Scott wrote: ↑May 9th, 2023, 1:17 pm As a friendly request, I ask that you please do avoid using the word "judgment" alone when discussing anything with me. Instead, use either the phrase "moral judgement" or "amoral judgement", so that I know what you mean.Hi Scott,
I will do what I can to try to ensure mutual understanding.
One of the difficulties is that - as far as I can tell - we have different understandings of morality. The "moral" that you reject is not exactly the "moral" that I affirm.
Your notion of morality seems to equate to
Scott wrote: ↑April 24th, 2023, 12:07 pm ...what's one's own religious or superstitious beliefs about it happen to be.Which I identify with morality based on custom or on religious revelation. What I argue for is morality based on natural rights.
However, having said that, it should be possible to say something about consensuality without going too far into competing notions of morality.
You appear to be arguing that consensuality is a matter of observable fact which does not require any moral judgment (of either type).
I've put forward two separate challenges to that notion.
The first is about duress, about actions that are coerced by threat. I suggest that there are stronger threats and weaker threats - a whole spectrum from lethal violence to mere disapproval. I'm saying that logically - in order to classify actions as consensual/nonconsensual - one has to draw a line somewhere on that spectrum, a line between persuasion and coercion. Between the sort of threat that leaves you with "effectively no choice" so you do what you do not consent to do, and the sort of threat that leaves you with choices, however unpleasant.
That's a judgment. Not necessarily a moral judgment. If you are drafting a law against rape, you may choose whatever boundary you will, without logical contradiction. You might, for example, create a separate offence called something like "obtaining sexual favours by threat" and reserve "rape" for cases where one party is forced.
The second challenge is about who has to consent for an action to be deemed consensual. Whose will matters ? Again it is a judgment, with no logical necessity for any particular answer. If the law of your culture is that rape is a crime against the woman's father - that in order for the act to not be legally counted as rape her father has to consent but she doesn't - there's nothing logically wrong with that.
If we are saying that consensuality is a matter of law, then the government can pass a law saying that all lawful payments are deemed to be consensual. So the answer to the OP is that tax is consensual if the law says so.
If we're talking ethics, rather than law, then we cannot rely on the legal judgments (as to what constitutes consent and who can consent in any given situation) in any particular jurisdiction in defining consensuality. To say that marital rape, for example, is wrong (according to some particular code of ethics) because it is nonconsensual is to assign the right of consent to both of the two physical participants. And that is a nontrivial moral judgment.
(A strict utilitarian might deny both participants the right of consent, saying that both should participate if and only if this leads to a better outcome).
To give another example, one could believe it is extremely immoral for a conniving sadistic lesbian to seduce a married woman into cheating on her husband, but that doesn't make it coercive or non-consensual. It doesn't make it rape.What makes it legally rape is what the law of the land says. What makes it morally rape in your eyes is what your code of morals says.
You seem to be asserting that you can somehow judge it to be not-rape without reference to any moral or legal code. I read such an assertion as being about "natural rights". If you mean something different, are you able to spell out what it is that you mean and how it is different?
Happy to engage with your examples, one at a time, and hoping you'll get around to returning the courtesy...