Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Consul]

There is no Theory or even Speculation about how the Conscious Experiences are in the Neurons.

They are "in the neurons" by being implemented by neural processes.

[SteveKlinko]

it's not just that. It is that Science has tried for a Hundred years to put Conscious Experience into the Neurons with Zero success. It is time to think in new ways. In my new way of thinking there is a Physical Mind (Brain) and a separate Conscious Mind. But there is a third aspect of Mind that is in between the Physical Mind and the Conscious Mind and that is the Inter Mind. The Inter Mind Connects the Physical Mind to the Conscious Mind. I call this Connectism.

The zero-success or zero-progress objection to the physicalistic approach to mind and consciousness is false; and, anyway, it immediately backfires: Is there an alternative nonphysicalistic/dualistic science of mind and consciousness which has succeeded in explaining how nonphysical (conscious) minds emerge from or are realized by physical bodies or nonphysical souls? No there isn't!

The hard problem isn't only a problem for physicalists but for dualists as well; and if the prospects for the physicalistic approach are dim, the prospects for the dualistic one are much dimmer!

QUOTE>
"Compare now what the neuroscientist can tell us about the brain, and what she can do with that knowledge, with what the dualist can tell us about spiritual substance, and what he can do with those assumptions. Can the dualist tell us anything about the internal constitution of mind-stuff? Of the nonmaterial elements that make it up? Of the nonphysical laws that govern their behavior? Of the mind's structural connections with the body? Of the manner of the mind's operations? Can he explain human capacities and pathologies in terms of its structures and defects? The fact is, the dualist can do none of these things because no detailed theory of mind-stuff has ever even be formulated. Compared to the rich resources and the explanatory successes of current materialism, dualism is not so much a theory of mind as it is an empty space waiting for a genuine theory of mind to be put in it."

(Churchland, Paul M. Matter and Consciousness. 3rd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013. p. 31)
<QUOTE

QUOTE>
"Abstract: The mind and brain sciences began with consciousness as a central concern. But for much of the 20th century, ideological and methodological concerns relegated its empirical study to the margins. Since the 1990s, studying consciousness has regained a legitimacy and momentum befitting its status as the primary feature of our mental lives. Nowadays, consciousness science encompasses a rich interdisciplinary mixture drawing together philosophical, theoretical, computational, experimental, and clinical perspectives, with neuroscience its central discipline. Researchers have learned a great deal about the neural mechanisms underlying global states of consciousness, distinctions between conscious and unconscious perception, and self-consciousness. Further progress will depend on specifying closer explanatory mappings between (first-person subjective) phenomenological descriptions and (third-person objective) descriptions of (embodied and embedded) neuronal mechanisms. Such progress will help reframe our understanding of our place in nature and accelerate clinical approaches to a wide range of psychiatric and neurological disorders."

Anil Seth: Consciousness: The last 50 years (and the next)
<QUOTE

You were the one that said that Science is already Nibbling away at the Hard Problem. That would imply that there is a Nibble of understanding of Conscious Experience. I'm just pointing out that there are no Nibbles of understanding, but it is still Zero understanding. I never said any other theory has the answer, but I did suggest that maybe we should start thinking in new ways. Insisting that Conscious Experience is in the Neurons, and that is that, is getting us nowhere. Maybe Conscious Experience has not been found to be in the Neurons, so far, because it is not in the Neurons.

[SteveKlinko]

There is no Theory or even Speculation about how the Conscious Experiences are in the Neurons.

They are "in the neurons" by being implemented by neural processes.

But there are no Theories or Chains of Logic that show Conscious Experience is in any Neural Process. What Neural Process Explains the Conscious Experience of Redness? Note that I don't mean a Neural Correlate of Conscious Experience but the actual Conscious Experience. The Hard Problem is 100% unsolved at this point in time.

[Consul]

But there are no Theories or Chains of Logic that show Conscious Experience is in any Neural Process. What Neural Process Explains the Conscious Experience of Redness? Note that I don't mean a Neural Correlate of Conscious Experience but the actual Conscious Experience. The Hard Problem is 100% unsolved at this point in time.

From the perspective of the physicalist mind-brain identity theory, it is misleading to speak of neural correlates of consciousness, because according to it experiences are (identical with) neural processes; and "you cannot correlate something with itself" (Jack Smart).
However, even if there is no ontological difference between experiences and neural processes, there is still an empirical difference between first-person perceptual (introspective) data about experiences and third-person perceptual (extrospective) data about neural processes.
Anyway:

QUOTE>
"The NCC strategy has been impressively productive over many years, delivering reams of fascinating findings, but its limitations are becoming apparent. One problem is that it is difficult, and perhaps in the end impossible, to disentangle a ‘true’ NCC from a range of potentially confounding factors, the most important of which are those neural happenings that are either prerequisites for, or consequences of, an NCC itself. In the case of binocular rivalry, brain activity that goes along with the conscious perception may also track upstream (prerequisite) processes like ‘paying attention’ and, on the downstream side, the verbal behaviour of ‘reporting’ – of saying that you see a house or a face. Although related to the flow of conscious perception, the neural mechanisms responsible for attention and verbal report – or other prerequisites and downstream consequences – should not be confused with those that are responsible for the conscious perception itself.

The deeper problem is that correlations are not explanations. We all know that mere correlation does not establish causation, but it is also true that correlation falls short of explanation. Even with increasingly ingenious experimental designs and ever more powerful brain imaging technologies, correlation by itself can never amount to explanation. From this perspective, the NCC strategy and the hard problem are natural
bedfellows. If we restrict ourselves to collecting correlations between things happening in the brain and things happening in our experience, it is no surprise that we will always suspect an explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal. But if we instead move beyond establishing correlations to discover explanations that connect properties of neural mechanisms to properties of subjective experience, as the real problem approach advocates, then this gap will narrow and might even disappear entirely. When we are able to predict (and explain, and control) why the experience of redness is the particular way it is – and not like blueness, or like jealousy – the mystery of how redness happens will be less mysterious, or perhaps no longer mysterious at all.

The ambition of the real problem approach is that as we build ever sturdier explanatory bridges from the physical to the phenomenological, the hard-problem intuition that consciousness can never be understood in physical terms will fade away, eventually vanishing in a puff of metaphysical smoke. When it does we will have in our hands a satisfactory and fully satisfying science of conscious experience."

(Seth, Anil. Being You: A New Science of Consciousness. New York: Dutton, 2021. pp. 30-1)
<QUOTE

[SteveKlinko]

But there are no Theories or Chains of Logic that show Conscious Experience is in any Neural Process. What Neural Process Explains the Conscious Experience of Redness? Note that I don't mean a Neural Correlate of Conscious Experience but the actual Conscious Experience. The Hard Problem is 100% unsolved at this point in time.

From the perspective of the physicalist mind-brain identity theory, it is misleading to speak of neural correlates of consciousness, because according to it experiences are (identical with) neural processes; and "you cannot correlate something with itself" (Jack Smart).
However, even if there is no ontological difference between experiences and neural processes, there is still an empirical difference between first-person perceptual (introspective) data about experiences and third-person perceptual (extrospective) data about neural processes.
Anyway:

QUOTE>
"The NCC strategy has been impressively productive over many years, delivering reams of fascinating findings, but its limitations are becoming apparent. One problem is that it is difficult, and perhaps in the end impossible, to disentangle a ‘true’ NCC from a range of potentially confounding factors, the most important of which are those neural happenings that are either prerequisites for, or consequences of, an NCC itself. In the case of binocular rivalry, brain activity that goes along with the conscious perception may also track upstream (prerequisite) processes like ‘paying attention’ and, on the downstream side, the verbal behaviour of ‘reporting’ – of saying that you see a house or a face. Although related to the flow of conscious perception, the neural mechanisms responsible for attention and verbal report – or other prerequisites and downstream consequences – should not be confused with those that are responsible for the conscious perception itself.

The deeper problem is that correlations are not explanations. We all know that mere correlation does not establish causation, but it is also true that correlation falls short of explanation. Even with increasingly ingenious experimental designs and ever more powerful brain imaging technologies, correlation by itself can never amount to explanation. From this perspective, the NCC strategy and the hard problem are natural
bedfellows. If we restrict ourselves to collecting correlations between things happening in the brain and things happening in our experience, it is no surprise that we will always suspect an explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal. But if we instead move beyond establishing correlations to discover explanations that connect properties of neural mechanisms to properties of subjective experience, as the real problem approach advocates, then this gap will narrow and might even disappear entirely. When we are able to predict (and explain, and control) why the experience of redness is the particular way it is – and not like blueness, or like jealousy – the mystery of how redness happens will be less mysterious, or perhaps no longer mysterious at all.

The ambition of the real problem approach is that as we build ever sturdier explanatory bridges from the physical to the phenomenological, the hard-problem intuition that consciousness can never be understood in physical terms will fade away, eventually vanishing in a puff of metaphysical smoke. When it does we will have in our hands a satisfactory and fully satisfying science of conscious experience."

(Seth, Anil. Being You: A New Science of Consciousness. New York: Dutton, 2021. pp. 30-1)
<QUOTE

The quote is misleading in that we are not building any Sturdier Explanatory Bridges between the NCC and Conscious Experiences. It talks about it like there already are some Bridges that do that and we only need to make them sturdier. There are no Bridges doing that no matter how elementary. There is Zero Explanation for Conscious Experiences. Also, Seth's Real Problem is just another name for the Hard Problem that Science has been trying to solve for a Hundred years.

[Consul]

The quote is misleading in that we are not building any Sturdier Explanatory Bridges between the NCC and Conscious Experiences. It talks about it like there already are some Bridges that do that and we only need to make them sturdier. There are no Bridges doing that no matter how elementary. There is Zero Explanation for Conscious Experiences. Also, Seth's Real Problem is just another name for the Hard Problem that Science has been trying to solve for a Hundred years.

* No, as he explains in his new book, for Seth the real problem is not "just another name for the hard problem." I cannot quote the whole chapter here, so I recommend you read his book!

* As for building explanatory bridges, here's an interesting paper:

Explanatory profiles of models of consciousness—towards a systematic classification

* You seem to be arguing implicitly that all neurophysicalistic attempts at reductive explanations of phenomenal consciousness/subjective experience are doomed to failure in principle; but "x has not been explained yet by natural science" certainly doesn't entail "x will never be explained by natural science"—unless, of course, consciousness is a supernatural phenomenon. However, there is no good reason to believe it is; and even if it were, we would never see an explanatorily successful supernatural science of consciousness.

[Consul]

Excerpt from a newspaper interview with Anil Seth:

"Presumably, the mind-body problem is never going to be entirely resolved?
[SETH:] No, but I’d like to make progress. It’s the boring answer of continuing to do rigorous science, rather than proposing some eureka solution to “the hard problem” [the question of why and how our brains create subjective, conscious experience]. My approach is that we risk not understanding the central mystery of life by lurching to one or other form of magical thinking. While science might be a little bit slower, there is much to be done in a straightforward materialist understanding of how the brain relates to conscious experience."

[Sy Borg]

But that's not the ontological conclusion drawn by its defenders, which is clearly antiphysicalistic:

"What Mary discovered about color experiences is meant to apply to conscious experiences generally. The lesson Jackson wants you to take away is that being consciously aware of something is to be in a state of mind with a particular sort of qualitative character, a character utterly unlike the character of material bodies – including the brain. Your only access to conscious qualities is through your experiencing them first hand. This feature of conscious qualities places them outside the physical domain.
Taking Jackson seriously means taking dualism seriously."

(Heil, John. Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2013. p. 170)

Heil's quote is just a strawhuman constructed from concern that the thought experiment may give succour to the "enemy".

To take Frank Jackson's thought experiment seriously is to be perplexed, not to jump to conclusions. The irony is that, as neuroscientist Christof Koch has observed, depending on one's perspective, reality can be seen as dual without inferring spooky action. Matter and information, ie. stuff and the stuff's configuration. Quantum and relativistic effects at different scales. Hardware and software. Body and mind.

You are wrong: The Mary argument is used by its defenders as an argument against physicalism (physicalist property monism)!

You are not only wrong, but the way you are wrong betrays a tribal, rather than open-minded, materialism. The idea that the Mary's Room thought experiment needs "defenders" is ridiculous. Of course, all ideas and information are used by various people, claiming their disparate points. The politics is not interesting.

What the thought experiment demonstrated is undeniably real. That is, knowing everything possible about something cannot even come close to replacing experience. There's the rub.

All Mary's Room does is reveal a fascinating and perplexing aspect of experience, and does it well.

[Belindi]

Re "the question of why and how our brains create subjective, conscious experience".

The problem is simply anatomical.

The pain of cramp in a muscle is a quale, and the effect of a surgeon's probe on the auditory cortex is also a quale.

Afferent nerves connect the cramping muscle to the cortex and pain quale.

The tip of the probe connects the probe to the auditory cortex and the sound quale.

[SteveKlinko]

The quote is misleading in that we are not building any Sturdier Explanatory Bridges between the NCC and Conscious Experiences. It talks about it like there already are some Bridges that do that and we only need to make them sturdier. There are no Bridges doing that no matter how elementary. There is Zero Explanation for Conscious Experiences. Also, Seth's Real Problem is just another name for the Hard Problem that Science has been trying to solve for a Hundred years.

* No, as he explains in his new book, for Seth the real problem is not "just another name for the hard problem." I cannot quote the whole chapter here, so I recommend you read his book!

* As for building explanatory bridges, here's an interesting paper:

Explanatory profiles of models of consciousness—towards a systematic classification

* You seem to be arguing implicitly that all neurophysicalistic attempts at reductive explanations of phenomenal consciousness/subjective experience are doomed to failure in principle; but "x has not been explained yet by natural science" certainly doesn't entail "x will never be explained by natural science"—unless, of course, consciousness is a supernatural phenomenon. However, there is no good reason to believe it is; and even if it were, we would never see an explanatorily successful supernatural science of consciousness.

I never say that Conscious Experience will never be found in the Neurons or Neural Activity. I only note that Science has tried to do this for a hundred years with Zero progress. The only test of a theory for me is as described in the OP. All other criteria that you might come up with might also be satisfied but the theory has got to Explain Conscious Experience.

[SteveKlinko]

Excerpt from a newspaper interview with Anil Seth:

"Presumably, the mind-body problem is never going to be entirely resolved?
[SETH:] No, but I’d like to make progress. It’s the boring answer of continuing to do rigorous science, rather than proposing some eureka solution to “the hard problem” [the question of why and how our brains create subjective, conscious experience]. My approach is that we risk not understanding the central mystery of life by lurching to one or other form of magical thinking. While science might be a little bit slower, there is much to be done in a straightforward materialist understanding of how the brain relates to conscious experience."

Yes, and there are many Scientists doing it his way. But I think that Science is going to get nowhere unless it starts thinking outside it's Box. Science does need some Scientists to plod along applying known Scientific concepts, but it also needs to find some Scientists that will have the courage to think in new ways.

So, what is the Experience of Redness? Is it some form of Matter? Is it some form of Energy? Is it an aspect of the structure of Space? Redness seems not to be any of these things. But maybe it is and someone will show how it is someday. But for now, the Phenomenon of Redness does not seem to exist within the known Scientific categories of Phenomenon. Redness is a Category outlier. But every other Color, Sound, Smell, Taste, and Touch, Experience are also Category outliers. Our whole Conscious Existence is a Category outlier. How can Science Explain these things? Computations. Complexity, and Mathematics don't seem to Explain anything about these Conscious Experiences. These Conscious Experiences are simply and truthfully outside the Box of what Science is doing right now. But they are probably not outside the Box of what Science could be doing. They are just not doing it.

[SteveKlinko]

Re "the question of why and how our brains create subjective, conscious experience".

The problem is simply anatomical.

The pain of cramp in a muscle is a quale, and the effect of a surgeon's probe on the auditory cortex is also a quale.

Afferent nerves connect the cramping muscle to the cortex and pain quale.

The tip of the probe connects the probe to the auditory cortex and the sound quale.

Don't just call everything a Quale. You are hiding the special nature of the different Quale. Qualia are Conscious Experiences. The problem is not simply Anatomical. For example, there is a Huge Explanatory Gap between probing the Auditory Cortex and the Experience of any Sound.

[Pattern-chaser]

it's not just that. It is that Science has tried for a Hundred years to put Conscious Experience into the Neurons with Zero success. It is time to think in new ways.

Not if those new ways parallel the old ways when it comes to casually discarding stuff that we arbitrarily - i.e. without evidence - decide are unlikely, when we actually have no idea of their likelihood. That was, and remains, my point, and you haven't even considered it, never mind responded to it. Fair enough, I can't force you, and I wouldn't if I could.

[SteveKlinko]

it's not just that. It is that Science has tried for a Hundred years to put Conscious Experience into the Neurons with Zero success. It is time to think in new ways.

Not if those new ways parallel the old ways when it comes to casually discarding stuff that we arbitrarily - i.e. without evidence - decide are unlikely, when we actually have no idea of their likelihood. That was, and remains, my point, and you haven't even considered it, never mind responded to it. Fair enough, I can't force you, and I wouldn't if I could.

You are mistaken to think that just because the new ways might have some parallels to old ways that the new ways should be ignored out of hand. When it comes to Conscious Experience all Ways are on the table. By the way I have considered all points of view on Consciousness and have been doing that for decades. Let me ask, because I don't know what you are referring to, what am I casually discarding?

[Pattern-chaser]

Let me ask, because I don't know what you are referring to, what am I casually discarding?

This:

Conscious Experience is so real to me that it is just Incoherent to think it is an Illusion...

To which I replied:

That's the thing about philosophy. Sometimes it's hard to draw the conclusions that the evidence justifies. It's harder still to consider something we have never even thought to question might not actually - in the real world, not in a philosopher's Ivory Tower - be correct. But evidence - or in this case, total lack of evidence - is evidence, and there is no justification in that evidence to believe what we have always assumed to be the absolute reality. It might be, or it might not be. If we discard theories without evidence or other justifiable reason, we will fail to discover what is there to be found.

For future reference, the up-arrow just to the right of where the quote-box says "SteveKlinko wrote:" is a link back to the post from which the text is quoted.