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[Sculptor1]

The position of the compatibilists saves all appearances and answers this question fully.
Those who reject it in favour of radical free will, when examined about choices and upon what those choices are based often break under questioning, and fall silent.

A choice made freely or under duress is the consequent and effected result of who are what we are at any given moment. Whilst we can do as we will, we cannot will as we will.

[RJG]

Whilst we can do as we will, we cannot will as we will.

Sculpt, thx, this is another good example of an X<X logical impossibility, that further proves the impossibility of free-will (conscious causation).

[The Beast]

The evidence is translated to opinion.
X < X; Is an illogical form of an abstract subject to the will.
What is needed is the definition of radical free will (why not called it “what is” or “what should be” or “what will be or all three” then: is it a substance?) in addition to the known Socratic wills.
What I believe is that the transition of Homo Sapiens to X Sapiens is one of coexistence first. So, it is possible that some form of Homo Habilis method still exists. It is possible that four or five transitions might coexist in a block-time or time-block. As such, I have an explanation for the “feeling” of a dinosaur stalking me. Since I can feel a dinosaur I have a Homo-Habilis method in my toolbox.
Therefore, the conclusion of the method: X<X is an opinion of illogical feeling expressed by deficient means (an opinion as well) that unsuccessfully/successfully tries to blank the will to meaning.

[Lagayascienza]

The position of the compatibilists saves all appearances and answers this question fully.
Those who reject it in favour of radical free will, when examined about choices and upon what those choices are based often break under questioning, and fall silent.

A choice made freely or under duress is the consequent and effected result of who are what we are at any given moment. Whilst we can do as we will, we cannot will as we will.

The radical Libertarian approach to free will is untenable because it denies Determinism which I take to be obviously true. However, free will in the Compatibilist sense is not incompatible with Determinism. A "reason-response" approach makes most sense to me. It recognises determinism but allows that we could have decided to act differently than we did if conditions had been different. So, if I had reasons to do X instead of Y, then I would have done X, whereas, if I'd had different reasons, I might have done Y. I don't see a problem with this sort of Compatibilism.

[Sculptor1]

Whilst we can do as we will, we cannot will as we will.

Sculpt, thx, this is another good example of an X<X logical impossibility, that further proves the impossibility of free-will (conscious causation).

Sadly I cannot claim the idea as my own.
The phrase is loosely translated from Arthur Schopenhauer, who was famously a supporter of determinism.

[Sculptor1]

The position of the compatibilists saves all appearances and answers this question fully.
Those who reject it in favour of radical free will, when examined about choices and upon what those choices are based often break under questioning, and fall silent.

A choice made freely or under duress is the consequent and effected result of who are what we are at any given moment. Whilst we can do as we will, we cannot will as we will.

The radical Libertarian approach to free will is untenable because it denies Determinism which I take to be obviously true. However, free will in the Compatibilist sense is not incompatible with Determinism.

That is why they call it compatibilism - the clue is in the name

A "reason-response" approach makes most sense to me. It recognises determinism but allows that we could have decided to act differently than we did if conditions had been different. So, if I had reasons to do X instead of Y, then I would have done X, whereas, if I'd had different reasons, I might have done Y. I don't see a problem with this sort of Compatibilism.

The idea of free will for compatibilists is just the absence or degree of absence of exogenous causes. To have completely free will you would have to be completely determined endogenously. In simple terms - no one is pointing a gun at your head.
In practice, even for compatibilisits, an instance of this is rare.
Nonethless, whilst we can will our actions we are locked in to obey the laws of nature.

[Sy Borg]

As stated in another thread:

C1 is wrong because we don't live in a Minkowski block reality. Making decisions just before stimuli arrives presents no major philosophical issue because the time difference is so short.

The mistake RJG makes is assuming that we start each moment as a blank slate and then respond to events after the fact, as if we were meat puppets controlled by outside forces. However, since we have memories, our "late" responses are clearly made done to prior mental processing, not from outside factors.

The lag does result in in a lack of control in areas where split seconds are critical, such as elite sports, where ultra skilled players routinely make "dumb" mistakes in the moment. Why? Events in sport sometimes occur more quickly than our response times. In effect, the mistakes come from processing data from a a fraction of a second ago, that has been superseded by rapidly unfolding events.

[Lagayascienza]

That's why I say that the short time delay does not preclude free will in Compatibilist terms.

Firstly, the delay is less than the blink of an eye, and it's far from clear that it is only during that short delay that a decision is actually made. Activity in the PFC during that short time might just be the brain booting up in readiness to make a conscious decision.

Moreover, as Sy borg mentions, we don't start each moment as a blank slate. Presxisting reasons, memories, beliefs, desires, knowledge, goals, etc. feed into decisions even if some processing occurs during the short delay before conscious awareness of a decision. That's why we have a conscious sense of continuity through time, why we have the feeling that our decisions are the result of pre-existing reasons, knowledge, goals, etc. In order to come to important, complex life decisions where conscious calculation is required, we need input from these existing memories, reasons, knowledge, goals, etc. Such decisions cannot just pop into existence from nowhere iniformed by anything.

Yes, we are determined to a large extent, but we are not automatons who are unable, in the present or near present, to freely choose based on reasons, knowledge, goals, etc. that we currently have. If those reasons knowledge, goals, etc. had been different we could have, and would have, made a different decision.

[Lagayascienza]

Having read the article RJG referred to on the precious page, I am of the same opinion still. I remain a Compatibilist.

Determinism may be true, but decisions and choices don’t just magically appear out of nowhere and pop into consciousness in the blink of an eye. They are made with the future in mind and are informed by things in our past and present - our reasons, memories, beliefs, desires, knowledge, goals, etc. and they are therefore our decisions, our choices freely based on our own motivations. Therefore, although determinism is true, there remains room for free will.

In relation to the 200-millisecond delay, philosopher Simon Blackburn likens the process of decision making to the running of a race. The race is not won at the finish line but depends on the runner’s running of the whole race. She has to get off the blocks, then into a good lane and pump for all she’s worth, right up to the finish line.

[Lagayascienza]

Sorry about the typo in my previous post. That should have read: ...on the previous page...

Apologies