Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Sculptor1]

I have never said I agree with psychopaths or with anyone else. I think those psychopaths who are dangerous must be locked up where they can do no harm.

True, you haven't acknowledged that you agree with psychopaths. Your statement was to the effect that nothing binds you morally except your feelings. Which, I'm suggesting, is the position taken by every psychopath.

Seems to me that your "must" sentence is expressing an "ought".

Whereas, if you were true to your stated position you could say no more than "It would gratify my feelings to see psychopaths locked up where they can do no harm, but your feelings may vary".

You are denying that there is any basis for moral reasoning, and then expecting us to take your ought-statements as the product of mature and informed reason rather than your momentary whim.

Feelings drive the reasoning and moral actions. That is true for psychopaths, semi-pyscholpaths and saints. Human represent a large moral spectrum. There is also the minefield of social, historical, and quoditian contingencies. All of which combine to make any claim to moral objectivity risible.

No one is in agreement with psychopaths, but only a fool would want to claim that people are no guided primarily by how they feel. For each of us upon hearing a moral law or rule we react to it by how we feel. Reason might help us dictate whether or not we comply with that rule.
But for us all feelings are the basis for moral reasoning and it is disengenous to claim that such a truth is a "denial" the basis for moral reasoning, when it is palpably obvious that moral reasoning is part of what we all do from Psyhcopaths to Saints.
There is no reason why one man's "ought", ought to be another woman's "ought", except that as humans we share similar feelings. But the spectrum of reactions of those feeling are modified by learning, aculturations and personal experience. This makes moral thinking subjective and relative..

If you want to make a claim for moral objectivity, then you would have to state your aim.
What is the purpose, or aim of morals?
Since such a purpose would of necessity guide the formation of your rules.
Can you say with certainty that those aims are universal or objectively true, or are they nothing more than aspiriation that are not shared by others.
If so are those "others" t be placed outside your moral scheme and rendered anathema?

[Lagayascienza]

Yes, I think that's right. It’s all based in our subjective feelings. People have contrived all sorts of complicated consequentialist and deontological normative moral theories that totally miss this point. They try to make morality objective and yet, as Hume said, they all start in our subjective moral sentiments. For example, Utilitarianism wants to base morality on the greatest utility for the greatest number, but how does the utilitarian prove objectively that doing so is morally right? That would be a subjective judgement based in the utilitarian's moral sentiments. Not to mention the difficulty of aggregating utility? It's the same with Kant's Categorical Imperative. Why should I act only according to a maxim whereby I can at the same time will that it should become a universal law? I would only want to do that if I first thought universal laws, and the maxim I wanted to be universal, were morally right. But, again, that would be my subjective judgement, and people could reasonably disagree. How do I prove objectively that the maxim I wish to be universal is morally right?

I don't think it needs to be this complicated. Basing morality in our subjective sentiments does not make morality unworkable. Fortunately, human core morality is remarkably consistent across cultures and so moral assertions such as, It's wrong to steal, or It's good to care for children, or Murder is morally abhorrent, or It's right to help someone in need if you can, or It's right to respect and care for our elderly... these enjoy almost universal assent. They're like expressing support for motherhood. Who doesn't?

But societies evolve, things change and there are areas on the fringes of core morality where we need to argue for our values. For example, the moral status of abortion or voluntary euthanasia were not live issues for our forebears on the savanna. They did not know about surgical abortions or how to pharmacologically give an old, sick lady a gentle death if she wanted it. Most people didn't get old back then. So these are issues peculiar to our times which, although they can be informed by science, still have to be hashed out with arguments based in our subjective feelings. Science tells me that a three-week-old foetus does not have fully fledged personhood like the pregnant woman whose interests I therefore take to be paramount. The interest of an old lady dying in agony from terminal cancer has, to my mind, a right above and beyond the religious opposition others might have to euthanasia. But others can reasonably disagree with me and it can take a long time to reach a societal consensus on such issues. That is perhaps as it should be. We have no choice but to present our reasons based in our feelings which can be informed by religion or science. But our subjective sentiments are the starting point.

[Sculptor1]

Yes, I think that's right. It’s all based in our subjective feelings. People have contrived all sorts of complicated consequentialist and deontological normative moral theories that totally miss this point. They try to make morality objective and yet, as Hume said, they all start in our subjective moral sentiments. For example, Utilitarianism wants to base morality on the greatest utility for the greatest number, but how does the utilitarian prove objectively that doing so is morally right? That would be a subjective judgement based in the utilitarian's moral sentiments. Not to mention the difficulty of aggregating utility? It's the same with Kant's Categorical Imperative. Why should I act only according to a maxim whereby I can at the same time will that it should become a universal law? I would only want to do that if I first thought universal laws, and the maxim I wanted to be universal, were morally right. But, again, that would be my subjective judgement, and people could reasonably disagree. How do I prove objectively that the maxim I wish to be universal is morally right?

I don't think it needs to be this complicated. Basing morality in our subjective sentiments does not make morality unworkable. Fortunately, human core morality is remarkably consistent across cultures and so moral assertions such as, It's wrong to steal, or It's good to care for children, or Murder is morally abhorrent, or It's right to help someone in need if you can, or It's right to respect and care for our elderly... these enjoy almost universal assent. They're like expressing support for motherhood. Who doesn't?

But societies evolve, things change and there are areas on the fringes of core morality where we need to argue for our values. For example, the moral status of abortion or voluntary euthanasia were not live issues for our forebears on the savanna. They did not know about surgical abortions or how to pharmacologically give an old, sick lady a gentle death if she wanted it. Most people didn't get old back then. So these are issues peculiar to our times which, although they can be informed by science, still have to be hashed out with arguments based in our subjective feelings. Science tells me that a three-week-old foetus does not have fully fledged personhood like the pregnant woman whose interests I therefore take to be paramount. The interest of an old lady dying in agony from terminal cancer has, to my mind, a right above and beyond the religious opposition others might have to euthanasia. But others can reasonably disagree with me and it can take a long time to reach a societal consensus on such issues. That is perhaps as it should be. We have no choice but to present our reasons based in our feelings which can be informed by religion or science. But our subjective sentiments are the starting point.

A thoughtful post.

If we were to ask the question posted in the title. I think the answer would have to be nothing could make it objective unless we can ALL agree on a certain set of aims.

[Good_Egg]

You are denying that there is any basis for moral reasoning...

There is a very good basis for moral reasoning. That basis is in our feelings, our moral sentiments. These are very important to us - things matter to us.

Maybe you need to spell out how one can reason from a feeling to any sort of conclusion ?

You talk in the subsequent post about "arguing for our values". But whilst there is undoubtedly argument in the sense of conflict, it's not clear that in your scheme of things there can be argument in the sense of reasoning.

If your feeling is that (in some particular circumstances) abortion is legitimate, and someone else feels differently, what role is there for reason ? Is it not the case that either you agree to differ or you fight to impose your will on the other person ?

Your bottom line seems to be that feelings are sovereign. That feelings cannot be wrong. That "I feel that..." trumps any conceivable reason.

Because once you admit the possibility that your feelings could be mistaken, or that the psychopath's moral sentiments are in some way deficient, then you're admitting the need for some standard or yardstick against which to judge your feelings or his feelings.

[Sculptor1]

You are denying that there is any basis for moral reasoning...

There is a very good basis for moral reasoning. That basis is in our feelings, our moral sentiments. These are very important to us - things matter to us.

Maybe you need to spell out how one can reason from a feeling to any sort of conclusion ?

You talk in the subsequent post about "arguing for our values". But whilst there is undoubtedly argument in the sense of conflict, it's not clear that in your scheme of things there can be argument in the sense of reasoning.

If your feeling is that (in some particular circumstances) abortion is legitimate, and someone else feels differently, what role is there for reason ? Is it not the case that either you agree to differ or you fight to impose your will on the other person ?

Your bottom line seems to be that feelings are sovereign. That feelings cannot be wrong. That "I feel that..." trumps any conceivable reason.

Because once you admit the possibility that your feelings could be mistaken, or that the psychopath's moral sentiments are in some way deficient, then you're admitting the need for some standard or yardstick against which to judge your feelings or his feelings.

Your objection is irrelevant.
Feelings are what they are. Not sure what you mean by "mistaken" , but clearly your reason can be just as "mistaken". Feelings are honest whether you like it or not. But even honest reasoning can be mistaken.
So you are not making a point for objective morality you are just shooting yourself in the foot.

Feelings drive the reasoning and moral actions. That is true for psychopaths, semi-pyscholpaths and saints. Human represent a large moral spectrum. There is also the minefield of social, historical, and quoditian contingencies. All of which combine to make any claim to moral objectivity risible.

No one is in agreement with psychopaths, but only a fool would want to claim that people are no guided primarily by how they feel. For each of us upon hearing a moral law or rule we react to it by how we feel. Reason might help us dictate whether or not we comply with that rule.
But for us all feelings are the basis for moral reasoning and it is disengenous to claim that such a truth is a "denial" the basis for moral reasoning, when it is palpably obvious that moral reasoning is part of what we all do from Psyhcopaths to Saints.
There is no reason why one man's "ought", ought to be another woman's "ought", except that as humans we share similar feelings. But the spectrum of reactions of those feeling are modified by learning, aculturations and personal experience. This makes moral thinking subjective and relative..

If you want to make a claim for moral objectivity, then you would have to state your aim.
What is the purpose, or aim of morals?
Since such a purpose would of necessity guide the formation of your rules.
Can you say with certainty that those aims are universal or objectively true, or are they nothing more than aspiriation that are not shared by others.
If so are those "others" t be placed outside your moral scheme and rendered anathema?

[Pattern-chaser]

My argument depends on the premiss that the individual is the moral unit: the society and its culture is not the moral unit.

Personally, I've never found the Libertarian perspective useful or helpful. The individual and the group are like yin and yang. They're complements. They belong together, and don't really make much sense when considered separately. I think morality is about both individuals and groups. But that's just me, I suppose?

[Lagayascienza]

Maybe you need to spell out how one can reason from a feeling to any sort of conclusion ?[/quote}

That's not hard. We do it all the time. I feel bad when I see kids starving or hurt in war and I feel good when I give to the UN children's fund. What's to argue about? The idea of torturing babies for fun is unspeakably yuk, absolutely appalling behaviour the very idea of which makes me sick to my stomach. What further reasoning do I need to do? I don't care if the psychopath thinks it's fun. There's something not right in his brain. Science shows that to be so and science backs up my subjective sentiment of unspeakable yuckiness. Normal humans don't do stuff like that. To ensure the safety of babies it would be prudent to lock such a psychopath up so as to prevent such unspeakable yuckiness occurring.

You talk in the subsequent post about "arguing for our values". But whilst there is undoubtedly argument in the sense of conflict, it's not clear that in your scheme of things there can be argument in the sense of reasoning.

If your feeling is that (in some particular circumstances) abortion is legitimate, and someone else feels differently, what role is there for reason ? Is it not the case that either you agree to differ or you fight to impose your will on the other person ?

There's lot's of room for reason. I could, backed up by science, perhaps persuade the anti-abortionist that their idea of a three week old fetus embodies complete personhood is mistaken. Maybe then their gut reaction that abortion is murder would be tempered by reason.

Your bottom line seems to be that feelings are sovereign. That feelings cannot be wrong. That "I feel that..." trumps any conceivable reason.

No, that is not what I have said. What I have said is that, given the universality of human core morality, we can trust our feelings in those core areas. You are just not going to get 99% of the population the agree with the psychopath. We can't. And we wouldn't want to. And there are good evolutionary reasons for us not wanting to, for our feeling that torturing babies for fun is just unspeakably awful? Our feelings about this cannot be mistaken.[quote}

Because once you admit the possibility that your feelings could be mistaken, or that the psychopath's moral sentiments are in some way deficient, then you're admitting the need for some standard or yardstick against which to judge your feelings or his feelings.

The standard yardstick is normal human feelings about such awful acts. That's all we have. Even if there were such a thing as objective right and wrong, we could not convince the psychopath that he should feel bad about his behaviour. He doesn't do feeling. And we don't need to convince him. We just need to lock him up.

[Sculptor1]

My argument depends on the premiss that the individual is the moral unit: the society and its culture is not the moral unit.

Personally, I've never found the Libertarian perspective useful or helpful. The individual and the group are like yin and yang. They're complements. They belong together, and don't really make much sense when considered separately. I think morality is about both individuals and groups. But that's just me, I suppose?

Yes. The Libertarian project is at best a selfish delusion, at worse a parasitic leach upon society

[Good_Egg]

Because once you admit the possibility that your feelings could be mistaken, or that the psychopath's moral sentiments are in some way deficient, then you're admitting the need for some standard or yardstick against which to judge your feelings or his feelings.

The standard yardstick is normal human feelings about such awful acts. That's all we have.

This is the heart of the issue.

You've now put forward three different sources of authority. Three different reasons why your feelings might be more right than somebody else's feelings.

- one is science. You think that your feelings regarding abortion are consistent with the facts as revealed by science, and therefore more right.

- one is evolutionary explanation. You think that your feelings having a clear explanation in evolutionary terms makes them more right.

- one is weight of numbers. You think that most of your feelings accord with a near-universal consensus of humanity, and that makes them more right.

Have I understood you correctly ?

And are you willing to admit that your feelings could be wrong if the person you're disagreeing with has scientific facts or an easy evolutionary explanation (anyone for the Selfish Gene theory ?) or the majority on their side ?

Or are these considerations only valid in support of your feelings against the feelings of others, and not vice versa ?

[Sculptor1]

Moral objectivity fails because when pared back to the fundementals there are certain questions that moral objectivists fail to address.
The common response is to ignore them, as "Good_Egg" has failed having been asked twice.
The first time we came to this point in the discussion Egg threatened to block me.
And so it seems he has. But the questions remain unanswered.....


If you want to make a claim for moral objectivity, then you would have to state your aim.
What is the purpose, or aim of morals?
Since such a purpose would of necessity guide the formation of your rules.
Can you say with certainty that those aims are universal or objectively true, or are they nothing more than aspiriation that are not shared by all others.
If so are those "others" to be placed outside your moral scheme and rendered anathema?

[Sculptor1]

Because once you admit the possibility that your feelings could be mistaken, or that the psychopath's moral sentiments are in some way deficient, then you're admitting the need for some standard or yardstick against which to judge your feelings or his feelings.

The standard yardstick is normal human feelings about such awful acts. That's all we have.

This is the heart of the issue.

You've now put forward three different sources of authority. Three different reasons why your feelings might be more right than somebody else's feelings.

- one is science. You think that your feelings regarding abortion are consistent with the facts as revealed by science, and therefore more right.

- one is evolutionary explanation. You think that your feelings having a clear explanation in evolutionary terms makes them more right.

- one is weight of numbers. You think that most of your feelings accord with a near-universal consensus of humanity, and that makes them more right.

Have I understood you correctly ?

And are you willing to admit that your feelings could be wrong if the person you're disagreeing with has scientific facts or an easy evolutionary explanation (anyone for the Selfish Gene theory ?) or the majority on their side ?

Or are these considerations only valid in support of your feelings against the feelings of others, and not vice versa ?

All three have a role.
But are you brave enough to nail your colours to the mast and with your "unfailing" reason offer us a purey objective morality??
And can you answer the big question of what would be the basis of your moral reasoning.


If you want to make a claim for moral objectivity, then you would have to state your aim.
What is the purpose, or aim of morals?
Since such a purpose would of necessity guide the formation of your rules.
Can you say with certainty that those aims are universal or objectively true, or are they nothing more than aspiriation that are not shared by others.
If so are those "others" to be placed outside your moral scheme and rendered anathema?

[Lagayascienza]

No, my feeling that torturing infants for fun is unspeakably AWFUL, is not one that could ever be changed. My feelings, and the feelings of the vast majority of humans on such a matter, will always coincide. Can you imagine a world in which such a thing could ever be considered acceptable? I can't. Nothing, and certainly not Science, could ever convince me that it was acceptable behaviour.

But science is not in the business of telling us what behaviour we should or should not feel ok with. We have to figure that out for ourselves with reference to our feelings. Moral right and wrong don't exist. But powerful moral sentiments certainly do exist. Morality is grounded in our feelings, and not in science and not in some mysterious, oracular realm from where we get answers to moral questions. Our feelings are the wellspring of our moralizing.

In respect of modern day, edgy cases like, say, euthanasia where we may not be sure, we use our feelings, informed by our intelligence. But there are no morally right or wrong answers. There never were and never will be. All we have to start with are our feelings. If you don't believe this then can you tell me where you get answers to your moral questions? Some people like to think they can outsource moral questions to religion. But I can tell you with certainty that, on questions concerning core human morality, such as whether it is ok to torture infants for fun, or to rape, murder or steal... religious answers will be the same as those given by our feelings. Why do you think that is?

As for abortion, another edgy case, I do not have any strong moral feelings about it. IMO, a foetus is not a person. A woman is a person. Therefore, my feelings are about the wellbeing of the woman concerned. You see what I did there? I had to think about how I felt on the issue and use my intelligence to work out what was at stake and for whom. And at the end of the day I concluded that a woman is more important than a foetus. First I had a quick look inwards to see if I had any feelings on the issue. I found none. So I then went into thinking mode. But on the question of whether if ok to torture infants for fun, the feelings well up immediately without any input from the intellect. Our feelings are generally much quicker and more efficient than any intellectualizing.

The problem with the example of the violent psychopath is that he cannot feel, or that what feelings he may have, are deranged, well outside the norm. This seems to be due to differences in the brains of psychopaths. It may not be their fault, but prudence, if nothing else, demands that we lock them up where they can do no harm.

[Lagayascienza]

My post above should have been addressed to Good_Egg. I hope that was clear. You got in just before me Sculptor 1.

[Good_Egg]

No, my feeling that torturing infants for fun is unspeakably AWFUL, is not one that could ever be changed. My feelings, and the feelings of the vast majority of humans on such a matter, will always coincide. Can you imagine a world in which such a thing could ever be considered acceptable? I can't.

You seem to be jumping around between three different ideas:

- the idea that right and wrong don't exist at all (is that nihilism? Do what you want, and pay the social price ?)

- the idea that it is morally wrong for you to act against your moral sentiments, and morally wrong for me to act against mine, but there's no basis for anyone to judge between the two. I'd call that "subjectivism".

- the idea that social consensus of the tribe determines what is right and wrong. Known as "social constructivism" ?

In trying to make a distinction between "core" and "edge"
examples, you seem to be suggesting that your feeling (that it's wrong to torture puppies, for example) is a different type of thing depending on whether other people in general agree with you. That seems obviously false.

I'm not a mind-reader, I can only go by what you say....

And can you answer the big question of what would be the basis of your moral reasoning.


If you want to make a claim for moral objectivity, then you would have to state your aim.
What is the purpose, or aim of morals?
Since such a purpose would of necessity guide the formation of your rules.
Can you say with certainty that those aims are universal or objectively true, or are they nothing more than aspiriation that are not shared by others.
If so are those "others" to be placed outside your moral scheme and rendered anathema?

Sorry Sculptor, that makes no sense to me. Things that objectively exist don't need a purpose, they just are.

I'm a visually-oriented person, so I liken apprehension of moral truths to colour vision. If you ask the purpose of blue, I can't answer you.

[Lagayascienza]

No, my feeling that torturing infants for fun is unspeakably AWFUL, is not one that could ever be changed. My feelings, and the feelings of the vast majority of humans on such a matter, will always coincide. Can you imagine a world in which such a thing could ever be considered acceptable? I can't.

You seem to be jumping around between three different ideas:

- the idea that right and wrong don't exist at all (is that nihilism? Do what you want, and pay the social price ?)

Yes, we can call it nihilism, but it’s a nice nihilism. Things still matter to us (we cannot help it) and we can still feel that we are decent people. So it's all good. But I wouldn't call it nihilism because nihilism implies that nothing really matters when, to us, things really do indeed matter.

- the idea that it is morally wrong for you to act against your moral sentiments, and morally wrong for me to act against mine, but there's no basis for anyone to judge between the two. I'd call that "subjectivism".

I have never said that it was morally wrong or morally right to act against one’s sentiments. Objective moral right or wrong do not exist so going against our sentiments, although perhaps unwise, would not be morally anything. There are only the moral sentiments themselves, how we feel about our own and other's actions. It is on the basis of these sentiments that we moralize. They are the basis on which we judge our own and other people’s actions to be nice or nasty. It is they that cause us to utter all our oughts and ought nots.

- - the idea that social consensus of the tribe determines what is right and wrong. Known as "social constructivism" ?

In terms of core morality, a social consensus is redundant. 99% of humans feel that torturing toddlers for fun is unspeakably awful. Who said anything about a social consensus? A consensus is something you get with a survey or a vote. But they are not needed. Our feelings are enough.

- In trying to make a distinction between "core" and "edge"
examples, you seem to be suggesting that your feeling (that it's wrong to torture puppies, for example) is a different type of thing depending on whether other people in general agree with you. That seems obviously false.
I'm not a mind-reader, I can only go by what you say....

Human core morality comprises those feelings that well up inside us when we contemplate, for example, torturing toddlers for fun, or murder, rape, theft, double dealing, not respecting and looking after our elderly… These are things religion, too, tells us are not good. Religion also tells us that loving our neighbor, giving to the needy etcetera are good, just as core morality tells us. The traditional morality that I call core human morality is pretty much universal across cultures and, like our livers and our toenails, is part of our evolutionary heritage.

When I mention “edge’ cases I’m talking about things like abortion or voluntary euthanasia for the old and incurable ill who are in pain that cannot be relieved. These were unlikely have been live issues for our forebears out on the savanna. Children were treasured and nurtured – they embodied the future of one's genes, the future of the tribe - and surgical abortions were unknown. With voluntary euthanasia, very few people got old in those days and, even if they had avoided getting eaten by a lion in their prime, our forebears did not have the pharmacological knowledge to provide an old sick person with a gentle death. So, they followed their feelings and cared for the young and looked after the elderly (the bearers of wisdom) as best they could. Abortion and voluntary euthanasia were just not issues and could not effect the survival of genes and so did not present evolution with anything to act on. Therefore strong feelings one way or the other about them did not evolve. (Although in modern times cultural evolution in the form of religion has acted to instill in some people the idea that they are wrong).

Once we accept that objective moral values do not exist, that our core morality is a product of evolution, that our moralizing is based is our subjective sentiments and that this is all ok, then the puzzle of metaethics is solved. Accepting all of this will not transform one into a deranged, cannibalistic serial killer. Everything continues as before. We can still be appalled at torturing toddlers for fun. Indeed, we cannot help but be appalled. We are designed (metaphorically speaking) by the blind watchmaker to be appalled. All remains as it is/should/must be.