Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Leontiskos]

At least try to offer an example of an exception to the rule I have set out.

OK. A boy named Stanley was on his last day in school. We encountered one another, and he suddenly thumped me in the face, knocking me down and leaving me bleeding. When I asked "Why?", he told me he was taking revenge on me for being such a prat. And because he would never see me again, he didn't want to miss out on his final opportunity to hurt me.

Are you claiming that "being a prat" is non-volitional, such that it is purely accidental and unrelated even to neglect? Because it seems obvious to me that this is false, and that your example therefore fails. Stanley obviously perceives you to be at fault for being a prat.

The reason we might punish someone for "being a prat" is because they are at fault for being a prat, and they should have acted differently.

[LuckyR]

We are just not communicating effectively.

You have labeled my proposal/strategy as "deterrence" centered, which is generally accurate, then criticized deterrence in the broad sense through your "convict the innocent man to achieve community deterrence" analogy, yet I am specifically describing my personal strategy to address personal wrongdoing by a specific wrongdoer. Apples and oranges. Your analogy doesn't apply to my proposal, though it has it's merits within the confines of community deterrence.

More importantly (to me) you keep quoting my comment that I don't perform vengeance "in response to the past event". I want to be crystal clear on what I mean by that. I was drawing a distinction (in conversation with other posters) between their opinion of why those who perform vengeance do it and my motivation. Their opinion was it was done solely for retribution FOR THE PAST ACT. My comment was that I don't agree with vengeance to improve my emotional state when thinking about the past act (which feeling that "justice was done" could provide), rather I seek to lower my otherwise increased risk of being victimized IN THE FUTURE.

Perhaps a numerical description would help here. At time 1 (before I am victimized) my risk of being victimized is average, say 5 on a 10 point scale. I am victimized at time 2 by a perpetrator Alfie. The crux of my decision making is that it is my experience that my chance of being victimized at a later time, say time 3, by Alfie if he suffers no negative consequences is higher than average, say 8. My goal is to provide the negative consequences such that Alfie's chance of victimizing me is 5 or less, just like everyone else (at time 1).

Therefore if I don't know who the perpetrator is, there is no one for me to address. If the community believes I was victimized by Bruno, but I know it was Alfie, there is no reason to mete out vengeance to Bruno (the innocent man), since he already has a 5 or lower chance of victimizing me at time 3. Only Alfie has an 8 chance. If Alfie is going to move to Columbia before time 3, my risk at time 3 from him is zero, no need for vengeance.

As to your point on whether the original act was just or unjust, I also said earlier that I believe in proportionality. Thus my strategy for optimizing my future risk exposure is universal in scope, just proportionally more severe if the interaction is unjust. For example, if an office competitor technically plays by the rules (not unjust) but twists them to his advantage against me, by invoking proportionality I am morally justified in similarly twisting the rules to regain the advantage against him. Naturally when Alfie performs his unjust action, all bets are off and again invoking proportionality, I am justified (though not required) to use methods outside of the rules to meet my goals.

Yes, I understand what you are saying. I think we are now in agreement that all of your purported strategies presuppose acting in response to a past event? Even the "twisting of the rules"? That even if your primary aim is not focused on the past event, the past event is still logically necessary for any of the strategies?

My point about general deterrence was meant to provide an example of a general problem with the view which leans too heavily on deterrence. I think I'll leave that argument behind since it is not making any headway.

I think this is probably a good place to stop. On the other hand, if you want to continue, I would say that "bending the rules" is unjust, and that it is never justified to harm the innocent (it is never justified to harm someone who has not acted unjustly). ...So your example of "bending the rules" is not an exception to the rule I have been pointing out.

Perhaps my post was unclear. I believe that when responding to harm from someone who acted technically within the rules, one should also act "technically" within the rules. That is both the original act and the response are "not unjust".

[Leontiskos]

Yes, I understand what you are saying. I think we are now in agreement that all of your purported strategies presuppose acting in response to a past event? Even the "twisting of the rules"? That even if your primary aim is not focused on the past event, the past event is still logically necessary for any of the strategies?

My point about general deterrence was meant to provide an example of a general problem with the view which leans too heavily on deterrence. I think I'll leave that argument behind since it is not making any headway.

I think this is probably a good place to stop. On the other hand, if you want to continue, I would say that "bending the rules" is unjust, and that it is never justified to harm the innocent (it is never justified to harm someone who has not acted unjustly). ...So your example of "bending the rules" is not an exception to the rule I have been pointing out.

Perhaps my post was unclear. I believe that when responding to harm from someone who acted technically within the rules, one should also act "technically" within the rules. That is both the original act and the response are "not unjust".

Here is why I disagree:

Is it unjust to act against the rules or is it unjust to commit an injustice? I would submit that someone can be acting unjustly while simultaneously observing rules, and that this is precisely what happened in the case where you propose to punish someone for "bending the rules." You are punishing someone who is at fault, and they are at fault because they committed an injustice (against you). It doesn't matter whether their injustice managed to follow some rule.

To look at it in a second way, if someone finds a loophole in order to bend a rule or law in a way that the intention of the law would oppose, then they are acting against the law. This is because they are acting against the intent or spirit of the law, even if they are not acting against the letter of the law.

Finally, to look at it a third way, if "the rules" are thought to be nothing more than justice itself, then it is not possible to bend the rules without breaking them. One cannot "bend justice."

[LuckyR]

Yes, I understand what you are saying. I think we are now in agreement that all of your purported strategies presuppose acting in response to a past event? Even the "twisting of the rules"? That even if your primary aim is not focused on the past event, the past event is still logically necessary for any of the strategies?

My point about general deterrence was meant to provide an example of a general problem with the view which leans too heavily on deterrence. I think I'll leave that argument behind since it is not making any headway.

I think this is probably a good place to stop. On the other hand, if you want to continue, I would say that "bending the rules" is unjust, and that it is never justified to harm the innocent (it is never justified to harm someone who has not acted unjustly). ...So your example of "bending the rules" is not an exception to the rule I have been pointing out.

Perhaps my post was unclear. I believe that when responding to harm from someone who acted technically within the rules, one should also act "technically" within the rules. That is both the original act and the response are "not unjust".

Here is why I disagree:

Is it unjust to act against the rules or is it unjust to commit an injustice? I would submit that someone can be acting unjustly while simultaneously observing rules, and that this is precisely what happened in the case where you propose to punish someone for "bending the rules." You are punishing someone who is at fault, and they are at fault because they committed an injustice (against you). It doesn't matter whether their injustice managed to follow some rule.

To look at it in a second way, if someone finds a loophole in order to bend a rule or law in a way that the intention of the law would oppose, then they are acting against the law. This is because they are acting against the intent or spirit of the law, even if they are not acting against the letter of the law.

Finally, to look at it a third way, if "the rules" are thought to be nothing more than justice itself, then it is not possible to bend the rules without breaking them. One cannot "bend justice."

I'm confused. Let's take your definition of unjust and replace it for my analysis of the original act. I called what my victimizer did: not unjust because he technically didn't break the rules, you're labeling it unjust. Okay, well if someone acts unjustly towards me, I am free to use whatever means are most expedient to lower my chance of future victimization. In other words I am not constrained by rules, just as he was not.

I don't have a problem with your use of unjust to describe bending rules. It is a matter of where in the continuum of behaviors does one draw the line between just and unjust. This sort of thing comes up routinely when trying to use binary labels on a spectrum of possibilities.

[Leontiskos]

Yes, I understand what you are saying. I think we are now in agreement that all of your purported strategies presuppose acting in response to a past event? Even the "twisting of the rules"? That even if your primary aim is not focused on the past event, the past event is still logically necessary for any of the strategies?

My point about general deterrence was meant to provide an example of a general problem with the view which leans too heavily on deterrence. I think I'll leave that argument behind since it is not making any headway.

I think this is probably a good place to stop. On the other hand, if you want to continue, I would say that "bending the rules" is unjust, and that it is never justified to harm the innocent (it is never justified to harm someone who has not acted unjustly). ...So your example of "bending the rules" is not an exception to the rule I have been pointing out.

Perhaps my post was unclear. I believe that when responding to harm from someone who acted technically within the rules, one should also act "technically" within the rules. That is both the original act and the response are "not unjust".

Here is why I disagree:

Is it unjust to act against the rules or is it unjust to commit an injustice? I would submit that someone can be acting unjustly while simultaneously observing rules, and that this is precisely what happened in the case where you propose to punish someone for "bending the rules." You are punishing someone who is at fault, and they are at fault because they committed an injustice (against you). It doesn't matter whether their injustice managed to follow some rule.

To look at it in a second way, if someone finds a loophole in order to bend a rule or law in a way that the intention of the law would oppose, then they are acting against the law. This is because they are acting against the intent or spirit of the law, even if they are not acting against the letter of the law.

Finally, to look at it a third way, if "the rules" are thought to be nothing more than justice itself, then it is not possible to bend the rules without breaking them. One cannot "bend justice."

I'm confused. Let's take your definition of unjust and replace it for my analysis of the original act. I called what my victimizer did: not unjust because he technically didn't break the rules, you're labeling it unjust. Okay, well if someone acts unjustly towards me, I am free to use whatever means are most expedient to lower my chance of future victimization. In other words I am not constrained by rules, just as he was not.

I don't have a problem with your use of unjust to describe bending rules. It is a matter of where in the continuum of behaviors does one draw the line between just and unjust. This sort of thing comes up routinely when trying to use binary labels on a spectrum of possibilities.

Our larger conversation is about whether one can punish (or deter) someone who is innocent. You are apparently claiming that one is able to harm someone who has not acted unjustly, and that this is some sort of exception to the principles I have been enunciating. For example, you said, "...I am justified (though not required) to use methods outside of the rules to meet my goals." When I look at <that post> I am at a loss as to why you are making a distinction between breaking and bending the rules, and how that distinction relates to what I have said. You seemed to claim that your principle of proportionality extends beyond the realm of retribution, because retribution is a response to injustice whereas proportionality may respond to acts which are not unjust (like the bending of the rules). So my most obvious response was to point out that bending the rules is unjust, and therefore proportionality and retribution are co-extensive.

The purpose of my last post was to show that your actions still adhere to the principles that I have been putting forward in this thread. Significantly punishing the person who breaks the rules and slightly punishing the person who bends the rules rely on the same principle, and both cases involve retribution, adversion to the past event, injustice, et al.

[Pattern-chaser]

At least try to offer an example of an exception to the rule I have set out.

OK. A boy named Stanley was on his last day in school. We encountered one another, and he suddenly thumped me in the face, knocking me down and leaving me bleeding. When I asked "Why?", he told me he was taking revenge on me for being such a prat. And because he would never see me again, he didn't want to miss out on his final opportunity to hurt me.

Are you claiming that "being a prat" is non-volitional, such that it is purely accidental and unrelated even to neglect? Because it seems obvious to me that this is false, and that your example therefore fails. Stanley obviously perceives you to be at fault for being a prat.

The reason we might punish someone for "being a prat" is because they are at fault for being a prat, and they should have acted differently.

Oh, my! You're not a very understanding or caring person, are you?

As I think back, Stanley did not mention being "a prat". He hit me, I asked "why?" and he replied "Because I won't get the chance again," and walked away. At the time, it was clear to me that he felt I deserved a thump in the face. It was some sort of 'revenge'.

The truth of the matter is that I was a young autistic boy, with all the usual problems with social communication (with NTs) and the resulting negative charisma. I was an obnoxious little too, but only inasmuch as all 15-year-olds are. 50 years later, I discovered I was autistic...

So you believe that, in some circumstances, people should be thumped to the ground, for being perceived as "prats"? Thanks a lot.

[Leontiskos]

At least try to offer an example of an exception to the rule I have set out.

OK. A boy named Stanley was on his last day in school. We encountered one another, and he suddenly thumped me in the face, knocking me down and leaving me bleeding. When I asked "Why?", he told me he was taking revenge on me for being such a prat. And because he would never see me again, he didn't want to miss out on his final opportunity to hurt me.

Are you claiming that "being a prat" is non-volitional, such that it is purely accidental and unrelated even to neglect? Because it seems obvious to me that this is false, and that your example therefore fails. Stanley obviously perceives you to be at fault for being a prat.

The reason we might punish someone for "being a prat" is because they are at fault for being a prat, and they should have acted differently.

Oh, my! You're not a very understanding or caring person, are you?

As I think back, Stanley did not mention being "a prat". He hit me, I asked "why?" and he replied "Because I won't get the chance again," and walked away. At the time, it was clear to me that he felt I deserved a thump in the face. It was some sort of 'revenge'.

The truth of the matter is that I was a young autistic boy, with all the usual problems with social communication (with NTs) and the resulting negative charisma. I was an obnoxious little too, but only inasmuch as all 15-year-olds are. 50 years later, I discovered I was autistic...

So you believe that, in some circumstances, people should be thumped to the ground, for being perceived as "prats"? Thanks a lot.

The question at hand is whether Stanley believed you to be at fault or not (i.e. whether he attributed your undesirable state to your own volition and free actions). If your example is to succeed as a counterexample then Stanley must not have perceived you to be at fault for your undesirable--in his eyes--state in any way. But this is clearly false, and therefore the example fails to rebut my claim.

Often it is better to deal with non-personal examples, because then one is usually able to think through them with more clarity and less emotion. But you chose this example yourself, and the truth of the matter does not depend on your emotions. Either Stanley imputed fault to you or he did not.

[Pattern-chaser]

...

You started off by saying this:

Humans will not pursue revenge if they perceive the harm to be purely accidental (and unrelated to neglect). Revenge is only sought when there is a perceived fault or culpability.

I disagreed, and you asked for an example. I gave one, but you didn't like it. OK, here is another opinion than mine. I do not claim it is correct because someone said it, I simply offer it as an example of someone who agrees with me, and disagrees with you.

Along with proportionality, there is a further criterion that ordinary revenge must meet. It has to be targeted at the person or people who have actually caused the perceived harm. This might seem obvious; yet many acts of revenge are in fact aimed at people who are innocent of having caused any harm at all. This would be a case of ‘radical’, rather than ordinary revenge.

Revenge porn is an all-too-common example of radical revenge. Many perpetrators of revenge porn are men who feel ashamed and emasculated when their partner breaks up with them. They respond by posting their ex-partner’s private, intimate photos and videos online. In this way, they attempt to project their own feelings of shame and powerlessness on to their ex-partner, by making the ex the one to feel ashamed and powerless. Sophie Mortimer, manager of the Revenge Porn Helpline in the UK, argues convincingly that ‘revenge porn’ is a misnomer, because the word ‘revenge’ wrongly implies that the victim has done something wrong, when often all they’ve done is end a relationship. And yet the perpetrator feels that they are taking righteous revenge. This conundrum gets to the heart of radical revenge: in reality, the target of revenge porn has done nothing to warrant the egregious breach of their privacy, but in the disturbed mind of the perpetrator, the victim deserves to suffer for having caused so much shame and pain.

[Anil G]

I am a firm believer of KARMA. What goes around comes around. Vengeance will not satisfy an individual it will only makes matter worst. Better to find ways to make it good and not worse. I think the one has a pure heart does not understand vengeance.

[Leontiskos]

...

You started off by saying this:

Humans will not pursue revenge if they perceive the harm to be purely accidental (and unrelated to neglect). Revenge is only sought when there is a perceived fault or culpability.

I disagreed, and you asked for an example. I gave one, but you didn't like it.

But you yourself said something which implies that your example fails. You said, "At the time, it was clear to me that he felt I deserved a thump in the face" (link). If Stanley thought you deserved it, then there was "perceived fault or culpability." The example counts as evidence in favor of my point, not as proof against it.

OK, here is another opinion than mine. I do not claim it is correct because someone said it, I simply offer it as an example of someone who agrees with me, and disagrees with you.

Along with proportionality, there is a further criterion that ordinary revenge must meet. It has to be targeted at the person or people who have actually caused the perceived harm. This might seem obvious; yet many acts of revenge are in fact aimed at people who are innocent of having caused any harm at all.

He says that they have caused perceived harm, but not true harm. His example also agrees with my statement, for I said, "Revenge is only sought when there is a perceived fault or culpability."

Let me help you out. My claim is, "If revenge is sought, then there is perceived fault or culpability." Now you've given two examples of things which do not contradict this claim, even though you have falsely claimed that they do. An example of something which would actually contradict the claim would be an example where <Revenge is sought, but there is no perceived fault or culpability>.

[Pattern-chaser]

An example of something which would actually contradict the claim would be an example where <Revenge is sought, but there is no perceived fault or culpability>.

Someone who craves revenge can always find a reason, perceived or even illusory, why that vengeance is 'deserved'. Your argument here seems to be that, even when vengeance has no justification, the avenger can always see or find one. So you support your argument with the assertion that the 'avenger' fabricates justification that they want and need to be true. Not a strong position, IMO?

Vengeance is closely linked to blame. Blame is what we do in preparation when we want to hurt someone. Blame is the 'justification' for hurting someone. The primary motivator here is the wish/need to harm someone. The consequent assignment of 'blame' offers a fabricated 'justification'. The final step is the vengeance itself, 'justified' by the victim being 'blameworthy'. Bullying by another name, I think? Or just 'might makes right'?

[Leontiskos]

An example of something which would actually contradict the claim would be an example where <Revenge is sought, but there is no perceived fault or culpability>.

Someone who craves revenge can always find a reason, perceived or even illusory, why that vengeance is 'deserved'. Your argument here seems to be that, even when vengeance has no justification, the avenger can always see or find one.

That seems to be your position, for you are the only one who has stated it. I have already stated my own position with a high degree of clarity, and it is not what you claim it to be.

[LuckyR]

Perhaps my post was unclear. I believe that when responding to harm from someone who acted technically within the rules, one should also act "technically" within the rules. That is both the original act and the response are "not unjust".

Here is why I disagree:

Is it unjust to act against the rules or is it unjust to commit an injustice? I would submit that someone can be acting unjustly while simultaneously observing rules, and that this is precisely what happened in the case where you propose to punish someone for "bending the rules." You are punishing someone who is at fault, and they are at fault because they committed an injustice (against you). It doesn't matter whether their injustice managed to follow some rule.

To look at it in a second way, if someone finds a loophole in order to bend a rule or law in a way that the intention of the law would oppose, then they are acting against the law. This is because they are acting against the intent or spirit of the law, even if they are not acting against the letter of the law.

Finally, to look at it a third way, if "the rules" are thought to be nothing more than justice itself, then it is not possible to bend the rules without breaking them. One cannot "bend justice."

I'm confused. Let's take your definition of unjust and replace it for my analysis of the original act. I called what my victimizer did: not unjust because he technically didn't break the rules, you're labeling it unjust. Okay, well if someone acts unjustly towards me, I am free to use whatever means are most expedient to lower my chance of future victimization. In other words I am not constrained by rules, just as he was not.

I don't have a problem with your use of unjust to describe bending rules. It is a matter of where in the continuum of behaviors does one draw the line between just and unjust. This sort of thing comes up routinely when trying to use binary labels on a spectrum of possibilities.

Our larger conversation is about whether one can punish (or deter) someone who is innocent. You are apparently claiming that one is able to harm someone who has not acted unjustly, and that this is some sort of exception to the principles I have been enunciating. For example, you said, "...I am justified (though not required) to use methods outside of the rules to meet my goals." When I look at <that post> I am at a loss as to why you are making a distinction between breaking and bending the rules, and how that distinction relates to what I have said. You seemed to claim that your principle of proportionality extends beyond the realm of retribution, because retribution is a response to injustice whereas proportionality may respond to acts which are not unjust (like the bending of the rules). So my most obvious response was to point out that bending the rules is unjust, and therefore proportionality and retribution are co-extensive.

The purpose of my last post was to show that your actions still adhere to the principles that I have been putting forward in this thread. Significantly punishing the person who breaks the rules and slightly punishing the person who bends the rules rely on the same principle, and both cases involve retribution, adversion to the past event, injustice, et al.

Just to be clear, in my office coworker/competitor example, since we are competitors, we are SUPPOSED to act in our own interest, which in a zero sum game, is against our competitor's interest. You use the word "harm" to describe his outcome at my hands, but that's the legitimate goal of the exercise when everyone is playing by the rules and competing cleanly. I described a particular situation where one competitor deviates from the spirit of "just" competition. You accurately described this as both against the spirit of the rules and unjust. I invoked proportionality to respond to him in similar fashion. We good?

[LuckyR]

An example of something which would actually contradict the claim would be an example where <Revenge is sought, but there is no perceived fault or culpability>.

Someone who craves revenge can always find a reason, perceived or even illusory, why that vengeance is 'deserved'. Your argument here seems to be that, even when vengeance has no justification, the avenger can always see or find one. So you support your argument with the assertion that the 'avenger' fabricates justification that they want and need to be true. Not a strong position, IMO?

Vengeance is closely linked to blame. Blame is what we do in preparation when we want to hurt someone. Blame is the 'justification' for hurting someone. The primary motivator here is the wish/need to harm someone. The consequent assignment of 'blame' offers a fabricated 'justification'. The final step is the vengeance itself, 'justified' by the victim being 'blameworthy'. Bullying by another name, I think? Or just 'might makes right'?

Everything in your post is possible, though I would draw a distinction between post hoc rationalization for one's own spontaneous act of violence and vengeance in response to an actual act of aggression.

[Pattern-chaser]

Someone who craves revenge can always find a reason, perceived or even illusory, why that vengeance is 'deserved'. Your argument here seems to be that, even when vengeance has no justification, the avenger can always see or find one. So you support your argument with the assertion that the 'avenger' fabricates justification that they want and need to be true. Not a strong position, IMO?

Vengeance is closely linked to blame. Blame is what we do in preparation when we want to hurt someone. Blame is the 'justification' for hurting someone. The primary motivator here is the wish/need to harm someone. The consequent assignment of 'blame' offers a fabricated 'justification'. The final step is the vengeance itself, 'justified' by the victim being 'blameworthy'. Bullying by another name, I think? Or just 'might makes right'?

Everything in your post is possible, though I would draw a distinction between post hoc rationalization for one's own spontaneous act of violence and vengeance in response to an actual act of aggression.

Yes, I accept and acknowledge the distinction, but I can't see that it has much of a practical effect on our discussion. People do indulge in 'vengeance' whether they have a valid justification — e.g. "in response to an actual act of aggression" — or not. For me, it is the vengeance that is the issue, not the 'justification', and not whether that 'justification' is a convincing one.