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[Eckhart Aurelius Hughes]

You asked about MLK. I'd guess that he preferred to go to jail and thereby achieve his political goals rather than not achieve them. But would have preferred to achieve them without going to jail. So he didn't consent to being in a situation where those were his choices, but once in that situation consented to be jailed rather than abandon his cause.

Hi, Good_Egg,

Thank you for your reply!

If we cannot agree with Martin Luther King consented to being put in jail or not, then I think of course we won't agree on the moderately more complicated and controversial issue of taxation.

This, if you believe that Martin Luther King consented to being in jail, please instead my topic about that, and let's continue conversing with each other there.

Here is the link to that topic:

Did Martin Luther King consent to being arrested and jailed?


Thank you,
Scott

[Good_Egg]

This question has been bugging me. What do we mean by "consensual" ?

Consider two explorers in the wilderness. One would prefer to go north, the other south. But other things being equal, they'd prefer to travel together.

If both value their preferred direction more than travelling together, they will part company. Is that consensual ? I think most people would say yes. The fact that each is vetoing the other's most-preferred outcome (one wants both to travel north, one wants both to travel south) doesn't mean that the compromise they come to (splitting up) is coerced (which seems to be the opposite of consensual).

Now suppose that the more eloquent of the two so talks up the dangers of travelling alone through the swamp to the north that the other agrees to accompany him south. Is that consensual ? Maybe partly ?

If, persuasion having failed, one steals the other's gun so that the other feels he has no option but to accompany him, is that consensual ? I guess most would say no.

What I provisionally concluded from this was that if you think someone has a moral right to do something (like travelling south) then the fact that doing so closes down another person's options is not seen as coercive, and therefore the outcome is judged consensual.

If you think someone acts wrongly in closing down another person's options (stealing the gun) then that other person's resulting choice is seen as coerced.

With a grey area in between. Exaggerating the dangers of a course of action falls in between morally legitimate persuasion (which does not coerce) and deception (which does).

So if the state vetoes someone's preferred option of living in the territory without paying taxes, but allows them the choice of leaving or paying up, is that consensual ?

It makes perfect sense to me to say no. But that "no" is predicated on an assumption that the state has no moral right to such a veto.

So the way that Scott wants to set up the question - as a matter of fact without discussing morality at all - is flawed. Common usage of the term "consensual" presupposes that some ways of restricting another person's choice set are morally legitimate and some are not.

"Non-consensual" does not mean that one party had no choice. It means that one party's choices have been wrongly constrained. Without that moral context the term is meaningless.

[Eckhart Aurelius Hughes]

What I provisionally concluded from this was that if you think someone has a moral right to do something (like travelling south) then the fact that doing so closes down another person's options is not seen as coercive, and therefore the outcome is judged consensual.

If you think someone acts wrongly in closing down another person's options (stealing the gun) then that other person's resulting choice is seen as coerced.

No, that is absolutely not at all what I mean by the word 'coercion', nor is it even remotely close to how I've ever heard any other English-speaker use the word to date.

For example, whether an act of sex between two homosexual men is consensual or non-consensual (i.e. rape) has nothing to do with whether it is "morally good" or "morally wrong" or such, or otherwise what's one's own religious or superstitious beliefs about it happen to be.

To give another example, one could believe it is extremely immoral for a conniving sadistic lesbian to seduce a married woman into cheating on her husband, but that doesn't make it coercive or non-consensual. It doesn't make it rape. The difference between coercion versus persuasion, and likewise the difference between consensual versus non-consensual, has absolutely nothing at all to do with whether the alleged violent force used and/or the alleged threats of violence used is "immoral".

[Good_Egg]

If a man offers a woman money for sex, and she agrees, is that consensual ? Yes ?

If she needs the money, is it still consensual ?

(Not sure how you'd define "need". Maybe if she's in debt and will lose her home without it ?)

Suppose the debt is to him. The money is rightfully his, but he offers to cancel the debt if she'll have sex with him. Is that coercion ? If she says no she's no worse off than if he hadn't made the offer.

Conversely, suppose he threatens to steal the money - to take what is not rightfully his - unless she has sex with him. Is that coercion? Seems like it to me.

So where's the boundary ? I'm suggesting that the essence of coercion is a threat to make someone worse off if they don't do what you want.

And the law recognises that being coerced diminishes one's responsibility for the act.

But "worse off" requires a baseline for comparison. The natural baseline is the situation where nobody does anything wrong.

So a judgment about whether an act is consensual or coerced is a judgment about whether the trade - agreement to the act in exchange for something - is for a "something" that involves a threat of wrongdoing.

You see the logic. If you don't agree, where would you draw the line ? When does an offer of something for sex become coercive ?

But "wrongdoing" here has nothing to do with religion, with morality based in religious revelation.

[Sculptor1]

If a man offers a woman money for sex, and she agrees, is that consensual ? Yes ?

If she needs the money, is it still consensual ?

(Not sure how you'd define "need". Maybe if she's in debt and will lose her home without it ?)

Suppose the debt is to him. The money is rightfully his, but he offers to cancel the debt if she'll have sex with him. Is that coercion ? If she says no she's no worse off than if he hadn't made the offer.

Conversely, suppose he threatens to steal the money - to take what is not rightfully his - unless she has sex with him. Is that coercion? Seems like it to me.

So where's the boundary ? I'm suggesting that the essence of coercion is a threat to make someone worse off if they don't do what you want.

And the law recognises that being coerced diminishes one's responsibility for the act.

But "worse off" requires a baseline for comparison. The natural baseline is the situation where nobody does anything wrong.

So a judgment about whether an act is consensual or coerced is a judgment about whether the trade - agreement to the act in exchange for something - is for a "something" that involves a threat of wrongdoing.

You see the logic. If you don't agree, where would you draw the line ? When does an offer of something for sex become coercive ?

But "wrongdoing" here has nothing to do with religion, with morality based in religious revelation.

We are all prostitutes

[Eckhart Aurelius Hughes]

If a man offers a woman money for sex, and she agrees, is that consensual ? Yes ?

Generally speaking, yes. That is, assuming no threat of non-defensive violence was made, and the two participants are informed adults of relatively sound mind; or, in short, in other words, assuming there is no extenuating circumstances.

If she needs the money, is it still consensual ?

(Not sure how you'd define "need". Maybe if she's in debt and will lose her home without it ?)

Generally speaking, yes, I think it is consensual. That is, assuming no threat of non-defensive violence was made, and the two participants are informed adults of relatively sound mind; or, in short, in other words, assuming there is no extenuating circumstances.

I need food, and when I buy farming services or food from a farmer, I am typically doing so consensually.

Suppose the debt is to him. The money is rightfully his, but he offers to cancel the debt if she'll have sex with him. Is that coercion ?

No, it is no coercion. Just as with the previous examples, it is seemingly consensual assuming there are no unmentioned extenuating circumstances (namely a threat of non-defensive violence).

In other words, I would say canceling debt in lieu of more typical payment is consensual just the same as more traditionally paying for the food/sex/services/etc. is.

Conversely, suppose he threatens to steal the money - to take what is not rightfully his - unless she [does X]. Is that coercion? Seems like it to me.

Yes, of course.

Moreover, if he doesn't threaten to steal the money but just does steal it, then the transaction is still non-consensual, hence the word 'steal'.

I'm suggesting that the essence of coercion is a threat to make someone worse off if they don't do what you want.

Depending on what you mean by "make someone worse off", that might not be completely wrong, but most interpretations of the phrase "make someone worse off" would make the above statement incorrect.

The rapist might genuinely believe his would-be victim is better off with his sex, and the rapist might might genuinely believe the victim would be worse off if the rapist doesn't rape the victim, and he can genuinely believe that there is nothing morally wrong about him raping his victim, and he can even believe his raping of the victim is morally justified and morally good, but even despite believing all that he can still easily understand that as a matter of amoral fact the rape is simply and utterly not consensual.

The natural baseline is the situation where nobody does anything wrong.

No, it isn't.

That fact is easily and clearly demonstrated by the examples given in my previous post (among countless others):

For example, whether an act of sex between two homosexual men is consensual or non-consensual (i.e. rape) has nothing to do with whether it is "morally good" or "morally wrong" or such, or otherwise what's one's own religious or superstitious beliefs about it happen to be.

To give another example, one could believe it is extremely immoral for a conniving sadistic lesbian to seduce a married woman into cheating on her husband, but that doesn't make it coercive or non-consensual. It doesn't make it rape. The difference between coercion versus persuasion, and likewise the difference between consensual versus non-consensual, has absolutely nothing at all to do with whether the alleged violent force used and/or the alleged threats of violence used is "immoral".

Thank you,
Scott

[Good_Egg]

Maybe it would be helpful to make explicit that there are two types of non-consensual act. The type where the victim has no choice at all, and the type where the victim goes along with it because they have been threatened with worse.

If the police come and arrest you, you don't get any choice. If you're kidnapped by force, you don't get a choice. If a rapist overpowers you, ties you up and rapes you, you don't get a choice.

I was taking it as read that taxation doesn't resemble that sort of non-consensual; but rather the sort where you're threatened with worse if you don't do what they want (in this case, pay up)..

So we're talking about coercion as being the use of threats to get what you want.

It makes no difference what the rapist believes is moral or what the rapist would count as being better or worse off. If he's using threat-coercion as his method of getting his way then the outcome is non-consensual

But what makes it a threat is that something worse (something that the victim counts as worse) will happen to her if she doesn't do what he wants. Rather than a promise that something which she counts as better will happen if she does.

I think you've agreed that where compliance is obtained by a promise (e.g. of debt forgiveness) rather than a threat then that's consensual.

What's the difference between a threat to do something and a promise not to ?

(Bearing in mind that by twisting words one can be made to sound very like the other).

There has to be a difference, because otherwise the same thing could rightly be described as one or the other, and the distinction between consensual and non-consensual collapses into a matter of subjective opinion. I don't think either of us believes that.

I'm suggesting that if I offer to stay my hand from anything I have a moral right to do, that's a promise. But if I say I'll do what I have no moral right to do unless... then that's a threat.

I can offer you the same choice - do what I want and I'll do X, decline and I'll do not-X. And whether that's a threat which coercively secures your co-operation or a promise which consensually secures your co-operation depends on whether I have the moral right to do X.

[Eckhart Aurelius Hughes]

So we're talking about coercion as being the use of threats to get what you want.

Roughly speaking, I would tend to tentatively agree, but technically I'd say it's not exactly true, namely because the phrase "the use of threats" is too vague.

For it to truly be non-consensual (i.e. coercive), the threatened consequence of not giving the threatener what they want has to itself be non-consensual, which typically also means it has to be a threat of violence or force (e.g. "do this or I'll shoot you in the head").

In contrast, if Mary Fakelady says to Jon Pretendguy, "have sex with me or I will go home and eat a whole pint of ice cream because I'll be sad", and then Jon agrees to have sex with Mary because he doesn't want her to be sad and go eat ice cream, the sex is still presumably consensual and is not rape. Mary didn't rape Jon by 'threatening' to go home and eat ice cream.

Thus, I suggest using the phrase 'violent threat', as in a "threat of violence", rather than merely the vaguer single word 'threat'.

To be even clearer, I'd suggest re-phrasing your whole statement as follows:

"So we're talking about coercion as being getting someone to do what you want by threatening to commit non-defensive non-consensual violence against them if they refuse."

Assuming that's what you meant, and my additions just add clarity and/or redundancy, then I agree.

I think you've agreed that where compliance is obtained by a promise (e.g. of debt forgiveness) rather than a threat then that's consensual.

Have I? I suppose that depends on how you define "promise" and how you define "threat".

Roughly speaking, the two words could be seen as synonyms.

To obtain more philosophical rigor, I find it helps to be intentionally redundant.

I can offer you the same choice - do what I want and I'll do X, decline and I'll do not-X. And whether that's a threat which coercively secures your co-operation or a promise which consensually secures your co-operation depends on whether I have the moral right to do X.

I absolutely disagree.

I firmly believe it has absolutely nothing to do with morality or a "moral right" whatever that means.

Jus primae noctis is still not consensual no matter how much of a "moral right" the rapist has to do the rape.

Likewise, one might not have a "moral right" to cheat on their romantic partner by having an affair, but that doesn't mean having an affair is rape, nor would rudely and meanly and selfishly saying "have sex with me, or I'll go have an affair with a consenting partner" be rape. Many would think it is "immoral", whatever that means, but it wouldn't be rape and all the sex involved would be consensual, be it with the partner who got threatened with an affair or the affair itself.

Moreover, this fact that consent has absolutely nothing to do with morality or "moral rights" or such is sufficiently demonstrated by the examples I gave repeatedly in previous posts:

For example, whether an act of sex between two homosexual men is consensual or non-consensual (i.e. rape) has nothing to do with whether it is "morally good" or "morally wrong" or such, or otherwise what's one's own religious or superstitious beliefs about it happen to be.

To give another example, one could believe it is extremely immoral for a conniving sadistic lesbian to seduce a married woman into cheating on her husband, but that doesn't make it coercive or non-consensual. It doesn't make it rape. The difference between coercion versus persuasion, and likewise the difference between consensual versus non-consensual, has absolutely nothing at all to do with whether the alleged violent force used and/or the alleged threats of violence used is "immoral".

[Good_Egg]

So we're talking about coercion as being the use of threats to get what you want.

Roughly speaking, I would tend to tentatively agree, but technically I'd say it's not exactly true, namely because the phrase "the use of threats" is too vague.

For it to truly be non-consensual (i.e. coercive), the threatened consequence of not giving the threatener what they want has to itself be non-consensual, which typically also means it has to be a threat of violence or force (e.g. "do this or I'll shoot you in the head").

I agree that the clearest examples of coercion involve a threat of violence or force.

I'm deliberately not focussing on those central examples; I'm focussing on the boundary. Those cases where a small change to the situation would be enough to flip it from an act we can agree is consensual to an act we can agree is non-consensual, I.e. coerced by threat.

Clearly the set of acts of coercion by threat of violence is a subset of the set of all acts of coercion by threat.

(I'm responding to your comment about rigour by resorting to mathematical language).

But I assert the obvious fact that the set of acts of coercion by threat of non-forceful non-violent acts is non-empty.

In contrast, if Mary Fakelady says to Jon Pretendguy, "have sex with me or I will go home and eat a whole pint of ice cream because I'll be sad", and then Jon agrees to have sex with Mary because he doesn't want her to be sad and go eat ice cream, the sex is still presumably consensual and is not rape.

Agreed. What I'm arguing is that what makes it consensual is that she has the moral right to do what she threatens.

I could be wrong. To show me I'm wrong you'd need to minimally tweak the example so that we agree that it is non-consensual. With a tweak that has nothing to do with moral rights but makes it obvious that the determining factor is something else.

I think you're arguing that whether an act (that is undertaken under pressure of consequences rather than for it's own sake) is consensual or not is a matter of determinable fact.

If you say it is not determinable, then your answer to the question "is taxation consensual" would have to be Don't Know.

No more time this morning - I want to get back to you later on your other points.

[Eckhart Aurelius Hughes]

Hi, Good_Egg,

Thank you for your reply.

Clearly the set of acts of coercion by threat of violence is a subset of the set of all acts of coercion by threat.

I'm not sure if that's true. It could be analogous to saying the set of all blue triangles is clearly a subset of the set of all 3-sided 2D shapes that are colored blue. Maybe; maybe not; but it's far from clear, at least per se as written, if not due simply to the equivocality of language.

But I assert the obvious fact that the set of acts of coercion by threat of non-forceful non-violent acts is non-empty.

I am very doubtful of the truth of your assertion.

In contrast, if Mary Fakelady says to Jon Pretendguy, "have sex with me or I will [cheat on you by having an affair]", and then Jon agrees to have sex with Mary because he doesn't want her to [have an affair], the sex is still presumably consensual and is not rape.

What I'm arguing is that what makes it consensual [or not] is that she has the moral right [or not] to do what she threatens.

And I completely and utterly disagree with you about that. I think someone who believes that Mary does NOT have a "moral right" to cheat on her husband by having an affair would still agree that the sex is consensual, even if her husband is only having sex with her because she threatened to cheat on him if he didn't. I firmly believe that whether or not Mary has a "moral right" to cheat on her husband has absolutely nothing to do with whether the threat is coercive in terms of consent and thus whether the sex is consensual or rape. Likewise, in my anecdotal experience, I have never heard anyone else ever besides you use the words 'consent' and 'coercion' in that way, such that Mary would be raping her husband by persuading him to have sex with her simply by threatening to do peaceful but "immoral" acts if he doesn't have sex with her.

I think you're arguing that whether an act (that is undertaken under pressure of consequences rather than for it's own sake) is consensual or not is a matter of determinable fact.

Politely, I have no idea what you mean by "under pressure of consequences rather than for it's own sake".

Having an orgasm is a consequence. Not having one, or at least being limited to resorting to having one alone, is a consequence. It's rare if not impossible and non-existent for a human to choose to do anything without any regard for the consequences of their choice.

While those who read my book would know my thoughts spiritually speaking on free-spirited creativity (e.g. possibly choosing to do something solely for its own sake without any regard to the consequences of the action including such as how much or if it all one is being paid to do it), but I don't at all see the relevance to this simple discussion about consent and coercion, such as in philosophically determining which acts are consensual sex versus non-consensual sex (i.e. rape). Sex doesn't need to be whyless to be consensual, and indeed insofar as any humans can choose to do anything truly whylessly, that is most definitely the extreme exception, not the rule, with those whyness-related ideas elaborated greatly in my book.


Thank you,
Scott

[LuckyR]

So we're talking about coercion as being the use of threats to get what you want.

Roughly speaking, I would tend to tentatively agree, but technically I'd say it's not exactly true, namely because the phrase "the use of threats" is too vague.

For it to truly be non-consensual (i.e. coercive), the threatened consequence of not giving the threatener what they want has to itself be non-consensual, which typically also means it has to be a threat of violence or force (e.g. "do this or I'll shoot you in the head").

I agree that the clearest examples of coercion involve a threat of violence or force.

I'm deliberately not focussing on those central examples; I'm focussing on the boundary. Those cases where a small change to the situation would be enough to flip it from an act we can agree is consensual to an act we can agree is non-consensual, I.e. coerced by threat.

Clearly the set of acts of coercion by threat of violence is a subset of the set of all acts of coercion by threat.

(I'm responding to your comment about rigour by resorting to mathematical language).

But I assert the obvious fact that the set of acts of coercion by threat of non-forceful non-violent acts is non-empty.

In contrast, if Mary Fakelady says to Jon Pretendguy, "have sex with me or I will go home and eat a whole pint of ice cream because I'll be sad", and then Jon agrees to have sex with Mary because he doesn't want her to be sad and go eat ice cream, the sex is still presumably consensual and is not rape.

Agreed. What I'm arguing is that what makes it consensual is that she has the moral right to do what she threatens.

I could be wrong. To show me I'm wrong you'd need to minimally tweak the example so that we agree that it is non-consensual. With a tweak that has nothing to do with moral rights but makes it obvious that the determining factor is something else.

I think you're arguing that whether an act (that is undertaken under pressure of consequences rather than for it's own sake) is consensual or not is a matter of determinable fact.

If you say it is not determinable, then your answer to the question "is taxation consensual" would have to be Don't Know.

No more time this morning - I want to get back to you later on your other points.

Part of the problem with using the Mary/Jon relationship as an analogy is trying to force a binary description on the nuances of their decision making. To divide their options into "consensual" and "rape" is too simple. Especially as one is primarily a legal term and the other does not have a universally accepted fine definition.

Real People in Real Life take the possibility of negative consequences of their actions into account in decision making routinely. The reality that almost every choice in every decision has the possibility of a negative (perhaps violent) consequence, does not magically change every interaction into most people's understanding of the meaning of the word "non consensual". I guess others disagree, though that is expected.

Or to put it another way, whether taxation is or is not consensual does not lie primarily on whether or not the government can jail tax dodgers (a negative consequence).

[Eckhart Aurelius Hughes]

To divide their options into "consensual" and "rape" is too simple.

For me, as I use the terms, it is definitely not too simple. Quite the opposite, actually. I simply define the word 'rape' as "non-consensual sex". Thus, as I use the terms, there is such thing as a legal rape (including legal martial rape in most of USA history for instance). As I use the terms, whether or not an act of sex is rape (i.e. consensual or not) has absolutely nothing to do with whether it happens to be legal or not in one of the jurisdictions in which happens to occur.

However, if you define the word rape differently, then please do swap out the word "rape" in any of my posts with the phrase "[non-consensual sex]" so that you will understand my meaning. Likewise, when talking with you specifically in the future, I will do my best to use the phrase "non-consensual sex" and avoid the word rape all-together since you seem to use it to mean something very differently than I do, such that perhaps to you in the very different way you may use the words the phrase "legal martial rape" would be an oxymoronic contradiction.

As to the topic at hand, since you have said that you believe Martin Luther King consented to being jailed, I ask you to instead post in my topic about that since if we cannot agree whether that was consensual we certainly won't be able to agree on taxation:

Did Martin Luther King consent to being arrested and jailed?


Thank you,
Scott

[Good_Egg]

But I assert the obvious fact that the set of acts of coercion by threat of non-forceful non-violent acts is non-empty.

I am very doubtful of the truth of your assertion.

Really ? You think people can be coerced into doing what they don't want to do by threats of violence, but not by any other sort of threat ?

Is it that you can't imagine a woman being pressured into sexual acts by threatening to fire her from her job ? Or by threatening to evict her from her home ? Or evict her parents from their home ? Or by threatening to tell some dark secret that she wants to keep hidden ?

Or is it that you think that resisting non-violent threats is somehow a choice whereas resisting threats of violence isn't ?

Politely, I have no idea what you mean by "under pressure of consequences rather than for it's own sake".

Sorry if I was unclear. I'm exploring the notion of coercion, of acting under duress.

You might say that people do things (have sex, pay taxes, whatever) either because they choose to ("for its own sake" or for the natural consequences) or because someone else incentivizes them by imposing additional consequences if they do or don't.

In common usage, we might call it a threat if the additional consequences of doing what the someone else doesn't want are negative, and a promise if the additional consequences of doing what they do want are positive.

And the two issues I'm worrying at are
A) when does that incentive make the chosen action non-consensual ?
B) what's the baseline ? What are we assuming happens if the someone else doesn't link what they do to what you do in this way ?

[Eckhart Aurelius Hughes]

But I assert the obvious fact that the set of acts of coercion by threat of non-forceful non-violent acts is non-empty.

I am very doubtful of the truth of your assertion.

Really ? You think people can be coerced into doing what they don't want to do by threats of violence, but not by any other sort of threat ?

I don't need to think X to be very doubtful of -X.

If I did confidently believe X, I wouldn't express that by merely saying that I am very doubtful of -X.

However, mostly, my bets one way or the other would depend greatly on how exactly one defines 'violence', as exemplified by the question of whether vandalizing someone's non-bodily property without their consent is violence.

A fictional example would be at the end of the book and film Fight Club when the cult-like group blows up empty buildings with bombs as a form of attack on the credit card companies that own the buildings.

Insofar as that is 'violence', then I would lean much more towards believing X is true, where X is the claim that coercion is defined in part by violence or the threat thereof.

Is it that you can't imagine a woman being pressured into sexual acts by threatening to fire her from her job?

Of course, I can imagine that.

It's especially imaginable if the would-be fired person's job is as porn star or prostitute. They would especially tend to get fired if they refuse to do sex at their boss's instruction.

Politely, I have no idea what you mean by "under pressure of consequences rather than for it's own sake".

Sorry if I was unclear. I'm exploring the notion of coercion, of acting under duress.

You might say that people do things (have sex, pay taxes, whatever) either because they choose to ("for its own sake" or for the natural consequences) or because someone else incentivizes them...

I am not sure what you mean exactly when you say that I "might say that", but regardless I can definitely assure you I would not say that.

To me, saying such a thing would be to present a blatant a false dichotomy.

I might incentivize someone to come mow my lawn for me by offering to pay them $100 to do it. They might choose to mow my lawn or not.

For those who don't believe in what book calls free-spirited creativity, there presumably are no exceptions: To them, presumably, all choices are incentivized and de-incentivized ; in other words, they would say, all decisions have many pros and cons, which influence chooser, and all choices have reasons.

Those who read my book might small out a small exception for what my book calls free-spirited creativity.

But certainly a decision wouldn't need to be act of supernatural or seeming/near supernatural free-spiritedness to be consensual.

If you would like to chat about subjects such as free-spirited creativity, consciousnesses (a.k.a. spirits), conscious will, and so-called 'metaphysical free will', I would be happy to do after you read my book, In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All, as I explain my thoughts about those things in clear agreeable detail in that book better and quicker than I could ever do on these forums.

Otherwise, I suggest we put aside spiritual/metaphysical topics such as free-spirited creativity, consciousnesses (a.k.a. spirits), conscious will, and so-called 'metaphysical free will'. I don't think we need to talk about or agree about anything related to those very spiritual and very metaphysical topics to discuss and agree about the nature of consent, which is (I think) a much more basic, narrower, simple, and agreeable topic.

In common usage, we might call it a threat if the additional consequences of doing what the someone else doesn't want are negative, and a promise if the additional consequences of doing what they do want are positive.

That's not my anecdotal experience of common usage. This is because it wouldn't be uncommon for a father to say to boy who is dating his daughter, "If you hurt her, I'll kill you," and the boy says, "is that threat?", and the dad says, "No, it's a promise."

Philosophically, I would typically assume that 'threat' and 'promise' are roughly if note entirely synonyms and are roughly if not entirely interchangeable. Insofar as there is a difference at all even a slight one, I'd typically assume it's just that a promise is a threat that's less likely to be a bluff or a lie or an over-exaggeration, whereas a mere threat is more likely to be a bluff or over-exaggeration such.

A) when does that incentive make the chosen action non-consensual ?

A threat or conditional promise can make the action it incentivizes non-consensual if the thing that is threatened or conditionally promised to be done would itself non-consensual.

For instance, since rape is non-consensual, if Bob threatens to rape Greg unless Greg does X, then Greg's choice to do X would be non-consensual.

In contrast, if Bob threatens to cheat on Greg by having a gay affair with Alan, if and only if Greg doesn't have gay sex with Bob, and thus Greg gives into the threat and has sex with Bob so Bob won't have the gay affair, then that would be consensual sex.

B) what's the baseline ? What are we assuming happens if the someone else doesn't link what they do to what you do in this way ?

I don't understand this question.

I do think the possibly the best heuristic test to see if something is consensual is simply to ask, "What will happen if I (or the threatened person) refuse?"

If that 'what will happen' entails non-defensive violence (e.g. murder, rape, etc.), then it is likely non-consensual.

If all the threats/promises/consequences/incentives are non-violent (including in the sense of not entailing so-called violence against other's people so-called property, such as so-called vandalism), then likely it is consensual.

To drastically oversimplify to the point of at least borderline absurdity for the sake of mutual understanding of the theoretical ideas, if everyone followed the amoral creed expressed in my short pinned tweet (which will never come close to happening), then there would in theory be absolutely no intentional non-consensual interactions between humans anymore, at least not between adult humans who are capable of consent.


Thank you,
Scott

[Good_Egg]

it wouldn't be uncommon for a father to say to boy who is dating his daughter, "If you hurt her, I'll kill you," and the boy says, "is that threat?", and the dad says, "No, it's a promise."

That seems a valid usage - using "promise" to convey certainty rather than to convey a positive consequence.

Doesn't change the argument , only means that I have to express it in different words. And more and longer words, if there's no snappy label for a conditional positive consequence...

B) what's the baseline ? What are we assuming happens if the someone else doesn't link what they do to what you do in this way ?

I don't understand this question.

I'm suggesting that what we're talking about can be expressed as Alfie seeking to ensure that Bruno does what Alfie wants, by making Alfie's actions conditional on what Bruno does.

E.g if their gang is electing a leader and Alfie wants Bruno's vote, Alfie might threaten to beat Bruno up if Bruno doesn't vote for him. That's a negative consequence for Bruno, that Alfie is attaching to the possible outcome of Bruno's choice which Alfie wants to dissuade him from. And I think we'd agree that that constitutes coercion, and that if this persuasion works then Bruno's vote for Alfie is non-consensual.

Alfie might take a different approach. If he promises Bruno a packet of drugs if Bruno votes for him, that's a positive consequence (in Bruno's value-system) that Alfie is attaching to a possible outcome of Bruno's choice which Alfie wants to persuade him to. And I think we'd agree that this is not coercion, and that if this persuasion works then Bruno's vote for Alfie is consensual.

So far, so good. But the problem I'm pointing out is that all this assumes that consequences are measured relative to a do-nothing baseline in which Alfie does not beat Bruno up and does not give him any drugs.

What happens if we change that baseline ?

If the baseline is that Alfie gives Bruno drugs every day, then Alfie's second condition (that he'll only give Bruno drugs if Bruno votes for him) becomes a negative consequence for Bruno attached to the outcome that Alfie doesn't want. A threat of stopping his drug supply.
Hence coercive, hence Bruno's vote is nonconsensual.

And similarly, if the baseline is that Alfie beats Bruno up every day, then Alfie's first condition (that he'll only beat Bruno up if Bruno doesn't vote for him) becomes a positive consequence for Bruno (a promise if letting him off) attached to the outcome that Alfie wants, hence non-coercive.

So either we say that whether someone is coerced or not, and hence whether an act is consensual or not, is subjective, depending on what you choose to take as your baseline.

Or else specifying a baseline becomes a necessary part of the definition of what we mean by coercion.

And that's the issue I'm raising.

You seem to be suggesting firstly that the second condition (about drugs) isn't coercive either way round because it doesn't involve violence. That seems to me obviously mistaken.

And secondly that an act under threat of negative consequences is always non-consensual, because the person threatened doesn't consent to the negative consequences. Which affirms the negative/positive distinction without addressing the baseline issue.

I say "seem" - it's entirely possible that I've misunderstood where you're coming from.

My tentative proposed solution to the issue is to specify a baseline, in terms of a theory of natural rights (aka moral rights).

Which has nothing to do with a religious type of moralizing, which might judge taking drugs to be inherently bad.