- July 3rd, 2023, 11:14 am
#444053
In order to logically prove that consciousness is fundamental to reality, one must be able to define consciousness, as well as reality, and then demonstrate how these definitions are equal, or how the definition of reality presupposes the definition of consciousness. In what follows, I will define consciousness as is evidenced through observations of our inner-experiences, as well as define reality in a number of ways that sufficiently represents any and all ontologies, and then demonstrate how these definitions of reality presuppose consciousness, and how if consciousness were not presupposed by reality, reality would not meet the necessary conditions for existence as posed by its definition(s).
While there is no established definition of consciousness by which to prove that consciousness is fundamental to reality, there is a consensus among many professionals that any definition of consciousness must account for the hard problem of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness was proposed by David Chalmers in 1994, and it posits that consciousness cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms of physical systems alone, because this would not account for how and why we have the subjective experience of qualities (Chalmers, 1997, p. 4). Subjective experience provides us with our underlying understanding of consciousness, for we only know of consciousness due to our personal qualitative experience with it. When we observe the consciousness of another human being, rather, we do not have access to the qualities of their private inner-conscious life, and so to us, that human being is in many ways indistinguishable from a machine that could merely be mimicking these conscious traits. We only infer that the other human in observation also has consciousness due to the similarities we draw from our own inner-conscious experience. So when we investigate what makes something conscious, as opposed to not conscious, we can only draw evidence from our own inner-conscious experiences. Contrarily, we cannot draw evidence from any physical interactions that could, at best, “mimic” these conscious traits, insofar as we can possibly comprehend. Even if consciousness/subjective experience did require some specific physical interactions, how subjective experience occurs — the essential character of our consciousness — would still remain a mystery, as what it is like to experience would not be demonstrated by the physical interactions themselves. The physical interactions of consciousness are thereby a manifestation of consciousness, whereas the the defining features of consciousness are the phenomena from our inner-experiences. Therefore, It is only through personal reflections of our own experiences, about our own experiences, that we can properly define consciousness.
It may be contested that this only allows for defining one’s own conscious experience to oneself, but does not allow for defining another's conscious experience, as one cannot become the experience of another subject. However, by granting that another individual is conscious, one is granting an instance of a category that they know to be true within themselves. Thus, one can reasonably infer that other subjects are also conscious if they display characteristics that belong to the same category as themselves as experiencing subjects. One can then progress towards defining consciousness by asking other subjects if a given explanation about their own inner-conscious life applies equally to them. This approach to achieving a general consensus on what constitutes consciousness is no different than how multiple subjects can agree upon the characteristics of a tree that stands in front of them. They compare observations on the matter to achieve general consensus on a model thereof.
Axiom 1: Consciousness/experience = That which knows by bridging sensed substances with qualitative meaning.
The basic empirical fact about our subjective experience realized by those who undertake personal reflections of their own thinking is that it is, fundamentally, what it is like to know. Knowledge is a factor of all subjective experiencing. We can easily recite Descartes “I think, therefore I am” when laying this foundation: Thinking provides the knowledge that we exist (Descartes, 1644, p. 2). However, “what it is like to know” still isn’t a sufficient definition of consciousness, because it does not account for other aspects of our subjective experience that permit us to know, and which knowing entails. When we reflect upon our acquisition of knowledge, we notice that it is in reference to observed substances, and that we know of such observed substances by its association with a qualitative meaning. Thus, we can claim that knowledge is the bridge between observed substances and qualitative meaning (Steiner, 1916, p. 58).
Our subjective experience isn’t merely the sensory impressions of substances, as this fails to account for the fact that we also interpret these sensory impressions in a uniquely qualitative manner. For example, if we were to observe water flowing through a river, we do not necessarily interpret the experience as such, precisely. We may interpret the experience with thoughts about the marine life within the river. This is a meaningful quality attached to the substances alerted to us by our observation/sensory impression. Inversely, neither do we think of “qualitative meaning” without any reference to substances alerted to us by our senses, as this fails to account for the fact that we can observe and sense substances permeating us at all times. Our thoughts about marine life within a river are in reference to sensory impressions - whether that be sensory impressions of substances from the outside world, or from memory. As such, the formation of knowledge requires both our sensory impression of substances, and the qualitatively meaningful thoughts that we attach to these sensory impressions of substances. Our sensory observations of water flowing through a river is knowledgeable to us because we attach to it a qualitative meaning by which it is comprehensible as knowledge. Therefore, knowledge is the bridge between the substances of our sensory impressions and the qualitative meaning of our thoughts. This is a basic observation of our inner-experience which we can claim as fact, as it is empirically evident in all subjective experiencing. This fact alone most certainly is not an explanation of all subjective experience. However, it is from this basic fact that we infer all additional phenomena of our subjective experience, of which ultimately reduces back to this basic fact. Thus, the fact that knowledge is the bridge between sensed substances and qualitative meaning is by all accounts the defining characteristic of our subjective experience/consciousness (Steiner, 1916, p. 58).
We must not mistake this definition of consciousness as dualistic. Dualism assumes two systems totally distinct from one another, and attempts to show how one of these two systems offers an explanation for the other. Whereas, this definition of consciousness presupposes two sides of a single system. It suggests that consciousness is the capacity to form sensory impressions of substances, and to attach qualitative meaning (thought) to such sensory impressions, as mediated by our capacity for knowledge. We could, perhaps, say that the substances and qualities themselves do pose a duality. However, knowledge fuses these together as a unified whole. As such, the substances and qualities of our experience do not have separate existences. They are, rather, two sides of the same system bridged together by knowledge (Steiner 1916, p. 69).
Furthermore, this definition of consciousness does not necessarily imply that the substances in observation in and of themselves are meaningfully altered by our consciousness, but rather, that our perception of the substances are given a qualitative meaning. Whether or not the physical substances actually change by experiencing them cannot, to the best of my knowledge, be answered by reflecting upon our inner experiences, because such would require an inference about what is outside of ourselves as experiencing agents (the outer world). Rather, it is the aim of this paper to demonstrate how qualitative meaning, knowledge, and substances are integral to consciousness, and how this is necessary for the existence of reality at large.
Axiom 2: Reality has a descriptive definition: Reality is the sum of all that is real, as opposed to absolutely nothing.
To demonstrate that consciousness is fundamental to reality, the definition of consciousness must equate to the definition of reality, or presuppose the definition of reality. Consciousness = reality if and only if it is true by definition. How reality as a whole is defined is among the most contested questions in philosophy and science. A descriptive definition of reality is only adequate if there are no actual or possible counterexamples to it (Gupta, 2008). This fact alone invalidates almost every conceivable definition. For example, reality cannot be defined by a specific empirically verifiable physical theory because we could provide counterexamples of other empirically verifiable physical theories. Even if there were an empirically verifiable physical theory which encapsulated all other empirically verifiable physical theories, it would not encapsulate the qualitatively meaningful aspects of our conscious experience, as has been previously demonstrated. Physical ontological theories and qualitative non-physical ontological theories cannot be encapsulated within the same ontology, as they are ontologically oppositional. The physical theories are counterexamples to qualitative non-physical theories, and vise versa. Thus, either only one of these two ontologies truly represents reality, or both of them are somehow tied into the same ontology. Thus, reality can only be adequately defined in a manner that is general enough so as to not presuppose either ontology independent of the other. Furthermore, as general as an adequate definition of reality must be, it must also be sufficiently meaningful. For example, reality cannot simply be defined so generally as “all that is real'' because such fails to define what is real, or thereby what is reality. A descriptive definition of a term that merely identifies as the term being defined does not suffice as a proper definition thereto, for it does not provide any further meaning. We cannot descriptively define reality based entirely on what it is — “all that is real'' — because this fails to account for that which reality is not, and implies that which it is not within its own definition by failing to exclude it therefrom, and is thereby false. When we fail to define what reality is not, we equally fail to define what reality is. Thus, we now have two necessary conditions upon which reality can be adequately defined: The definition must be general enough such that there can be no actual or possible counter examples, and it must be specific enough such that is sufficiently meaningful.
With that said, an adequate descriptive definition of reality is as follows: Reality is the sum of all that is real, as opposed to absolutely nothing. This definition of reality is adequately descriptive because there are no possible or actual counterexamples, and because it is sufficiently meaningful. There are no actual or possible counterexamples because anything actually or possibly real is encapsulated within it. Additionally, it is sufficiently meaningful because it appropriately excludes absolute nothingness as something actually or possibly real. It is impossible for absolutely nothing to exist because to speak on the concept of “absolute nothingness”, one has to instead speak on “something”. Even though absolute nothingness is conceivable in concept, it does not exist because the meaning of the concept contradicts the result from having conceptualized it as something real. While the concept of absolute nothingness is certainly real, absolute nothingness, in and of itself, cannot be real. This definition of reality gives meaning to the term reality by specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions upon which the term applies — that it is not absolute nothingness. By failing to define reality in this way, but instead, merely defining it as “all that is real” or “all that is consciously imagined”, absolute nothingness is falsely implicated as a possible aspect of reality, or at least, isn’t appropriately excluded therefrom.
While it is most adequate and general to define reality as ‘the sum of all that is real, as opposed to absolutely nothing”, one of the purposes of this paper is to demonstrate how any definition that proposes consciousness as an emergent property of reality, in fact, presupposes consciousness as fundamental to reality. Thus, I will also propose two additional definitions of reality that adequately represents the two primary opposing ontologies (theistic ontologies vs materialist ontologies) for the purposes of demonstrating this point:
Definition 1: “Reality is the sum of all that is consciously imagined, as opposed to absolute nothingness”.
Definition 2: “Reality is the sum of all that is real, as opposed to that which is only consciously imagined, as well as absolute nothingness”
Definition 1 generally represents a theistic ontology, (including idealism, panpsychism, etc.), for it gives reality at large the quality of conscious imagination. Whereas, definition 2 generally represents a materialist ontology (including realism, objectivism, etc) for it excludes that which is imagined as fundamental to reality. In what follows, I will demonstrate how consciousness is presupposed by either definition, and thereby irrespective of one's ontological stance.
Axiom 3: Reality has essential substances
The prospect that reality has substances — irrespective of what they are and their significance — is almost a universally held claim. Substances in a given ontology are foundational entities, and are different for each philosophical system. For example, in Plato’s system, substances are forms. And similarly, in David Hume's system, substances are ideas. Whereas for an atomist, substances are atoms (Robinson, 2004). Regardless of what these substances are, any and all ontological arguments must be formed around the existence of substances.
Axiom 4: The definition of reality owns the criteria for the essential substances & non-substances of reality.
The definition of reality informs the essential substances of reality because they are posed by the definition of reality. If, rather, the essential substances of reality were contrary to that which is posed by the definition of reality, they could not be used to define reality, and the definition of reality would have no bearing on its substances. This, of course, cannot be the case; the definition of reality owns the criteria for reality. Thus, what reality is by definition informs the essential substances posed by the definition. The only definitive substances posed by the two proposed definitions of reality are “realness” (definition 2), and “conscious imagination” (definition 1)). However, what properties may further consist of these substances is not explicitly stated by these definitions alone, and is not important for the purposes of this proof procedure. Furthermore, these definitions also reference nothingness. While nothingness is actually the absence of substance, it is still required to define reality with. The non-substance nothingness is essential for defining the substance realness, and is thereby equally essential as the substance realness for defining reality. Thus, nothingness can be regarded as an essential non-substance of reality.
With these 4 axioms in place, consider the following inquiry:
4_Being_and_Nothing.png (18.15 KiB) Viewed 4705 times
Does the above graphical representation imply the following definition of reality?
Reality is all that is real, as opposed to absolutely nothing.
Answer: No, it does not.
The graphic does distinguish between reality and nothing, but it also displays both of them together. All It implies is the substance realness and the non-substance nothingness.
Without considering what the definition means, while maintaining the substances/non-substances posed by the definition (realness and nothingness), it is implied that reality has the substance realness and the non-substance nothingness — that reality is both something and absolutely nothing. Evidently, this would contradict the meaning/definition of reality — all that is real, as opposed to absolutely nothing. Realness and nothingness are indeed essential substances and non-substances for defining reality as “all that is not nothing”, but only in terms of that meaningful definition upon which they are posed. In other words, as per the definition of reality, reality is the meaningful configuration of the substance realness and the non-substance nothingness in a qualitative manner that only means realness. Whereas, without the meaningful configuration of the substance realness and the non-substance nothingness as per the definition of reality, nothingness isn't appropriately excluded from reality. Thus, the essential substances and non-substances of reality are subject to the qualitative meaning reality gives them in order to fulfill the criteria posed by its definition. Whereas, without considering the qualitative meaning reality gives its essential substances and non-substances, the criteria posed by the definition is not fulfilled, as it is implied that reality is both real/something and nothing. Therefore, reality cannot just be its substances and non-substances in order to fulfill the criteria of being “all that is not nothing”. Rather, reality must be that which knows by bridging qualitative meaning and substances/non-substances, in order to fulfill the criteria of being “all that is not nothing”. In other words, this definition of reality is of knowledge, with a criteria that is only fulfilled by bridging together the qualitative meaning of the definition with the substances/non-substances posed by the definition. This is also equivalent to the proposed definition of consciousness (Axiom 1: Consciousness/experience = That which knows by bridging qualitative meaning with substances). Therefore, the definition of reality presupposes consciousness.
I previously demonstrated two additional potentially adequate descriptive definitions of reality that reflect the two opposing theistic vs materialistic ontologies. With either of these two definitions, the same reasoning can be applied to demonstrate how reality presupposes consciousness. Definition 2 of reality posits that what is consciously imagined is not fundamental to reality. In order for this definition of reality to be of any meaning, it must be consciously imagined/conceptualized so, or else it would merely amount to a set of substances and non-substances with no meaningful configuration. However, consciously imagining this definition would demonstrate its own falsehood, as such would contradict the meaning posed by the definition. Reality cannot fundamentally be something that isn't consciously imagined when conscious imagination is required to define reality in this way. Therefore, Definition 2 is false, and also presupposes consciousness.
As demonstrated by this paper, how reality is the meaningful configuration of the substance something/realness and the non-substance absolute nothingness in a manner that just means something/realness corresponds to how our minds organize sensory information into meaningful concepts. According to our observations of our inner-experiences, our sensory perception accumulates streams of data (substances) from our environment, while our thinking organizes these streams of data into meaningful concepts. Data drawn from our sensory perceptions are included within some conceptual ideas, and excluded from others. It is this conscious ability that, according to this paper, reality at large applies to itself in order to fulfill the criteria posed by its own definition. With the variable of consciousness, reality excludes itself from absolute nothingness and thereby fulfills the criteria posed by its definition. Whereas, without the variable of consciousness, something would have no way of excluding itself from absolute nothingness, and reality would fail to fulfill the criteria posed by its definition.
Naturally, the question now remains whether this logical proof that consciousness is fundamental to reality extends to a logical proof of God. Every religion defines god differently. However, most religions have in common the central idea that God is an omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent universal consciousness (Wainwright, 2006). Aside from this, there is no general consensus on what God is or does. With that said, the logical proof in this paper does indeed extend to a logical proof of God as most theists commonly interpret God, for this paper logically proves that a universal consciousness is necessary for the eternal being of reality.
It may be contested that we cannot give God qualities that we project from our own human consciousness, for we are not God. However, consciousness is innately within us humans. And, hypothetically, for these defining factors of our consciousness to differ from the consciousness of reality at large (God) would only indicate that either what we experience as consciousness is not in fact consciousness, or that consciousness is not in fact presupposed by reality at large (God). However, this paper has demonstrated that we are in fact conscious, and how said consciousness is presupposed by reality at large. Therefore, our human consciousness can project the underlying qualities of God. However, for the reason that we are not God, this paper does not demonstrate what further characteristics God may have. While the particulars of our human consciousness most certainly differs from God, we ultimately share the underlying characteristics of consciousness that make us conscious beings to begin with. While we are but humans, and sometimes all too human, we also possess within us the innate characteristics of consciousness that marks our connection to God and eternal life.
References:
Chalmers, David. J. (1997). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.
Descartes, Rene. (1644). Principles of Philosophy. SMK Books.
Gupta, Anil, "Definitions", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Definitions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2021 Edition)>.
Robinson, Howard, "Substance", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Substance (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2021 Edition)>.
Steiner, Rudolf. (2011). The Philosophy of Freedom: The Basis for a Modern World Conception. Rudolf Steiner Press.
Wainwright, William, "Concepts of God", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Concepts of God (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2017 Edition)>.
Image References:
Maybee, J. E. 2016. Figure 4 [Photograph]. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition). <Hegel’s Dialectics>.
While there is no established definition of consciousness by which to prove that consciousness is fundamental to reality, there is a consensus among many professionals that any definition of consciousness must account for the hard problem of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness was proposed by David Chalmers in 1994, and it posits that consciousness cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms of physical systems alone, because this would not account for how and why we have the subjective experience of qualities (Chalmers, 1997, p. 4). Subjective experience provides us with our underlying understanding of consciousness, for we only know of consciousness due to our personal qualitative experience with it. When we observe the consciousness of another human being, rather, we do not have access to the qualities of their private inner-conscious life, and so to us, that human being is in many ways indistinguishable from a machine that could merely be mimicking these conscious traits. We only infer that the other human in observation also has consciousness due to the similarities we draw from our own inner-conscious experience. So when we investigate what makes something conscious, as opposed to not conscious, we can only draw evidence from our own inner-conscious experiences. Contrarily, we cannot draw evidence from any physical interactions that could, at best, “mimic” these conscious traits, insofar as we can possibly comprehend. Even if consciousness/subjective experience did require some specific physical interactions, how subjective experience occurs — the essential character of our consciousness — would still remain a mystery, as what it is like to experience would not be demonstrated by the physical interactions themselves. The physical interactions of consciousness are thereby a manifestation of consciousness, whereas the the defining features of consciousness are the phenomena from our inner-experiences. Therefore, It is only through personal reflections of our own experiences, about our own experiences, that we can properly define consciousness.
It may be contested that this only allows for defining one’s own conscious experience to oneself, but does not allow for defining another's conscious experience, as one cannot become the experience of another subject. However, by granting that another individual is conscious, one is granting an instance of a category that they know to be true within themselves. Thus, one can reasonably infer that other subjects are also conscious if they display characteristics that belong to the same category as themselves as experiencing subjects. One can then progress towards defining consciousness by asking other subjects if a given explanation about their own inner-conscious life applies equally to them. This approach to achieving a general consensus on what constitutes consciousness is no different than how multiple subjects can agree upon the characteristics of a tree that stands in front of them. They compare observations on the matter to achieve general consensus on a model thereof.
Axiom 1: Consciousness/experience = That which knows by bridging sensed substances with qualitative meaning.
The basic empirical fact about our subjective experience realized by those who undertake personal reflections of their own thinking is that it is, fundamentally, what it is like to know. Knowledge is a factor of all subjective experiencing. We can easily recite Descartes “I think, therefore I am” when laying this foundation: Thinking provides the knowledge that we exist (Descartes, 1644, p. 2). However, “what it is like to know” still isn’t a sufficient definition of consciousness, because it does not account for other aspects of our subjective experience that permit us to know, and which knowing entails. When we reflect upon our acquisition of knowledge, we notice that it is in reference to observed substances, and that we know of such observed substances by its association with a qualitative meaning. Thus, we can claim that knowledge is the bridge between observed substances and qualitative meaning (Steiner, 1916, p. 58).
Our subjective experience isn’t merely the sensory impressions of substances, as this fails to account for the fact that we also interpret these sensory impressions in a uniquely qualitative manner. For example, if we were to observe water flowing through a river, we do not necessarily interpret the experience as such, precisely. We may interpret the experience with thoughts about the marine life within the river. This is a meaningful quality attached to the substances alerted to us by our observation/sensory impression. Inversely, neither do we think of “qualitative meaning” without any reference to substances alerted to us by our senses, as this fails to account for the fact that we can observe and sense substances permeating us at all times. Our thoughts about marine life within a river are in reference to sensory impressions - whether that be sensory impressions of substances from the outside world, or from memory. As such, the formation of knowledge requires both our sensory impression of substances, and the qualitatively meaningful thoughts that we attach to these sensory impressions of substances. Our sensory observations of water flowing through a river is knowledgeable to us because we attach to it a qualitative meaning by which it is comprehensible as knowledge. Therefore, knowledge is the bridge between the substances of our sensory impressions and the qualitative meaning of our thoughts. This is a basic observation of our inner-experience which we can claim as fact, as it is empirically evident in all subjective experiencing. This fact alone most certainly is not an explanation of all subjective experience. However, it is from this basic fact that we infer all additional phenomena of our subjective experience, of which ultimately reduces back to this basic fact. Thus, the fact that knowledge is the bridge between sensed substances and qualitative meaning is by all accounts the defining characteristic of our subjective experience/consciousness (Steiner, 1916, p. 58).
We must not mistake this definition of consciousness as dualistic. Dualism assumes two systems totally distinct from one another, and attempts to show how one of these two systems offers an explanation for the other. Whereas, this definition of consciousness presupposes two sides of a single system. It suggests that consciousness is the capacity to form sensory impressions of substances, and to attach qualitative meaning (thought) to such sensory impressions, as mediated by our capacity for knowledge. We could, perhaps, say that the substances and qualities themselves do pose a duality. However, knowledge fuses these together as a unified whole. As such, the substances and qualities of our experience do not have separate existences. They are, rather, two sides of the same system bridged together by knowledge (Steiner 1916, p. 69).
Furthermore, this definition of consciousness does not necessarily imply that the substances in observation in and of themselves are meaningfully altered by our consciousness, but rather, that our perception of the substances are given a qualitative meaning. Whether or not the physical substances actually change by experiencing them cannot, to the best of my knowledge, be answered by reflecting upon our inner experiences, because such would require an inference about what is outside of ourselves as experiencing agents (the outer world). Rather, it is the aim of this paper to demonstrate how qualitative meaning, knowledge, and substances are integral to consciousness, and how this is necessary for the existence of reality at large.
Axiom 2: Reality has a descriptive definition: Reality is the sum of all that is real, as opposed to absolutely nothing.
To demonstrate that consciousness is fundamental to reality, the definition of consciousness must equate to the definition of reality, or presuppose the definition of reality. Consciousness = reality if and only if it is true by definition. How reality as a whole is defined is among the most contested questions in philosophy and science. A descriptive definition of reality is only adequate if there are no actual or possible counterexamples to it (Gupta, 2008). This fact alone invalidates almost every conceivable definition. For example, reality cannot be defined by a specific empirically verifiable physical theory because we could provide counterexamples of other empirically verifiable physical theories. Even if there were an empirically verifiable physical theory which encapsulated all other empirically verifiable physical theories, it would not encapsulate the qualitatively meaningful aspects of our conscious experience, as has been previously demonstrated. Physical ontological theories and qualitative non-physical ontological theories cannot be encapsulated within the same ontology, as they are ontologically oppositional. The physical theories are counterexamples to qualitative non-physical theories, and vise versa. Thus, either only one of these two ontologies truly represents reality, or both of them are somehow tied into the same ontology. Thus, reality can only be adequately defined in a manner that is general enough so as to not presuppose either ontology independent of the other. Furthermore, as general as an adequate definition of reality must be, it must also be sufficiently meaningful. For example, reality cannot simply be defined so generally as “all that is real'' because such fails to define what is real, or thereby what is reality. A descriptive definition of a term that merely identifies as the term being defined does not suffice as a proper definition thereto, for it does not provide any further meaning. We cannot descriptively define reality based entirely on what it is — “all that is real'' — because this fails to account for that which reality is not, and implies that which it is not within its own definition by failing to exclude it therefrom, and is thereby false. When we fail to define what reality is not, we equally fail to define what reality is. Thus, we now have two necessary conditions upon which reality can be adequately defined: The definition must be general enough such that there can be no actual or possible counter examples, and it must be specific enough such that is sufficiently meaningful.
With that said, an adequate descriptive definition of reality is as follows: Reality is the sum of all that is real, as opposed to absolutely nothing. This definition of reality is adequately descriptive because there are no possible or actual counterexamples, and because it is sufficiently meaningful. There are no actual or possible counterexamples because anything actually or possibly real is encapsulated within it. Additionally, it is sufficiently meaningful because it appropriately excludes absolute nothingness as something actually or possibly real. It is impossible for absolutely nothing to exist because to speak on the concept of “absolute nothingness”, one has to instead speak on “something”. Even though absolute nothingness is conceivable in concept, it does not exist because the meaning of the concept contradicts the result from having conceptualized it as something real. While the concept of absolute nothingness is certainly real, absolute nothingness, in and of itself, cannot be real. This definition of reality gives meaning to the term reality by specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions upon which the term applies — that it is not absolute nothingness. By failing to define reality in this way, but instead, merely defining it as “all that is real” or “all that is consciously imagined”, absolute nothingness is falsely implicated as a possible aspect of reality, or at least, isn’t appropriately excluded therefrom.
While it is most adequate and general to define reality as ‘the sum of all that is real, as opposed to absolutely nothing”, one of the purposes of this paper is to demonstrate how any definition that proposes consciousness as an emergent property of reality, in fact, presupposes consciousness as fundamental to reality. Thus, I will also propose two additional definitions of reality that adequately represents the two primary opposing ontologies (theistic ontologies vs materialist ontologies) for the purposes of demonstrating this point:
Definition 1: “Reality is the sum of all that is consciously imagined, as opposed to absolute nothingness”.
Definition 2: “Reality is the sum of all that is real, as opposed to that which is only consciously imagined, as well as absolute nothingness”
Definition 1 generally represents a theistic ontology, (including idealism, panpsychism, etc.), for it gives reality at large the quality of conscious imagination. Whereas, definition 2 generally represents a materialist ontology (including realism, objectivism, etc) for it excludes that which is imagined as fundamental to reality. In what follows, I will demonstrate how consciousness is presupposed by either definition, and thereby irrespective of one's ontological stance.
Axiom 3: Reality has essential substances
The prospect that reality has substances — irrespective of what they are and their significance — is almost a universally held claim. Substances in a given ontology are foundational entities, and are different for each philosophical system. For example, in Plato’s system, substances are forms. And similarly, in David Hume's system, substances are ideas. Whereas for an atomist, substances are atoms (Robinson, 2004). Regardless of what these substances are, any and all ontological arguments must be formed around the existence of substances.
Axiom 4: The definition of reality owns the criteria for the essential substances & non-substances of reality.
The definition of reality informs the essential substances of reality because they are posed by the definition of reality. If, rather, the essential substances of reality were contrary to that which is posed by the definition of reality, they could not be used to define reality, and the definition of reality would have no bearing on its substances. This, of course, cannot be the case; the definition of reality owns the criteria for reality. Thus, what reality is by definition informs the essential substances posed by the definition. The only definitive substances posed by the two proposed definitions of reality are “realness” (definition 2), and “conscious imagination” (definition 1)). However, what properties may further consist of these substances is not explicitly stated by these definitions alone, and is not important for the purposes of this proof procedure. Furthermore, these definitions also reference nothingness. While nothingness is actually the absence of substance, it is still required to define reality with. The non-substance nothingness is essential for defining the substance realness, and is thereby equally essential as the substance realness for defining reality. Thus, nothingness can be regarded as an essential non-substance of reality.
With these 4 axioms in place, consider the following inquiry:
Reality is all that is real, as opposed to absolutely nothing.
Answer: No, it does not.
The graphic does distinguish between reality and nothing, but it also displays both of them together. All It implies is the substance realness and the non-substance nothingness.
Without considering what the definition means, while maintaining the substances/non-substances posed by the definition (realness and nothingness), it is implied that reality has the substance realness and the non-substance nothingness — that reality is both something and absolutely nothing. Evidently, this would contradict the meaning/definition of reality — all that is real, as opposed to absolutely nothing. Realness and nothingness are indeed essential substances and non-substances for defining reality as “all that is not nothing”, but only in terms of that meaningful definition upon which they are posed. In other words, as per the definition of reality, reality is the meaningful configuration of the substance realness and the non-substance nothingness in a qualitative manner that only means realness. Whereas, without the meaningful configuration of the substance realness and the non-substance nothingness as per the definition of reality, nothingness isn't appropriately excluded from reality. Thus, the essential substances and non-substances of reality are subject to the qualitative meaning reality gives them in order to fulfill the criteria posed by its definition. Whereas, without considering the qualitative meaning reality gives its essential substances and non-substances, the criteria posed by the definition is not fulfilled, as it is implied that reality is both real/something and nothing. Therefore, reality cannot just be its substances and non-substances in order to fulfill the criteria of being “all that is not nothing”. Rather, reality must be that which knows by bridging qualitative meaning and substances/non-substances, in order to fulfill the criteria of being “all that is not nothing”. In other words, this definition of reality is of knowledge, with a criteria that is only fulfilled by bridging together the qualitative meaning of the definition with the substances/non-substances posed by the definition. This is also equivalent to the proposed definition of consciousness (Axiom 1: Consciousness/experience = That which knows by bridging qualitative meaning with substances). Therefore, the definition of reality presupposes consciousness.
I previously demonstrated two additional potentially adequate descriptive definitions of reality that reflect the two opposing theistic vs materialistic ontologies. With either of these two definitions, the same reasoning can be applied to demonstrate how reality presupposes consciousness. Definition 2 of reality posits that what is consciously imagined is not fundamental to reality. In order for this definition of reality to be of any meaning, it must be consciously imagined/conceptualized so, or else it would merely amount to a set of substances and non-substances with no meaningful configuration. However, consciously imagining this definition would demonstrate its own falsehood, as such would contradict the meaning posed by the definition. Reality cannot fundamentally be something that isn't consciously imagined when conscious imagination is required to define reality in this way. Therefore, Definition 2 is false, and also presupposes consciousness.
As demonstrated by this paper, how reality is the meaningful configuration of the substance something/realness and the non-substance absolute nothingness in a manner that just means something/realness corresponds to how our minds organize sensory information into meaningful concepts. According to our observations of our inner-experiences, our sensory perception accumulates streams of data (substances) from our environment, while our thinking organizes these streams of data into meaningful concepts. Data drawn from our sensory perceptions are included within some conceptual ideas, and excluded from others. It is this conscious ability that, according to this paper, reality at large applies to itself in order to fulfill the criteria posed by its own definition. With the variable of consciousness, reality excludes itself from absolute nothingness and thereby fulfills the criteria posed by its definition. Whereas, without the variable of consciousness, something would have no way of excluding itself from absolute nothingness, and reality would fail to fulfill the criteria posed by its definition.
Naturally, the question now remains whether this logical proof that consciousness is fundamental to reality extends to a logical proof of God. Every religion defines god differently. However, most religions have in common the central idea that God is an omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent universal consciousness (Wainwright, 2006). Aside from this, there is no general consensus on what God is or does. With that said, the logical proof in this paper does indeed extend to a logical proof of God as most theists commonly interpret God, for this paper logically proves that a universal consciousness is necessary for the eternal being of reality.
It may be contested that we cannot give God qualities that we project from our own human consciousness, for we are not God. However, consciousness is innately within us humans. And, hypothetically, for these defining factors of our consciousness to differ from the consciousness of reality at large (God) would only indicate that either what we experience as consciousness is not in fact consciousness, or that consciousness is not in fact presupposed by reality at large (God). However, this paper has demonstrated that we are in fact conscious, and how said consciousness is presupposed by reality at large. Therefore, our human consciousness can project the underlying qualities of God. However, for the reason that we are not God, this paper does not demonstrate what further characteristics God may have. While the particulars of our human consciousness most certainly differs from God, we ultimately share the underlying characteristics of consciousness that make us conscious beings to begin with. While we are but humans, and sometimes all too human, we also possess within us the innate characteristics of consciousness that marks our connection to God and eternal life.
References:
Chalmers, David. J. (1997). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.
Descartes, Rene. (1644). Principles of Philosophy. SMK Books.
Gupta, Anil, "Definitions", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Definitions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2021 Edition)>.
Robinson, Howard, "Substance", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Substance (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2021 Edition)>.
Steiner, Rudolf. (2011). The Philosophy of Freedom: The Basis for a Modern World Conception. Rudolf Steiner Press.
Wainwright, William, "Concepts of God", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Concepts of God (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2017 Edition)>.
Image References:
Maybee, J. E. 2016. Figure 4 [Photograph]. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition). <Hegel’s Dialectics>.
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