Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Philosophy Club

[Gertie]

Robert Pirsig, the author of "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance," is known for his criticism of the subjective/objective dichotomy. He challenged the traditional Western philosophy's "fact-value" or "subject-object" division, arguing that it has banished the questions of quality, values, and morality from the objective realm, relegating them to the subjective.

Philosophy can make a case for "the why of existence (e.g. 'the philosophical God', Schopenhauer's Will or Robert Pirsig's Quality) and that means that philosophy can transcend the subjective/objective dichotomy without losing touch with an aspect that is fundamental to reality. That ability does not spring from existence itself, but from an aspect that is more fundamental than existence itself.

Can you explain this more?

Because it strikes me that the Subject/Object distinction boils down to the existence of the private, 'directly known' and qualiative first person perspective, which only consciously experiencing subjects have. Where-as 'objects' are things which are experienced, public, 'over there', observable and inter-subjectively falsifiable. This just seems to be how it is. (And it's an important difference, because it's the qualiative nature of conscious experience which brings all value, meaning, purpose and mattering into the world). What would 'transcending' this difference mean?

[popeye1945]

Robert Pirsig, the author of "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance," is known for his criticism of the subjective/objective dichotomy. He challenged the traditional Western philosophy's "fact-value" or "subject-object" division, arguing that it has banished the questions of quality, values, and morality from the objective realm, relegating them to the subjective.

Philosophy can make a case for "the why of existence (e.g. 'the philosophical God', Schopenhauer's Will or Robert Pirsig's Quality) and that means that philosophy can transcend the subjective/objective dichotomy without losing touch with an aspect that is fundamental to reality. That ability does not spring from existence itself, but from an aspect that is more fundamental than existence itself.

Can you explain this more?

Because it strikes me that the Subject/Object distinction boils down to the existence of the private, 'directly known' and qualiative first person perspective, which only consciously experiencing subjects have. Where-as 'objects' are things which are experienced, public, 'over there', observable and inter-subjectively falsifiable. This just seems to be how it is. (And it's an important difference, because it's the qualiative nature of conscious experience which brings all value, meaning, purpose and mattering into the world). What would 'transcending' this difference mean?

Would it not mean differences in individual biology, such as including differing understandings, the collective subjective would then become meaningless. Apparent reality would then be a private matter, each agent's experience isolated from any commonality.

[value]

Robert Pirsig, the author of "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance," is known for his criticism of the subjective/objective dichotomy. He challenged the traditional Western philosophy's "fact-value" or "subject-object" division, arguing that it has banished the questions of quality, values, and morality from the objective realm, relegating them to the subjective.

Philosophy can make a case for "the why of existence (e.g. 'the philosophical God', Schopenhauer's Will or Robert Pirsig's Quality) and that means that philosophy can transcend the subjective/objective dichotomy without losing touch with an aspect that is fundamental to reality. That ability does not spring from existence itself, but from an aspect that is more fundamental than existence itself.

Can you explain this more?

Because it strikes me that the Subject/Object distinction boils down to the existence of the private, 'directly known' and qualiative first person perspective, which only consciously experiencing subjects have. Where-as 'objects' are things which are experienced, public, 'over there', observable and inter-subjectively falsifiable. This just seems to be how it is. (And it's an important difference, because it's the qualiative nature of conscious experience which brings all value, meaning, purpose and mattering into the world). What would 'transcending' this difference mean?

The why of subjective experience. The why of the concept 'begin' from which the world as a Totality presents itself in mind.

What is more fundamental than 'begin' must be beginning-less of nature, and, in my opinion, it is non-sensical to suppose that a begin has only two options for an explanation, as is commonly assumed without philosophical justification.

One is fundamentally obligated to explain the potential of a begin.

Sculptor1 once mentioned the following:

There are 4 possible states of the universe.

1) A universe with no beginning and no end. (eternal)
2) A universe with no beginning but with and end
3) A universe with a beginning and no end.
4) A universe with a beginning and an end.

Terrapin Station had a similar view but according to him there are just 2 options to explain the universe:

1) the universe either magically sprung into existence
2) the universe magically always existed

He reasoned the following:

For any given initial existent, either it "spontaneously appeared" or it always existed. Those are the only two options, and they're both counterintuitive. Nevertheless, there's no other choice.

Logical options. Either we're exhausting the logical possibilities or we're not. Again, if you can think of a third option, that's great, but you'd need to present what the third option would be.

The mentioned options are all based on the assumption that the concept 'begin' is applicable to the universe on a fundamental level and that causality is required to explain the origin of the Universe.

At question would be how a philosophical 'option' (magically always existed or magically have sprung into existence) is possible in the first place. It is then seen that for any option to be possible an aspect is required that is not of a nature that allows a choice.

This is what transcending the subjective/objective dichotomy is about, and it shows its practical value for philosophical progress. It is vital to align progress with both 'ought' (morality) and 'adherence' (truth).

[Gertie]

Robert Pirsig, the author of "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance," is known for his criticism of the subjective/objective dichotomy. He challenged the traditional Western philosophy's "fact-value" or "subject-object" division, arguing that it has banished the questions of quality, values, and morality from the objective realm, relegating them to the subjective.

Philosophy can make a case for "the why of existence (e.g. 'the philosophical God', Schopenhauer's Will or Robert Pirsig's Quality) and that means that philosophy can transcend the subjective/objective dichotomy without losing touch with an aspect that is fundamental to reality. That ability does not spring from existence itself, but from an aspect that is more fundamental than existence itself.

Can you explain this more?

Because it strikes me that the Subject/Object distinction boils down to the existence of the private, 'directly known' and qualiative first person perspective, which only consciously experiencing subjects have. Where-as 'objects' are things which are experienced, public, 'over there', observable and inter-subjectively falsifiable. This just seems to be how it is. (And it's an important difference, because it's the qualiative nature of conscious experience which brings all value, meaning, purpose and mattering into the world). What would 'transcending' this difference mean?

The why of subjective experience. The why of the concept 'begin' from which the world as a Totality presents itself in mind.

What is more fundamental than 'begin' must be beginning-less of nature, and, in my opinion, it is non-sensical to suppose that a begin has only two options for an explanation, as is commonly assumed without philosophical justification.

One is fundamentally obligated to explain the potential of a begin.

Sculptor1 once mentioned the following:

There are 4 possible states of the universe.

1) A universe with no beginning and no end. (eternal)
2) A universe with no beginning but with and end
3) A universe with a beginning and no end.
4) A universe with a beginning and an end.

Terrapin Station had a similar view but according to him there are just 2 options to explain the universe:

1) the universe either magically sprung into existence
2) the universe magically always existed

He reasoned the following:

For any given initial existent, either it "spontaneously appeared" or it always existed. Those are the only two options, and they're both counterintuitive. Nevertheless, there's no other choice.

Logical options. Either we're exhausting the logical possibilities or we're not. Again, if you can think of a third option, that's great, but you'd need to present what the third option would be.

The mentioned options are all based on the assumption that the concept 'begin' is applicable to the universe on a fundamental level and that causality is required to explain the origin of the Universe.

At question would be how a philosophical 'option' (magically always existed or magically have sprung into existence) is possible in the first place. It is then seen that for any option to be possible an aspect is required that is not of a nature that allows a choice.

This is what transcending the subjective/objective dichotomy is about, and it shows its practical value for philosophical progress. It is vital to align progress with both 'ought' (morality) and 'adherence' (truth).

I think I understand. You're saying that because we can't understand how the universe could either begin or be eternal, then ... the most fundamental thing isn't to do with reducibility or causal chronological emergence over time, it's to do with the nature of the universe as it presents to our conscious experience. And it presents as a package of both objects and subjective feelings, values, desires, joy, suffering, etc. A phenomenological type of approach.

OK, thanks.

[Gertie]

Robert Pirsig, the author of "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance," is known for his criticism of the subjective/objective dichotomy. He challenged the traditional Western philosophy's "fact-value" or "subject-object" division, arguing that it has banished the questions of quality, values, and morality from the objective realm, relegating them to the subjective.

Philosophy can make a case for "the why of existence (e.g. 'the philosophical God', Schopenhauer's Will or Robert Pirsig's Quality) and that means that philosophy can transcend the subjective/objective dichotomy without losing touch with an aspect that is fundamental to reality. That ability does not spring from existence itself, but from an aspect that is more fundamental than existence itself.

Can you explain this more?

Because it strikes me that the Subject/Object distinction boils down to the existence of the private, 'directly known' and qualiative first person perspective, which only consciously experiencing subjects have. Where-as 'objects' are things which are experienced, public, 'over there', observable and inter-subjectively falsifiable. This just seems to be how it is. (And it's an important difference, because it's the qualiative nature of conscious experience which brings all value, meaning, purpose and mattering into the world). What would 'transcending' this difference mean?

Would it not mean differences in individual biology, such as including differing understandings, the collective subjective would then become meaningless. Apparent reality would then be a private matter, each agent's experience isolated from any commonality.

Essentially, yes that's how things seem to be (bearing in mind biology/bodies are only known of in the form of experience). But we can still compare notes about the content of our own experience, note similarities and differences, care and empathise. And also inter-subjectively create a shared model of a world 'out there' we share together. That's an inter-subjectively constructed commonality of sorts, rather than a literal collective consciousness.

[popeye1945]

You're talking about the collective subjective experience, which would only differ from the subjective individual by the degree of dissimilarity within the common species. To the individual truth is experience, to the collective it is agreement. I believe the collective is less fallible, as the collective most greatly represents the species.

[Gertie]

You're talking about the collective subjective experience, which would only differ from the subjective individual by the degree of dissimilarity within the common species. To the individual truth is experience, to the collective it is agreement.

Right, with physicalism at least, despite our own 'private' experience being all each of us can know for certain, we can share notes and inter-subjectively agree that 'publicly' observable and measurable (physical stuff) exists, as the world we share and both are experiencing. Including biological bodies and brains which correlate with our individual first person perspectives. So if I stub my toe you can third person observe that, but not feel it through some literal collective consciousness. We can also agree about norms and values, etc, but these aren't third person observable or falsifiable in that way which objects are.

I believe the collective is less fallible, as the collective most greatly represents the species.

Per physicalism, I'd think most agree when it comes to third person falsifiable observable (physical) stuff. If 99 people see a green tree and 1 person sees it as a red tree, we can reasonably assume the one person has some visual defect like colour blindness. Their visual modelling has an anomaly. But it's still a matter of comparing experiential models, and as it turns out science tells us colour is experientially created by us somehow, rather than being a property of the tree.

When it comes to 'subjective' desires, tastes, values, opinions, etc that's a different ballgame. You can go for the 'wisdom of crowds' approach, but it's not 'objectively' falsifiably reliable in the same way. Social norms change for all sorts of reasons.

[value]

transcending the subjective/objective dichotomy... it shows its practical value for philosophical progress. It is vital to align progress with both 'ought' (morality) and 'adherence' (truth).

I think I understand. You're saying that because we can't understand how the universe could either begin or be eternal, then ... the most fundamental thing isn't to do with reducibility or causal chronological emergence over time, it's to do with the nature of the universe as it presents to our conscious experience. And it presents as a package of both objects and subjective feelings, values, desires, joy, suffering, etc. A phenomenological type of approach.

OK, thanks.

In my opinion, while there may be diverse other perspectives, transcending the subjective/objective dichotomy as intended by Robert Pirsig, in general, concerns a philosophical case for the fundamental nature of reality of which it can be said that it is plausible despite not being empirical.

I've seen many attempts to describe the fundamental nature of reality, that received serious consideration and that, when examined, could appear philosophically plausible.

I recently managed to get an AI to confirm that the concept 'Dominance' in Gottfried Leibniz Monad theory is the most fundamental aspect in the universe with a 'nature by itself' for consideration.

"According to Gottfried Leibniz, dominance can be considered the fundamental aspect that underlays the universe. Leibniz believed that the universe is made up of eternal monads, which are indivisible and indestructible units of reality. These monads are unified by a dominant monad, which is responsible for the form and soul of the universe. Leibniz believed that dominance is a direct expression of God because all change of monads must come from within and only the ultimate monad which is God can change monads from within."
https://www.perplexity.ai/

It seems that it can be concluded that several philosophies consider a 'most fundamental aspect' with a nature by itself that can be philosophically considered despite not being either objective or subjective.

- Good (the Good) by Plato, Wittgenstein and others
- Will (energy) by Schopenhauer
- Love (a gift of a non-being aspect) by Jean-Luc Marion or the founder of this forum (@Scott, An inspirational book aligned with the philosophy of Jean-Luc Marion)
- Dominance (that unifies eternal monads for form and soul) by Gottfried Leibniz
- Truth
- Beauty
- ... more?

What do those 'most fundamental aspects' that would fundamentally underlay the universe have in common?

For one: they share an apparent origin or source that is 'beyond comprehension' (e.g. 'cannot be named' as in the Tao Te Ching). They concern an aspect that is neither objective nor subjective, but of which a whole philosophy is produced that would argue that that aspect is 'plausible'.

The same process involved in making a case for plausibility in the mentioned fundamental concepts, has been involved in the creation of the scientific method, in an attempt to achieve an optimal 'adherence' to the philosophical concept truth.

American philosopher William James once said the following about truth:

Truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it. The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons.

When truth is again viewed as part of the good, one naturally arives back again at the philosophical position before the scientific method was invented, and can see that what underlays the whole process of science, involves an aspect that is neither subjective nor objective.

[Sea Turtle]

The only Objective information is when no thought is needed to comprehend it. As our thought process is Subjective, everything it processes becomes a Subjective.

Objective information is objective because we think it true. To be Objective requires truth.

Truth is Subjective.

Results in Objective being not possible. Everything is Subjective.

We search for Truth, so that we can feel that what we know is Objective.

The word and concept of Objective is simply a tool to convince others and self of Truth.

Objective == Truth

[popeye1945]

You're talking about the collective subjective experience, which would only differ from the subjective individual by the degree of dissimilarity within the common species. To the individual truth is experience, to the collective it is agreement.

Right, with physicalism at least, despite our own 'private' experience being all each of us can know for certain, we can share notes and inter-subjectively agree that 'publicly' observable and measurable (physical stuff) exists, as the world we share and both are experiencing. Including biological bodies and brains which correlate with our individual first person perspectives. So if I stub my toe you can third person observe that, but not feel it through some literal collective consciousness. We can also agree about norms and values, etc, but these aren't third person observable or falsifiable in that way which objects are.

I believe the collective is less fallible, as the collective most greatly represents the species.

Per physicalism, I'd think most agree when it comes to third person falsifiable observable (physical) stuff. If 99 people see a green tree and 1 person sees it as a red tree, we can reasonably assume the one person has some visual defect like colour blindness. Their visual modelling has an anomaly. But it's still a matter of comparing experiential models, and as it turns out science tells us colour is experientially created by us somehow, rather than being a property of the tree.

When it comes to 'subjective' desires, tastes, values, opinions, etc that's a different ballgame. You can go for the 'wisdom of crowds' approach, but it's not 'objectively' falsifiably reliable in the same way. Social norms change for all sorts of reasons.

WOW! EXCELLENT GERTIE!

[Gertie]

You're talking about the collective subjective experience, which would only differ from the subjective individual by the degree of dissimilarity within the common species. To the individual truth is experience, to the collective it is agreement.

Right, with physicalism at least, despite our own 'private' experience being all each of us can know for certain, we can share notes and inter-subjectively agree that 'publicly' observable and measurable (physical stuff) exists, as the world we share and both are experiencing. Including biological bodies and brains which correlate with our individual first person perspectives. So if I stub my toe you can third person observe that, but not feel it through some literal collective consciousness. We can also agree about norms and values, etc, but these aren't third person observable or falsifiable in that way which objects are.

I believe the collective is less fallible, as the collective most greatly represents the species.

Per physicalism, I'd think most agree when it comes to third person falsifiable observable (physical) stuff. If 99 people see a green tree and 1 person sees it as a red tree, we can reasonably assume the one person has some visual defect like colour blindness. Their visual modelling has an anomaly. But it's still a matter of comparing experiential models, and as it turns out science tells us colour is experientially created by us somehow, rather than being a property of the tree.

When it comes to 'subjective' desires, tastes, values, opinions, etc that's a different ballgame. You can go for the 'wisdom of crowds' approach, but it's not 'objectively' falsifiably reliable in the same way. Social norms change for all sorts of reasons.

WOW! EXCELLENT GERTIE!

Thanks!

[Good_Egg]

Right, with physicalism at least, despite our own 'private' experience being all each of us can know for certain, we can share notes and inter-subjectively agree that 'publicly' observable and measurable (physical stuff) exists...
We can also agree about norms and values, etc, but these aren't third person observable or falsifiable in that way which objects are.

You're making an important distinction here. Between whether we can be philosophically certain that physical objects exist (we can't - solipsism is undisprovable) and whether we can know with enough assurance for everyday purposes (we can - only an insane philosopher would refuse to eat because they doubted that the food in front of them really exists).

And then a similar distinction relating to knowing. When you distinguish third-party agreement as defining inter-subjective truth versus third-party agreement as an indicator that our perception of the objective is likely to be accurate (because it isn't faulty in any idiosyncratic way).

Seems to me that where this stuff gets put to the test is when it comes to an issue like seeing ghosts. If person A sees a ghost and person B beside them doesn't, do we conclude that the phenomenon is imaginary ? Or that some people are sensitive to signals that others cannot perceive ?

Seems that if any two people independently see the same image, then that's evidence against it being a purely-subjective phenomenon. Even if 998 people see nothing....

But do we take the same view when it comes to visions of the Virgin Mary?

[Pattern-chaser]

It's rather that subjectivity is an artefact of radical scepticism; of the idea we cannot know an objective world exists 'out there.' Insofar as it is notionally true, it has no practical value.

It has one very practical value, I think. It reminds us that the truth — the truth(s) that we can know — is often inaccessible to us, that uncertainty can be an unavoidable feature of our reality. That is surely a very useful reminder, when we are always so keen to assume our opinions or guesses are more reliable than they actually are?

[Mercury]

It's rather that subjectivity is an artefact of radical scepticism; of the idea we cannot know an objective world exists 'out there.' Insofar as it is notionally true, it has no practical value.

It has one very practical value, I think. It reminds us that the truth — the truth(s) that we can know — is often inaccessible to us, that uncertainty can be an unavoidable feature of our reality. That is surely a very useful reminder, when we are always so keen to assume our opinions or guesses are more reliable than they actually are?

So you think subjectivism has led to a practical scepticism, and not to nihilism, absurdism, and post-modern epistemic/moral relativism? You think it leads people to carefully examine and form their own values, rather than make a cathderal of their egos and insist no-one can tell them different? It hasn't undermined a common concept of truth and/or set of established social values, leading to solipsistic individualism, and in turn to polarisation unto extremes of political tribalism, no? Because had it done so, it might be worth asking whether Galileo wasn't right after all, and if he were, what are the implications of that?

[Pattern-chaser]

It's rather that subjectivity is an artefact of radical scepticism; of the idea we cannot know an objective world exists 'out there.' Insofar as it is notionally true, it has no practical value.

It has one very practical value, I think. It reminds us that the truth — the truth(s) that we can know — is often inaccessible to us, that uncertainty can be an unavoidable feature of our reality. That is surely a very useful reminder, when we are always so keen to assume our opinions or guesses are more reliable than they actually are?

So you think subjectivism has led to a practical scepticism, and not to nihilism, absurdism, and post-modern epistemic/moral relativism? You think it leads people to carefully examine and form their own values, rather than make a cathedral of their egos and insist no-one can tell them different? It hasn't undermined a common concept of truth and/or set of established social values, leading to solipsistic individualism, and in turn to polarisation unto extremes of political tribalism, no? Because had it done so, it might be worth asking whether Galileo wasn't right after all, and if he were, what are the implications of that?

Yes, I think I agree with most of that...