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[psyreporter]

I completely agree. My point is that moral 'stances' - judgements or values can't be factually correct or incorrect - the case or not - which is why morality isn't and can't be objective.

I believe that for objectivity to be applicable to a moral principle or value, it should hold universally. Morality is a group term (a category) with a broad spectrum that touches the human on many diverse levels.

A basis of respect for others - including plants and animals - may be obtainable with an objective moral principle. A mere switch of the mind to "what could be" (the unknown future) could give rise to a base level of care for the other. It can be objective because the future, while undefinable, cannot be denied. The objectivity of such a (core) principle could follow from its universality and irrefutability.

[Peter Holmes]

I completely agree. My point is that moral 'stances' - judgements or values can't be factually correct or incorrect - the case or not - which is why morality isn't and can't be objective.

I believe that for objectivity to be applicable to a moral principle or value, it should hold universally. Morality is a group term (a category) with a broad spectrum that touches the human on many diverse levels.

A basis of respect for others - including plants and animals - may be obtainable with an objective moral principle. A mere switch of the mind to "what could be" (the unknown future) could give rise to a base level of care for the other. It can be objective because the future, while undefinable, cannot be denied. The objectivity of such a (core) principle could follow from its universality and irrefutability.

The point is that 'a moral principle or value' is, by definition, something we do or can adopt as a decision - a matter of judgement - a matter of opinion. And objectivity means independence from opinion. Can you refute that defeater for moral objectivism?

It would be inconsistent to apply a moral principle or value less than universally - so universality tends to come as standard with moral values and principles. But a universally applied - or even held - moral opinion remains an opinion. It can't turn into a fact - something independent from opinion.

Your point about other species and the need to widen the scope of our moral concerns perfectly demonstrates what I'm saying. Vegans believe it's morally wrong to eat animals and their products - and they have rational arguments to justify their belief. Non-vegans don't agree, and similarly have rational arguments. And there's no moral fact of the matter that can settle the dispute - no independent feature of reality to which to appeal as conclusive' evidence' for either position. It's not a factual matter. It boils down to judgement, belief or opinion. There's no way around it.

[Terrapin Station]

It would be inconsistent to apply a moral principle or value less than universally - so universality tends to come as standard with moral values and principles.

It's only inconsistent, in the sense where it's a philosophical (or more specifically logical) problem when we're talking about both asserting and denying the same thing, in the same sense/respect, etc., so that we're not equivocating.

Different people having different moral stances, and a person having a moral stance that they don't feel applies to everyone, are not inconsistent in this sense.

They might be "inconsistent" in the sense of not being similar, or in the sense of being relatively unpredictable, but that's not a problem.

[Peter Holmes]

It would be inconsistent to apply a moral principle or value less than universally - so universality tends to come as standard with moral values and principles.

It's only inconsistent, in the sense where it's a philosophical (or more specifically logical) problem when we're talking about both asserting and denying the same thing, in the same sense/respect, etc., so that we're not equivocating.

Different people having different moral stances, and a person having a moral stance that they don't feel applies to everyone, are not inconsistent in this sense.

They might be "inconsistent" in the sense of not being similar, or in the sense of being relatively unpredictable, but that's not a problem.

What I mean is that to believe, say, slavery is morally wrong here and now, but morally acceptable in other places and times, would be inconsistent. To explain and justify the inconsistency wouldn't be to remove or nullify it.

And with some moral issues, inconsistency is unavoidable - it's part of our moral predicament. For example, many of us believe it's morally wrong to kill someone, but also think it's morally justifiable to kill in a just war or extreme self-defence - or to execute some convicted criminals.

[Terrapin Station]

What I mean is that to believe, say, slavery is morally wrong here and now, but morally acceptable in other places and times, would be inconsistent.

Right, but that's not philosophically or at least not logically inconsistent in a way that's a problem. For it to be inconsistent in a way that's a problem it has to be non-equivocated. In other words, we have to say "It's morally wrong here and now and it is not morally wrong here and now"--the same person has to say both, where both sides are about the same senses/referents of the terms, etc.

[psyreporter]

The point is that 'a moral principle or value' is, by definition, something we do or can adopt as a decision - a matter of judgement - a matter of opinion. And objectivity means independence from opinion. Can you refute that defeater for moral objectivism?

A decision or a matter of judgement does not need to imply that it is a opinion. The differentiating factor between a fact and opinion is merely a decision originating from the philosophy that resulted in the scientific method.

At some point in time a 'decision' was made to grant the result of the scientific method a status other than that of an opinion. It is merely a belief, an opinion in a way, that the result of the scientific method will remain valid over time. It is a belief in uniformitarianism (a dogma).

Despite this, I do believe that moral principles can be based on factors that can be considered (agreed on) to be irrefutable, thereby providing it with a fundament that can be called objective.

[Terrapin Station]

The point is that 'a moral principle or value' is, by definition, something we do or can adopt as a decision - a matter of judgement - a matter of opinion. And objectivity means independence from opinion. Can you refute that defeater for moral objectivism?

A decision or a matter of judgement does not need to imply that it is a opinion. The differentiating factor between a fact and opinion is merely a decision originating from the philosophy that resulted in the scientific method.

At some point in time a 'decision' was made to grant the result of the scientific method a status other than that of an opinion. It is merely a belief, an opinion in a way, that the result of the scientific method will remain valid over time. It is a belief in uniformitarianism (a dogma).

Despite this, I do believe that moral principles can be based on factors that can be considered (agreed on) to be irrefutable, thereby providing it with a fundament that can be called objective.

The fact that a (large) number of people can feel so strongly about something, in concert with each other, that they can't imagine feeling otherwise, doesn't actually make the feeling something other than a feeling. If some lone, unusual person comes along who happens to feel differently, that doesn't amount to that person getting a fact wrong. They just feel differently.

[Peter Holmes]

What I mean is that to believe, say, slavery is morally wrong here and now, but morally acceptable in other places and times, would be inconsistent.

Right, but that's not philosophically or at least not logically inconsistent in a way that's a problem. For it to be inconsistent in a way that's a problem it has to be non-equivocated. In other words, we have to say "It's morally wrong here and now and it is not morally wrong here and now"--the same person has to say both, where both sides are about the same senses/referents of the terms, etc.

I don't know what a philosophical inconsistency is. But if it exists - how can it be that a philosophical inconsistency isn't a problem? If we call it an ethical inconsistency, would it still not be a problem? I don't follow your reasoning here.

And if we're introducing logic, the claim 'slavery is wrong and slavery is not wrong' is hardly a mere inconsistency. It's a flat contradiction, breaking the identity rule and so false - unless there's an equivocation fallacy. But that claim misrepresents my argument, so it's a straw man.

These are the two claims I'm talking about:

1 Slavery is morally wrong.
2 Slavery in some places and in some periods is / was not morally wrong.

It's rejecting the second claim that makes affirming the first claim possible. To affirm both claims is certainly (and problematically) morally inconsistent, and a case could be made for it being logically contradictory as well.

[Terrapin Station]

These are the two claims I'm talking about:

1 Slavery is morally wrong.
2 Slavery in some places and in some periods is / was not morally wrong.

It's rejecting the second claim that makes affirming the first claim possible. To affirm both claims is certainly (and problematically) morally inconsistent, and a case could be made for it being logically contradictory as well.

I agree with that re those two statements, but no one who would make those two statements is really making (1) categorically, in a way that's not further qualified. They'd just not be stating all of the conditions they actually assign to it. When they state (2) they're in the process of giving more details re the qualification(s) they'd make.

"Inconsistency" refers to a logical contradiction in an academic context, including philosophy.

There are looser definitions I mentioned earlier--someone saying something dissimilar to something else they said, or saying something you don't expect them to say/do, etc. But there's no problem with someone doing something dissimilar or unpredictable.

[Terrapin Station]

Oops re screwing up the quotation mark-up.

[Peter Holmes]

I agree with that re those two statements, but no one who would make those two statements is really making (1) categorically, in a way that's not further qualified.

I doubt you have any evidence to justify that claim. But anyway, it's false, because I think slavery is morally wrong universally, without qualification.

"Inconsistency" refers to a logical contradiction in an academic context, including philosophy.

This is just wrong. The word has many different uses in different contexts.

I'm sorry, but I don't think this conversation is going anywhere. Thanks.

[Peter Holmes]

Ditto with the quote instructions.

[LuckyR]

It's only inconsistent, in the sense where it's a philosophical (or more specifically logical) problem when we're talking about both asserting and denying the same thing, in the same sense/respect, etc., so that we're not equivocating.

Different people having different moral stances, and a person having a moral stance that they don't feel applies to everyone, are not inconsistent in this sense.

They might be "inconsistent" in the sense of not being similar, or in the sense of being relatively unpredictable, but that's not a problem.

What I mean is that to believe, say, slavery is morally wrong here and now, but morally acceptable in other places and times, would be inconsistent. To explain and justify the inconsistency wouldn't be to remove or nullify it.

And with some moral issues, inconsistency is unavoidable - it's part of our moral predicament. For example, many of us believe it's morally wrong to kill someone, but also think it's morally justifiable to kill in a just war or extreme self-defence - or to execute some convicted criminals.

You are creating seeming inconsistencies through sloppy wording. For example, in your slavery example: I personally find slavery morally wrong now and also in the antebellum South, whereas slavery while currently ethically wrong, was ethically permitted in the antebellum South. In addition among plantation owners at that time, slavery was morally acceptable (I assume they would also, if asked, find slavery morally acceptable in the future ie our present). No inconsistency.

[psyreporter]

The fact that a (large) number of people can feel so strongly about something, in concert with each other, that they can't imagine feeling otherwise, doesn't actually make the feeling something other than a feeling. If some lone, unusual person comes along who happens to feel differently, that doesn't amount to that person getting a fact wrong. They just feel differently.

Do you believe that the scientific method or the belief in its irrefutability originates from a feeling?

[GE Morton]

Purpose does not need to be an intended end of a deliberate action. The essence of purpose is a result applicable to the concept "good".

Well, that is not how it is defined in any dictionary. While it is true that everyone pursuing some purpose will consider that purpose "good" --- else they would not be pursuing it --- what counts as "good" is necessarily subjective and idiosyncratic.

Does "good" need an intention?

"Good" needs a valuer. Propositions asserting that something is "good" are non-cognitive unless a valuer --- someone who deems that thing good --- is specified or at least implied. If Alfie consider X to be good, and decides to pursue it, he will have a purpose and an intention.

According to Aristotle, philosophical contemplation is the highest human virtue. Philosophical contemplation is the discovery of "good". It isn't an end by itself, it is a strive. Philosophical contemplation could be seen as serving life in the best way.

The first sentence in the Nicomachean Ethics reads, "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." That statement is perfectly correct. Thereafter Aristotle proceeds to declare specific things to be "good." But they will only be "good" if someone desires them and invests some time, effort, other resources to acquire them. And those objects of pursuit will vary from person to person.

There is no "the good." There are only goods, all relative to the plethora of interests and desires of particular valuers.