Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Pattern-chaser]

If we communicated with honesty, more of us would be theoretically better off too. But only autists seem capable of this apparently-impossible feat.

... which is why we are so often eaten alive in the real world. Autists are far from the only people capable of honesty, but we tend to have less choice than most. Our "truth" tends to blurt out, whether it's strategically sensible or not.

Oh, we are all capable of honesty, and sometimes, we are honest. Just not very often. We autists are an exception, but most others are not often truly honest in their communication. Not honest with each other, and — more importantly — not honest with ourselves. And the result is obvious — unclear and misleading communication.

This topic is, in a way, about being honest with ourselves and each other, asking why we are sometimes willing to dismiss an idea without sufficient reason, while we (correctly) require sufficient reason when we accept one.

[Sy Borg]

If we communicated with honesty, more of us would be theoretically better off too. But only autists seem capable of this apparently-impossible feat.

... which is why we are so often eaten alive in the real world. Autists are far from the only people capable of honesty, but we tend to have less choice than most. Our "truth" tends to blurt out, whether it's strategically sensible or not.

Oh, we are all capable of honesty, and sometimes, we are honest. Just not very often. We autists are an exception, but most others are not often truly honest in their communication. Not honest with each other, and — more importantly — not honest with ourselves. And the result is obvious — unclear and misleading communication.

This topic is, in a way, about being honest with ourselves and each other, asking why we are sometimes willing to dismiss an idea without sufficient reason, while we (correctly) require sufficient reason when we accept one.

You have to dismiss some ideas. Otherwise you'll go bonkers. For instance, why waste time checking out flat Earth ideas or the 6,000 year-old creationist Earth? When people persist with claims that have been, if not disproved, at least shown to be very unlikely, one should not feel shamed into treating those claims like valid ones. Why repeat the same process? If people cannot get organised to learn the main counter claims to any controversial ideas they hold, they probably don't belong on the philosophy forum. Life's too short to explore every blind alley in the hope of finding diamonds.

[Gee]

For the record, I like logic; but I have often dismissed an idea that was presented to me as being reasonable and logical. I require a great deal more than someone's assurance that an idea is reasonable and logical. If you want to know why I would dismiss this out of hand, then consider the following:

A man has been invited to his next-door-neighbor's house for dinner, so he will (a) walk or (b) fly to his neighbor's house. Well, this is not a difficult question. It is obvious that the answer is (a) and he will walk as we do not fly to our neighbor's house, unless we are a bat or a bird. Logic and reason will dictate this very simple answer.

But what if the man is a forest ranger, who lives on a lake and owns a sea plane, and his next-door-neighbor lives two miles away on the other side of the lake? Well that changes things. This additional information would change my very simple answer. Why?

Because logic is an internal examination of the facts. It either validates or invalidates what we already have/know. It does not give us new information. I suspect this is why Heidegger called it a "school room tool" that is used to check a student's theory. So what happens when we add 'reason' to logic? Well, when we reason something out, we are looking for new answers, angles, information, ideas, so we are trying to add to our knowledge. So when we put the two together, what we are doing is making a guess based on our experiences, beliefs, whatever, and then creating logical steps that validate our beliefs. In short, we are rationalizing. We are using an internal logical argument to justify a belief, which in turn is now a linear rationalization which validates new facts/truths.

I read this whole thread and only once did I read the word, rationalized, which was at the bottom of page 3 in Sculptor's post. Although you got some good informative answers from other posters, I was surprised that no one else recognized rationalization, which is what "reason and logic" means nine out of ten times. I think we have lost some of our critical thinking skills. If you are interested, you can go to Wiki and look up rationalizing. There is a wealth of information about how we use rationalization to fool ourselves. It has been years since I studied it, but I still remember feeling less than brilliant.

Gee

Thanks for that! I especially take your points about rationalisation. But I think the word, and the idea, has been lacking in this topic, at my request. I was focussing only on the 'logic' of requiring more and better reason to accept an idea than is required to reject it. The same process of logic and reason applies in both cases.

OK. But if you are looking for an explanation for why logic requires more reason for acceptance than it does for rejection, you are going to run into rationalization, whether you name it as such or not.

Let's keep it simple and use the example that I gave above -- the man going to dinner. If the man does not have a neighbor, then that would be a valid reason to reject the idea, or maybe he is trapped in his house, so he would not be leaving to go to dinner. Rejection is easy. Regarding acceptance of the dinner date; How did he get the invite? Is he sure he has the right time and date? Does he want to go? Are these nice neighbors? How does he plan to get there? Does he have appropriate clothing? The questions can go on an on with regard to acceptance.

I am sure that you have heard the expression, "you can't prove a negative." That is because there is no evidence with a negative. Above you have the opposite problem, in order to provide proof for acceptance, as there is too much evidence with the potential of there being more. All I did was add information about him being a forest ranger, who owned a sea plane and lived on a lake, and it changed the whole scenario. So how can one know if we have ALL of the information? This makes acceptance of an idea much more difficult to achieve because we can't know if we have it all.

We examine what evidence there is, and we come to a conclusion: 1. We accept the idea, maybe tentatively; 2. we place the idea back onto the 'maybe' pile, as there is insufficient reason to reach a conclusion; 3. we reject the idea, and place it on the 'discarded' pile. But the examination, and any accompanying analysis (etc), are the same in all cases.

What exactly is this "idea" that you are attempting to judge? Are you talking about knowledge? Because that is what it looks like to me. So I have to wonder why you are seeking the rules about knowledge in a science forum instead of in epistemology? Science does not study knowledge -- philosophy does.

So what is the logical reason that allows us to take step 3 with much less reason than taking step 1? I don't think there is one. And yet I have seen, on philosophy forums and elsewhere, posters saying things like "this is obvious rubbish"; "this problem is not worthy of our attention"; "no sane person would believe such rot"; and so on.

I say again, if you use a "logical reason" to judge an idea, or knowledge, you are RATIONALIZING. People do not use logic to change their beliefs, they use emotion.

Oddly enough, when I posted this topic, none of them have come forward to offer a justification for their conduct. No mention of Heidegger and Carnap, or the extreme sciencist view that only problems that can be dealt with by science and the scientific method are worthy of consideration. Nothing.

Oh well...

I talked to a neurologist in one of the science forums, who explained belief to me. She said, "You wake up in the morning and see day light. The next morning is the same. Years go by and you adjust to seeing daylight in the morning. It becomes something that you anticipate. It becomes comfortable. This comfort is emotional. So one day you wake up and there is no more sun, which scares the heck out of you. Belief is just information that we have some emotional attachment to." It does not have to be about religion, it does not even have to be obviously emotional, it just has to be comfortable. The longer a belief is held, the harder it is to turn.

Gee

[Pattern-chaser]

Life's too short to explore every blind alley in the hope of finding diamonds.

Neophobe!!!

With your attitudes, no truly new discovery will ever again be made. We will have to content ourselves with filling in the gaps in our current knowledge-map. That seems a shame, to me. And tedious too. ... Did I mention "boring"?

[Pattern-chaser]

We examine what evidence there is, and we come to a conclusion: 1. We accept the idea, maybe tentatively; 2. we place the idea back onto the 'maybe' pile, as there is insufficient reason to reach a conclusion; 3. we reject the idea, and place it on the 'discarded' pile. But the examination, and any accompanying analysis (etc), are the same in all cases.

What exactly is this "idea" that you are attempting to judge? Are you talking about knowledge? Because that is what it looks like to me. So I have to wonder why you are seeking the rules about knowledge in a science forum instead of in epistemology? Science does not study knowledge -- philosophy does.

It's not the idea I'm trying to study, it's the process of logic/reason we use to accept or reject that idea.

I put the topic in the Science corner to emphasise its simplicity. It's about reason and logic, and nothing else. It does not address or concern beliefs, or rationalisation. It has nothing to do with what an idea might be about, but only the way an idea is superficially treated by philosophers or scientists.

So what is the logical reason that allows us to take step 3 with much less reason than taking step 1? I don't think there is one. And yet I have seen, on philosophy forums and elsewhere, posters saying things like "this is obvious rubbish"; "this problem is not worthy of our attention"; "no sane person would believe such rot"; and so on.

I say again, if you use a "logical reason" to judge an idea, or knowledge, you are RATIONALIZING. People do not use logic to change their beliefs, they use emotion.

I am not trying to investigate beliefs of any sort. I am not trying to persuade people of anything, nor am I trying to change minds or alter beliefs. This topic has nothing at all to do with emotion.


The points you raise are good and interesting ones. I'm only resisting them because they are anathema to this topic, as I created it. This topic asks one simple question about the logical structure of argument. It really is (intended to be) that simple, and that limited.

[Sy Borg]

Life's too short to explore every blind alley in the hope of finding diamonds.

Neophobe!!! 😉

With your attitudes, no truly new discovery will ever again be made. We will have to content ourselves with filling in the gaps in our current knowledge-map. That seems a shame, to me. And tedious too. ... Did I mention "boring"?

Sure, go and check out whether the Earth is flat for the thousandth time. I'd sooner learn about more contemporary findings than revisit the old and resolved issues.

[value]

.....

[value]

my central point remains — the criteria for accepting and rejecting an idea are logically the same. To accept a lower standard to reject an idea makes no (logical) sense.

This seems to be a valid argument but your proposed logical implication, that it requires to uplift the demand for justification to reject claims to the same level as is used to accept claims, may not have the practical effect of 'keeping an open mind for anything'.

The reason is, as was mentioned by Thomyum2, is that justification is itself based on belief and thus when posing that justification is to have a quality beyond belief, i.e. is something to expect as a finality in the world, it will result in the propagation of dogma.

If an idea we are considering cannot be dismissed, as we did for the flat-Earth theory, then we must consider it to be a possibility. We don't have to believe it or accept it, but only consider it possible, if we have no justification for dismissing it.

Are you familiar with Russell's teapot argument?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell%27s_teapot

"If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a China teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier time."

If it cannot be dismissed that a teapot is flying around near Mars, why should one be obligated to consider it a possibility?

I tend to agree with Sculptor1 on this and his question seemed valid:

If I tell you that the moon is a balloon, tell me why you might want to not dismiss that out of hand!
I'll wait for your answer.

My answer to this is simple — please don't trivialise this discussion. Thanks.

Sculptor1 was right about the flat-earth theory example.

The best example I can think of is a historical one. In the days when flat-earth was universally accepted, the possibility that the Earth could be round was universally rejected, without consideration.

This is false.
...
There was never a time when the earth was universally thought flat.
As far as the evidence goes its more of a modern delusion.
Columbus and his contemporaries knew the world was round, as did the ancients.

AI: "The myth that people in the Middle Ages believed in a flat Earth was created in the 17th century by Protestants to argue against Catholic teachings. Historians have debunked this myth, stating that educated people in Columbus's time, including Columbus himself, knew that the Earth was round. In conclusion, the belief in a flat Earth was not universal, and the idea that people in the Middle Ages predominantly thought the Earth was flat is a modern delusion. Columbus and his contemporaries, as well as the ancients, knew that the world was round.

The concept of a spherical Earth dates back to ancient times, with Greek philosophers such as Pythagoras and Aristotle providing evidence for a round Earth around 500 BC. By the 5th century BC, it was widely accepted that the Earth was a sphere."

"The myth of the flat Earth, or the flat-Earth error, is a modern historical misconception that European scholars and educated people during the Middle Ages believed the Earth to be flat."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myth_of_the_flat_Earth


With regard the concept justification to be based on belief and not on 'intrinsic real' (objective reality):

By "justification", I mean to refer to reaching a justified conclusion, which is to say a sufficient or 'good enough' reason for reaching that conclusion. And the justification I refer to here is a logical and reasoned one. Not moral, legal, or cultural, or any other shade of justification. I refer to logical argument, and to logically-derived and justified conclusions. Does the logic/reason of this argument justify our conclusion? If it doesn't, then our conclusion is unsafe. And if we can't rely on our conclusions, they are of no value that I can see.

This is questionable in my opinion. With your argument, in the face of a generic perceiver that is to receive wisdom on behalf of 'what to do?', the idea is put forward as apparently unquestionable, that justification beyond belief - knowledge of a fixating kind - is ought to be obtained.

It would naturally propagate dogma by the simple fact that one is to subject to a higher judgement external to ones belief and that higher judgement is naturally to be within the control of a body, an authority, such as a Church organ or a 'scientific establishment' that acts 'on behalf' of that presumable non-belief worthy higher judgement, because who is he/she to know it better?

The reply of Thomyum2 is interesting in this regard:

In thinking about how to answer here, I happened to pull up the Wikipedia entry on 'justification' and find it defined there as "the property of belief that qualifies it as knowledge rather than mere opinion." I find it interesting in that justification doesn't really distinguish between truth and falsehood as much as it does between whether or not we qualify some specific belief as being 'knowledge'. I'm not sure though that there is a really clear boundary between 'knowledge' and 'opinion' as this appears to me to be a somewhat subjective distinction.

That said, in relation to your post here, it is to beliefs that justification applies, and not to logical arguments, so I think there might be a bit of a category error in the question here.

It is related to the belief that scientific facts are other than truth claims, or the dogmatic belief in uniformitarianism, the belief that the facts of science are valid outside the scope of time.

I actually think you were on the right track in responding to JackDaydream above when you asked if there is a moral element to justification, and I do think that's the case as it is such an individual and personal determination, almost like a moral decision, like deciding a right from a wrong, but just with different criteria and faculties involved. Deciding that something is justified is a kind of a value judgement, just as it's a value judgement to hold that a logical argument is sound, or that a premise is true.

I'm reminded of a favorite quote from William James here:

Truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it. The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons.

It seems my choice of word — "justification" — was a poor one. By "justification", I mean to refer to having a good and sufficient reason to reach a definite conclusion. A conclusive reason, if you will.

It seems that you seek 'closure' in language, with that language being referred to as 'logic and reason'.

The founder of Institute of Arts and Ideas Hilary Lawson wrote a book about Closure theory that might be applicable.

"For over 2000 years our culture has believed in the possibility of a single true account of the world."
https://iai.tv/video/hilary-lawson-on-closure (video)

Closure theory ... "the theory describes our method of using language to close off the unlimited source of info directly in front of and all around us."
https://www.amazon.com/Closure-Story-Ev ... 0415136504

It has been my opinion that the pursuit of closure is a moral one (the essence of ethics) but it is not in the achievement of closure that one finds its true value.

The truth of science is just a facet of 'the good' as William James mentioned in the quote provided by Tomyum2, and morality and other aspects might be equally worthy of consideration from diverse perspectives.

Besides that the idea of justification beyond belief propagates dogma, the pursuit of Closure seeks exclusion and therefore can result in violence.

What once has been perceived as good, is put in front of the charier as it were, and that is where the war begins...

Bertrand Russell described it in an essay that he called ‘Philosophers and Pigs’.

It seems the essence of virtue is persecution, and it has given me a disgust of all ethical notions. In private, Russell referred to the essay as ‘Philosophers and Pigs’.
https://aeon.co/essays/philosophy-at-wa ... l-analysis

Therefore your idea put forward as unquestionable that justification - a qualitative knowledge different from belief - is ought to be obtained seems to be a basis to propagate dogma and fixation, because what else are people to do when they are held a carrot in front of them that poses that justification beyond belief it to be attained as a greater good, and one is better to adhere to what the dogma about that justified truth is telling them, because who are they to 'know it better' than [fill in your authority here]...

I'm reminded of a favorite quote from William James here:

Truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it. The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons.

Scientific truth belongs to morality and it is dogmatic to argue that it stands separate from morality, i.e. that it has a quality 'beyond belief' or 'beyond time'.

[Pattern-chaser]

<lots of stuff>

I am embarrassed that my words, that I had thought so carefully crafted, could be so thoroughly misunderstood. I intended almost none of the meaning you read and understood. Sorry.

[Pattern-chaser]

<lots of stuff>

I am embarrassed that my words, that I had thought so carefully crafted, could be so thoroughly misunderstood. I intended almost none of the meaning you read and understood. Sorry.

For example, my mention of the flat-earth belief. [I didn't realise it was a bit of a myth. But I think it still illustrates what I was trying to say.] This was an example of something that could justifiably — i.e. with sufficient reason — be dismissed, because of the wealth of contradictory evidence. Read for yourself, from my OP:

There are many ideas that we subject to serious and considered thought. Some can be easily dismissed. For example, the idea that the Earth is flat — we have loads of solid evidence that it cannot be so, so it is correct to discard it as a possibility. The bit I want to focus on, here, is that we dismissed flat-Earth justifiably. I.e. we had a clear and conclusive reason to reject it — justification.

Your comments seemed to assume that I was somehow claiming that the Earth is flat, or that the flat-Earth theory should not be dismissed. I was arguing the exact opposite, and I'm fairly sure my words (above) made this clear.

[value]

I was basing my perception on the meaning of your argument in the topic based on the following assertion:

By "justification", I mean to refer to having a good and sufficient reason to reach a definite conclusion. A conclusive reason, if you will.

I started my comment with the notion that I understand from your OP that you seek to uplift the demand for justification for rejection of truth claims to the same level as that is generally used to accept truth claims. My first impression was that it is a good idea but the proposed solution, to uplift the demand for justification for rejection, in the pursuit of a 'definite conclusion', seems to propagate dogma.

The example provided by Sculptor1 seemed valid in my opinion:

If I tell you that the moon is a balloon, tell me why you might want to not dismiss that out of hand!
I'll wait for your answer.

You wrote the following in the OP:

If an idea we are considering cannot be dismissed, as we did for the flat-Earth theory, then we must consider it to be a possibility.

I understand that you are not arguing in favour of flat-earth theory but instead attempt to uplift the demand to provide a justification for the rejection of the theory. While that argument would appear valid, it seems to consolidate the idea that justification is possible without belief, i.e. your argument would pre-suppose something about the nature of knowledge and justification.

I cited Hilary Lawson's Closure theory of what it would imply in general when humanity would adopt the idea of 'justification beyond belief'.

"For over 2000 years our culture has believed in the possibility of a single true account of the world."
https://iai.tv/video/hilary-lawson-on-closure (video)

I cited Russell's teapot argument to give an example of how it relates to dogma.

Thomyum2 wrote the following about it:

I find it interesting in that justification doesn't really distinguish between truth and falsehood as much as it does between whether or not we qualify some specific belief as being 'knowledge'. I'm not sure though that there is a really clear boundary between 'knowledge' and 'opinion' as this appears to me to be a somewhat subjective distinction.

That said, in relation to your post here, it is to beliefs that justification applies, and not to logical arguments, so I think there might be a bit of a category error in the question here.

With regard my post.

My primary critique was centred around the concept 'justification' and the idea of 'definity' (finality) when it concerns truth claims of an apparent nature 'beyond belief', e.g. scientific facts.

My critique concerns the idea of definity (or the mere possibility of it) that is apparently put forward in your reasoning as an unquestionable aspect.

My argument was that truth claims including scientific facts are fundamentally based on belief and that the demand for justification 'beyond belief' naturally propagates dogma because it places control over what is to be considered justified with an authoritative body that acts on behalf of that 'external to belief' knowledge, be it a religion or a scientific establishment.

While I would agree that it is important to maintain an open mind, it seems to me that it would not be achieved by a demand for conclusive justification for the rejection of ideas since that would pre-suppose the possibility of knowledge beyond belief.

[Sculptor1]

Your comments seemed to assume that I was somehow claiming that the Earth is flat, or that the flat-Earth theory should not be dismissed. I was arguing the exact opposite, and I'm fairly sure my words (above) made this clear.

In this respect the god hypothesis is exactly the same as the flat earth hypothesis.

Yet when I reject it for justifyable reasons, people try to pretend the the earth definely "looks round" but there are reasons for it appearing that way. Same with the god theory. For what has a long history of absurd claims and justifiable rejections, a system of fudge production from the theist is to be as respected as it is from the flat earthers.

If you can even offer a clear statement of the god hypothesis then maybe you might be justified in trying to shift the "logical fault" to another person. And it is not like I have not asked YOU and many others to put up on this topic. But where oh where is the coherent god definition?
It's about as clear as the earth is flat. In effect the logical fault remains with you.

So if you want to attack unspecified people for a failure of logic you really need to put up the goods. But you do not. and this means that the whole thread is just verbal badinage. With your refusal to give an example. - and the God hypothesis (which is what you are really talking about) remains not only vauge and vacuous but seems to be a theory which does no work.

[Pattern-chaser]

Your comments seemed to assume that I was somehow claiming that the Earth is flat, or that the flat-Earth theory should not be dismissed. I was arguing the exact opposite, and I'm fairly sure my words (above) made this clear.

In this respect the god hypothesis is exactly the same as the flat earth hypothesis. [...] - and the God hypothesis (which is what you are really talking about)...

This topic concerns logical argument, nothing more.

The flat earth idea can be placed on the Rejected pile because we have sufficient reason. Most, maybe all, ideas concerning God must remain on the Maybe pile, as there is not sufficient reason to place them on the Accepted or Rejected piles.

[Pattern-chaser]

I was basing my perception on the meaning of your argument in the topic based on the following assertion:

By "justification", I mean to refer to having a good and sufficient reason to reach a definite conclusion. A conclusive reason, if you will.

I started my comment with the notion that I understand from your OP that you seek to uplift the demand for justification for rejection of truth claims to the same level as that is generally used to accept truth claims. My first impression was that it is a good idea but the proposed solution, to uplift the demand for justification for rejection, in the pursuit of a 'definite conclusion', seems to propagate dogma.

It was never my intention to "uplift" the justification for rejecting an idea, but to observe, and to recognise/acknowledge, that the standard (for acceptance and rejection) has always been the same, logically speaking. By this I mean to say that the logic that allows us to judge an argument as having a valid form does not differentiate between acceptance and rejection, as either/both are the results of the same process of investigation, using (only) logic and reason as the investigative tools.

You wrote the following in the OP:

If an idea we are considering cannot be dismissed, as we did for the flat-Earth theory, then we must consider it to be a possibility.

I understand that you are not arguing in favour of flat-earth theory but instead attempt to uplift the demand to provide a justification for the rejection of the theory. While that argument would appear valid, it seems to consolidate the idea that justification is possible without belief, i.e. your argument would pre-suppose something about the nature of knowledge and justification.

In the context of justification being based solely on logic and reason, I think that we can decide some matters — the ones where we find that we have sufficient reason to do so — in the absence of belief. I'm having difficulty in understanding your problem with this.

My argument was that truth claims including scientific facts are fundamentally based on belief and that the demand for justification 'beyond belief' naturally propagates dogma because it places control over what is to be considered justified with an authoritative body that acts on behalf of that 'external to belief' knowledge, be it a religion or a scientific establishment.

While I would agree that it is important to maintain an open mind, it seems to me that it would not be achieved by a demand for conclusive justification for the rejection of ideas since that would pre-suppose the possibility of knowledge beyond belief.

As above, I can't see your point or your problem. What am I missing?

E.g. The justification for rejecting flat-earthism is the strong and many-facetted contradictory evidence, which offers sufficient reason for rejection. I see no "belief" in that...?

[Sculptor1]

Your comments seemed to assume that I was somehow claiming that the Earth is flat, or that the flat-Earth theory should not be dismissed. I was arguing the exact opposite, and I'm fairly sure my words (above) made this clear.

In this respect the god hypothesis is exactly the same as the flat earth hypothesis. [...] - and the God hypothesis (which is what you are really talking about)...

This topic concerns logical argument, nothing more.

The flat earth idea can be placed on the Rejected pile because we have sufficient reason. Most, maybe all, ideas concerning God must remain on the Maybe pile, as there is not sufficient reason to place them on the Accepted or Rejected piles.

NO. Flat earthers and THeists came to their conclusions in the ancient past. And their reason are all out of date.
And uless and until you are able to grow the necessary things to define when you mean then nothing you say is of any worth.