Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Xris]

I am begining to realise your posts are not about wanting answers but about your ego. So I must leave you to your O so certain quantum universe. If you want me to answer then I recommend you adopt a less aggressive and insulting attitude.

[Prismatic]

I am begining to realise your posts are not about wanting answers but about your ego. So I must leave you to your O so certain quantum universe. If you want me to answer then I recommend you adopt a less aggressive and insulting attitude.

It seems more likely your own ego is at stake. You have not tried to answer even one question. And for my part I now realize you have no answers to any questions and are merely looking for a way out of responding.

[Belinda]

If it is the case **that human observers and experimenters are minds/brains/bodies that are themselves made of quanta would this case provide a practical solution to the indeterminacy problem?

** I think that there is neuroscientific evidence for the case

[Xris]

I am begining to realise your posts are not about wanting answers but about your ego. So I must leave you to your O so certain quantum universe. If you want me to answer then I recommend you adopt a less aggressive and insulting attitude.

It seems more likely your own ego is at stake. You have not tried to answer even one question. And for my part I now realize you have no answers to any questions and are merely looking for a way out of responding.

I have answered your questions but you appear completely intent on competing rather than finding an answer. I am not defending my ego, I am attempting to put the view and theory of Gaede into perspective. It is pointless continuing while you maintain this arogant stance.xris

[Andlan]

Philosophically, then, I opt for the conclusion that QM says something about the epistemological limits of physics as a scientific approach. I hold onto the possibility that such limits are somehow surmountable in principle, though I do not see how myself. I don't really care if it says anything ontological about nature simply because (1) I don't actually believe humans know what they are talking about when they talk about the ontology of anything, and (2) I think the purpose of science should be to catalogue experience by way of ever-the-more comprehensive models for the purposes of utility, prediction, and problem-solving; not to uncover universal truths (especially since scientific methodology shows no particularly priveleged approach toward such an idolatrous goal). I guess that's why I am pro-CI.

I realise now that by proposing an impossible microscopic experimental apparatus I am actually saying the same as you, that QM demonstrates physics to have its limits in practice (even if these limits are surmountable in principle). You are coming from an anti-realist position that I respect; but what do you say to JC Maxwell, a defender of the realist position, who denied that there is a genuine distinction between observable and detectable (only) objects? He says that there is a continuum from observing with the naked eye, looking through a window, observing with binoculars, to detecting particles in a cloud chamber photograph? I take this to imply that there is no difference in kind between classical physics and QM. I guess Bohr would argue against Maxwell?

[Half-Six]

If it is the case **that human observers and experimenters are minds/brains/bodies that are themselves made of quanta would this case provide a practical solution to the indeterminacy problem?

** I think that there is neuroscientific evidence for the case

Penrose/Hameroff have come up with some ideas in this regard. I’m no expert on their work; I think, though they use the notion of quantum coherent superposition within the brain, which allows quantum computing, and which then “self-collapses” every few microseconds, so it’s deterministic in “fits and starts” as it were. You don’t need a measurement to be made to collapse the wavefunction - that is you don’t ultimately need a conscious observation to collapse it. Rather it’s the other way around; consciousness arises from this “self-collapse”.

I think we need to be more precise than just lumping together minds/brains/bodies as consisting of quanta. QM is a theory of physics, so in that respect we can say brains (lumps of physical matter) consist of quanta, which is where Penrose/Hameroff start off; but what does it mean to then say that minds are made of quanta? It seems to me the old philosophical nutmegs still linger within this explanation – how does conscious awareness arise out of this self-collapse?

In my opinion it relies heavily on the Cartesian duality between mind and matter; principally that matter is an entity that can exist separately from mind, and mind arises from that matter. The logical problem with this is that all science, all of what we know about the physical world, presupposes two notions. 1. that we are consciously aware of that world 2. that we can think. So once we start trying to explain conscious awareness as arising from particular physical states, and then justify this by doing experiments, which we have to be consciously aware of – then we hit circularity. We are using conscious awareness as part of the explanation of conscious awareness.

As a response to Andlan

To my mind, philosophy is about the conditions for truth itself; about what it is possible to know, rather than the details of what we do know.

A philosophical approach to QM might be, how is it we see the world as “collapsed” or macro-; and as having Bell’s strong correlations; including seeing ourselves as macro-measuring devices; without falling into the circularity of positing “ourselves-seen-as macro-measuring devices”, as being what causes us to see. I’m still thinking about this approach

[Prismatic]

I have answered your questions but you appear completely intent on competing rather than finding an answer. I am not defending my ego, I am attempting to put the view and theory of Gaede into perspective. It is pointless continuing while you maintain this arogant stance.xris

Forgive me if I continue to think the arrogance is entirely on your side in dismissing several hundred years of progress in physics—for which there are numerous experimental verifications—in favor of a picture for which there are no experimental verifications whatsoever.

You have not answered my questions. You have merely strung words together, but that doesn't provide a real answer. For example, I asked how you would explain the inverse square variation of luminance and pointed out that it is a simple mathematical result—the fact that the area of a sphere varies as the square of its radius—whether you think of particles or energy distributed over the area, but that with ropes you would have the same number of ropes passing through the area no matter what its size, an apparent contradiction. This presumably was your "answer"

The strength of light by photon or electromagnetic tangible contact would be no different in strength or distribution.

That is no answer at all—it is mere hand-waving. It does nothing to resolve the apparent contradiction.

[Xris]

I have answered your questions but you appear completely intent on competing rather than finding an answer. I am not defending my ego, I am attempting to put the view and theory of Gaede into perspective. It is pointless continuing while you maintain this arogant stance.xris

Forgive me if I continue to think the arrogance is entirely on your side in dismissing several hundred years of progress in physics—for which there are numerous experimental verifications—in favor of a picture for which there are no experimental verifications whatsoever.

You have not answered my questions. You have merely strung words together, but that doesn't provide a real answer. For example, I asked how you would explain the inverse square variation of luminance and pointed out that it is a simple mathematical result—the fact that the area of a sphere varies as the square of its radius—whether you think of particles or energy distributed over the area, but that with ropes you would have the same number of ropes passing through the area no matter what its size, an apparent contradiction. This presumably was your "answer"

The strength of light by photon or electromagnetic tangible contact would be no different in strength or distribution.

That is no answer at all—it is mere hand-waving. It does nothing to resolve the apparent contradiction.

I am not dismissing a hundred or is two hundred years of science. I may be questioning certain theoretical conclusions but not science. Gaede just so happens to be giving an alternative, an alternative that may not be exactly correct or I may not be capable of defending to the point of each and every question. But particle science is not exactly clear on each and every aspect, is it? He actualy proves many scientific reasoning as much as he disproves others. I notice you do not accept the aspects that clarify or answer previously unanswerable conclusions. As for your question, why do you make the strange conclusion that given light is accepted as an EM wave function described as a stream of discrete particles, photons, can not be seen as multiple ropes emanating from a concentration of atoms? How would the observation change if we altered the concept? The ropes answer more questions than create but you are not mentioning those points, do you? Please remember, I am not Gaede and I am not accepting all that he preaches only one significant aspect that indicates an alternative to particles in quantum reasoning. It destroys the idea that the quantum universe is indeterminate, something others have hinted at, on this thread. One mentioned a tangible contact between atoms another fibres may have been detected. Is it possible they are coming to a similar conclusion?

[Belinda]

Half Six wrote:

I think we need to be more precise than just lumping together minds/brains/bodies as consisting of quanta. QM is a theory of physics, so in that respect we can say brains (lumps of physical matter) consist of quanta, which is where Penrose/Hameroff start off; but what does it mean to then say that minds are made of quanta? It seems to me the old philosophical nutmegs still linger within this explanation – how does conscious awareness arise out of this self-collapse?

I am persuaded that Spinoza's 'the mind is the idea of the body' is true. Spinoza first studied Descartes and was dissatisfied with the two substances theory of existence; Spinoza then formed his own monistic theory of existence the double aspect theory in which mind and matter are two aspects of one overarching reality. I therefore presume that there is an exact correlation between body/brain events and mind events given that spinal reflexes and the organs of special sense continue to connect with the CNS. Events within the brain/mind can be correlated not subjectively, I think, but objectively with scientific instruments and reporting, plus behavioural observations.

So once we start trying to explain conscious awareness as arising from particular physical states,

I don't think that the link is causal.

A circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle, which is also in God, are one and the same thing, which is explained through different attributes. Therefore, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of Extension, or under the attribute of Thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes, i.e., that the same things follow one another. (IIp7s)

[Prismatic]

I am not dismissing a hundred or is two hundred years of science. I may be questioning certain theoretical conclusions but not science. Gaede just so happens to be giving an alternative, an alternative that may not be exactly correct or I may not be capable of defending to the point of each and every question.

Here is a detailed answer.

If Gaede were merely offering a reasonable alternative to a portion of accepted physics and doing it by performing experiments and writing up his results for the journals, even though his ideas are wrong and crazy, I would say, give him some latitude and let's see what he's got. However Gaede goes far beyond that to claim that mathematics has nothing to do with physics at all and that mathematical physicists are the most stupid people in the world. Here is what he has to say:

Mathematics is not only NOT the language of Physics, it has absolutely nothing to do with Physics.

These have to be the most stupid people on the planet. No contest! They go to the university for ten years, get a Ph.D., and then babble about wormholes, time travel, and point particles that appear out of nowhere. They say there is something called dark matter and another thing called dark energy. They claim that the universe is made of 1-D strings. They have no rivals.

That's why it is absolutely jaw-dropping for the mathematicians to claim the power to infer architecture from numbers, or to believe, in the alternative, that they can synthesize what something looks like in a neat little equation. Mathematics becomes a religion when the mathematicians attempt to provide a physical interpretation to their functions, when they apply numbers and variables in the context of Geometry. This religion is known as Mathematical Physics, an irrational discipline that attempts to blend Mathematics and Physics.

That is an arrogant, not to say delusional, point of view that dismisses Newton, Einstein, and Hawking as idiots.

Now what does he have to offer in place of mathematical physics as it has been done for the last few hundred years? What is to replace the mechanics of Newton as modified by Einstein's relativity or the very successful results of quantum mechanics? Ropes! And nice pictures of ropes. Of course you can forget the law of gravitation which Newton used to derive Kepler's laws of planetary motion because it's an equation and equations have nothing to do with physics. The calculations that got us into space and to the moon are all nonsense, of course.

Physics before Gaede came along has always been an experimental science, that is, experiments were performed in which measurements were taken and held up against theory to either verify it or disprove it. In Gaede's world you can't do that because once you get into measuring anything you have crossed the line into using mathematics to do physics, which he doesn't allow.

As for your question, why do you make the strange conclusion that given light is accepted as an EM wave function described as a stream of discrete particles, photons, can not be seen as multiple ropes emanating from a concentration of atoms? How would the observation change if we altered the concept?

Easily. In classical electromagnetic theory light waves travel in a given direction provided nothing impedes them, but according to Gaede's explanation of his rope theory

"3D torsion waves travel simultaneously in opposite directions along this physical mediator."

It would be a simple matter to devise an experiment to test this notion. Send a laser beam in a given direction over a long distance with a photosensor at the source to detect light coming back.

Now this raises new questions about the ropes. If they transmit torsion waves and are a physical medium, then they must be infinitely elastic since the ropes between say a comet and the earth get stretched to great lengths as the comet moves away. What known physical medium is infintely elastic?

One might imagine the ropes explaining attractive forces such as gravity and the Coulomb force between oppositely charged particles, but the repulsive electric force between similarly charged objects and the repulsive magnetic force between similar poles is hard to explain by ropes. (Old country joke: a women asks a man why he is dragging a chain. He asks in return "Have you ever tried to push one of these things?)

The ropes answer more questions than create but you are not mentioning those points, do you?

(I see the charge of arrogance has now been amended to include bias.) Do you truly believe the rope hypothesis answers more questions than it creates? Does it really? I think not. I've given you questions it raises and you have yet to answer except by waving your hands.

Please remember, I am not Gaede and I am not accepting all that he preaches only one significant aspect that indicates an alternative to particles in quantum reasoning. It destroys the idea that the quantum universe is indeterminate, something others have hinted at, on this thread. One mentioned a tangible contact between atoms another fibres may have been detected. Is it possible they are coming to a similar conclusion?

The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is still quite certain at this point. Einstein came up with thought experiments to disprove uncertainty, but all failed. Von Neumann—following Heisenberg's derivation— gave mathematical derivations of uncertainty principles in his book. It turns out that they are quite plentiful in mathematics and there are others in physics as well.

As for Gaede, he has given himself more than enough rope to hang by.

[A Poster He or I]

Andlan said,

You are coming from an anti-realist position that I respect; but what do you say to JC Maxwell, a defender of the realist position, who denied that there is a genuine distinction between observable and detectable (only) objects? He says that there is a continuum from observing with the naked eye, looking through a window, observing with binoculars, to detecting particles in a cloud chamber photograph?

Denying a distinction between observable and detectable-only objects is, to my mind, claiming that indirect observation is as valid as direct observation. In other words, that one can say the same sort of generalities about indirectly observed phenomena that are said of directly observed phenomena. To grant Maxwell the benefit of the doubt, I'll assume that he intended this equivalence to exist in principle, not necessarily in practice.

So, I think I'd say to Mr. Maxwell:

Sir, though I doubt it was your intention, this reasoning admits into reality the existence of ghosts, demons, angels and other supernatural phenomena by the simple fact that their effects upon observable reality imply their real existence, despite the fact that those people who claim direct observation of these phenomena are universally condemned as delusional. Moreover, your reasoning implies that it must be perfectly acceptable to assume the factual existence of these non-directly observable objects can be sufficiently understood as a supernatural existence. If this was not your intent, sir, then the onus lies on you to define how one objectifies these ghostly objects as "material objects having no genuine distinction from commonly observable objects," given that you cannot use observability as a criterion.

My underlying point here is that Mr. Maxwell can't do it because

1. Objectifying anything means assigning it attributes relative to some pre-existing cognitive schemata about how reality works, such assignment being imparted by measuring devices (or sensorimotor apparata) whose standard operational parameters and permissible values are recognized and already integral to the same cognitive schemata employed in such objectification;

2. Indirect observation robs us of the opportunity to objectify the object, forcing us to settle for a mere cataloguing of its effects. This is good enough for an anti-realist because an anti-realist realizes that it is "six-of one, half dozen of the other" whether your object is identified by

(a) its relational behavior toward standardized metrics in a cognitive schema or by

(b) its relational behavior toward standardized objects (whose metrics are pre-established) in a cognitive schema.

But a realist can't get away with this attitude because it is fundamentally a surrender to relativism. A realist must ground the objectification process by believing that either his metrics hold universally or that he can discover (which really means invent) new metrics as he goes. That's all fine...until his metrics stop working and he isn't ready with new ones. At that point realism becomes an incoherent position as I tried to show in my response to Mr. Maxwell.

I take this to imply that there is no difference in kind between classical physics and QM. I guess Bohr would argue against Maxwell?

Bohr definitely held to a sharp distinction between the classical and quantum world, believing it to be a clear illustration of his own Principle of Complementarity which Bohr felt to be an integral part of the Copenhagen Interpretation, but most physicists--even CI adherents--dismiss as incidental or superfluous. My own thought is that Bohr was right but not for the reasons he believed. I believe the classical world is an emergent phenomenon out of quantum-level complexity.

[Half-Six]

I therefore presume that there is an exact correlation between body/brain events and mind events given that spinal reflexes and the organs of special sense continue to connect with the CNS.

How would connections between spinal reflexes, organs of sense and CNS, which are all physical, lead to a connection between body/brain and mind, between physical and mental?

Events within the brain/mind can be correlated not subjectively, I think, but objectively with scientific instruments and reporting, plus behavioural observations.

Yes, but only amongst similar forms of life. How we observe behaviour for instance:- how scientists observe how the eye and brain behave when someone observes something, presupposes the scientists themselves are using a similar eye and brain in a similar way (whatever similar may mean here!).

[Belinda]

Half-Six wrote:

How would connections between spinal reflexes, organs of sense and CNS, which are all physical, lead to a connection between body/brain and mind, between physical and mental?

Because the former don't lead to the latter, they are simultaneously different aspects of the latter.

Yes, but only amongst similar forms of life. How we observe behaviour for instance:- how scientists observe how the eye and brain behave when someone observes something, presupposes the scientists themselves are using a similar eye and brain in a similar way (whatever similar may mean here!).

Is it not possible to get over the observer participant effect by factoring it in**, on those occasions when variables can be precisely delineated, such as happens in physics and other non-human sciences, even in biology?

** we have already agreed that brain events can be modelled as quanta.Also, please see Because the former don't lead to the latter, they are simultaneously different aspects of the latter

[Half-Six]

Half-Six wrote:

How would connections between spinal reflexes, organs of sense and CNS, which are all physical, lead to a connection between body/brain and mind, between physical and mental?

Because the former don't lead to the latter, they are simultaneously different aspects of the latter.

So why mention it? Since you do mention it, then your argument, as I understand it, says they do lead to the latter. “given that – connection between physical events ---- I presume – correlation between brain/mind”. So if we weren’t “given that…” you wouldn’t presume that. It leads to your conclusion.

I can see that if you take the Spinozist approach (I don’t know that much about Spinoza, so I’ll trust your reading ) that “mind and matter are two aspects of one overarching reality” then, by definition, there has to be a correlation – although I don’t see you’re justified in saying it’s exact. But this is just your overriding presupposition, it’s your “given”. It’s either accepted or not, you can’t argue about why it might be true or not without taking another basic presupposition. And there’s no need to add other givens, like physical connections.

It seems analogous to Bohr’s complementarity – in order to use QM, you just accept it, you don’t argue why it might be so. Accepting it works; people can work with QM very successfully with it; but if we want to do philosophy – then we have to ask why it might be so.

So accepting a Spinozist approach doesn’t help uncover brain/mind correlations, to do that you have to question it.

Yes, but only amongst similar forms of life. How we observe behaviour for instance:- how scientists observe how the eye and brain behave when someone observes something, presupposes the scientists themselves are using a similar eye and brain in a similar way (whatever similar may mean here!).

Is it not possible to get over the observer participant effect by factoring it in**, on those occasions when variables can be precisely delineated, such as happens in physics and other non-human sciences, even in biology?

** we have already agreed that brain events can be modelled as quanta.Also, please see Because the former don't lead to the latter, they are simultaneously different aspects of the latter

It is factored in – by being human. We see things in a human manner (including seeing how it is we see things), which means we agree on experimental results, and what deductions we take from hypotheses. This doesn’t mean we can’t argue about them, but at base level there is agreement, ultimately agreement in form of life – that’s what gives objectivity. If a bat could do science, we wouldn’t understand much of it – let alone a daffodil!

[Andlan]

1. Objectifying anything means assigning it attributes relative to some pre-existing cognitive schemata about how reality works, such assignment being imparted by measuring devices (or sensorimotor apparata) whose standard operational parameters and permissible values are recognized and already integral to the same cognitive schemata employed in such objectification;

I agree that objectification means to categorise phenomena principally for pragmatic reasons, using some pre-existing or defined schemata. Why this schemata is always mathematical is something that might concern us - it seems that there must be an underlying regularity that we are tapping into, or at least some rationalising instinct in our possession.

2. Indirect observation robs us of the opportunity to objectify the object, forcing us to settle for a mere cataloguing of its effects. This is good enough for an anti-realist ....

By this do you mean that QM does not objectify phenomena at all? We can only establish what we can directly observe? OK, we cannot go back to prehistoric times to determine if dinosaurs actually existed, but we still feel sure that they did based on fossil evidence. Presumably you identify indeterminate with unobjectifiable. Although microscopic particles do not have intrinsic properties according to Complementarity, they still have either-or dispositions that are constrained by measurements based on macroscopic properties. Observation per se is not the preserve of the classical or macroscopic domain (Brownian motion comes to mind again), although our observations are limited by the fact that our properties are macroscopically defined.

Bohr definitely held to a sharp distinction between the classical and quantum world, believing it to be a clear illustration of his own Principle of Complementarity which Bohr felt to be an integral part of the Copenhagen Interpretation, but most physicists--even CI adherents--dismiss as incidental or superfluous. My own thought is that Bohr was right but not for the reasons he believed. I believe the classical world is an emergent phenomenon out of quantum-level complexity.

Classical physics must satisfy QM (so I agree that the latter is more fundamenatal), but the reason for this need to satisfy is that classical and quantum are part of the same empirical world. In that sense I agree with Maxwell. Nonetheless, a border does exist between the two domains because of our limitations in measuring quantum phenomena. If by some magic we were microscopic and could interract with what was down there, perhaps we could come up with some deterministic theories (although we may need to come up with a new set of properties based on what we could observe there).

-- Updated June 1st, 2012, 9:22 am to add the following --

Half-Six wrote:

How would connections between spinal reflexes, organs of sense and CNS, which are all physical, lead to a connection between body/brain and mind, between physical and mental?

Because the former don't lead to the latter, they are simultaneously different aspects of the latter.

Asking how mental events can cause physical events (free-will) is rightly diagnosed as a category mistake by 'dual aspect' theories. The problem is that a 'monism' in which mind and matter are one is counter-intuitive. We don't seem to be able to avoid the notion that our minds cause bodily reactions and that our desires, intentions and beliefs actually matter. Monism claims these to be illusions and, just like evolutionary psychology, relegates the uniqueness of our historical lives by treating mental events as law-like.