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[Fried Egg]

I read an interesting book called "Galileo's Error" By Philip Goff on the "hard" problem of consciousness and he is basically an advocate for panpsychism. Without wanting to go into that particular subject here, he made a good argument that, since the days of of Galileo, science has been designed intentionally to preclude the subjective and focus strictly on objective, quantitively measurable facts. While that has been so successful in many fields of science, it has set barriers to the ability of science to explain the subjective. Which is why he believes that the problem of consciousness will never be properly understood until that changes.

But that doesn't mean that science cannot investigate the subjective. Imagine we want to find out how many people had ever felt depressed. Or imagine we wanted to get a handle on what a heart attack felt like. With well posed questions and a big enough sample we can do studies that will yield statistically significant results on anything that individuals feel subjectively.

That does not investigate the subjective. No amount of surveys can tell you what it's like to feel depressed or what a heart attack actually feels like. No amount of data can tell a blind person what seeing yellow feels like.

And yet we know consciousness exists, and how it feels to feel the things we feel, because we directly experience it.

Furthermore, science has a problem with teleological explanations. We cannot objectively measurepurpose. And yet we experience our own sense of purpose and our actions that are guided by it. Like consciousness, we assume other humans have purpose because we do ourselves. And yet the scientific approach to many social sciences (including economics) eschews a any form of teleological analysis, preferring to study human interactions as if we were mindless physical entities (through strict statistical analysis) as that's more "scientific".

Note, I'm not arguing against science or the scientific method here. Just that there might be some improvements that need to be made in order to develop our understanding reality in certain fields.

[Pattern-chaser]

I read an interesting book called "Galileo's Error" By Philip Goff on the "hard" problem of consciousness and he is basically an advocate for panpsychism. Without wanting to go into that particular subject here, he made a good argument that, since the days of of Galileo, science has been designed intentionally to preclude the subjective and focus strictly on objective, quantitively measurable facts. While that has been so successful in many fields of science, it has set barriers to the ability of science to explain the subjective.

I agree. As science was growing-up, it needed to specialise, to become the outstanding tool we know today. To do this, I think it abandoned (probably not 'consciously'), subjective topics and subjectivity — the difficult stuff. IMO.

[Lagayascienza]

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I read an interesting book called "Galileo's Error" By Philip Goff on the "hard" problem of consciousness and he is basically an advocate for panpsychism. Without wanting to go into that particular subject here, he made a good argument that, since the days of of Galileo, science has been designed intentionally to preclude the subjective and focus strictly on objective, quantitively measurable facts. While that has been so successful in many fields of science, it has set barriers to the ability of science to explain the subjective. Which is why he believes that the problem of consciousness will never be properly understood until that changes.

How has science set itself barriers against explaining the subjective? The subjective is part of consciousness. If science cannot explain consciousness, then nothing will explain it. Science has already made progress in that regard but we don’t hear a lot about that progress on philosophy forums where a good many want to keep consciousness “spooky”.

But that doesn't mean that science cannot investigate the subjective. Imagine we want to find out how many people had ever felt depressed. Or imagine we wanted to get a handle on what a heart attack felt like. With well posed questions and a big enough sample we can do studies that will yield statistically significant results on anything that individuals feel subjectively.

That does not investigate the subjective. No amount of surveys can tell you what it's like to feel depressed or what a heart attack actually feels like. No amount of data can tell a blind person what seeing yellow feels like.

And yet we know consciousness exists, and how it feels to feel the things we feel, because we directly experience it.

You are talking here about “raw feel” or “qualia”. I don’t want to go down that philosophical rabbit-hole here but, while we might not know for sure that your experience of red is the same as mine, we do know that if we both have normal colour vision, then we will agree that certain objects look red and that others don’t. The philosophical question of whether science can prove objectively and with absolute certainty that your subjectively experience of red is identical to my experience of red is irrelevant. Nothing is ever proven with absolute certainty. And, for practical purposes, it doesn’t need to be. Such questions are of entertainment value only to navel gazing philosophers. We can tell each other how red looks to us and reach a consensus. Scientifically designed surveys in the social sciences do this on a larger scale and they discover truths about what humans think and feel subjectively. For example, medical science has given us a picture of what humans think a heart attack subjectively “feels” like. When we have been told or read what a heart feels like, then we know that it might be a good idea to call an ambulance if we or someone else experiences that subjective “feel”. Medical science has built up a useful picture of what a heart attack subjectively feels like. There are numerous other example of how science investigates the subjective and produces useful findings.


In the end, the concept of “qualia” is a controversial one with no explanatory power. Thought experiments like “Mary’s Room” prove nothing other than our present lack of understanding of exactly how brains do what they do, and perhaps about the limitations of language. Only science will be able to explain consciousness and the emergence of subjectivity.

Furthermore, science has a problem with teleological explanations. We cannot objectively measure purpose. And yet we experience our own sense of purpose and our actions that are guided by it. Like consciousness, we assume other humans have purpose because we do ourselves. And yet the scientific approach to many social sciences (including economics) eschews a any form of teleological analysis, preferring to study human interactions as if we were mindless physical entities (through strict statistical analysis) as that's more "scientific".

We can infer purpose from the way people behave individually and en masse given certain subjective feelings or external conditions. And we can make predictions about how people will act given those feelings or external conditions. For example , if people subjectively feel severe chest pain and shortness of breath, then they are likely to suspect that they may be having a heart attack. That’s what a heart attack “feels” like. And we can predict that if they have that feeling they are likely to call an ambulance. Their subjective “feel” of a heart attack was their purpose in calling an ambulance. As another example, we can ask people what their purpose was in doing X or Y. If we ask enough people then we can get a statistically significant, objective finding in relation to purpose. For example, if we ask people why they took route X to work instead of route Y we may find that they feel that the traffic is worse on route Y. Science can tell us a lot about the subjective and about purpose.

Note, I'm not arguing against science or the scientific method here. Just that there might be some improvements that need to be made in order to develop our understanding reality in certain fields.

Right. And that’s the great thing about science. Its truth claims are always provisional and it is always open to new data and more effective ways of gaining real knowledge. Gaining real knowledge is what science is about.

On the other hand, theological claims about gods, spirits, ghosts, etcetera are not real knowledge. They are merely just-so stories. They may have been a unifying force which helped hold societies together by controlling behaviour, and they may still assuage existential angst in some people, but they have no truth value. The claims of things like astrology , tarot, etcetera are in the same league. They are not knowledge. They are just-so stories to which the value “true” cannot be ascribed.

Science can certainly probe the subjective. In fact science is the only way to obtain new knowledge about anything. Again, I would ask anyone who rejects scientism as I’ve defined it to put forward an alternative “way of knowing” anything that gives reliable knowledge about the world and yet is clearly distinct from the methods used by science. Be sure to include a demonstration that such knowledge is indeed valid and reliable, and thus comparable to scientific knowledge, but without using science in that demonstration.

[value]

Accusation of “scientism” are often tossed about by people who think science gets above itself. How do people here feel about scientism? Does science over-reach as some accuse it of doing? Does it intrude into areas where it is inapplicable and has no business? Or does science have a universal applicability? If it does have universal applicability, does that make scientism the most reasonable basis for understanding the universe?

I figure that the reference 'some people' would be applicable to me as a user on this forum who has repeatedly questioned and criticized scientism. I published an online book of one of the topics on this forum that includes over 400 posts debating Daniel Dennett's defense of scientism and his rejection of ⃤ Qualia.

Science received a good defense in that topic:

Guess science won this round by a landslide..

I want to make it clear beforehand that I am actually not ideologically motivated. As mentioned before repeatedly "I wouldn't mind what is actually the case". So my 'chosen' stance in this regard must rather be seen as a tool for questioning more deeply into things, and is intended strategically for aspired philosophical advancement more generally.

You conclude with the question whether scientism should be seen as the most reasonable basis for understanding the Universe.

In my critical investigation of scientism I actually ended up with the same question, or more generally: is embracing dogma, which scientism fundamentally is according to my view, the highest that humanity might aspire? Is there no other way than dogma, and if so, would scientism in that light be the best choice that humanity might make when compared to various alternatives such as religious dogma?

Despite this, when considering the sheer possibility of philosophy and its fundamental ability to question dogma itself, I would have to disagree with my suggestion, despite that I don't have an answer beforehand.

So my answer would be no: dogmatic scientism is not justified or the best way for humanity. In the words of Hereandnow in topic "On The Absurd Hegemony of Science":

"when science makes its moves to "say" what the world is, it is only right within the scope of its field. But philosophy, which is the most open field, has no business yielding to this any more than to knitting "science" or masonry. Philosophy is all inclusive theory, and the attempt to fit such a thing into a scientific paradigm is simply perverse."
viewtopic.php?t=18123

In a sense, it all comes down to the following, in my opinion:

"Barbarians reflect on cruelty in nature to fuel cruelty. Moral and ethical beings reflect on reason to become reasonable. The potential of philosophy shows what path is right to chose."

Science might tell you that X will happen because it happened in the past. Morality and philosophy more generally involves a scope that goes beyond what science might ever be able to tell.

Evidence to back it up:

Learning one’s genetic risk changes physiology independent of actual genetic risk
In an interesting twist to the enduring nature vs. nurture debate, a new study from Stanford University finds that just thinking you’re prone to a given outcome may trump both nature and nurture. In fact, simply believing a physical reality about yourself can actually nudge the body in that direction—sometimes even more than actually being prone to the reality.
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562- ... -behaviour

The primary flaw of scientism lays in this: the unjustified assumption of existence as a given and a correlated attempt to escape the fundamental uncertainty of reality by retreating into an assumed empirical certainty.

The certainty aspired and assumed by scientism is illusory and based on dogmatic assumptions that cannot withstand philosophical scrutiny.

The utilitarian success of science is one thing, philosophical correctness is another.

[value]

Some examples of statements that I would call scientism take the form:

• X has always been observed to occur (e.g. physical laws); therefore, X will always occur.

• All existing evidence supports the Big Bang theory; therefore, the Big Bang really happened.

• Science has progressively been able to explain more and more things, therefore anything yet unexplained will eventually be explained by science.

These statements are inductive generalizations and are fallacious in the manner of the statement that ‘all swans we’ve seen are white; therefore, all swans are white’. Of course, many people have great confidence in science and believe statements such as these, and I’ve no argument against that. But when they’re asserted as universal or proven truths, I think it’s important to point out that the reasoning just isn’t there to support that.

While that assertion might be true, people on the side of scientism would ask and perhaps rightfully demand "what is the alternative?".

A fundamental driver of scientism in human culture might be the following adage:

"The primary problem is the motivation."

Philosopher of science Stephen C. Meyer wrote in his book The Mystery of Life’s Origin that a primary motive at play, that might cause scientists to consciously favor dogmatic and even religious deviation, is scientific progress itself.

What is the alternative? Let them be wrong in their assertions, as long as they are making progress on behalf of science. What would be the problem with the assertion that all swans are white and that it is later discovered that some swans are black? In the mean time, humans would have been able to scientifically progress with their knowledge of the existence of white swans.

So my position would be to accept the critique of opponents of scientism and demand from philosophy to 'deliver'.

[Lagayascienza]

I agree with Martin Boudry who in his 2020 paper Scientism Schmientism! Why There Are No Other Ways of Knowing Apart from Science (Broadly Construed) wrote:

"...all valid ways of knowing are continuous with those of the sciences, and form one seamless web. There are no “other ways of knowing” apart from the ones being used in science (empirical observation and various logical and statistical inferences). Of course, we can still make pragmatic distinctions between institutionalized science and other forms of inquiry. Take an everyday form of knowledge acquisition such as a plumber trying to locate a leak. It would be somewhat strange to call my plumber a “scientist”, but that doesn’t mean that he’s engaged in some “other way of knowing”. If he’s a good plumber, he will rely on the same methods and modes of inference that are found in the scientist’s toolkit: making observations, testing out different hypotheses, using logical inferences, and so on. Needless to say, the background knowledge used by my plumber is also connected to proper scientific knowledge, for example about fluid dynamics. The main difference is that my plumber is working on a relatively mundane and isolated problem (my sink), which is both simple enough to solve on his own, and parochial enough not be of any interest to academic journals. To see what would really constitute a “different way of knowing”, imagine that my plumber started using a dowsing rod or magic crystals to locate the leak. Such methods are radically different from the ones being used in science. But not coincidentally, they are also bunk. (Emphasis added)

In short, the definition of “scientism” that I would endorse is the following: there are no other ways of knowing apart from those used by the sciences (broadly construed, including history and the humanities). All valid modes of knowing are continuous with each other and rely on pretty much the same methods and modes of inference. If, on the other hand, someone presents us with a method that is completely detached from the ones used in science, like personal intuition or revelation or reading tea leaves, we can be confident that it’s rubbish. As I put it in my chapter for the book:

“If a factual question is answerable at all, it can be answered using methods that are at least continuous with science. If some epistemic enterprise becomes too detached from science, and thus from the rest of the web of knowledge with which science is connected, that usually does not bode well for that enterprise.'

I agree with this. Theology, tarot, astrology ... It's all bunk. I would add only that science can probe consciousness which is the source or the subjective. In fact, as Boudry says, science is the only way to obtain new knowledge about anything. Again, I would ask anyone who rejects scientism as I’ve defined it to put forward an alternative “way of knowing” anything that gives reliable knowledge about the world and yet is clearly distinct from the methods used by science. Be sure to include a demonstration that such knowledge is indeed valid and reliable, and thus comparable to scientific knowledge, but without using science in that demonstration.

[LuckyR]

But that doesn't mean that science cannot investigate the subjective. Imagine we want to find out how many people had ever felt depressed. Or imagine we wanted to get a handle on what a heart attack felt like. With well posed questions and a big enough sample we can do studies that will yield statistically significant results on anything that individuals feel subjectively. We could do a scientifically designed survey to get reliable results on moral values, religious beliefs and just about anything else we might care to study. I'm open to suggestions but, again, I cannot think of any phenomenon that science cannot investigate.

Well, yes and no. Science can objectively quantify a population's opinion of what they find beautiful, but it cannot tell you what is beauty.

[Lagayascienza]

Yes, aesthetic judgements and moral sensibilities are not truth apt and science has to ask us what we find beautiful or morally laudable or repugnant. But there are interesting and scientifically useful regularities that emerge across the human population in respect of these.

[Pattern-chaser]

But that doesn't mean that science cannot investigate the subjective. Imagine we want to find out how many people had ever felt depressed. Or imagine we wanted to get a handle on what a heart attack felt like. With well posed questions and a big enough sample we can do studies that will yield statistically significant results on anything that individuals feel subjectively. We could do a scientifically designed survey to get reliable results on moral values, religious beliefs and just about anything else we might care to study. I'm open to suggestions but, again, I cannot think of any phenomenon that science cannot investigate.

Well, yes and no. Science can objectively quantify a population's opinion of what they find beautiful, but it cannot tell you what is beauty.

Statistics can gather lots of useful data for us. It is the closest science can get to understanding subjectivism. But its "closest" isn't very close at all. Statistics enables us to develop a view from the outside, such as an alien observer might gain. But to understand "subjectivity", as I understand it, is quite another matter. Statistics offers no assistance here. None at all.

To seriously consider subjectivity, we need tools other than science. Those who assert otherwise are sciencists, yes?

[Thomyum2]

I agree with Martin Boudry who in his 2020 paper Scientism Schmientism! Why There Are No Other Ways of Knowing Apart from Science (Broadly Construed) wrote:

...

I agree with this. Theology, tarot, astrology ... It's all bunk. I would add only that science can probe consciousness which is the source or the subjective. In fact, as Boudry says, science is the only way to obtain new knowledge about anything. Again, I would ask anyone who rejects scientism as I’ve defined it to put forward an alternative “way of knowing” anything that gives reliable knowledge about the world and yet is clearly distinct from the methods used by science. Be sure to include a demonstration that such knowledge is indeed valid and reliable, and thus comparable to scientific knowledge, but without using science in that demonstration.

Thanks for mentioning this article – I’ve looked it up and read it and although I don’t agree with everything that Boudry says, I find it thought-provoking and insightful. Interesting to see that the two definitions (using 'best' or 'only' criteria) of 'scientism' I mentioned before are now multiplied to four by the addition of the narrow vs. broad way of defining 'science'.

Lots that could be talked about here – allow me to just offer a few thoughts:

To start with, you’ve paraphrased Boudry as saying that ‘science is the only way to obtain new knowledge about anything’ and I think in the context of the entire article this oversimplifies his position. As per his title – he is saying ‘there are no other ways of knowing apart from those used by the sciences (broadly construed)’ – I emphasize the plural here as he’s expanding the definition of ‘science’ beyond how the term is usually used, to include not just all of the many different sciences, but also ‘history and the humanities’ as well as anything that is ‘continuous with science’, but excluding anything what is ‘radically different’ or ’‘too detached from science.’ What’s not at all clear to me is where or by what criteria exactly one would draw the line between these – the examples of theology and metaphysics that he gives as ‘too detached’ would usually be classified as humanities, which falls inside his broad definition. I’d offer that he’s perhaps ‘construed’ science so broadly here as to almost be defining it as any valid kind of ‘knowing’ (which of course is the origin of the word in Latin), thereby making this a self-fulfilling argument, to the effect of saying ‘there are no ways of knowing other than, well…knowing', which basically leads into an epistemological argument about what really qualifies as 'knowing' in the first place. So in the big picture, I think he's playing a bit of a language game here.

The second issue I see is that when he states: ‘If a factual question is answerable at all, it can be answered using methods that are at least continuous with science.’ Given that the term ‘factual’ usually refers to something that exists or has actual reality, then what is ‘a factual question’ is going to hinge on a person’s ontological stance, which of course opens up another 'rabbit hole' which is outside the topic of this thread. Since ‘science’ is usually understood to be limited to observations of physical objects and phenomena, then I would have to assume his position here is materialist or physicalist and that he's speaking only of facts about the physical world. But someone who subscribes to a different ontology will necessarily see this differently and reasonably conclude that traditional science is not going to be able to answer factual questions about things that are not, or do not have an observable effect on, physical objects and that an alternative 'way of knowing' might be able to. Again, it's beyond the scope of this thread so I'll leave it there.

Lastly, I'm puzzled by, and would take issue with Boudry’s classification ‘personal intuition’ as ‘completely detached from science and the rest of knowledge.’ Intuition is intertwined with science and the process of gaining knowledge. Ironically, the example of the plumber whose work he describes is one of someone who is likely using intuition to solve a problem. Scientists too rely on intuition, inspiration and imagination to develop the very hypotheses that they create to build the body of scientific knowledge – Einstein spoke often and highly of the value of intuition. He reportedly once said that “One who scorns the power of intuition will never rise above the ranks of journeyman calculator.”

All of this takes me back to my previous posts on this thread where I pointed out originally that this term ‘scientism’ is not a clearly defined one which makes arguments about it convoluted and confused. As I offered above, I think a more useful understanding of the term is something along the lines of a misapplication of science – a belief in mistaken or unfounded assumptions about what science has said or what it is capable of. Since I see philosophy's primary role as one of identifying and understanding the assumptions that underly our beliefs, it's most of interest to me to approach the question from that angle.

To close, I’d just take you up on your challenge to offer an alternative way of knowing by suggesting that instinct (which I think is closely related to intuition) might be something to consider. Animals, for example, make no use of scientific methods, yet demonstrate exceptional knowledge of their world, knowledge which they’ve used to survive longer and more successfully than humans have. And, I might add, doing it in a way that doesn’t destroy their home or deplete their resources in the process. Perhaps they have something to teach us humans about ways of knowing.

[Thomyum2]

But that doesn't mean that science cannot investigate the subjective. Imagine we want to find out how many people had ever felt depressed. Or imagine we wanted to get a handle on what a heart attack felt like. With well posed questions and a big enough sample we can do studies that will yield statistically significant results on anything that individuals feel subjectively. We could do a scientifically designed survey to get reliable results on moral values, religious beliefs and just about anything else we might care to study. I'm open to suggestions but, again, I cannot think of any phenomenon that science cannot investigate.

Well, yes and no. Science can objectively quantify a population's opinion of what they find beautiful, but it cannot tell you what is beauty.

Statistics can gather lots of useful data for us. It is the closest science can get to understanding subjectivism. But its "closest" isn't very close at all. Statistics enables us to develop a view from the outside, such as an alien observer might gain. But to understand "subjectivity", as I understand it, is quite another matter. Statistics offers no assistance here. None at all.

To seriously consider subjectivity, we need tools other than science. Those who assert otherwise are sciencists, yes?

Introducing the terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ into philosophical discussions always seems to bring a certain degree of confusion, as I think it is doere here too. To clarify, I would propose that science can observe humans – i.e. their behaviors (psychology) and physiology (neuroscience) – and can thereby study subjective experiences are far as trying to identify a physical source for that experience, or a correlation between that reported experience and something that is 'objectively' observable. But I think it's clear that the contents of subjective experiences themselves are not observable.

But I think the question that relates to scientism is not one of whether or not science can study or explain human subjective experiences, but is rather: are there some human subjective experiences that are experiences of an objective phenomenon external to the subject, but for which no object is detectable to scientific methods of observation? In other words, in the absence of science’s ability to identify a physical ‘object’ of a given reported subjective experience, how are we to distinguish whether this experience is purely subjective (i.e. entirely within the person’s mind and without an ‘object’) or one that is an experience of something objectively real but for which science simply lacks the tools to observe the object. There's a spectrum here - going from things such as hallucinations, delusions, dreams, etc. on the one end, which are generally considered to be solely within the mind of the individual, to things such as morals, purposes, spirits, God, etc., for which multiple individuals may share the experience and thereby make the claim that these things have independent existence and are a knowable part of reality even in the absence of physical confirmation by science.

But whatever the case, the only thing that ‘science’ itself can say is whether or not an object or cause was observed to correspond with this subjective experience. The question to science always remains open pending further evidence. But ‘scientism’, in the strict sense, will go beyond and say that because ‘science’ has not identified a physical object or cause, therefore this object does not exist, and this person’s experience is solely a subjective experience with no objective corollary. In other words, as I see the matter, science’s claims remain in the realm of what has been observed, whereas scientism’s claims extend to the world of what should be believed based on the existing body of recorded observations.