Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[GaryLouisSmith]

Not the naive literal form of it to which you subscribe, Consul's references make that clear.

What's "the naive literal form" of Platonic realism?

As I understand these matters. Naive realism is the same as direct realism. One sees or knows the object directly without going through concepts or any kind of mental construct. It has to do with a theory of the mind. Russell, following Moore, was fighting Idealism. In order to do that he thought that he had to have direct knowledge of the world. It is that directness that is the issue.

[Felix]

GaryLouisSmith: Are they really just psychological matters as you have suggested?

Not only psychological, no, I didn't mean to imply that, but I think it plays a part.

GaryLouisSmith: I don’t see how anyone could find a meaningful explanation for anything in the Vedas. I love the Vedas and I have tried to translate a bit of them into English, but they are wild.

You'd have to know the language they were written in, Aurobindo was conversant in it and also in English, French, Latin, and Greek. Here's his book, I see there's a Kindle edition but I have the hardback edition: https://amzn.to/2ZKjlYW

GaryLouisSmith: Russell was a Platonic Realist.

Do you suppose a platonic realist could be an atheist? Are those two positions mutually exclusive?

[Consul]

As I understand these matters. Naive realism is the same as direct realism. One sees or knows the object directly without going through concepts or any kind of mental construct. It has to do with a theory of the mind. Russell, following Moore, was fighting Idealism. In order to do that he thought that he had to have direct knowledge of the world. It is that directness that is the issue.

Russell was one of the fathers of sense-data theory, which is a version of indirect (representative) perceptual realism: The direct/immediate objects of perception are mental objects called sense-data.

"Let us give the name of 'sense-data' to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. We shall give the name 'sensation' to the experience of being immediately aware of these things. Thus, whenever we see a colour, we have a sensation of the colour, but the colour itself is a sense-datum, not a sensation."

(Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy. 1912. Reprint, Mineola, NY: Dover, 1999. p. 4)

[Consul]

What's "the naive literal form" of Platonic realism?

As I understand these matters. Naive realism is the same as direct realism.

Platonic, transcendent universals (forms, objective "ideas") are supersensible, imperceptible entities. They are intellectually apprehensible but not perceptually.

[Consul]

Do you suppose a platonic realist could be an atheist? Are those two positions mutually exclusive?

Yes. No.
Russell was a Platonic realist and an atheist!

[GaryLouisSmith]

GaryLouisSmith: Are they really just psychological matters as you have suggested?

Not only psychological, no, I didn't mean to imply that, but I think it plays a part.

GaryLouisSmith: I don’t see how anyone could find a meaningful explanation for anything in the Vedas. I love the Vedas and I have tried to translate a bit of them into English, but they are wild.

You'd have to know the language they were written in, Aurobindo was conversant in it and also in English, French, Latin, and Greek. Here's his book, I see there's a Kindle edition but I have the hardback edition: https://amzn.to/2ZKjlYW

GaryLouisSmith: Russell was a Platonic Realist.

Do you suppose a platonic realist could be an atheist? Are those two positions mutually exclusive?

I have studied Sanskrit or Vedic Sanskrit and I attempted to translate out of that. I like what I came up with, but it is far from everyday conversational English. It is more like modern poetry.

Sure, a Platonic Realist could be an atheist. Gustav Bergmann, whose philosophy I follow, was, as far as I know.

[GaryLouisSmith]

As I understand these matters. Naive realism is the same as direct realism. One sees or knows the object directly without going through concepts or any kind of mental construct. It has to do with a theory of the mind. Russell, following Moore, was fighting Idealism. In order to do that he thought that he had to have direct knowledge of the world. It is that directness that is the issue.

Russell was one of the fathers of sense-data theory, which is a version of indirect (representative) perceptual realism: The direct/immediate objects of perception are mental objects called sense-data.

"Let us give the name of 'sense-data' to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. We shall give the name 'sensation' to the experience of being immediately aware of these things. Thus, whenever we see a colour, we have a sensation of the colour, but the colour itself is a sense-datum, not a sensation."

(Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy. 1912. Reprint, Mineola, NY: Dover, 1999. p. 4)

I think you just turned Russell into an Idealist. He would turn over in his grave and scream.

[Consul]

I think you just turned Russell into an Idealist.

No, I didn't, since indirect (representative) realism is different from idealism/phenomenalism.

"In this book I argue that the correct philosophical theory of perception is a representative one. By such a theory, I mean one which holds

(i) that the immediate objects of (visual) perception are always mental;
(ii) that there are objects, variously called external, material or physical, which are independent of the existence of sentient creatures;
(iii) that these objects have only the primary qualities;
and
(iv) to (visually) perceive a material object is to be in a certain kind of perceptual state as a causal result of the action of that object.

(The restriction to visual perception – seeing – is to be understood throughout.)
With the exception of clause (ii), these clauses are defended in the chapters that follow. Clause (ii) is, however, an assumption. I assume, that is, that Idealism (Phenomenalism) is false. I take it that we are a very small part of a universe that existed millions of years before we did and will exist millions of years after we have gone."

(Jackson, Frank. Perception. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. p. 1)

[GaryLouisSmith]

I think you just turned Russell into an Idealist.

No, I didn't, since indirect (representative) realism is different from idealism/phenomenalism.

"In this book I argue that the correct philosophical theory of perception is a representative one. By such a theory, I mean one which holds

(i) that the immediate objects of (visual) perception are always mental;
(ii) that there are objects, variously called external, material or physical, which are independent of the existence of sentient creatures;
(iii) that these objects have only the primary qualities;
and
(iv) to (visually) perceive a material object is to be in a certain kind of perceptual state as a causal result of the action of that object.

(The restriction to visual perception – seeing – is to be understood throughout.)
With the exception of clause (ii), these clauses are defended in the chapters that follow. Clause (ii) is, however, an assumption. I assume, that is, that Idealism (Phenomenalism) is false. I take it that we are a very small part of a universe that existed millions of years before we did and will exist millions of years after we have gone."

(Jackson, Frank. Perception. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. p. 1)

Representative realism is pretend realism.

[Consul]

Representative realism is pretend realism.

It is (really) ontologically realistic about nonmental/physical entities; but assuming it's true, the epistemological question is how we can acquire knowledge of them if we can't have direct perceptual access to them. I agree with Searle's critique:

"According to the Representative Theory, we never actually perceive objects directly; rather, we perceive sense data, and we can get knowledge about objects from these sense data because in certain respects they resemble the objects that cause them. Representation comes by way of resemblance. So, when I look at the green table, the shape and size of the table are represented in my experience, and the table really does have shape and size. The resemblance between my sense data and the table itself enables me to get knowledge of the table from my experiences.
…
The decisive objection to the Representative Theory was already made by Berkeley when he said that ideas can only resemble other ideas. What he meant by that, in this context, is that the perceptual ideas that we have of an object could never resemble the object itself because the object is completely invisible and otherwise inaccessible to the senses. There is no way that the ideas we can perceive can resemble (or look like, or be visibly similar to) actual features of objects because the objects, by definition, are inaccessible to our senses. It is as if I said there were two cars in my garage that look exactly alike, except that one is totally invisible. The notion of 'looking like' presupposes that both are visible, and on the Representative Theory one of them is not. Why does this matter? Because the form of representation in question requires resemblance. We are to think of the ideas as like pictures of the objects, but the picturing relation makes no sense if the object pictured is invisible. I think this is a decisive refutation of the Representative Theory, and I have never been able to take the theory seriously."

(Searle, John R. Seeing Things As They Are: A Theory of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. pp. 225-6)

[GaryLouisSmith]

Representative realism is pretend realism.

It is (really) ontologically realistic about nonmental/physical entities; but assuming it's true, the epistemological question is how we can acquire knowledge of them if we can't have direct perceptual access to them. I agree with Searle's critique:

"According to the Representative Theory, we never actually perceive objects directly; rather, we perceive sense data, and we can get knowledge about objects from these sense data because in certain respects they resemble the objects that cause them. Representation comes by way of resemblance. So, when I look at the green table, the shape and size of the table are represented in my experience, and the table really does have shape and size. The resemblance between my sense data and the table itself enables me to get knowledge of the table from my experiences.
…
The decisive objection to the Representative Theory was already made by Berkeley when he said that ideas can only resemble other ideas. What he meant by that, in this context, is that the perceptual ideas that we have of an object could never resemble the object itself because the object is completely invisible and otherwise inaccessible to the senses. There is no way that the ideas we can perceive can resemble (or look like, or be visibly similar to) actual features of objects because the objects, by definition, are inaccessible to our senses. It is as if I said there were two cars in my garage that look exactly alike, except that one is totally invisible. The notion of 'looking like' presupposes that both are visible, and on the Representative Theory one of them is not. Why does this matter? Because the form of representation in question requires resemblance. We are to think of the ideas as like pictures of the objects, but the picturing relation makes no sense if the object pictured is invisible. I think this is a decisive refutation of the Representative Theory, and I have never been able to take the theory seriously."

(Searle, John R. Seeing Things As They Are: A Theory of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. pp. 225-6)

Why are you against the idea of seeing/perceiving/knowing the object directly without going through representatives?

[Consul]

[Representative realism] is (really) ontologically realistic about nonmental/physical entities; but assuming it's true, the epistemological question is how we can acquire knowledge of them if we can't have direct perceptual access to them.

We certainly don't have direct perceptual access to nonmental/physical reality in the sense that our perceptions don't involve any sensations. They do, but sensations as the experiential contents of perception are not its intentional objects but its (transparent) medium. In this respect, sensory perception is not immediate; but it's immediate in the sense that "we do not first have to perceive something else by way of which we perceive the real world" (Searle, Seeing Things As They Are, 15). That is, we perceive things by means of sensations (sensory appearances/impressions), but we don't perceive things indirectly by directly perceiving our sensations. For example, the having of a (veridical) visual sensation is a seeing of something, and "you cannot perceive the visual experience because it is the perceiving. It is not an interface, it is the perceiving itself." (Searle, Seeing Things As They Are, 187)

[GaryLouisSmith]

[Representative realism] is (really) ontologically realistic about nonmental/physical entities; but assuming it's true, the epistemological question is how we can acquire knowledge of them if we can't have direct perceptual access to them.

We certainly don't have direct perceptual access to nonmental/physical reality in the sense that our perceptions don't involve any sensations. They do, but sensations as the experiential contents of perception are not its intentional objects but its (transparent) medium.

As I see it we DO have direct perceptual access to nonmental/physical reality. Why not? Of course that would mean that I believe that minds exist and they aren't just a function of the brain. But you knew that already.

[Consul]

Why are you against the idea of seeing/perceiving/knowing the object directly without going through representatives?

I'm not, because I reject representative realism. As Searle stresses, sensory perception is presentational rather than representational. It perceptually presents nonmental/physical things to the subject without any representational intermediaries such as sense-data (conceived as mental objects). However, this doesn't mean that there is no experiential medium involved, through which the objects of perception are presented to the subject. There certainly is, viz. sensations. Obviously, they are the experiential medium of sensory perception: To sensorily perceive something is to experience a sensation functioning as a sensory appearance/impression of it. Note that to perceive something by sensing an appearance/impression of it is not to perceive its sensory appearance/impression but it itself!

[Consul]

As I see it we DO have direct perceptual access to nonmental/physical reality. Why not? Of course that would mean that I believe that minds exist and they aren't just a function of the brain. But you knew that already.

Are you still talking about sensory perception, or about "intellectual perception" aka rational intuition?

"The aim of this book is to elaborate and defend a view of intuition according to which it is a form of intellectual perception. The rough idea is this: while sensory perceptions are experiences that purport to, and sometimes do, reveal how matters stand in concrete reality by making us sensorily aware of that reality, intuitions are experiences that purport to, and sometimes do, reveal how matters stand in abstract reality by making us intuitively aware of that reality."

(Chudnoff, Elijah. Intuition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. p. 1)