Philosophy Discussion Forums

RJG
Do you want to prove that Fooloso4 and I have experiences? I know that Fooloso4 and you have experiences, and I know that you know that Fooloso4 and I have experiences. What do you think would be the method of logically proving that we have or have not experiences? Looking into our brains?

Is it that you 'know' (as true), or is it more accurate (and truthful) to say that you 'believe' you know (as true)?

You can't get truths and falses from 'beliefs', but only from 'logic'. Your belief is not logically founded. If you think I'm wrong, then please show your logic that justifies your belief. There is none!

RJG wrote: ↑December 24th, 2018, 11:50 am Is it that you 'know' (as true), or is it more accurate (and truthful) to say that you 'believe' you know (as true)?

You can't get truths and falses from 'beliefs', but only from 'logic'. Your belief is not logically founded. If you think I'm wrong, then please show your logic that justifies your belief. There is none!

You demand logical proofs. You did not answer my question of how you would prove we have or have not experiences. What would make your knowledge that we have experiences - which I know you have - knowledge supported by logic?

RJG wrote:
It seems that you are trying to assert/claim -- 'beliefs' should be considered as 'truths' ...correct?
Fooloso4 wrote:
No, that is not correct.

Your words seemingly indicate otherwise.

No, it is your conjecture and misunderstanding that leads you to think this.

Firstly, "reasonableness" is determined by the beholder (the believer) himself, not by some outside independent party.
Fooloso4 wrote:
You might believe it is reasonable to doubt that your neighbor has thoughts, but if that is the case I don’t think the gap will be closed through this discussion.

Non-sequitur. How is this relevant to what I've said?

What is at issue is whether it is reasonable to think that your neighbor might be a zombie. You can use your own standard of what you think is reasonable. You are the “beholder (the believer). You have given me no reason why you think he might be.

RJG wrote:
Secondly, "reasonableness" is already implied in one's belief.
Fooloso4 wrote:
Do you think it is reasonable to believe that your neighbor is a zombie? What is it about your neighbor that would lead you to believe such a thing? What are your reasons for believing your neighbor is or might be a zombie?

Again, non relevance here. Your response doesn't follow my comment.

Again, using your own standard of what is reasonable, what is it about your neighbor that would lead you to believe such a thing? What are your reasons for believing your neighbor is or might be a zombie?

RJG wrote:
One's (reasonably held) 'belief' that one's neighbor is/is not a zombie, does not necessarily mean that it is/is not 'true', ...right?
Fooloso4 wrote:
You begin with a hypothetical and since the hypothetical cannot be proven wrong you conclude that your neighbor might be a zombie. You treat the belief that your neighbor is a zombie as equivalent to the belief that your neighbor is not a zombie, as if both require the same degree of evidence or that both rather than only one needs any evidence at all to be "believed".

Is this a "YES" or a "NO"?

Try to follow along: Belief does not entail truth. The fact that it cannot be confirmed beyond all doubt that he is not does not mean I have grounds to think he might be.

RJG wrote:
Why can't we just leave 'beliefs' as 'beliefs', ...and leave the 'truths' (and falses) to 'logic'???
Fooloso4 wrote:
The plea to leave ‘beliefs’ as ‘beliefs’ indicates that you are unaware of the problem of belief and the incommensurate ways in which the term is used.

So then are you trying to assert that "beliefs" should be considered as "truths"?

I am asserting just what I said: The plea to leave ‘beliefs’ as ‘beliefs’ indicates that you are unaware of the problem of belief and the incommensurate ways in which the term is used.

In your insistence that I answer your questions you have avoiding answering mine. You are positing a hypothetical, I am asking for reasons and evidence by which you might actually suspect that your neighbor is a zombie. Now of course we both know that you do not actually suspect such a thing, and so, what bearing does any of this have on the truth?

I can say to my friend: "Now they have found a scientific method of proving if someone has or has not experiences. Let us do the test with you." Would I trust the validity of the test if it proved that my friend has no experiences?

Tamminen wrote: ↑December 24th, 2018, 2:10 pm I can say to my friend: "Now they have found a scientific method of proving if someone has or has not experiences. Let us do the test with you." Would I trust the validity of the test if it proved that my friend has no experiences?

Good question. Sound like one that Wittgenstein might ask.

I cannot use empirical science to prove to another that I am conscious.
No empirical science can disprove to me that I am conscious.
I cannot use empirical science to prove to myself that the whole world is anything more than an hallucination and that there are no others.

Chili wrote: ↑December 24th, 2018, 10:22 pm I cannot use empirical science to prove to another that I am conscious.
No empirical science can disprove to me that I am conscious.
I cannot use empirical science to prove to myself that the whole world is anything more than an hallucination and that there are no others.

Exactly, and that is because my being in the world with others is the "space" where we do empirical science.

When we do science, we do not doubt:

My being
My being conscious
My being conscious of the world
My being conscious of others
The being of the world
The being of others
The being of consciousness of others

Science makes its progress inside this ontological space. The description of the space may change in the same way as the description of physical space has changed, but some basic structures are always there, unquestioned until reflected on. As Wittgenstein says, we can seek only in space.

RJG wrote:You can't get truths and falses from 'beliefs', but only from 'logic'. Your belief is not logically founded. If you think I'm wrong, then please show your logic that justifies your belief.

Tamminen wrote:You demand logical proofs.

Not so. I demand 'rationality' (simple logic). If you are going to claim something as 'true', then "beliefs", by themselves, don't cut it.

Tamminen wrote:You did not answer my question of how you would prove we have or have not experiences. What would make your knowledge that we have experiences - which I know you have - knowledge supported by logic?

I don't think it is possible to prove that someone else (consciously) experiences, but only ourselves, for any information that we could garner, would only be 'our' experience. Therefore solipsism cannot logically be disproved, (...but only disliked).

Chili wrote:I cannot use empirical science to prove to another that I am conscious.
No empirical science can disprove to me that I am conscious.
I cannot use empirical science to prove to myself that the whole world is anything more than an hallucination and that there are no others.

Agreed. It is not logically possible to disprove (or prove!) solipsism.

RJG wrote:It seems that you are trying to assert/claim -- 'beliefs' should be considered as 'truths' ...correct?

Firstly, "reasonableness" is determined by the beholder (the believer) himself, not by some outside independent party.

Fooloso4 wrote:What is at issue is whether it is reasonable to think that your neighbor might be a zombie. You can use your own standard of what you think is reasonable. You are the “beholder (the believer). You have given me no reason why you think he might be.

Again, "reasonableness" doesn't matter. It doesn't get us closer to truth. It only makes us 'feel better' about our belief, that's all.

Fooloso4 wrote:Again, using your own standard of what is reasonable, what is it about your neighbor that would lead you to believe such a thing? What are your reasons for believing your neighbor is or might be a zombie?

Although I suspect (and hope!) my neighbor is 'not' a zombie, I have NO WAY of knowing one way or another.

RJG wrote:One's (reasonably held) 'belief' that one's neighbor is/is not a zombie, does not necessarily mean that it is/is not 'true', ...right?

Fooloso4 wrote:The fact that it cannot be confirmed beyond all doubt that he is not, does not mean I have grounds to think he might be.

...and vice versa.

RJG wrote:Why can't we just leave 'beliefs' as 'beliefs', ...and leave the 'truths' (and falses) to 'logic'???

Fooloso4 wrote:The plea to leave ‘beliefs’ as ‘beliefs’ indicates that you are unaware of the problem of belief and the incommensurate ways in which the term is used.

However defined, beliefs are nothing more than just beliefs. Beliefs are not truths.

Fooloso4 wrote:I am asking for reasons and evidence by which you might actually suspect that your neighbor is a zombie. Now of course we both know that you do not actually suspect such a thing, and so, what bearing does any of this have on the truth?

Firstly, I suspect that my suspicion that my neighbor is 'not' a zombie, is due to my cultural upbringing, my indoctrinated belief that zombies are not real. Secondly, my belief, or suspicions, have NO bearing on the 'truth' of the matter. -- Truth is not determined by my beliefs!

RJG -

If logic is either discovered or made, and you take it as “discovered” then solipsism an option.

It makes no sense to say on one hand that solipsism is impossible to dismiss whilst claiming to “discover” rather than “create” logic. One must insist on psychologism in order to adhere to solipsism. If that is the case then any logical argument given is on shaky ground (given that your foundation is “logic” it follows that you know nothing other than some choice to accept “logic” on blind faith whilst calling it psychologism by way of denying any counter to solipsism).

RJG:

Again, "reasonableness" doesn't matter. It doesn't get us closer to truth. It only makes us 'feel better' about our belief, that's all.

The term 'reasonableness' means according to reason, that is, rationality.

What you don’t seem to get is just how odd and misplaced the question is whether it is true that your neighbor has thoughts and subjective experience. It has nothing at all to do with feeling better about our beliefs. If someone were to ask me whether I believe that my neighbor has thoughts I would say I believe it rather than not, but it is not ordinarily a matter of belief. The possibility that it could be otherwise does not even arise. It is not a matter of belief but part of the ground upon which beliefs are founded.

Although I suspect (and hope!) my neighbor is not a zombie, I have NO WAY of knowing one way or another.

Yes, I understand, you are “only doing philosophy”. You see that it is possible to doubt that your neighbor is not a zombie and so conclude that because you can’t be certain you do not know whether he is or not. But that is a standard of knowledge that does not apply to our lives. It is not what we generally mean when we say we know something or someone. You have NO WAY of knowing anything. You have NO WAY of knowing that what you consider “‘rationality’ (simple logic)” is logical. It may only seem that way to you because there is some aberrant neural pathway in your brain that makes what is illogical appear to be logical to you. You have NO WAY of knowing that your brain is not playing tricks on you.

However defined, beliefs are nothing more than just beliefs. Beliefs are not truths.

Again, you miss the point. You are using both ‘beliefs’ and ‘truths’ in a narrow and constricted way.

The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight. (Wittgenstein, CV 47)

Just as one has difficulty walking in shoes that are too tight one has difficulty thinking in a language that is too restricted.

Can you tell the truth or only believe that you are telling the truth? Do you know the difference or only believe you do?

Tamminen wrote: ↑December 25th, 2018, 4:23 am

Chili wrote: ↑December 24th, 2018, 10:22 pm I cannot use empirical science to prove to another that I am conscious.
No empirical science can disprove to me that I am conscious.
I cannot use empirical science to prove to myself that the whole world is anything more than an hallucination and that there are no others.

Exactly, and that is because my being in the world with others is the "space" where we do empirical science.

I can do science all day long without believing that others are conscious. I can even make use of science done by others without believing it.

Simply, you do not seem to believe in material cause-and-effect. And yet I guess you get on board planes?

Chili wrote: ↑December 25th, 2018, 1:18 pm I can do science all day long without believing that others are conscious. I can even make use of science done by others without believing it.

Simply, you do not seem to believe in material cause-and-effect. And yet I guess you get on board planes?

I do not doubt causality, I do not doubt that others are conscious. I need not believe in either.

Tamminen wrote: ↑December 25th, 2018, 2:07 pm

Chili wrote: ↑December 25th, 2018, 1:18 pm I can do science all day long without believing that others are conscious. I can even make use of science done by others without believing it.

Simply, you do not seem to believe in material cause-and-effect. And yet I guess you get on board planes?

I do not doubt causality, I do not doubt that others are conscious. I need not believe in either.

Some of use feel the instinct to put some method to our beliefs. That goes back to the beginnings of civilization.

Your attitude sounds fun, too.