The state-of-the art in scientific methodology is tha Bayesian model for scientific thinking. In this model, we estimate objectively the plausibility of an idea by estimating it as P(X/Y). where X is the theory being true, and Y is some evidence that we can consistently observe. When the evidence is a priori unlikley (P(Y) is low), but highly likely given the hypothesis is true, (P(Y/X) is high), then the Bayesian formula shows that finding the evidence increases the value of P(X) from it's prior value.
I'm not particularly familiar with Bayesian stats/probability, so please excuse me (and maybe correct me) if I've misunderstood what you're saying here and make mistakes.
Presumably you're talking about Bayesian design of experiments. But surely this is essentially about designing efficient ways to test hypothesese and navigate the most efficient route through a problem space? I don't see how it has direct bearing on the validity or otherwise of the theory of evolution
as a whole. My understanding is that Bayesian methods have in fact been used successfully in many individual areas of evolutionary theory, as in other individual areas of science. But you seem to be trying to apply it retrospectively to the generation of the whole original hypothesis of evolution and asserting that it lacks prior plausibility?
(Incidental point: I presume you mean P(X|Y), not P(X/Y)?)
A good argument debunking evolution theories is that they have not been tested using strong inference.
As far as I can see, this is essentially the standard scientific method: Thinking of observations that could falsify your hypothesis, etc. Evolution has been going through this process for 150 years. It's about as well tested as any scientific theory could be. The scientist who discovered solid verifiable evidence to overturn the whole of evolutionary theory would go down in history. There's quite an incentive to do it, as there is in all of science. But extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. If a scientific theory has been established over a long time by a large body of diverse interconnecting evidence, it takes very convincing evidence, and a new theory which explains all the discoveries of the previous theory, to overturn it. That's why the people at CERN who seem to have discovered that neutrinos can travel faster than light checked their results over and over and over again and then put them out to the wider physics community to see if anybody else can find out where they went wrong. That's why a British physicist said he'd eat his own shorts if Relativity had to be replaced!
Another well affirmed method is the bayesian approach, where it is regarded as best to use either intuitive popularity or inductive reasoning to assign prior plausibilities, and to begin by testing the hypothesis with the highest prior plausibility.
Highest prior plausibility to whom? You seem to take it as a given that a creator based theory of artificial selection has higher prior plausibility. On what basis? Human instincts? Do you have good inductive reasons to believe that our instincts should be trusted in this case because they've worked before in devising hypotheses for parts of science that are outside of direct human experience? I think not.
In the case of modification through descent (a part of evolutionary thinking)/ artificial, not natural selection has a higher prior plausibility.
Says who? Your application of Baysian reasoning to the entire theory of Evolution requires, essentially, a vote of interested parties or induction from previous experience. But "interested parties" means people who have examined reproducable evidence, not the instincts of the population at large. Nothing wrong with instincts, but they are not a good indicator of truth when taken outside of their sphere of experience. And there is no previous experience of what works in this case.
Evolition, not evolution, is the hypothesis or theory most likely to be true.
Says who?
The widespread historical significance of personal subjective bias, rationalization, and wishful thinking, have placed some contraints on the estimation of prior plausibility of hypotheses. There is no support for the adoption of a personal opinion, even one supposedly defended with "reason."
That's absolutely true. It is notoriously difficult to remove personal biases from scientific observations. Some of the most famous examples are Kepler's insistence that the planets must travel in circles (because of his attachment to ancient Greek ideas of mathematical perfection) or, perhaps, Percivel Lowell's observations of "canals" on Mars (because of his Victorian ideas about engineering and a mistranslation of Italian!).
The human talent for spotting patterns (even when no pattern is present) together with strong desires for a particular worldview to be vindicated can be a dangerous combination.
This can mean that people have wasted a lot of time with hypothesese that don't fit the evidence. Kepler did eventually accept the evidence of (approximately) eliptical orbits, but he had to struggle to overcome his prior expectations.
I don't know if Bayesian inference would have helped Kepler to overcome his predjudices. Obviously a calculation of P(X|Y)/P(X) in his case would have show that the "circular orbits hypothesis" was a very bad fit to the evidence, but he knew that anyway! The impression I get is that it is more suited to quite specific individual hypotheses, among many, within a subject area, not the discovery of entire new paradigms. But maybe I'm wrong. Perhaps you can set me straight!
Inductively, we observe in biology "levels" of living beings, which increase in "creativity" as they become "higher" in intelligence and number of senses. We also note that "lower" beings, with fewer senses, are commonly oblivious to the presence of higher beings.
I don't think this picture you're painting of a heirarchy of beings, with each layer being aware of those below it but oblivious of those above it, is particularly accurate. Creatures are generally aware of what's important to them, regardless of where it sits in this supposed heirarchy. Robins are aware of their prey (e.g. worms) and their preditors (other large animals like cats). Animals are generally most aware of their prey, preditors, offspring and potential mates - the parts of their environment that are most relevant to their reproductive success.
The whole concept of "awareness" and "consciousness", and the extent to which various creatures possess it, is of course a topic in itself. But I suspect that a worm would not be aware, or conscious, of
any other creatures, either above or below it, in any way that we would recognize. A dog, or a cat or a chimpanzee, on the other hand, would probably be aware of humans just as much as it is aware of any other animal.
So, as far as I can see, this downward-looking heirarchy of awareness that you postulate looks a little bit like one of these ideas that look superficially plausible and which is obviously attractive to you because it fits with you aim of showing that there exists a higher form of life of which humans are unaware, but is not really bourne out by the facts. Nice try!
There is no reason to suppose this is not true of humans considering the possibility of living beings higher in intelligence and power, with more sense, than we have.
Sounds like a tempting analogy. But of course up until the human "level" you were talking about life on Earth. Presumably, above the human level, you're talking about something else? Extra-terrestrial Aliens or Gods? Quite a radical departure from the heircarchy up to that point. Not really part of the pattern you're trying to establish.
And, most of Homo sapiens has either an intuitve or an experiential sense that tExhese higher beings exist.
It's true that we've always had a strong tendency to see agency in the world. In the past we have tended to see individual agents controlling individual natural phenomena, whenever we don't understand the mechanism for those phenomena. More recently some of us have come up with the idea of a single intelligent agent behind all of nature, while others have stuck to the "different agents for different tasks" model, and others have no concept of supernatual agents at all.
As with a lot of human behaviour, we can see psychological reasons why we do this, and why it would be useful to us. But, as I said before, the simple fact that many people believe a particular thing doesn't necessarily constitute evidence of
that thing. It constitutes evidence of a propensity to a particular belief. We can then talk about why that propensity exists.
We can see from the discoveries of much of modern science (Relativity and Quantum Mechanics and all that) that our intuition is often a bad indicator of truth when dealing with things that are outside of our direct everyday experience.
Even older "classical" physics can be counter-intuitive. Newton's laws were a breakthrough, and a departure from the Aristotlean ideas about motion, precisely
because they were counter-intuitive. Our everyday experience of objects tends to disagree with the idea that an object continues to move at constant velocity unless acted on by a force (because in practice it's difficult to remove friction). Our intuition is probably more in tune with Aristotle's ideas about things like the laws of motion.
It's easy to draw conclusions based on intuition - common sense. The breakthrough ideas are usually those that go
against common sense.
So, there is no sound philosophic basis for assigning a low prior plausibility to the idea. Of course it is not "proven." Raising that issue is unphilosophical, for it implies that, being unprovens mean improbable.
You seem quite keen to put the words "proven" and "proof" into my mouth. Of course
what is not proven? What issue did I raise? Did I claim that the absence of a creator was proven? I certainly don't remember saying that. Obviously it would be impossible to
prove the absence of a creator. I simply suggested that the concept of a creator is not necessary as an explanatory mechanism if it doesn't explain anything.
So, your first comment
"Only if there is some evidence for the existence of a creator and a reason to believe that a creator explains something that cannot be explained by other means."
is unphilosophical, and probably wrong.
I don't know what you mean by "unphilosophical". Do you mean it's an invalid argument?
From your previous comments, you seem to think I was talking about proof here. I wasn't. I was talking about the necessity or otherwise to postulate the existence of an intelligent creator in explaining the diversity of life on Earth. I don't think there is a necessity. Obviously it's possible to postulate the existence of all kinds of things and many people do! But to be scientific they have to have predictive power.
"Null hypothesis" has a standard definition in statistical methods in science.
Indeed it does, which is why I was querying your use of it to describe something which is clearly not a null hypothesis because, apart from anything else, it is falsifiable. Either you're misusing, misunderstanding or redefining the term. I can't find out which of these you're doing by looking up the standard definition. That's why I asked you.
How would a rabbit in a Cambrian fossil bed falsify natural selection, and not artificial selection?
The theory of evolution by natural selection makes predictions about the way in which life evolves from one form to another which would be challenged by the discovery of an anachronistic creature in an ancient fossil bed.
I don't know if it would challenge your idea of artificial selection because I don't know what the creator's purpose is. If it is to precisely mimic evolution by natural selection, then I guess artificial selection is falsified by the pre-cambrian rabbit too. But it becomes a superfluous idea. (although, of course, he might have just changed his mind and decided not to mimic natural selection after all). If he has some other unknown purpose then it's perfectly possible that the Cambrian rabbit is a part of that purpose. Who am I to judge?
Why would conversations with the Creator not resolve issues about why He created things a certain way?
They
would if the evidence that they yield were consistent and independently verifiable. But anyone can claim to have had a conversation with anybody about anything. And a lot of people do make all kinds of diverse and colourful claims about such things. I see plenty of people in the world claiming to have been spoken to by the creator and they are most certainly not in universal agreement about what he said or what his intentions are!
I gave you Satinover's name, and the name of His book. What more do you need?
Of course I googled him and briefly read about his book but, like everyone else, I don't have time to read every book or reference that is cited to me in enough depth to get a really proper idea of it. So I have to rely on others who have done so. You seem to have read his book, sO I was asking you for more information. You're not obliged to give it.
But I do vaguely remember hearing of similar sounding ideas which are, essentially, statistical tricks. Seemingly astonishing predictions can be "discovered", after the event, by looking for patterns in any large block of information (i.e. any large book). Apologies to Mr Satinover if this is a misrepresentation based on misunderstanding of what he was saying due to my minimal research.
So, there you go again, deflecting the debate from "How likely is it?" to "Not proven, Not proven!" which is meaningless. Nothing can be proven! The goal is to assess plausibility. A government suppressed alien event is more likly than it would be without the testimonies. But, how likely is that? Let's get busy making an objective estimate.
There you go again putting the word "proven" in my mouth! I didn't mention or imply proof at all! I simply said that opinion that a particular thing is true does not necessarily constitute
evidence that the thing
is true. People hold opinions for all kinds of reasons, and most people have an opinion on most things, whether or not they have any actual knowledge. That's human nature. The whole point of scientific investigation is to minimize our human predjudices and opinions by setting standards for the collection of verifiable, reproducable evidence.
Some people, in some countries, still routinely believe in witches. This is not evidence for the existence of witches. It is evidence for the existence of a particular aspect of human nature. It does not give us reason to start a research progamme into the existence of witches. It
may give us reason to start a research programme into various aspects of human psychology and culture.
Using Bayesian methods, the plausibility of "evolition" is substantially higher than "evolution."
You haven't really given any details of what you mean by "evolition". But you've suggested that you mean an intelligent agent selectively breeding and/or genetically engineering living things to create the diversity we see today, and that of the past which is implied by the fossil record.
If this is true, a huge body of evidence suggests that this intelligent agent seems to want to precisely mimic the effects of environmental pressures using artificial means. It's as if he wants us to
think that evolution occurred by environmental selection by carefully manufacturing an exact replica of what would be happening if he were not involved. So far, no evidence has ever been found which goes against this apparent motive.
So it's a bit like imagining a creator who made the entire universe last Tuesday but filled it with diverse mutually supporting evidence (including our own memories) suggesting that it's a lot older. It's sophistry, but it
could be true. But if the behaviour of the world never deviates from what you'd expect if it wasn't true, then why complicate things?
If it looks like a duck, and walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then the best hypothesis until some contrary evidence is discovered, is that it is a duck.