims, that any claim is falsifiable. What it means for a claim to be falsifiable is that it wouldn't be impossible to change any claim that P to not-P instead--it simply requires evidence for not-P. In other words, all scientific claims are open to revision. But this can't be the case if we've proved that P. That's the whole gist of science as opposed to something like religion, where for the latter there are unfalsifiable claims that must be accepted dogmatically.

Okay. So just to check. Your view is that a factual assertion such as 'the earth orbits the sun' can't be proven (shown to be true), because some evidence could turn up to falsify it. Have I got that right?

Yes, and that's a core tenet of science methodology. All scientific claims must be falsifiable, must be open to revision. If we've proved something, it can't be wrong. In science, we don't prove things, we provisionally verify them in lieu of data that falsifies them.

[Terrapin Station]

First off, how many times are you going to repeat that nonsense?

If Joe defines "box" as "any cloud in the sky," then we can understand Joe as long as we know that he defines "box" that way.

Yes, he can. But why would he, instead of using "clouds," unless he is trying bamboozle hearers into accepting some nonsensical claims about boxes?

Why someone would use an idiosyncratic definition doesn't matter at the moment. I want to make sure that we're clear that it's not the case that we can't understand someone if they're using idiosyncratic definitions. It's important to understand that so that we don't keep repeating that misinformation.

[Terrapin Station]

If we've proved that P, then it can't be the case that not-P. But it's a core tenet of empirical claims, especially as scientific claims, that any claim is falsifiable. What it means for a claim to be falsifiable is that it wouldn't be impossible to change any claim that P to not-P instead--it simply requires evidence for not-P. In other words, all scientific claims are open to revision. But this can't be the case if we've proved that P. That's the whole gist of science as opposed to something like religion, where for the latter there are unfalsifiable claims that must be accepted dogmatically.

Again, you're attaching an idiosyncratic meaning to a common word --- in this case, truncating a broader meaning to a narrower one. Here is the common definition:

"PROVE (transitive verb):

"1a: to establish the existence, truth, or validity of (as by evidence or logic)."

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prove

Empirical propositions are proved via evidence. Logical or mathematical propositions are proved via deduction.

So you'd say that in philosophy, science, logic and mathematics, any arbitrary "proof" could be wrong?

[GE Morton]

If we've proved something, it can't be wrong. In science, we don't prove things, we provisionally verify them in lieu of data that falsifies them.

It can't be wrong at the time it is proved. That doesn't imply it could not be wrong tomorrow. I can prove that it is sunny today. It it rains tomorrow I'll be able to prove that.

[GE Morton]

So you'd say that in philosophy, science, logic and mathematics, any arbitrary "proof" could be wrong?

Any "arbitrary" proof could be wrong, if the prover made a mistake in deduction or misinterpreted some evidence. But only logical proofs are unfalsifiable. Scientific proofs remain valid only as long as the facts remain unchanged.

[Terrapin Station]

If we've proved something, it can't be wrong. In science, we don't prove things, we provisionally verify them in lieu of data that falsifies them.

It can't be wrong at the time it is proved. That doesn't imply it could not be wrong tomorrow. I can prove that it is sunny today. It it rains tomorrow I'll be able to prove that.

So in 1725, you'd say that (a) there was proof that phlogiston was released during combustion, and (b) the proof that phlogiston was released during combustion couldn't be wrong. Is this correct (that this is what you'd say)?

[Karpel Tunnel]

So you'd say that in philosophy, science, logic and mathematics, any arbitrary "proof" could be wrong?

Any "arbitrary" proof could be wrong, if the prover made a mistake in deduction or misinterpreted some evidence. But only logical proofs are unfalsifiable. Scientific proofs remain valid only as long as the facts remain unchanged.

Which means they are not proofs. Conclusions, theories. Science can come up with those, not proofs, precisely because it bases its conclusions on empirical evidence which may be shown later to be outweighed by stronger evidence. It makes no sense to say that scientist A proved that X is true and then a year later scientist B proved her wrong.

Proofs take place in symbolic logic or math.

[GE Morton]

So in 1725, you'd say that (a) there was proof that phlogiston was released during combustion, and (b) the proof that phlogiston was released during combustion couldn't be wrong. Is this correct (that this is what you'd say)?

No. There was no proof that phlogiston was released. Phlogiston was a theoretical substance, not an observable one.

[GE Morton]

Any "arbitrary" proof could be wrong, if the prover made a mistake in deduction or misinterpreted some evidence. But only logical proofs are unfalsifiable. Scientific proofs remain valid only as long as the facts remain unchanged.

Which means they are not proofs. Conclusions, theories. Science can come up with those, not proofs, precisely because it bases its conclusions on empirical evidence which may be shown later to be outweighed by stronger evidence. It makes no sense to say that scientist A proved that X is true and then a year later scientist B proved her wrong.

Proofs take place in symbolic logic or math.

Well, you're making the same mistake as TP --- confounding a narrow or specialized meaning of a term with the broader, more general one. See the dictionary definition above.

[Terrapin Station]

So in 1725, you'd say that (a) there was proof that phlogiston was released during combustion, and (b) the proof that phlogiston was released during combustion couldn't be wrong. Is this correct (that this is what you'd say)?

No. There was no proof that phlogiston was released. Phlogiston was a theoretical substance, not an observable one.

Again, you just defined "proof" as "1a: to establish the existence, truth, or validity of (as by evidence or logic)," and you said that you take philosophy, science, etc. to use that same definition.

So you're saying that in the 1700s, we did nothing to establish the existence, truth, or validity of (as by evidence or logic) phlogiston?