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[James Royce]

A book I just read, on ‘pro-objectivity normative theory’, has arguments for its new moral, social and political theory which may interest you. The book argues that an objective normative theory must be coherent, and asks what evidence there could be for such a theory, arguing that coherence with scientific objectivity must be included in any such evidence and relatedly in the theory’s basis. The book argues that, “regardless of underlying theoretical epistemic controversies, practical science moves on highly-successfully — showing in-practice that objectivity or knowledge is a sufficiently firm notion to be involved in a practical, normative theory’s basis.” Hence an objective normative theory must be pro-objectivity.
Some other or related arguments here:-
“From the viewpoint of any standard, the standard and viewpoint are correct. E.g., from a selfish viewpoint, selfishness is normatively correct. As ‘correct’ means ‘truly, i.e., objectively, correct’, here selfishness is viewed as the only correct/objective moral end. This relatedly applies to pro-selfishness or the end, ‘Be pro-selfishness’, as that selfish viewpoint is inherently pro-selfishness. The general point here has important implications:-
Thence, from objectivity’s viewpoint, or judging via the standard, ‘objectivity’, a pro-objectivity standard and viewpoint are the only correct or objective standard and viewpoint. So this applies regarding normativity. With this, as a viewpoint involves a theory, from objectivity’s or an objective viewpoint pro-objectivity theory is the only correct or objective normative theory, and ‘Be pro-objectivity’ is the only objective normative standard and hence end. It is of course only from objectivity’s viewpoint that it can be known whether something is an objective normative end. (From other viewpoints, e.g., a selfish viewpoint, there can only be mere belief, without objectivity or truth.) Knowledge means truth. Therefore, ‘Be pro-objectivity’ truly is the only objective or correct normative end. This is the only coherent conclusion here, and not just because being pro-objectivity is coherent with objectivity. It is also coherent in that it is the only comprehensible and relatedly rational conclusion here.”
A related argument, also involving coherence, “involves another rationally unquestionable proposition, namely: an objective normative theory, one able to be knowledge, must have a basis and hence end/standard which favour and somehow involve (at least their own) objectivity or status as knowledge.
An objective, normative theory and hence its basis must involve objectivity in that normative theories inherently prescribe or are pro- some end(s), and being pro- an objective end means the theory here and hence its basis are pro- the theory’s end’s objectivity, i.e., its correctness. Otherwise the theory would not be in favour of the theory’s end’s correctness, of itself being objective, and of its own existence. This situation and the theory would be incoherent, self-contradictory. The theory would either be indifferent regarding its prescribed end, and hence not necessarily bother to prescribe or be pro- it, in-effect regarding its correct, inherent end as not correct, not inherent; or the theory would reject its own prescribed, correct end, and hence not prescribe the end it inherently prescribes. It would be anti- what it inherently is pro-. Either way, it would unobjectively regard the objectively correct as not correct. So the theory would not be that objective theory. It would not really exist (as itself).
In sum:- It is impossible and incoherent for an objective normative theory inherently pro- its objective end to not be pro- the theory’s and the end’s objectivity — and hence inherently pro-objectivity here. Objectivity, or knowledge, is inherently never incoherent. So an objective theory, one able to be normative knowledge, must have a basis and end positively involving or pro- at least their own objectivity and hence status as knowledge. There must be coherence here — a positive, pro- relationship.” The book argues that, further, coherence demands that, coherent with the previous sentence’s “coherence here”, an objective normative theory must be fully coherent with pro-objectivity, i.e., by having ‘Be pro-objectivity’ as its (the) single, objective end. With this, the book argues as follows:-
“Those arguments centrally involve pro-objectivity having a pro- relation to objectivity, and vice versa, and hence a unique coherence between pro-objectivity and objectivity. That is, relatedly, again, an objective normative end must be coherent with, pro- or positively-related to objectivity. ‘Be pro-objectivity’ obviously achieves that, in a unique way no other end can match. (Other ends are primarily pro- something other than objectivity, e.g., selfishness.) Similarly, the only end-prescription as close as possible to objectivity, or as closely normatively related as possible to objectivity, is ‘Be pro-objectivity’. And, if a normative principle can be rationally claimed to be knowledge, the principle must be coherent with, pro- or positively-related to knowledge in a general way (where choices here are coherent with that principle). ‘Be pro-objectivity’ obviously achieves that, because objectivity is the faculty-system which acquires and contains knowledge. (And ‘Be pro-objectivity’ is inherently not incoherent with any knowledge, only with certain (inherently normative) choices concerning knowledge.)”
Summarising those and related arguments:-
“Where objectivity is rationally-undeniably possible, e.g., in practical science, evidence crucially involves coherence.... Evidence is that which confirms whether a theory is objective/knowledge.
Because evidence’s essential nature involves coherence, if there is unique mutual coherence between a normative theory and objectivity, ... this provides at least some evidence for the theory’s objectivity. Coherence here suggests the theory is at least somewhat evidence-based or supported by the general nature of evidence.” The argument here again concludes that a normative theory maximally coherent with objectivity is hence an objective theory, with ‘Be pro-objectivity’ as its only obligatory end.
The book presents further arguments or evidence for the book’s theory, but hopefully I’ve said enough to get you interested. The book also discusses practical applications at length (while “stressing that fallibilism and skepticism may be appropriate regarding some suggested specifics – but that future research can increasingly avoid problems here”). The theory argues it has one objective, obligatory primary end, namely ‘Be pro-objectivity’, but also permits “plural a-objective, secondary ends irrelevant [orthogonal] to that end. The theory’s basis permits great liberty and cultural, sexual, artistic, lifestyle and much other diversity regarding secondary ends. The primary end is a general principle implying non-sexism, non-racism, types of happiness, freedom, education, sympathy, peace, democracy, altruism, flourishing, fairness and much more. Emotions and various other subjective experiences are considered important.”

[Whynot]

A book I just read, on ‘pro-objectivity normative theory’, has arguments for its new moral, social and political theory which may interest you. The book argues that an objective normative theory must be coherent, and asks what evidence there could be for such a theory, arguing that coherence with scientific objectivity must be included in any such evidence and relatedly in the theory’s basis. The book argues that, “regardless of underlying theoretical epistemic controversies, practical science moves on highly-successfully — showing in-practice that objectivity or knowledge is a sufficiently firm notion to be involved in a practical, normative theory’s basis.” Hence an objective normative theory must be pro-objectivity.
Some other or related arguments here:-
“From the viewpoint of any standard, the standard and viewpoint are correct. E.g., from a selfish viewpoint, selfishness is normatively correct. As ‘correct’ means ‘truly, i.e., objectively, correct’, here selfishness is viewed as the only correct/objective moral end. This relatedly applies to pro-selfishness or the end, ‘Be pro-selfishness’, as that selfish viewpoint is inherently pro-selfishness. The general point here has important implications:-
Thence, from objectivity’s viewpoint, or judging via the standard, ‘objectivity’, a pro-objectivity standard and viewpoint are the only correct or objective standard and viewpoint. So this applies regarding normativity. With this, as a viewpoint involves a theory, from objectivity’s or an objective viewpoint pro-objectivity theory is the only correct or objective normative theory, and ‘Be pro-objectivity’ is the only objective normative standard and hence end. It is of course only from objectivity’s viewpoint that it can be known whether something is an objective normative end. (From other viewpoints, e.g., a selfish viewpoint, there can only be mere belief, without objectivity or truth.) Knowledge means truth. Therefore, ‘Be pro-objectivity’ truly is the only objective or correct normative end. This is the only coherent conclusion here, and not just because being pro-objectivity is coherent with objectivity. It is also coherent in that it is the only comprehensible and relatedly rational conclusion here.”
A related argument, also involving coherence, “involves another rationally unquestionable proposition, namely: an objective normative theory, one able to be knowledge, must have a basis and hence end/standard which favour and somehow involve (at least their own) objectivity or status as knowledge.
An objective, normative theory and hence its basis must involve objectivity in that normative theories inherently prescribe or are pro- some end(s), and being pro- an objective end means the theory here and hence its basis are pro- the theory’s end’s objectivity, i.e., its correctness. Otherwise the theory would not be in favour of the theory’s end’s correctness, of itself being objective, and of its own existence. This situation and the theory would be incoherent, self-contradictory. The theory would either be indifferent regarding its prescribed end, and hence not necessarily bother to prescribe or be pro- it, in-effect regarding its correct, inherent end as not correct, not inherent; or the theory would reject its own prescribed, correct end, and hence not prescribe the end it inherently prescribes. It would be anti- what it inherently is pro-. Either way, it would unobjectively regard the objectively correct as not correct. So the theory would not be that objective theory. It would not really exist (as itself).
In sum:- It is impossible and incoherent for an objective normative theory inherently pro- its objective end to not be pro- the theory’s and the end’s objectivity — and hence inherently pro-objectivity here. Objectivity, or knowledge, is inherently never incoherent. So an objective theory, one able to be normative knowledge, must have a basis and end positively involving or pro- at least their own objectivity and hence status as knowledge. There must be coherence here — a positive, pro- relationship.” The book argues that, further, coherence demands that, coherent with the previous sentence’s “coherence here”, an objective normative theory must be fully coherent with pro-objectivity, i.e., by having ‘Be pro-objectivity’ as its (the) single, objective end. With this, the book argues as follows:-
“Those arguments centrally involve pro-objectivity having a pro- relation to objectivity, and vice versa, and hence a unique coherence between pro-objectivity and objectivity. That is, relatedly, again, an objective normative end must be coherent with, pro- or positively-related to objectivity. ‘Be pro-objectivity’ obviously achieves that, in a unique way no other end can match. (Other ends are primarily pro- something other than objectivity, e.g., selfishness.) Similarly, the only end-prescription as close as possible to objectivity, or as closely normatively related as possible to objectivity, is ‘Be pro-objectivity’. And, if a normative principle can be rationally claimed to be knowledge, the principle must be coherent with, pro- or positively-related to knowledge in a general way (where choices here are coherent with that principle). ‘Be pro-objectivity’ obviously achieves that, because objectivity is the faculty-system which acquires and contains knowledge. (And ‘Be pro-objectivity’ is inherently not incoherent with any knowledge, only with certain (inherently normative) choices concerning knowledge.)”
Summarising those and related arguments:-
“Where objectivity is rationally-undeniably possible, e.g., in practical science, evidence crucially involves coherence.... Evidence is that which confirms whether a theory is objective/knowledge.
Because evidence’s essential nature involves coherence, if there is unique mutual coherence between a normative theory and objectivity, ... this provides at least some evidence for the theory’s objectivity. Coherence here suggests the theory is at least somewhat evidence-based or supported by the general nature of evidence.” The argument here again concludes that a normative theory maximally coherent with objectivity is hence an objective theory, with ‘Be pro-objectivity’ as its only obligatory end.
The book presents further arguments or evidence for the book’s theory, but hopefully I’ve said enough to get you interested. The book also discusses practical applications at length (while “stressing that fallibilism and skepticism may be appropriate regarding some suggested specifics – but that future research can increasingly avoid problems here”). The theory argues it has one objective, obligatory primary end, namely ‘Be pro-objectivity’, but also permits “plural a-objective, secondary ends irrelevant [orthogonal] to that end. The theory’s basis permits great liberty and cultural, sexual, artistic, lifestyle and much other diversity regarding secondary ends. The primary end is a general principle implying non-sexism, non-racism, types of happiness, freedom, education, sympathy, peace, democracy, altruism, flourishing, fairness and much more. Emotions and various other subjective experiences are considered important.”

whynot: Deriving an ought from an is appears to be hard work for some folks. But I totally agree with the author's initial premise, mayhaps based on slightly differing interpretive reasoning. Moral and normative assignment must be-objectively established and the science of human nature is the only rational foundation to achieve this objectivity. So I have developed two primary axioms that accomplish just this purpose and will serve as a foundational classification system and test standard for the veracity of any evaluative moral stricure. They are as follows...

All of manimals behaviors are foundationally guided by the following axiomatic statements, thus it can be seen that the reason and purpose beneath all of sentient man's behaviors are:

1. To live as long as possible

and/or

2. To create/discover/build a life one can live with


These being descriptive statements one can surmise their coherence to both man's nature as man or, that is to say, their ontologic necessity is established in being qua being, and the consistency and approximation to all of man's behaviors, both abstract internal cogitations and objective normative and non-normative acts, the above two axioms represent the intended consequences of any of man's given actions.

As number one contains within it, (intrinsically), the antecedent value assignment that human life is a value worth sustaining over time,(and improving upon as in axiom 2), it can readily be seen that this will serve as a springboard in over-coming Humes is/ought fallacy or the Naturalistic fallacy, in that it contains the seeds for the beginning of any additional moral codifices or normative systems of behavior valuation. In that they are semantically consistent with a descriptive parametric these axioms facilitate a vast array of human behaviors from a completely neutral, (other than objective human nature), and thus foundational vantage...thus any additional purposing such as happiness, selfishness, altruism, consequentialism, etc. are never priviledged or omitted in any consideration of a behavior/rule/institutional practice that mitigates for or against either axiom. In fact, from the foundational basis of these two axioms one can concievably develop a system of morals that incorporate all of the above strategies in a mixture that recognizes the value of one over another in any given specific.

For instance, a law against gay marriage can be seen as unnecessarily restrictive to axiom two pursuits and therefore has no moral high ground or justification. As long as it can be shown that gay marriage represents an improvement in the life of the couple seeking such a union, weighed against the interests of society pose no appreciable risk, in fact it can be shown that happy people are much more productive and more likely to become contributive members of said society than unhappy people.

[FALCON]

Behavior; moral. Construction consequence of the advanced society. Surprisingly it leaves the road. Fallen by mistake: Murphy's law.
The play will always be present to avoid the absolute entirety.

[Steve3007]

To: "whynot".

You posit that the two moral imperatives of life are:

1. To live as long as possible

and/or

2. To create/discover/build a life one can live with (in laymen's terms: to be happy)


I can only partially follow your following arguments because they are, to my simple mind, written using an unnecessary amount of jargon which tends to mask your basic points.

But I have to say that I disagree with your two imperatives, as I understand them.

Surely, if there is an underlying principle behind all moral decisions in life, it must be the desire to pass on our genes?

Parents are willing to sacrifice their lives for their children.

We want to live for a long time because people who don't tend to have fewer offspring and so don't tend to pass this tendency on to the next generation.


There are other objection to your first imperative, but I believe they are superficial. For example: suicide bombers. They clearly do not want to live as long as possible.

But I would say that, in a sense, they do. It's just that they sincerely believe in a life after death and they believe that their actions in this life will result in a more comfortable afterlife (in paradise). They are therefore, in a strange way, conforming to imperative number 2.

[Whynot]

To: "whynot".

You posit that the two moral imperatives of life are:

1. To live as long as possible

and/or

2. To create/discover/build a life one can live with (in laymen's terms: to be happy)


I can only partially follow your following arguments because they are, to my simple mind, written using an unnecessary amount of jargon which tends to mask your basic points.

But I have to say that I disagree with your two imperatives, as I understand them.

Surely, if there is an underlying principle behind all moral decisions in life, it must be the desire to pass on our genes?

Parents are willing to sacrifice their lives for their children.

whynot: Hi Steve, I ask only if it could be the case that passing on ones genetics wouldn't fit comfortably beneath axiom number two? If doing so is seen by folks as part of a life worth living, then I see no reason why axiom two wouldn't adequately cover this human desire.

Steve: We want to live for a long time because people who don't tend to have fewer offspring and so don't tend to pass this tendency on to the next generation.


There are other objection to your first imperative, but I believe they are superficial. For example: suicide bombers. They clearly do not want to live as long as possible.

whynot: I agree that suicide is an exception to the rule, (always a good sign that the rule is valid), but only so long as there is a rule. Otherwise suicide might be classified as normal human behavior.

Steve: But I would say that, in a sense, they do. It's just that they sincerely believe in a life after death and they believe that their actions in this life will result in a more comfortable afterlife (in paradise). They are therefore, in a strange way, conforming to imperative number 2.

whynot: I suppose in a rather contorted logic they might think so, but to me that seems like such a long shot. Just as an after thought I want to clarify that these twin axioms are not offered specifically as moral guides, but are more along the lines of purpose and reason for human behavior. I only include the fact that a moral code could be adequately devised from these axioms if someone had the inclination to do so. I also hold them forth as objective because they are based on human nature rather than assumptions and beliefs about gods and after-lives and such. Folks who appeal to theistic foundations will still behave in accordance with these axioms so they are broad enough to cover any flavor of religion or cultural norms. Everyone desires to live as long as possible. If they do not, there is a reason that's usually associated with mental disorders or they have been psychologically deprogrammed by the fervor of ideologies. And everyone who is alive will always find something to do that they believe will improve upon their conditions, thus rendering their lives worth living to some degree or another.

[Steve3007]

whynot: I ask only if it could be the case that passing on ones genetics wouldn't fit comfortably beneath axiom number two?

Ah yes, but I think then you have a bit of a circular argument. You see, I read your axiom number 2 as essentially saying that we are motivated by a desire for our life to be happy/contented/fullfilled.

But if the underlieing motive for passing on one's genes is happiness, it's looking as though you're going to define happiness as our underlieing motive.

Clearly we all do things that make us happy because that is kind of the definition of happiness - it's "what we want". And as long as you define "what we want" in the broadest possible sense, then we all, by definition, always do "what we want".

(I'm not sure if that makes any sense. Can anyone else think of a way to make it clearer?!?)

[Whynot]

whynot: I ask only if it could be the case that passing on ones genetics wouldn't fit comfortably beneath axiom number two?

Ah yes, but I think then you have a bit of a circular argument. You see, I read your axiom number 2 as essentially saying that we are motivated by a desire for our life to be happy/contented/fullfilled.

But if the underlieing motive for passing on one's genes is happiness, it's looking as though you're going to define happiness as our underlieing motive.

Clearly we all do things that make us happy because that is kind of the definition of happiness - it's "what we want". And as long as you define "what we want" in the broadest possible sense, then we all, by definition, always do "what we want".

(I'm not sure if that makes any sense. Can anyone else think of a way to make it clearer?!?)

whynot: Hi again Steve,
I think I understand what you're trying to convey. Again I apologize if my articulation of these axioms and/or the reasoning behind them was not clear. Let me see if I can clarify my reasoning for these two specific axioms and why I've worded them as they are. I'll try this example to see if it helps:

Let's choose any person from anywhere in the world and ask them a simple question. Let's begin with that middle aged woman over there sitting behind the wheel of her car waiting for traffic to clear so she can move on out into the highway. "Mam, excuse me, mam? I'm doing some research for a class project and I wonder if you'd mind helping me by answering one simple question?"

Lady: "Well, I'm in a bit of a hurry but if it doesn't take too long I'll try. How can I help?"

You: "Well, I just need to ask you one question."

Lady: "Yes?"

You: "Where are you going right now and why?"

Lady: (a bit puzzled)"That's all? Well, I'm on my way to the hospital to recieve another cancer treatment. The doctors discovered a rare form of cancer in my liver a few months ago and we're trying chemo first before they operate. Does that help?"

You: "Yes mam, sorry to hear that and I hope things go well for you."


Now we can easily see that her response places her very human behavior snugly under axiom 1.

Let's do another. Here comes a young couple pushing a stroller with a small baby tucked inside under a flowery blue blanket. They appear to be engaged in conversation and hardly notice us as we approach.

You: "Excuse me sir?"

Man: "Yes?"

You: "I don't mean to bother you two but I'm doing some research on a special class project and I wonder if you could help me by answering one simple question?"

Man (looking at the woman and then back at you)"Ok, sure, I'll try. What question?"

You: "Do you mind telling me where you folks are going right now and why?"

Man: (looks at you carefully for a second, then at the woman again, shrugs and begins)"We're headed over there to that new childcare center that just opened, (points up the road in the direction they were headed). We heard they have a wonderful program for very young children and my wife has just landed a big contract that will require too much of her time to stay home with our baby, and since we need the money, we decided to investigate the quality of childcare they offer before she agrees to take on this project."

You: "Thank you sir, that's exactly the kind of thing I'm looking for. You folks have a good day and I hope everything works out to your benefit."

whynot; Again, as you can see, this response can easily be seen to fit comfortably beneath the heading of axiom 2. I will venture an opinion Steve, that you will be hard pressed to find anyone with a response to that question who's answer won't fit neatly within one or both of those two axioms...which is why they attain to the status of axioms.

Now you are very welcome to assign any additional value to any human pursuit or behavior that fits within these axioms. Happiness, pride, contentment, selfishness...any human emotionally motivated value assignment will also fit within these axioms. Again, that is why they are axiomatic and thus objective. They are universal and wholly consistent with human nature as you and I and everyone else has experienced it on a daily basis.

I hope this helps and I welcome your input as it helps me to solidify my own cogitations on these subjects.