Alun wrote:
Erm. You seem to be ignoring the definition of inductive logic.
If all we have ever observed is natural selection as a mechanism for evolution, then we are making an inductive inference by concluding that natural selection is the mechanism for all evolution.
But, as already pointed out, that isn't all we have ever observed.
There isn't much else to say here, but I'll make it obvious for you: The fallacy of composition is a deductive fallacy. It is in fact the bread and butter of inductive logic. This has been well-understood since Hume.
The soundness of an inductive argument depends on the strength and validity of the premises. Although less formal and stringent than a deductive argument, one can still make a profound compositional error in the construction of their premises in an inductive argument. Pointing out such an error undermines the strength of the inductive conclusion.
The value of your inductive argument rests upon serious compositional fallacies in the formation of your premise; you assume your conclusion. First, you assume without basis that "evolution" is "one phenomenon"; second, you assume
in contradiction to known fact that the only process known to contribute to "evolution", in an explanatory sense, is
natural selection.
"Natural Selection" is not the only evolutionary process we are aware of that contributes to biological variance, nor is it categorically identical to those other evolutionary processes we know exist. We also know that intelligent design, random mutation, genetic drift, exaption, and epigenetics contribute to successful biological divergence.
If your inductive argument is that because "natural selection" is the
only known process that produces taxonomic change, so we can inductively conclude that it might be conceptually satisfying as a sufficient explanation for all biological diversity, the fact that your premise is factually wrong necessarily renders the argument unsatisfying conceptually.
I am not asserting that it must be the same thing, I am saying that we can justifiably infer that it is the same thing, and then compose valid empirical tests of that inference, because the conceptual structure of the theory is justified by induction.
You can justifiable infer that it ***might** be the same thing; but that wasn't how you worded the challenge conclusion.
That's a good point. I didn't come up with the name, and I'll readily admit that the word 'natural' is pretty vague. However, I'd say that by my definition of environmental determination of reproductive success, we took advantage of natural selection for most of our existence; only during the last 30 years did we outright change the mechanism (by learning to transcribe novel DNA sequences).
It seems that now you are attempting to co-opt an entirely different process - teleological, deliberate manipulation of selections - into "natural selection". Why not just call whatever man does as part of "natural selection" and co-opt direct genetic manipulation as well?
Any non-equivocated, honest definition of "natural selection" does not include deliberate, intelligent goal-setting and intelligent manipulation of materials and forces to acquire targets; the honest definition of natural selection
excludes those things.
The fact that a process that is categorically different from natural selection is known to exist, and is known to have deliberately manipulated the expression of traits for a future purpose of some biological phenomena for thousands of years, factually disproves your necessary inductive premise that natural selection is the only process we have empirical knowledge of that contributes to the explanation of evolutionary change.
It seems to me that you are watering down both your challenge conclusion and definitions in order to salvage your argument. Your orginal argument concluded:
Evolution in the past can be explained as a consequence of species divergence due to reproductive pressure.
You now present your conclusion in this way:
I am not asserting that it must be the same thing, I am saying that we can justifiably infer that it is the same thing, and then compose valid empirical tests of that inference, because the conceptual structure of the theory is justified by induction.
I guess, under your interpretation of inductive reasoning, a conclusion so worded that claims that evolution
can be explained by X, is the same as saying "evolution
might be able to be explained by X, to the point that it justifies further research based on that idea."
You are now equivocating "natural selection" with "intelligent design" by humans how have been deliberately pursuing specific goals taxonomic goals through breeding programs.
Are you going to water your argument and definitions down to the point that they don't make any meaningful, disputable claims whatsoever?