So for example, if you're disproving WMaterialism of the sort I described, one way you might do so is to claim that quanta are an irreducible feature of any explanation of the world, but they have been shown not to have well-defined causal properties, and therefore cannot really be 'matter.' (I am guessing that your answer is a little more interesting than this, from the OP.)
By 'well-defined,' I think I mean fully predictable (not just reliably probable). Also, keep in mind that if you are claiming to have disproven WMaterialism, existence is not the issue--only explanation of phenomena.
Just to clarify, my questions were not rhetorical; I actually would like to know how you answer them, so that I can correctly interpret your argument.
reflected_light, is that a book by Wilhelmus Luijpen? If so, good luck--and bring some aspirin! Continental philosophy is, in my opinion, far more difficult than Analytical. They tend to take things holistically, meaning you may not be able to break down thoughts into bite-sized premises and conclusions. Existential Phenomenology is inspired by Martin Heidegger, who is notoriously hard to understand--some people think he's a quack, others a genius, and others just indecipherable. (Also he had a brief stint with the Nazis.)